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**AUTHORITARIANISM IN EGYPT AND SOUTH KOREA:
PRAETORIAN REGIMES OF GAMAL ABDUL NASSER
AND CHUNG HEE PARK**

BY

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SUPERVISED BY

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**A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

**INSTITUTE FOR MIDDLE EASTERN & ISLAMIC STUDIES
THE FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES & HEALTH
UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM**

2003



21 MAY 2003

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ABSTRACT

Authoritarianism has been the main political feature of Third World countries. Particularly, military authoritarianism – praetorian regimes – prevailed in newly independent countries. With the demise of colonialism in the aftermath of both World Wars, many overdeveloped military sectors in newly independent countries came to the forefront of power by means of military coups. This research focuses on two of the most salient examples of military authoritarian regimes in 1950s and 1960s – Nasser’s Egypt and Park’s Korea.

This thesis compares between Nasser’s and Park’s leaderships and both regimes in terms of legitimacy, leadership characteristics, ideology and concrete output of economy. In so doing, a basic framework for classifying the representative military authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and East Asia can be invented. This thesis classifies Nasser’s authoritarian regime as an ‘inclusive – extrovert’ regime founded by Nasser’s pro-populace attitude and his strong passion to gain regional hegemony. In diametrically contrast, Park’ regime is described as an ‘exclusive – introvert’ regime due to Park’s exclusive administering without encouraging people.

This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter deals with the theoretical framework and proposes the framework of comparison as a research proposition. The second chapter is a historical overview of Egypt and South Korea and in the following chapter; the legitimacy issue and leadership characteristics are explored. In chapter IV and V, both leaderships’ ideological attitude and its application into domestic policies and economic policies are dealt with in a concrete way. In the last chapter, conclusive remarks and final word are proposed. Findings of this research provide us with reevaluation of the nature of two outstanding military authoritarian leaders’ epistemologies and their performances.

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“I sought the Lord, and he heard me, and delivered from all my fears” (Psalm 34:4)

GLOSSARY

A.S.U.: Arab Socialist Union

C.F.C.: Combined Forces Command of Korean and the U.S. Army

C.P.N.C.K.: The Committee for the Preparation of the National Construction of Korea

Chabol: Special term of Korean conglomerates

D.M.Z.: De-Militarised Zone

D.P.: The Korean Democratic Party

D.P.R.K.: Democratic People's Republic of Korea; North Korea

D.R.P.: The Korean Democratic Republican Party

E.D.F.Y.P.: Economic Development Five-Year Programme

E.N.P.: The Egyptian National Party

E.P.B.: Economic Planning Board in Korean Government

G.A.T.T.: The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

G.T.C.s: General Trading Companies

H.C.I.: Heavy & Chemical Industry

I.B.R.D.: International Bank for Reconstruction & Development

I.M.F.: International Monetary Fund

I.S.I.: Import Substitution Industry

Infitah: Open-door policy of President Anwar Sadat

K.C.I.A.: The Korean Central Intelligence Agency

K.P.G.: Korean Provisional Government

K.T.A.: Korean Trade Association

KOTRA: Korean Trade Promotion Corporation

L.D.C.s: Less Developed Countries

L.P.: The Korean Liberation Party

L.R.: The Egyptian Liberation Rally

M.N.C.: Multi National Company

M.O.S.T.: Ministry of Science and Technology

N.C.U.: National Conference for Unification

N.I.C.s: Newly Industrialised Countries

N.I.F.: National Investment Fund

N.U.: The Egyptian National Union
O.N.T.A.: Office of National Tax Administration
P.R.P.: The People's Revolutionary Party in Korea
R.C.C.: Revolutionary Command Council
S.K.L.P.: South Korean Labour Party
U.A.R.: United Arab Republic
U.K.: United Kingdom
U.N.: United Nations
U.S.: United States
U.S.A.I.D.: The United States Agency for International Development
U.S.A.M.G.I.K.: The United States Army Military Government in Korea
U.S.S.R.: Union of Soviet Socialist Republic; the former Soviet Union
Yushin: Special system of reform for national revitalisation of Park's administration

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION OF KOREAN NAMES

In this dissertation, a western-style appellation for Korean names is used.

Ex) Chung Hee Park and Il Sung Kim (instead of Park Chung Hee and Kim Il Sung)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Objectives of this Research

With regard to taxonomy, this dissertation may be classified as a case study in comparative politics. As the term suggests, the basic methodology of comparative politics is to compare one polity with other political entities. The primary purpose of comparative politics is to widen and deepen the knowledge of certain political situations and to broaden the scope of paradigms of political analysis by comparing more than two polities in terms of political attributes such as political institutions, laws, political culture, performance of the regime, and leadership.

One of the most popular subjects of comparative politics is the comparison of the hardware of political systems, such as their institutions and organisations. Comparative research into the various political institutions and organisations of certain regimes is an effective tool in understanding the peculiarities of different types of politics. In addition, the software of politics, such as political culture and the process of political socialisation, should also be considered to be an important subject for study.

When it comes to theorisation of politics, one of the most beneficial outcomes of comparative research is the building of an epistemological bridge between the peculiarities of specific cases and theoretical generalisation.¹ In addition to this, comparative research can construct guidelines to keep the facts within the relevant theoretical range, and it contributes to the verification and articulation of theory by examining the concrete cases in detail.

As a matter of fact, the primary purpose of comparative research is to develop a 'middle-range theory', rather than to create a grand theory which comprehends the whole range of political phenomena. This attribute of comparative research does not seek and examine the general causality of every single political phenomenon in certain areas, but focuses on specific comparable cases with the relevant comparative criteria, and traces trends of similarities or

¹ Paul Diesing, *Patterns of Discovery in the Social Sciences* (Chicago: Atherton, 1971) p.184.

differences in order to find some consistent phenomena.

Thus the comparative study of two authoritarian regimes, with which this dissertation is concerned, is not intended to establish a general theory, but rather to examine the differences between the two regimes, and to set up relevant models, in order to make a contribution towards related areas of research in comparative politics.

A considerable amount of research has already been done on the role of military regimes in the newly emerging countries of the 1950s, when Nasser took power, and the 1960s, when Park came to the forefront of Korean politics.² This dissertation adds to the existing corpus of knowledge, by making a comparison between Nasser's military regime in Egypt from 1952 to 1971 and Park's regime in Korea from 1961 to 1979.

In the aftermath of World War II, as existing colonial orders in international politics collapsed, newly independent countries emerged in many parts of the world. These newly emerging countries faced serious difficulties in controlling their frequent political upheavals, since they did not have any internalised democratic experiences, which have usually been gained through the long and painful process of resolving such political conflicts and struggles. They transplanted political systems imported from outside without making any adjustments in line with the peculiarities of their own political situations. In these unstable political conditions, the military sectors of certain countries which had experienced colonial invasions were exclusively developed while the other sectors were not. This overdeveloped military sector tended to intervene in politics, justifying their intervention as a sacred mission to achieve stability and save the country from chaos. Free Officers in Egypt who were educated and trained by the British army, and Park and his colleagues, who were influenced and disciplined by the Japanese military system, are examples of this.

These military regimes confronted the chaotic and unpredictable political atmosphere of a typical non-institutionalised and non-modernised newly emerging country. Thus, when it comes to analysing military authoritarianism in unstable newly emerging countries, it is less common to focus on formal features, such as the institutional factors of a political entity or

² Some researchers have regarded the military regimes of the Third World as the vanguard of modernisation of the developing countries; Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernisation," in John J. Johnson, (ed.), *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). On the other hand, a negative view of the military regimes is expressed in Eric Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule upon Economic and Social Change in Non-Western States," *American Political Science Review*, Vol.64, No.4 (1970) pp.1131-1148. For a comprehensive discussion of this matter, see Olatunde Odetola, *Military Regimes and Development: a Comparative Analysis of African States* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982) Chapter 1, and Mary Kaldor, "The Military in Development," *World Development*, Vol.4, No.6. (1976) pp.459-482.

general factors of the democratic system than to look at their informal features, such as the leader's peculiar personality, or the particular sentiments of the people towards their leader. Although the military sector may have been overdeveloped, its functional role was still under the influence of a patriarchal system, due to the overall holding back of modernisation, which is related to patrimonial traditions.

With regard to the military regimes of Egypt and Korea, strongly personalised leaderships dominated the entire society, particularly the military sectors. Nasser's and Park's regimes could both be described as being highly personalised, and hence it is important to concentrate on, and to look closely into the leadership characteristics and the performance of the two Presidents.

There are a number of reasons why the regimes of Nasser and Park were chosen as the subjects for this comparison.

First of all, Nasser and Park's regimes were both extremely long-term examples of military government, which took power by means of a military coup in the 20th century. Over eighteen years, they maintained their regimes and carried out their own specific policies. These cases are enormously different from the fragmentary short-term military regimes which disappeared after carrying out a few improvised policies. Nasser and Park maintained their regimes for almost two decades without facing any seriously fatal challenges to their power, and hence it is possible to follow regime developments and changes in policy, and to determine the characteristics of their forms of leadership.

Secondly, the Nasser and Park's regimes may be considered to be the representative military governments of the Middle East and East Asia. Overall, Nasser's Egypt and Park's Korea are the most remarkable cases when it comes to doing research into military interventions in Third World countries for academic purposes. Indeed, Nasser could be described as a prominent figurehead in the Middle East, and the most influential figure in the Middle East and North Africa at that time. His ideology and performance have been the popular subjects of research.

Park's regime, however, has not yet been thoroughly researched in worldwide level of academic arena, and it is therefore particularly worthwhile to examine the regime's makeup. In the region of East Asia, which is famous for its dramatic economic growth, Park's regime was the only regime which took power by means of a military coup. His regime achieved dramatic development in a short space of time.

The third reason for choosing these two regimes is that there are similarities between them. Nasser and Park enjoyed absolute power for about the same length of time, albeit with a

ten year gap between the appearances of each regime.³ In terms of historical background and career backdrops, Nasser and Park show remarkable similarities. They had both been through the colonial experience as adolescents, witnessed the hardships of their own countries, had a vocational background as high-ranking military officers, and had both come from lower-middle class social groups. Most of all, the processes of planning and executing their respective military coups, and taking the seat of the presidency were extremely similar.

Lastly, despite the many similarities between Nasser and Park's regimes, as mentioned above, the outcomes of ideologies and policies that the regimes performed were remarkably different. Nasser's main ideology could be described as 'Arab Nationalism and Arab Socialism', which came to be the form of Arab unity movements and economic drives in accordance with state capitalism. Whereas Park's ideologies were 'Economic Nationalism and Anti-Communism', and focused exclusively on economic development by means of the repressive drive of a strict anti-communist sentiment. Details of these remarkable differences are dealt with in Chapters IV, and V.

This dissertation thus attempts to compare the leadership, ideology and performance of the two regimes. In order to do this, the key factor to consider as an independent variable for differentiating the two regimes is the matter of 'personal legitimacy'.

Generally speaking, politically developed states have their own institutionalised political system which has been established by a long process of trial and error in order to find the most appropriate system of politics. In most cases, the adopted systems are ostensibly democracy. Being outside the institutionalised democratic system, military regimes assuming the reins of government by means of a military coup have always been troubled by a lack of legitimacy, since any leadership established in this violent manner has obviously not gone through the process of consensus and agreement in selecting a leader. In the unstable political situation resulting from such a lack of legitimacy, it is obvious that achieving legitimacy is essential for the establishment of a stable government.

Therefore, this dissertation assumes that there must be correlations between legitimacy and regime performance, such as ideology formation, and the policy-making process. In this context, the main purpose of this study is to compare Park's regime, which began with a serious lack of historical and personal legitimacy, with Nasser's regime, which had no serious problems of personal and historical legitimacy. In so doing, this dissertation attempts to highlight certain variations between each regime's ideology formation and detailed outcomes of policy-making.

When it comes to comparative research, it is obvious that a consideration of all the

³ Nasser's term in power was 18 years 2 months and 5 days (from 23rd of July 1952 to 28th of September 1970).

potential factors in the 'cause–result relation' would be the best method of achieving a reliable result. Practically, however, it is impossible to consider every single variable in this way. In this context, it is essential to control the variables in order to determine the most relevant factor. First of all, the environment of international politics, which was dominated by the Cold War system, acts as an important independent variable. In addition, both leaders' personal inclinations and characteristics, and the cultural background of both countries are notable variables.

However, as will be shown in the following chapter, it was the nature of Nasser's and Park's personal legitimacy that was the most influential factor in shaping their leadership characteristics. These differences in terms of leadership characteristics meant the two regimes' attitudes towards international and domestic affairs were in striking contrast to each other. In this dissertation, the personal legitimacy of both leaders is placed as an independent variable and the outcomes of both leaderships' different character, ideology formation, and regimes' performance are considered as dependent variables.

Park's was 18 years 5 months and 10 days (from 16th of May 1961 to 26th of October 1979)

2. Theoretical Framework

In this section, theoretical basis related to Nasser's and Park's regime is proposed. After the World War II, representative feature of political leadership in the Middle East and East Asia had been non-democratic authoritarianism. In this context, Nasser's Egypt and Park's South Korea were not exceptional. Both regimes are described as an 'authoritarian military regime'. Thus, the basic exploration into the authoritarianism and its consequence would be necessary in order to carry out more relevant analysis. In addition to the basic theoretical reviews of authoritarianism, one of the concrete forms of authoritarianism – Praetorianism, which indicates authoritarian regime based on military interventions, is dealt with.

2.1. Authoritarianism as an Applicable Theory and Its Reflection in Egypt and Korea.

2.1.1. The Concept of Authority

The term 'authority' has its origins in the Latin word '*auctoritas*'. The meaning of '*auctoritas*' is the personal influence which is based on the property and various activities of the *Auctor* (creator, founder, pioneer). Nowadays, this meaning has slightly changed to 'a certain person's influence and dominance (*potestas* and *imperium*) over individuals and groups'.⁴

According to Weber's definition, the notion of authority implies the 'right to command', and the first necessity in gaining authority is legitimacy. For rulers, possession of this authority guarantees the probability of the people's obedience.⁵

The source of authority varies. Certain factors such as a specific position in an organisation, property and financial capabilities, fame and eminence, and professional knowledge can be the basis for gaining authority. In political terms, authority can be used when it indicates the influence and dominance of sovereignty, such as with the president, premier,

⁴ E.D. Watt, *Authority* (London: Croom Helm, 1982) p.11.

⁵ Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968) p.53.

monarch, and other forms of the apex of political power. Even though this sovereignty itself can guarantee authority for a while, the more important factor in maintaining sovereignty is legitimacy, which can be influenced by the process of power attainment and the performance of the regime.

Weber proposed the sources of legitimacy to be tradition, charisma (personal characteristics), and rationality. Generally, the traditional source of legitimacy is seen in the feudal system, rationality is emphasised in modern states, and during a period of political-social upheaval, charisma is the most important factor in legitimising a regime. In a chaotic society, crisis consciousness due to the instability of the central regime and feelings of ineffectualness caused by the non-institutionalisation of the political system prevail amongst the people. Those who have such a feeling of crisis require a charismatic leadership, able to break the anomic situation.

The common way of gaining legitimacy in Third World countries is by achieving a mixture of traditional authority and charisma. Particularly in a praetorian society, charismatic leadership could be the easiest way to gain legitimacy. In this context, military interventions in Third World countries occurred frequently in order to break the anomic situations of society, and these interventions brought about strictly charismatic authoritarian regimes.

2.1.2. Authoritarianism

2.1.2.1. The Authoritarian personality

In contrast to the notion and the usage of 'authority', the term 'authoritarianism' has a slightly negative image. The general definition of authoritarianism - not in a political sense - is the character and attitude of reigning over others through force. It frequently shows overconfidence and misappropriation of authority.⁶ According to Theodor Adorno, the authoritarian attitude and behaviour internalised in certain leaders originate from an authoritarian personality. This personality has a double-sided character. In the face of superior authority, the authoritarian personality would take a stance of absolute obedience, while it tends to reign mercilessly over inferior authority.⁷

Consequently, if the majority of the people in a particular society have an authoritarian

⁶ E.D. Watt, *op.cit.*, pp.20-21.

personality, which has been internalised by cultural or political inheritance, that society could be characterised as a strict hierarchical authoritarian society, which is operated by the mechanism of 'command and obedience' instead of 'compromise and negotiation'. In addition, the political system tends to have a strict authoritarian hierarchical structure, far removed from the democratic system.

In the case of Korea, aspects of the cultural background, such as the strict social strata system, caused the society to internalise this authoritarian hierarchical structure of politics as a matter of necessity for social stability and economic prosperity.

2.1.2.2. The Authoritarian Regime

1) Definition and General Characteristics of Authoritarianism

According to the definition of Juan Linz, authoritarianism may be described as a political system in which a political leader or a certain small group exercises power without any formal limits. Authoritarian rule does not allow the people to have the two basic rights of a democratic system. These rights are the right to compete for power and the right to participate in the political process as citizens. Juan Linz categorised non-democratic systems as authoritarian if they were,

Political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predicable ones.⁸

In an authoritarian regime, it is difficult to form an effective political organisation by method such as creating political parties, and existing vested parties and political groups are usually dissolved, suspended or banned from performing any political activities. The regimes vary in the degree of institutionalisation of political organisations.

Authoritarian regimes do not institutionalise a legal opposition for free political competition, but sometimes permit different forms of opposition on the premise of guaranteeing

⁷ Theodor W. Adorno, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper & Row, 1950) pp.1-11.

⁸ Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain," in Erik Allard and Stein Rokkan (eds.) *Mass Politics: Studies in Political Society* (New York: Free Press, 1970) p.255.

the security of the regime. However, some authoritarian regimes face strong opposition within the regime from those who have different goals, such as those who want to restore the extremely conservative *ancien regime*, or those who want radical democratisation.

Authoritarian regimes limit people's freedom and engage in the political repression of their opponents. Frequently, in the authoritarian military regimes of Third World countries, political offenders are charged with criminal offences against the nation's security. These political offenders are put on trial through military tribunals, which do not provide the same protection of legal rights as civil courts do, and which can impose much heavier penalties. Even when applied by civil courts, authoritarian codes of law define certain actions as criminal actions that are legal in liberal democracies, for example, political propaganda, membership in progressive parties, and participating in strikes.

Authoritarian regimes can be categorised according to a variety of factors, such as the regime's characteristics, political actors, guiding ideologies and so on. Amos Perlmutter examined the political dynamics of five authoritarian models - the Bolshevik, Nazi, Fascist, Corporatist and Praetorian models – according to the criteria of political support and mobilisation patterns.⁹

In order to be able to analyse fully Egypt and South Korea under the rules of Nasser and Park, the praetorian model¹⁰ (personal-oligarchic rulership related to military intervention in politics) is deemed to be the most appropriate one to follow.

2) The Ideological Attitudes of Authoritarianism

Amos Perlmutter specified certain ideological attitudes characteristic of most authoritarian regimes. The ideology of most modern authoritarian movements, parties, and regimes has certain characteristic ideological attitudes. Amongst them, two noticeable features

⁹ Amos Perlmutter, *Modern Authoritarianism: A Comparative Institutional Analysis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981) pp.31-44.: In addition to Perlmutter's categorisation, Linz defined the more detailed subtypes of authoritarian regimes as follows: i) bureaucratic-military regimes, ii) organic statist regimes, iii) mobilisational regimes including post-democratic and post-colonial societies, iv) personal rulership and v) post-totalitarian regimes with the criteria of the subject of rulership.

¹⁰ This model is strongly linked with the military base, which has the potential to dominate political system. The praetorian state draws its major support from the military establishment, though the military may not interfere in the administration of the state, the economy, the police, or the military party. It means that in a praetorian state the military plays a highly significant role in key political structures and institutions. Arab praetorians typically either create a military party or harness an established nationalist or radical party. In Latin America, the praetorians may tolerate a populist political party, although they retain the right to move from the barracks to the presidential palace if the party fails to comply with their demands. It is obvious that the military is the locus of power in the praetorian state, even if only a few officers are visible.

are: i) radical nationalism, and ii) anti-liberal democracy and anti-parliamentarism¹¹

When it comes to mobilising people, the first characteristic - radical nationalism - is one of the most effective and one of the easiest tools for the authoritarian regime to use. It was taken to extremes by Nazism and Fascism in the form of a malignly distorted resentment of other ethnic identities. Particularly for the military praetorians, nationalism is the most efficient instrument for controlling the people and society. The sentiments of xenophobia and radical nationalism have played a role as the fundamental platform of military regimes in the Middle East and North Africa.¹² Most military coups in the Middle East between 1936 and 1976 were carried out under the slogan of 'genuine independence from the foreign powers'.

Nasser and Park utilised this nationalist sentiment when they were designing and carrying out their respective military coups. After each coup, in the process of putting into practice domestic and foreign policy, nationalism was the deciding factor in persuading and mobilising the people to stand on the regime's side.

The second ideological tendency of authoritarianism highlighted by Perlmutter was that of anti-liberal democracy, in the sense of the avoidance of genuine democracy.¹³ The notions of liberal democracy and authoritarianism contradict one another. While liberalism suggests a concept of human enlightenment and unfettered development and self-expression, authoritarianism strictly prohibits resistance and protest against the despotic regime. It usually censors public opinion, and sometimes even fabricates facts in the interests of the regime.

In this context, the concepts of non-interference of the state and *laissez-faire* are unacceptable to authoritarian regimes. Liberal democracy has rarely gained a foothold in the Middle East and Asia, where praetorian authoritarianism has been more the order of the day.¹⁴

The parliamentary system is one of the most representative features of modern liberal democratic countries. For the authoritarian regime, this system is an unwanted instrument which would obstruct the regime's arbitrary methods of administration. Even though, ostensibly, most authoritarian regimes actually have their own party system and parliament, the major characteristic of modern authoritarianism in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa is its profound contempt for genuine parliamentarism and party-centred government, which are considered tools of colonial rule and have been denounced as corrupt, irresponsible, reactionary, and contrary to the Arab cause. This attitude is reflected in Nasser's statement:

¹¹ A. Perlmutter, *op.cit.*, pp.78-84. Originally Perlmutter enumerated five features of the ideological attitude of modern authoritarianism: radical nationalism, anti-liberalism, anti-parliamentarism, anti-bourgeois ethos, and anti-Semitism and racism.

¹² *Ibid.*, p.80.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p.81.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.82.

The dictatorship from which we have suffered under the name of democracy was the dictatorship of capital, feudalism, under the name parliament. Political democracy cannot be a reality unless there is social justice and social democracy and unless there are equal opportunity between the capitalist and the worker and between the feudalist and the agricultural labourer. One has plenty of money and can have a good dinner and one has no money to pay for dinner. Capitalists and feudalists want to hold general elections according to Western methods adopted by capitalist countries in which the minority enjoys all the influence and has an abundance of money. The political parties serve the interests of feudalists and capitalism.¹⁵

While Nasser hardly mentioned liberal democracy in his political discourse, Park took up the subject of liberal democracy frequently. However, his reference to democracy was just for show, and did not contain any genuine intention to put it into practice. Nasser did not allow the establishment of a multi-party system and managed domestic politics with dominant mono institutions such as the Liberation Rally (L.R.), the National Union (N.U.), and the Arab Socialist Union (A.S.U.). These were not actual political parties, but apparatuses for mass mobilisation and control. In contrast, the appearance of the political organisations early on in Park's regime give the impression that Korean politics were similar to those of the U.S.'s democratic system, which permits a multi-party system, and which has an electoral system which allows for direct election of the President and members of Congress. Yet, operationally, it could be defined as only a quasi-democratic system. Especially after the enactment of the Yushin constitution in 1972, the political system in Korea was reduced to an absolute dictatorship - the Fourth Republic.

2.1.3. Authoritarianism, Dictatorship and Totalitarianism

There is a variety of concepts related to authoritarianism such as dictatorship, tyranny, autocracy, totalitarianism and fascism. All these concepts are used primarily as antonyms for 'democracy' and as sub-forms of authoritarianism. Amongst these terms, dictatorship and totalitarianism are representative features of authoritarian regimes.

The etymological origin of dictatorship is '*dicere*' (speak), implying that a certain

¹⁵ *President Gamal Abdul Nasse's Speeches and Press Interviews, January-December 1961* (Government Publication, 1961) p.396. quoted in Amos Perlmutter, *Egypt: The Praetorian State* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1974), p.139.

person or group has the exclusive right to speak. The audience has to listen to whatever the supreme power says and the orders have to be strictly obeyed. In other words, the practical meaning of the term dictatorship is that one particular leader monopolises the state's power exclusively and wields this absolute power arbitrarily without any hindrance.¹⁶ The exclusive possession and arbitrary exercise of power are the principle characteristics of a dictatorship.

An outstanding example of dictatorship is the praetorian system of the ancient Roman Empire. In case of war, rebellion, economic crisis or natural calamity in the Empire, dictatorship was tolerated by the people of Rome as a legitimate political action for the security of the Empire.¹⁷ The offspring of the Roman praetorians in the modern world justified their dictatorships as necessary for the preservation of national security, and as being the only means for achieving economic development.

Another of the sub-forms of authoritarianism is totalitarianism. Totalitarianism is associated with the characteristics of the political system itself in the authoritarian regime. Many scholars have tried to distinguish the concept of totalitarianism from that of authoritarianism. According to Linz, an authoritarian regime is a totalitarian system if it has the following attributes:

i) There is a monistic but not monolithic centre of power, and whatever pluralism of institutions or groups exists derives its legitimacy from that centre, is largely mediated by it, and is mostly a political creation rather than an outgrowth of the dynamics of the pre-existing society.

ii) There is an exclusive, autonomous, and more or less intellectually elaborated ideology with which the ruling group or leader, and the party serving the leaders, identify and which they use as a basis for policies or manipulate to legitimise them. The ideology has some boundaries beyond which lies heterodoxy that does not remain unsanctioned. The ideology goes beyond a particular program or definition of the boundaries of legitimate political action to provide, presumably, some ultimate meaning, sense of historical purpose, and interpretation of social reality.

iii) Citizen participation in and active mobilisation for political and collective social tasks are encouraged, demanded, rewarded, and channelled through a single party and many monopolistic secondary groups. Passive obedience and apathy, retreat into the role of 'parochial' and 'subjects' characteristic of many authoritarian regimes, are

¹⁶ Franz L. Neumann, "Notes on the Theory of Dictatorship," in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, *Comparative Politics* (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1986) p.161.

¹⁷ Mark N. Hagopian, *Regimes, Movements, and Ideologies* (New York: Longman, 1978) p.49.

considered undesirable by the rulers.¹⁸

Neumann described the distinctive features of totalitarianism as follows: i) a police state, ii) centralisation of power, iii) mono-party dictatorship, iv) a hierarchical relationship between state-society, and v) the frequent use of violence and terror as legal political instruments.¹⁹

In brief, totalitarianism is a more concrete and harder form of authoritarianism in terms of the extent of rigidity, simplicity, subordination, uniformity, monism, and verticality. However, these distinctions are just conceptual. In reality, it is impossible to draw a clear distinction between authoritarianism and totalitarianism. Thus, it may be said that authoritarianism and totalitarianism are not different types of political regimes, but rather that they are synonymous in the context of a non-democratic system.

2.2. The Praetorian Model of Authoritarianism

2.2.1. Military Intervention in the Third World and Its Role in Modernisation

One of the most prominent trends in Third World countries is that of military intervention in politics. This trend is not a specific symptom in a certain region of the Third World, but a general tendency, which characterises the current political situation in a number of Third World countries.

In the developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s, military coups occurred frequently. Some research focused on the fact that military interventions in politics were linked to the modernising and industrialising process, and there have been some critical arguments about the advantages and disadvantages of military interventions for the development and modernisation of Third World countries.

Bae Ho Han considered military intervention in some cases to be a positive political action. According to him, because the military system is equipped with a well-organised mechanism of order, regulation, and control, the military sector could provide the political

¹⁸ Juan Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds.) *Handbook of Political Science: Macropolitical Theory* (Reading: Addison-Webley, 1975) pp.191-192.

¹⁹ Franz Neumann, *op.cit.*, pp.165-166.

regime with stability and security. With consistent and firm instructions, the military leadership could control the chaotic situations which were rampant in the Third World due to the ceaseless political conflicts.²⁰

Particularly, the military leadership which had been influenced by colonial legacies of modernised sectors like military officers trained by colonial government - as a factor of overdeveloped state - played a crucial leading role in propelling modernisation by providing organised management skills and know-how in planning and programming projects.²¹ Lucian Pye asserts that after a coup, military officers were able to lead the government effectively with their modernised organisations and well-disciplined techniques.²² This capability of military leadership made the state stable, and this stability raised the level of the state's creditworthiness and gave the state opportunities to attract foreign investment.²³ In addition, Henry Bienen points out that, generally speaking, military leadership did not lean towards a particular ethnic background or political faction but sought the state's interest as a whole,²⁴ though there are some exceptions such as Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Hafez al Assad's Syria.

The opposing point of view of the military's role in modernisation is that military leadership did not affect the state's development. While positive interpretations of the military's role in the state's development came up mainly in the 1960s, negative viewpoints emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s.

One of the outstanding analyses regarding this viewpoint was made by Eric Nordlinger.²⁵ Nordlinger analysed seventy-four cases of military government in the Third World and concluded that there were no significant correlations between military intervention and socio-economic modernisation. He points out that because the military leaderships tended to pursue their own interests and security, they were thus relatively conservative in the face of social change, and that kind of conservatism does not produce the radical reformation needed for modernisation.

²⁰ Edwin Liuwen, "The Military: A Revolutionary Force," *Annals*, No.334 (1961) pp.30-40, quoted in Tae Dong Chung, "The Civil-Military Relations in the Third World: A Viewpoint for the Comparative Research," in Bae Ho Han (ed.) *Politics of the Newly Emerging Countries* (Seoul: Jung Eum Sa, 1983) p.63.

²¹ Dong Hee Lee, *Military Institute of Korea* (Seoul: Il Jo Gak, 1982) p.327.

²² Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds.), *Political Development and Social Change* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971) pp.277-283.

²³ James H. Mittleman, "Dependency and Civil-Military Relations," paper presented at the Conference on Civilian Control of the Military: Myth and Reality in Developing Countries (Buffalo, October 1974) quoted in T.D.Chung, *op.cit.*, p.71.

²⁴ Henry Bienen, "Armed Forces and National Moderniser: Continuing the Debate," *Armed Forces and National Development: Proceedings of the 1st Wharangdae International Symposium* (Seoul: Korea Military Academy, 1981) p.6.

²⁵ Eric A. Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule upon Economic and Social Change in Non-Western States," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 64, No. 4 (December, 1970) pp.1131-1148.

In Robert Jackman's analysis of the comparative research into civil and military regimes in terms of modernisation, military regimes were no more efficient in promoting the modernisation process. Exploring seventy-seven cases in Third World countries from the 1960s to the 1970s he was able to demonstrate four facts: i) military intervention in the Third World had no specific influence on economic development, ii) social changes were not dependent on the extent of military intervention but relied on the level of economic development, iii) while it was true that some African countries under military regimes were able to increase their GNP, in other countries of the Third World there were no noticeable changes in the GNP statistics, iv) in cases where the military regimes were unstable in political power struggles, this had a detrimental effect on the economy. In short, Jackman concluded that there were no noticeable correlations between military regimes and economic development.²⁶

However, whether military intervention in Third World countries made a contribution to modernisation and development or not, it is clear that the emergence of military leaderships in Third World countries changed the shape of political systems enormously by overthrowing the existing political orders and systems of *ancien regimes*. This sudden change in political systems opened up a new type of political dynamics in the Third World. The military regimes of both Nasser and Park demonstrated the dynamics of military government. In fact, it became a tendency developed for the military sector to intervene in politics with a passion for restructuring their country. This tendency may be called the 'new professionalism' of the military sector.

2.2.2. New Professionalism and Military Intervention

In general, military officers have a sense of their own superiority to other sectors. They are excessively sensitive to chaotic situations and security crises, and sometimes tend to act on impulse when they feel critically unstable. Thus, if the society they belong to is faced with a critical situation that might threaten the continued existence of the state, military officers intervene in politics in an attempt to prevent the state from collapsing. These military elites tend to have a hatred for chaotic situations and disorder. It is this hatred which stimulates military elites to try to intervene in politics, and this can be an important factor in a coup.

Morris Janowitz enumerated the ideological characteristics of the military sector as

²⁶ Robert W. Jackman, "Politicians in Uniform: Military Government and Social Change in the Third World," *American Political Science Review*, Vol.70, No.4 (December 1976) pp.1084-1097; A similar analysis was performed by R.D.McKinlay and A.S.Cohan, and their results were exactly the same as Jackman's. R.D.McKinlay and A.S.Cohan, "Performance and Instability in Military and Non-Military Regime Systems,"

push factors of military intervention as follows: i) hyper-nationalism, ii) puritanism, iii) collectivism, and iv) anti-politics (or anti-democracy). According to Janowitz, through these sentiments, military elites are predisposed to regard themselves as the destined protectors of a state that faces the threat of incapable politicians, corruption, political chaos, and security crises.²⁷

These tendencies encouraged the military elites to develop a new vocational consciousness of professionalism, which consisted of an aspiration to participate in politics in order to intervene in matters of domestic security. One example of military intervention from this point of view was proposed by Alfred Stepan. He analysed the coup of 1964 in Brazil against the background of an emerging new professionalism and expansion of military influence.²⁸

Under the slogan of 'domestic stability and security from inner threats', military officers were trained as professionals in various sectors of state administration. As a result of this training, the military sector was able to play a key role in administering the state. The first concern of the military elites was no longer national security in the face of external enemies but domestic stability and the establishment of an efficient administration. This is 'New Professionalism'.

Strictly speaking, Nasser's regime cannot be seen as an example of this new professionalism, since the main motivation of Nasser's coup was the eradication of Western imperial influences and the expulsion of King Farouk's monarchy, and was thus a form of anti-colonial movement or independent resistance. However, after the Free Officers took the core positions in the government and became more professional in various parts of the state administration, they came to dedicate themselves in the professional areas of government administration as military bureaucrats.

It can be argued that the case to which new professionalism is most relevant is that of Park's regime. His explicit pledges announced immediately after the coup of 1961 were to build political stability and to establish a professional, effective government by purging old politicians and bureaucrats under the surveillance of the military junta. His main interests were domestic issues such as economic development, shaping a new political system, amending the constitution, and developing foreign relations with Japan and with the U.S. in particular. All ministerial positions were filled by military officers, and even after the power transference to a

American Political Science Review, Vol.70, No.3 (September 1976) pp.850-864.

²⁷ Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Phoenix Books: The University of Chicago Press, 1974), pp.64-65.

²⁸ See Alfred Stepan, *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973) p.130.

civil government through the presidential election, when General Park was elected as a civil President of Korea, the influence of military elites increased in every part of the government.

2.2.3. The Main Concept of Praetorianism

The typical starting point for military intervention is a coup. The meaning of a coup d'état is a political upheaval where the army overthrows the vested powers and takes the helm of state affairs by using military force. The first example of this is the coup initiated by the praetorian guard of the Roman Emperor. The praetorian guard took power by means of armed force, and exercised sovereign power as military officers. From this origin of the terminology, military leaderships, which come to power by means of a coup, may be called praetorian leaderships, and the political systems led by the military leaderships are praetorian systems.²⁹

According to the analysis by Perlmutter and Linz above, it is pertinent to define the regimes of both Nasser and Park as 'oligarchic - corporatist praetorian model'.³⁰ Despite the fact that both regimes were largely dependent upon the personal charisma of the individual leader at the early stages, they formulated strong coalitions with other actors. Nasser encouraged the lower-middle class to join political organisations such as the National Union or the Arab Socialist Union. Few members of the military junta played an autonomous role in Nasser's government. Other political actors and agents were subordinate to the personalised leaderships without any significant autonomy. Park assembled the ruling coalition from military elites, big business conglomerates, and professional technocrats. His regime showed the characteristics of exclusionary corporatism. To analyse these two regimes in terms of authoritarian governance demands the appropriate typology - oligarchic and corporatist praetorian authoritarianism.

In a modern praetorian state, military elites are inclined to intervene and to have the ability to control government officials. The political conditions in such states support the

²⁹ Ho Jin Kim, *The Korean Political System* (Seoul: Bak Young Sa, 1997) p.143.

³⁰ Amos Perlmutter classified the praetorian system into three modal types: i) the personalist praetorian model, ii) the oligarchic praetorian model, and iii) the corporate praetorian model. The personalist model is when one military leader has absolute power to rule the country exclusively. The status of the military sector in this model is subservient to the leader. The oligarchic model refers to the case where the military leader takes political power and forms a ruling group of the military junta. The autonomy of the military sector is relatively stronger than in the personalist model. The corporate model is the collective ruling of the military as a dominant group without a specific military leader. In this system, the military sector has to form a coalition with bureaucrats, technocrats, scholars and various interest groups in society. Nasser's and Park's cases may be described as the personalist praetorian model because both leaders' influence and representation were unchallenged. At the same time, both regimes' military sectors were relatively strong and had autonomy. Thus, these regimes may be categorised as oligarchic praetorian as well; Amos Perlmutter, *Political Roles and Military Rulers* (London: Frank Cass, 1981) pp.41-44, pp.130-131.

development of the military elite as the nucleus group and encourage its expectations of becoming the ruling class and political elite. In Nordlinger's words, military elites are 'managers of force', 'experts in violence' and 'armed bureaucrats'. Only with the armed forces, can the military sector acquire the key positions easily.³¹

³¹ E.A.Nordlinger, *op.cit.*, p.1142.

3. Framework of Comparison - Research Modelling and Propositions

On the basis of the theoretical background examined above, this section briefly examines the praetorian authoritarian characteristics of Nasser's regime in Egypt and Park's regime in Korea. Then, in order to make the comparison of both regimes clear, two models are proposed, for the purpose of providing an appropriate explanation of the distinctive features of each regime.

According to Perlmutter's analysis, both Nasser's and Park's regime may be categorised as praetorian authoritarianism with a military power base mixed with corporative praetorian characteristics and oligarchic praetorian characteristics, as mentioned above. It is true that both authoritarian regimes possessed corporative aspects and oligarchic features. In this context, it is possible to classify this praetorian model by detailed and clarified models with the use of the relevant criteria, which are related to the personal, historical, and situational background of both leaders.

3.1. Two Criteria for Comparison - Inclusionary / Exclusionary and Extrovert / Introvert Characteristics

3.1.1. The Concept of the Inclusionary / Exclusionary Regime

The concepts of 'inclusionary' and 'exclusionary' regimes are taken from the classification of the characteristics of state corporatism, proposed by Alfred Stepan. He defined inclusionary corporatism as the pro-working class and pro-peasantry attitude of state's elites amongst various interest groups. Favoured groups of working class and peasantry are included in the regime's process of constructing political support groups. Through the political activation of the lower-middle classes, those classes are absorbed by the regime for the purpose of gaining stability. By contrast, exclusionary regimes attempt to debilitate the people's influence, repress trade unions and incapacitate any labour movements. The elimination of working class and

peasantry groups from the political arena is one of the most prominent characteristics of the exclusionary regime.

The detailed application and evaluation of the corporatist features of Nasser and Park's regimes are not dealt with in this dissertation. As mentioned previously, the reason for this is that there were some corporatist - oligarchic characters in both regimes, and the issue of relations with the working / peasantry classes would have to be the explanatory criterion for scrutinising the differences between the two regimes.

The positive relationship between the state and the working / peasantry classes may be defined as an inclusionary relationship. This inclusionary regime consists of a populist coalition of labour and national capital in opposition to the imperial intervention of foreign powers and capital. By forming such an inclusionary coalition, the state is able to mobilise the working class and peasantry in order to expand state autonomy. At the same time, such a coalition makes it easier to control those classes effectively. Thus, activating these classes and gaining their support could be the main prop of the state in terms of achieving national security and maintaining legitimacy.

In short, the peculiarities of inclusionary regimes are summarised as follows:

i) state elites attempt to form a political coalition with the working and peasantry classes, ii) the first priority of distribution is the interest of the propertyless classes, iii) the regime which proclaims itself nationalist tries to consolidate with the working class and peasantry, and formulates a nationalist coalition in opposition to foreign capital, iv) the inclusionary regime shows itself to be a populist regime and possesses a high level of people's support which is the basis for gaining legitimacy.³²

In contrast to an inclusionary regime, an exclusionary regime emerges with the crisis consciousness of state elites, who believe that the people's influence and power could undermine the regime's security. This regime intends to incapacitate the people's coalition and repress the lower classes with the aim of preventing them from standing against the regime. The peculiarities of the exclusionary regime may be summed up as follows:

i) state elites regard the workers and peasantry as an obstruction to the regime's intentions, ii) state elites attempt to form a coalition with small numbers of specific industrial bourgeoisie, the monopolised business sector, military sector and technocrats, and oppose populism, iii) no distributive policies are found, and the state concentrates on the rapid expansion of total accumulation without fair distribution.³³

³² Myung Soon Shin, *The Third World Politics* (Seoul: Bup Moon Sa, 1988) pp.414-415.

³³ Min Sun Park, "Corporatistic Society Control in the Developing Countries: Comparative Research between Latin America and Korea," Ph.D. dissertation, Seoul National University (1983) pp.89-90.

The exclusionary regime eliminates the autonomy of the working and peasant classes and controls these classes under the surveillance of the state. However, this kind of regime runs the constant risk of being overturned by the dissatisfied people's protest when overall economic conditions worsen or the quality of life deteriorates. There is the constant possibility of labourers' revolts against the repressive regime. As the crisis consciousness of the state elites escalates, the coalition of the exclusionary regime becomes consolidated and at the same time more repressive. When repression reaches a peak, the stability which had been secured by the repressive methods finally collapses.

The clear distinction between Nasser and Park is to be found in their attitudes towards the working and peasant classes. Park adopted the economic strategy of unequal development in cooperation with a small number of conglomerates, repressed labour movements and ignored the demands of equal distribution. By contrast, Nasser chose socialistic populism as his main strategy. The state directly managed the entire economic sector in favour of the working and peasant classes. Consequently, there was no dissatisfaction concerning distribution, and Nasser's regime got enormous support from the lower-middle classes, which were composed mainly of workers and farmers. However, the decline in the efficiency of economic management had an effect on the overall productivity, and this lower productivity created critical problems for the regime's security.

Table 1.1. The Two “Poles” of Corporatist Regimes

	Inclusionary Regime	Exclusionary Regime
State elite’s initial reaction to already activated, or potentially salient worker and/or peasant groups	Attempts to incorporate into support coalition for new political and economic system sought by state elites and to encapsulate cooptatively into state corporatist associational organisations	Attempts to exclude those autonomous organisations and demand making practices from the political arena that might obstruct the new political and economic system sought by state elite and to coercively encapsulate into state corporatist associational structures
Dominant state policies used to encapsulate salient worker and peasant groups	Primarily, distributive, symbolic and group-specific welfare policies; secondly, coercive measures	Primarily, coercive measures; secondly, group specific welfare policies and virtually no distributive policies in initial stages
State elite’s policy toward functions of state apparatus	Attempts to expand distributive, regulative, arbitative, control and planning capacities	Attempts to significantly expand scope and depth of coercive, control, and planning capacities
State elite’s characteristic coalitional partners	National bourgeoisie and newly encapsulated workers and peasants	International bourgeoisie and technocrats
Characteristic enemies of state elite's coalition	Oligarchic, and traditional (non industrial) foreign capital	Populist and radical political leaders and autonomously organised working class
State elite’s characteristic stance towards structural reforms	Normally some nationalist and domestic reforms are made as part of the ‘constituent acts’ of the regime	Few or no nationalist or domestic reforms. Emphasis on ‘post-populist,’ or ‘post-polarisation’ consolidation
State elite’s orientation toward mobilisation of worker and peasant groups	Attempts to sponsor limited controlled mobilisation against coalitional enemies and into state chartered associational structures	Attempts to dismantle the organisational capacity of workers or peasant to mobilize against the policies of the coalitional partners and to demobilise into state chartered associational structures
Characteristic legitimacy principles of state elite vis-à-vis its coalitional partners	Political populism and economic nationalism	Political order and economic efficiency
Maximum hegemonic possibilities vis-à-vis salient working class	Diffuse support that contributes to hegemony of new political structures and facilitates effective control at relative low coercion levels	Hegemony virtually impossible, passive acquiescence heavily dependent on coercive mechanisms

Source: Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978) pp.76-77.

3.1.2. The Concept of the Extrovert / Introvert Regime

The other criterion that this dissertation proposes for the typological classification of both regimes is the concept of the 'extrovert / introvert' regime, which is judged according to the regime's attitude towards external powers.

In fact, the first aim of most praetorian military regimes which have taken power by means of an armed-forces coup is to guarantee the regime's security and its stability, because they might be troubled by a reaction on the part of the *ancien regime* and of people who are not satisfied with the new regime's performance. In this context, with the intention of securing the regime's stability, new military regimes have a desire to demonstrate the positive outputs of their own policies as quickly as possible.

These outputs are produced at two levels, the level of 'performance' and the level of 'dignity'. The first level concerns the domestic performance and productivity, which can improve the people's quality of life. The other concerns autonomy and real independence in relation to foreign powers. In particular, those who have experienced a colonial period are likely to have unforgettable and traumatic memories of losing national dignity to foreign oppressors. They are thus inclined to be extremely sensitive about national dignity and genuine independence.

In this context, the regime's 'introvert or extrovert' character could be a useful standard for comparison when examining the preference of the regime. The extrovert regime, which lays emphasis on international relations, intends to expand its regional influence through regional hegemony. By achieving hegemony, the extrovert regime is able to secure its own stability. On the other hand, an introvert regime focuses only on domestic affairs and internal tasks. This regime's priority is placed on task achievements without a deep involvement in foreign affairs.

The extrovert regime pursues autonomy in international relations without any foreign intervention. With this autonomy, it tries to gain regional hegemony, and finally it attempts to use this hegemony as a method for domestic mobilisation. Some Third World countries, for example, tried to get interest and protection for their countries from political and economic dependence by standing in a neutral position between the Eastern and Western blocs.

The introvert regime does not attempt to gain autonomy in the arena of international politics, and takes a subservient position to certain foreign powers. Being in a subordinate position, it is unable to put into practice its policies without any intervention from outside, but such a regime may get full political support and financial aid from an external power. With this support, the regime can concentrate on the domestic development programme.

Nasser and Park's regimes are especially good examples of regimes to which a comparative approach may be applied using these criteria. While Nasser intended to become a bona fide Arab leader, going for regional hegemony by playing a leading role in the process of Arab unification, Park set up the main line of his administration in subordination to the U.S. and Japan in order to acquire military support for national security from the U.S. and financial aid for rapid economic growth from Japan. However, Park's subservient policies to the U.S. and Japan irritated those people who were resentful of colonial intervention. As peoples' opposition became more and more severe, the regime's attitude toward them became simultaneously more oppressive.

3.2. Two Models for Comparison

When it comes to the regimes' attitude and outputs of policies, there are many differences between Nasser and Park's regimes. Consideration of these differences can provide a distinctive clarification of the nature of each of these regimes. First of all, in terms of the attitude of both regimes attitude towards the grass-roots class, clear distinctions may be found.

Nasser's leadership may be defined as an inclusionary praetorian regime model, while Park's regime can be seen as an exclusionary praetorian regime. Nasser gained enormous political support from the grass-roots class for his regime, which strengthened the government's capability to administer the state. Nasser's ability to mobilise the masses provided a solid power base from which to maintain the regime's security.

Because Nasser's pro-working class and pro-lower middle class propaganda and policy making process focused on the peoples' needs and satisfaction, his regime was not troubled by legitimacy problems caused by any lack of popularity of the leadership or any lack of support by the people.

On the other hand, Park's repressive and coercive authoritarian regime used violent methods toward those who protested against the military government and those who demanded a democratic arrangement. His regime was made up of military officers who belonged to the clandestine cadres of the coup, a small number of monopolistic capitalists who were allowed to retain their monopolised interests by the regime, and some pro-regime intellectuals.

Although there were some similarities to Nasser's regime, such as the patriarchal oligarchy which was a charisma-based cohesive ruling coalition, differences can be identified. While Nasser's regime was based upon popular support and the gaining of popularity, Park

ruled the country with the support of an extremely exclusive ruling coalition that was strictly confined to a very small number of political actors.

The other factor to consider when it comes to the characteristics of each regime is that of extroversion and introversion. Nasser's main concern and the prime feature of his reigning period was the ultimate target of Arab unity and prosperity. In his efforts to achieve Arab unification, he aimed to become the representative leader of the Arab world. The prompt achievement of regional hegemony was his primary goal. This goal inspired his regime's extrovert attitude. In particular, he publicised his regime's foreign policy as non-alignment, standing by neither the Western nor the Eastern bloc, in order to secure the regime's autonomy in international relations. As the figurehead of the Arab region, he intervened militarily in Yemen and Palestine, and proclaimed Egypt's central role in the liberation of African, Arab and Islamic countries.

By contrast, Park's regime focused only on the domestic task of economic development. In the immediate aftermath of his coming to power, he did not have any autonomy to participate in international politics as an influential actor, but rather concentrated on domestic matters.

Consequently, it is possible to identify these two regimes as the 'Inclusionary – Extrovert' regime, which Nasser directed, and the 'Exclusionary – Introvert' regime led by Park. Setting up these two different models can help distinguish sharply between the two regimes, and expand our horizon of understanding of the praetorian authoritarian regime which appeared in the Third World.

3.2.1. Nasser's Egypt – 'Inclusionary - Extrovert Regime'

: The populist regime of pro-lower middle class - The pursuit of regional hegemony

Nasser's establishment of the new praetorian regime began with the coup of 1952, to protest against the incompetence and to overthrow the despotic monarchy of King Farouk. In addition to this, he presented himself as a warrior resisting Western colonialism, which had exploited Egypt for a long time. As serious grievances towards the powerless King Farouk and resistance against Western colonialism increased, it is understandable that the Free Officers who were trying to make an effort to transform their country from its miserable state into a dignified, genuinely independent country, would execute the military coup on the basis of new professionalism. In the historical context, these were the circumstances in which the Free Officers could temporarily solve the endemic problems arising from the anti-colonial sentiments

and discontentment with King Farouk among the people. Nasser had a pro-socialist attitude. He inaugurated the land reform, which was supported by the lower class, and showed himself to be people-oriented and open towards the labour and peasant strata, instead of forming alliances with the oligarchic groups of the bourgeoisie with their vested rights. He presented himself as an anti-bourgeois figure. His policy was based on socialist ideals and he was good at using people's resentment against the propertied class under King Farouk. Against this backdrop, his regime may be seen as a people-based populist regime.

In addition, the fact that he had a good command of rhetoric and a very impressive propaganda machine related to mass mobilisations enabled him to receive strong political support from the people. It seemed that Nasser's policies, and even his slightest movements, were closely watched by the people. Consequently, he did not encounter any crisis of legitimacy, which was often caused by the lower classes in Third World countries until his defeat in the War in 1967.

It is broadly known that he practised one of the most popular leaderships in Third World countries in the sphere of non-alignment movements by proclaiming Positive Neutralism. In terms of popularity, Nasser's leadership can be described as a heroic regime and people regarded him as a messianic figure who would break the fetters of colonialism and release them as a saviour to them from affliction. In this context, his political ambitions were extended to include bona fide leadership of the Arab world, and he became energetically involved in the international affairs of the Arab region. By his involvement in Arab politics, he showed himself to be an international leader and political fighter against colonial powers in the genuine interests of Arabs. His attempts to acquire hegemony in the region characterise his regime as an extrovert one.

Consequently, in this research, Nasser's regime will be categorised as an 'inclusionary – extrovert' regime. 'Inclusionary' means that, although there were oligarchic aspects to his regime, he aimed to have the consensus of all classes, except some extreme opposing clans such as the Muslim Brotherhood, and certain influential established groups such as the feudalists. This categorisation is linked to another term concerning popularity orientation, implying that the origins of his power were at the grass-roots. 'Extrovert' character of his regime meant that his intention to become regional leader and his attempts at building a concrete hegemonic regime in the Arab area pushed him to focus on the movement of Arab unity and foreign intervention.

3.2.2. Park's Korea – 'Exclusionary - Introvert Regime'

: The exclusive pro-conglomerate regime – The pursuit of national security by means

of domestic repression

Park's regime showed completely different characteristics from that of Nasser in several respects. While the Egyptian coup led by Nasser was organised under the slogan of 'eradication of feudalism and termination of colonialism', Park's coup was executed under the slogan of 'controlling the social chaotic frustrations and putting off the invasion of North Korea under the situation of social confusion'. However, this coup failed to obtain a sufficient degree of legitimacy. The reason for this was that, just thirteen months ahead of Park's coup in 1961, there was a successful student revolution, which put an end to the dictatorship of President of the First Republic of Korea, Syngman Rhee, forcing him to abdicate, and a totally new democratic government of the Second Republic of Korea led by Prime Minister Myun Chang was launched. In this context, many descriptions and evaluations of Park's military coup of 1961 have suggested that his regime could have been a kind of reactionary coup d'état.

Apart from this domestic background, under the Cold War system Park had to depend on the United States for military support and to raise national loans. Although there was probably no way to be completely independent of the U.S. at that time, his attachment to the U.S. inspired anti-colonial, anti-American sentiments in many intellectuals and people at the grass-roots who had been ardently longing for total independence and real democracy. Worse still, Park's government was forced by the U.S. to normalise the official diplomatic relations with Japan on the pretext of getting war compensation from Japan. This tactic was just part of the U.S.'s strategy for containing Soviet influence in the East Asia. Park had no other option but to accept the U.S.'s 'suggestion'.

Since the Korean peninsula was under permanent threat of war from North Korea, and the fear of communisation was increasing, Park had to depend on the U.S.'s directions. He used the threatening situation to oppress most anti-regime protest movements. However, in terms of legitimacy, which rests on the voluntary support of the people, it may be said that Park's regime was very weak and fragile.

Through the Economic Development Plan (E.D.P.), rapid economic improvement had been achieved. This dramatic economic growth made South Korea one of the New Industrialised Countries (N.I.C.s). The most notable progress was achieved during this period. In the process, Park bestowed monopolistic privileges on a limited number of capitalists and landowners. This association produced a coercive ruling coalition consisting of the military, monopolistic capitalists, and a few intellectuals patronised by the regime. Most policies were decided by this coalition and there was no possibility of the autonomy of civil society or of the protection of people's interests. This showed a relatively exclusive attitude towards other

political actors, which characterised Park's regime as an exclusionary one.

In the icy bi-polar atmosphere caused by the Cold War, Park's government developed a strict, menacing anti-communist policy, similar to that of the notorious McCarthyism. Foreign policy and diplomacy were controlled totally by the U.S. There was no diplomatic autonomy in the South Korean government. In this subordinating situation, Park directed all the actions of the government administration into solely domestic matters, which can be described as 'introvert' in character.

In this context, in order to maintain his regime, Park had to impose repressive measures and strengthen the solidarity of his ruling coalition. For this reason, in contrast to Nasser, who obtained support and legitimacy from his people, Park controlled his regime with a kind of exclusive, oppressive attitude towards the people, and demonstrated the characteristics of an introvert, dependent regime in terms of foreign relations. This gave rise to esoteric coalitions.

3.3. Three Dimensions of Comparative Analysis on Nasser & Park

It is worthwhile comparing the two different types of regime by means of the two models of comparison proposed above. Although Nasser and Park's regimes originated in the different political, cultural, and social backgrounds of the two countries, their personal backdrops and appearances were very similar in some ways. However, the performance and outputs of the two regimes were diametrically opposed.

It is therefore important and necessary to understand the concrete differences between them and to examine the causes of these dissimilarities. This dissertation attempts not only to enumerate the important characteristics of both regimes, but also intends to describe the factors which caused the different traits by means of the method of comparative analysis. In this way, this research examines the reasons for the differences between two praetorian authoritarian regimes.

In order to clarify the causality of differences between the two regimes more efficiently, three dimensions of comparison are proposed in this research. By means of making comparison in these dimensions, the natures of both regimes can be clarified lucidly. Those dimensions are: i) 'Legitimacy and Leadership Characterisation', ii) 'Formation of Ideology and Its Applications' as the regimes' epistemological natures. iii) 'Economic Outputs' as a concrete exemplification of policy making.

The first dimension of legitimacy and leadership characteristics is dealt with in Chapter III. By making comparison between the two regimes in terms of legitimacy issues, the researcher attempts to clarify the consequent differences in the formation of leadership characteristics of both regimes. Secondly, in Chapter IV, comparative analysis between the two regimes is carried out in terms of ideological attitudes of both leaders. In so doing, the epistemological positions of both leaderships and domestic applications as the form of materialisation of ideology can be exemplified. The third dimension of comparison is outputs of economic strategies of both regimes, which are dealt with in Chapter V. Clear differences in economic performance between Nasser and Park's regime is presented as the form of 'state capitalism in Egypt and state-led capitalism in South Korea'.

II. UNDERSTANDING THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1. Introduction

In this chapter, historical background of Egypt and Korea is dealt with in chronological order. As noted in the preceding chapter, there is a need for an overview of the historical background of Egypt and Korea in order to provide a more vivid depiction and sequential pictures of the dynamics of both leaders' backgrounds before embarking on the full-scale examination of both leaders' regimes.

Egypt was one of the cradles of civilisation. Although her glorious moment of Pharaonic era and Saladin's heroic domination ended and was dominated with French and Ottoman Empire, Egypt continuously maintained her dignity as a prominent figurehead of Mediterranean world. While Egypt had been coming into the spotlight throughout the world history, Korea had been relatively isolated being located in Far East and had been called the 'Hermit Kingdom' due to her recluse history without opening to the world except to China and Japan. In this context, the representative feature of Korean history may be described as 'toadyism'.

Entering the modern era, the colonialism of super powers influenced both Egypt and Korea enormously. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, as British colonialism invaded in Egypt, anti-Western sentiment arouse amongst the Egyptian people. In this context, Nasser and his colleagues came to the front of Egypt's politics as leading figureheads for Egypt's genuine independence.

Korea, where there had been troubles of ceaseless interventions of Chinese dynasties and invasion of Japan for a long time, had to still confront the influence of outer powers. The climax of those troubles was the division of peninsula. Park's military regime, which appeared in that circumstance, had to adhere to the super power's control.

In this chapter, detailed historical incidents are not thoroughly dealt with, but drawing outlines of brief history is carried out from the medieval era to the end of Nasser and Park's period. In so doing, the concrete ideas and pictures of both leaderships could be portrayed.

2. Egypt: A History

2.1. History of Egypt's Ancient Period and Middle Age Era³⁴

The geographical features of Egypt, with the majority of the population living in the Nile Valley and the Nile Delta, surrounded by the deserts of Libya, Sahara and Sinai, have produced a high degree of cultural individuality. In contrast to her internal geographical remoteness, situated as she is on the border between Asia and Africa,³⁵ Egypt has been the focus of the attentions of foreign powers from a strategic point of view.

As the starting point for our brief examination of the history of Egypt, Pharaonic Egypt endured from the end of 4000 BC until conquest by the Assyrians in 671 BC. The Egyptian people regard the Pharaonic era as the most prosperous period of Egyptian history. A great number of Egyptian scholars and historians have expressed their nostalgia for this period. Many symbols remain of the glory of the ancient Egypt. The building of the pyramids and other relics in around 3000 BC signify a powerful dominion commanding great resources. After the rule of Rameses the Second, Egypt's strength and glory began to decline. After the Assyrian conquest in 671 BC, the native regime was restored until 525 BC, when Persia conquered Egypt.

The Persian kings were good at controlling conquered peoples. They patronised the indigenous religions of their subjugated territories and were officially regarded as Pharaohs. Another change took place in 332 BC when the Persian Empire surrendered to Alexander the Great, who was acknowledged as a pharaoh and who founded the city of Alexandria. After Alexander's death, Egypt came under the control of General Ptolemy, whose dynasty was Greek in origin and appearance.

After the demise of Cleopatra in 30 BC, Egypt came under the sway of the Roman Empire and became a province of the great Mediterranean Roman Empire. Christianity was introduced, but the Coptic church of Egypt adhered to its monotheism, which conflicted with the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, in spite of being accused of heresy.

With the exception of a brief Sasanian (Persian) invasion in 616, Egypt remained under Byzantine domination until the Arab soldiers under the direction of Amr ibn al-As invaded Egypt from Syria. The Islamic advance was virtually complete by 641. Although Islam was a

³⁴ For detailed history of ancient Egypt, see Ian Shaw (ed.), *The Oxford History of Ancient Egypt* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

completely different religion, the Coptic Christians did not resent the Islamic conquest since they disliked the tyrannical leadership of Byzantine though. As time went on, Egypt became an Arabic-speaking country with a Muslim majority, though there remained a Coptic Christian minority. For over two centuries, Egypt was dominated by the Abbasid caliphate of Baghdad, but the Tulunid and Ikshidid dynasties were regarded as virtually independent regimes between 868 and 969. The domination of the Ikshidid dynasty came to an end in 969 with the invasion of the Fatimids from Tunisia. The Fatimids were Shia Muslims and Egypt remained under the leadership of the Shiite regime until 1171.

During the early period of the Fatimids' rule, Egypt was prosperous and wealthy. The country was administered efficiently, and subsequently became an area of strategic importance. Cairo was well-developed, and the al-Azhar mosque was founded, later becoming a world famous centre of Islamic thought. And when the Kurdish Salah ad-Din ibn Ayyub, known to Europe as Saladin, appeared on the stage of politics as a sultan over Egypt, he became one of the most famous leaders in the Arab world.

After the death of Saladin in 1193, the Egyptian Ayyubids took over his position. The French King Louis the Ninth invaded Egypt in 1249, but met with a crushing defeat in the battle of al-Mansura in 1250, and withdrew his troops. From then on, Egypt was governed by Mamluk sultans until the Ottoman Empire conquered the world at the beginning of the 16th century.

By the beginning of the 16th century, the Ottoman Turks had already made dramatic advances. Constantinople was captured by them in 1453, and early in the 16th century the Turks invaded Vienna and almost occupied it. In their expansion southwards, the Turks defeated the Mamluks at the battle of Marj Dabiq, north of Aleppo, in 1516, and overthrew the last Mamluk sultan in a second battle, outside Cairo, in 1517. Egypt became one of the provinces of the Ottoman Empire, but the Ottoman allowed the country a good deal of autonomy.

At the end of the 18th century, Egypt was in trouble again, this time as a result of the conflict between France and Britain. Napoleon's aim was to disrupt the basis of British commercial wealth derived from her many colonies. Napoleon's imperial gaze had been drawn to Egypt as a means of threatening the growing British power in India.³⁶ He finally landed at Alexandria in 1798. However, all his efforts came to nothing due to the resistance of the British and Ottoman forces in 1801.³⁷

³⁵ Panayiotis J. Vatikiotis, *The History of Egypt* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), p.3.

³⁶ Derek Hopwood, *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1984* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985) p.9.

³⁷ This incident was critical in determining the shape of modern Egypt in the arena of international politics. The Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in terms of colonial competition brought Egypt to the attention of Europe, beginning that process of European intervention in the country which has never really ended.

2.2. The Muhammad Ali Dynasty

After the withdrawal of the French troops, an Albanian mercenary officer of the Ottoman Empire, Muhammad Ali, took power in Egypt. Although he was a foreigner, he was able to establish a virtually independent stable regime in Egypt.³⁸ He drove out the British forces stationed in Alexandria in 1807, and between 1820 and 1822 annexed most of northern Sudan. He was an outstanding political leader in modern Egypt, who led a breakthrough for the country, turning his back on the past and introducing new and irrevocable changes.³⁹

Then, next three successors to Muhammad Ali were, Abbas I, Said Pasha, and Khedive Ismail. During the period of their rule, foreign intervention in Egypt deepened, and the Egyptian economy declined. These rulers were not concerned with the welfare of the Egyptian peoples and they were incapable of administering the country.

Said granted Ferdinand de Lesseps, a French engineer, the privilege of building the Suez Canal in 1854, and the whole construction was completed in 1869. During the construction period, Said was succeeded by Ismail, Ibrahim's son. Ismail was overambitious. He invested excessive amounts of money in the construction of infrastructure such as railways and telegraph lines, in order to improve the Egyptian economy. In so doing, he incurred a debt of £93 million in fourteen years. Between 1863 and 1876, Egyptian indebtedness rose from £7 million to nearly £100 million.⁴⁰ In an effort to repay both his personal and the national debt, Ismail sold shares in the Suez Canal to the British government for a cash payment of £4 million. It is obvious that Ismail was in serious financial trouble, but a more significant aspect of the affair was that, from that time on, French influence decreased and Britain began to expand its sphere of influence in Egypt, which was now in debt and in need of loans from the European powers. Consequently, financial control by the British government increased. According to Goldschmidt, more than half the state revenues had to go to the Debt Commission, and all other government

³⁸ Even though Muhammad Ali was an illiterate and uneducated mercenary officer from outside Egypt, he had a vision of a modern powerful and independent Egypt. He made efforts to establish a modernised and prosperous Egypt. He reformed the economy, focusing particularly on building up the base of economic development such as factories, an improved irrigation system, and the introduction of cotton cultivation. In addition to the economic sector, he tried to improve the education system, military preparation, and technology. However, his overambitious projects brought about the creation of rich social strata, a large bureaucracy and foreign merchants. The excesses of those groups were the fundamental causes of Nasser's coup in 1952. Derek Hopwood, *op.cit.*, p.10

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.9.

⁴⁰ P.J.Vatikiotis, *op.cit.*, p.86.

expenditures had to be pared to the bone.⁴¹

Tawfiq succeeded his father Ismail. He controlled Egypt by the repressive method of military force. Like his father's regime, his government was dominated by Western powers. A French and a British controllers exercised strict financial control over Egypt. At the same time, a nationalist attitude began to grow amongst Egyptians who had been influenced by the West, many of whom regarded the Khedive, Tawfiq, as a puppet of France and Britain. In 1881, Orabi Pasha, whom Egyptians honour as the first genuine hero for national independence from the West⁴², presented a petition to Tawfiq's government calling a reduction in the influence of the Western powers. He forced Tawfiq to form a new ministry and to call on the Chamber of Deputies (*Mujlis Shura al-nuwwab*), a consultative body originally set up by Ismail. However, in this situation of escalating tension, neither France nor Britain made any concessions to conciliate Egyptian public opinion. Feelings in Egypt hardened, and in 1882 the Khedive had to appoint a nationalist ministry with Orabi as Minister for War. At that time, Orabi was the most significant leader. France and Britain dispatched naval squadrons to get rid of hardliner Orabists. Although France subsequently withdrew from this attack, a British expeditionary force landed at Ismailia and routed the Egyptian army at Tel el-Kebir. Cairo was occupied and Tawfiq's authority was restored, to be exercised subsequently under British control.

After the restoration of Tawfiq's power, Britain's original intention had been to set Egyptian affairs in order and then pull out, however, the economic hardship caused by financial indebtedness made Britain stay in Egypt much longer than expected. In the aftermath of the expulsion of the Orabists, from 1883 to 1907, Tawfiq's government was dominated by the British Agent and Consul General, Sir Evelyn Baring, who became Lord Cromer in 1891. Tawfiq was succeeded by his son Abbas II in 1892. Abbas II resented British influence in Egypt, particularly Cromer's authority. At the same time, a nationalist movement began to develop under the leadership of Mustafa Kamil, a young lawyer. Kamil did not have any argument with the Ottoman's nominal sovereignty over Egypt, but resented the practical domination of Britain. The slogan for his movement was 'Egypt for the Egyptians'.⁴³ Resentment against British influence escalated.

In 1907, Sir Eldon Gorst replaced Lord Cromer as Consul General. Gorst tried to establish peaceful relations with the Khedive. He was followed by Lord Kitchener in 1911. When the Ottoman Empire took part in World War I in November 1914, Egypt was still

⁴¹ Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr. *Modern Egypt – the Formation of a Nation-State* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988) p.38.

⁴² Derek Hopwood, *op.cit.*, p.11.

⁴³ Abbas Kelidar, "The Political Press in Egypt, 1882-1914," *Contemporary Egypt: Through Egyptian Eyes – Essays in honour of P.J.Vatikiotis*, Charles Tripp (ed.) (London: Routledge, 1993) p.16

nominally a part of that Empire, despite the fact that she was practically under Egyptian control. Egypt was drawn into the vortex of the World War, and was declared a British protectorate, with a British High Commissioner, and Britain assumed responsibility for the defence of the Suez Canal.

In December 1914, Abbas II was dethroned. The British government backed Hussein Kamil, the brother of Tawfiq, as the new leader of Egypt who was willing to be led by the British government. When Hussein died in 1917, he was succeeded by his brother Fouad. The nationalist movement had flourished under wartime conditions, and in November 1918 the nationalist leader Saad Zaghloul presented the High Commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, with a demand for autonomy, which Britain refused. The nationalists became known as the Wafd (delegation).⁴⁴ After that time, negotiations on the matter of Egyptian autonomy between Britain and the Wafd continued, but at first a negotiated resolution was not forthcoming. As a result, demonstrations and riots broke out periodically over the next three years, with the Wafd demanding total independence for Egypt and Sudan. Dramatically, on 28th of February 1922, Britain unilaterally abolished the protectorate. More than that, Britain recognised Egypt as an independent sovereign state, with the condition that Britain would retain responsibility for communications for the British Empire in the country, defend Egypt against direct or indirect aggression, safeguard foreign interests and national minorities in Egypt, and protect Sudan. This was underwritten by the Egyptian constitution, promulgated in 1923.⁴⁵

2.3. Portents of Military Revolution

Between the gaining of Egyptian independence and the Second World War, there was a triangular struggle between the King, the Wafd and the British government. The Wafd tried to carry out a revolution to establish a republican government, but the King owed his throne to the British. General elections usually gave the Wafd a majority, but a Wafd administration was unacceptable to King Fouad, who had the support of the British government.

As the last King of Muhammad Ali's dynasty, King Farouk acceded to the throne in 1935. Just a year later, the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of twenty years' duration was concluded. This treaty terminated the British occupation but empowered Britain to station forces in the Suez

⁴⁴ Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., *op.cit.*, p.56.

Canal Zone until the Egyptian army was in a position to ensure the security of the canal.⁴⁵

During the Second World War, the British government regarded Egypt as a vital point in terms of military strategy in the Middle East. The Wafd preferred and supported co-operation with the British without hesitation. In this context, in order to gain the solid support of the Wafd, Britain forced Farouk to agree to the formation of a Wafdist government under the leadership of Nahas Pasha in 1942. Nahas became increasingly enthusiastic about the achievement of Arab unity, and he was energetic in setting up the Arab League. But his government fell two years later.

Immediately after the end of the war, there was a traumatic upheaval in the Middle East; this upheaval resulted from the foundation of an Israeli state in Palestinian territory. Egypt joined Iraq, Syria and Jordan in military action following the declaration of the State of Israel in May 1948. However, they were defeated. King Farouk's popularity had declined. The political situation became chaotic in the absence of any proper authority. At the same time, the Muslim Brotherhood, a puritanical religious body, had become a threat to the regime's security, and communism had gained new adherents. The discredited regime made a last effort to obtain popular support by re-nominating Nahas Pasha as Prime Minister. He abrogated the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 without notice in 1951, and began a popular struggle to eject the British troops. This led to mounting violence, culminating in battles between Egyptian and British troops, the eruption of mob violence in January 1952, and his government's loss of the power. Following the July 1952 coup all political parties, including the Wafd, were dissolved.⁴⁷

2.4. The Process of Power Attainment (The Revolutionary Period)

On 23rd of July 1952, a group of young army officers, the 'Free Officers', who had been planning a military coup d'etat for a long time, seized power in Cairo. After the coup, they collaborated with Ali Maher, a veteran politician, to establish a government under the control of the military junta, and secured the abdication of King Farouk in favour of his infant son, Ahmed

⁴⁵ Dilip Hiro, *Dictionary of the Middle East* (London: Macmillan, 1996) p.336.

⁴⁶ The outbreak of the Italian-Ethiopian war in 1935 made Britain amenable to redefining Anglo-Egyptian ties. The result was the signing of an Anglo-Egyptian treaty in 1936, valid for twenty years. It gave Britain the exclusive right to equip and train the Egyptian military. While it required Egypt to expand its transport and communications facilities and make them available to the British forces, it entitled Britain to build as many new air bases as it wished. It signified a formal end to the posting of British troops outside the Suez Canal zone, subject to Egypt building up its defence capabilities to a sufficient level. British troops were to be stationed specifically to guard the Suez Canal until such time that the two signatories agreed that Egypt could do the job alone. Britain retained the right to take over all defence and communications facilities in the event of war. *Ibid.*, pp.14-15.

⁴⁷ Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. *op.cit.*, pp.84-88.

Fuad II on 26 July. King Farouk sailed into exile, and a year later, the rule of a foreign dynasty in Egypt officially came to an end.

General Muhammad Neguib, a leading associate of the Free Officers,⁴⁸ was a representative figure of the revolutionary army. He was well-known for his constant resistance to King Farouk's regime. He had incurred the enmity of the palace and had earlier made himself popular by his courageous condemnation of British actions in 1942. Because of his nationwide reputation, the revolutionary army selected him as their representative. Neguib took up the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and became head of the military junta. Counter-revolutionary political sectors attempted to regain power. Particularly, the Wafd was in the vanguard of the attack on the military junta. However, on 7th of September, all the attempts made by old regime's political power had come to nothing when General Neguib assumed the office of Prime Minister of Egypt, replacing Ali Maher. Real power, however, lay with the nine officers who formed the Revolutionary Command Council (R.C.C.).

As the first step towards gaining support from the people, a land reform law was announced in September, which stated that land ownership was limited to 200 feddans per household. The primary intention behind the promulgation of this law was to debilitate the power of the feudal class, which had dominated Egyptian political life for a long time. In addition, the property of the royal family was confiscated. On 10th of December, the Constitution was terminated, and on 16th of January 1953, all political parties and organisations were dissolved. It was announced that there would be a three-year transition period⁴⁹ before representative government which had proper legitimacy was restored. On 18th of June, the monarchy was abolished and Egypt was declared a republic. General Neguib took three crucial positions in the government: President, Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, and Abdul Hakim Amer was appointed Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces.

Although General Neguib now appeared to have absolute power in Egypt, a serious conflict developed between General Neguib, a man of Sudanese origin, a devout Muslim and very conservative, and Nasser, who planned the coup behind the scenes and who had a secular vision of politics. On 25th of February 1954, Neguib was expelled from the critical positions of President, Prime Minister and Chairman of the R.C.C., and at the same time was accused of

⁴⁸ When Nasser was working as an instructor at the Staff College, he organised a clandestine group of officers for Egyptian revolution – the Free Officers. In the meeting of October 1949, they made a fresh determination of the revolutionary scheme by which they would try to establish an anti-colonial regime by means of the total eradication of British influence within Egyptian territory. Their ideal vision of the state was the democratic parliamentary system based on modernised military support. Core members of the Free Officers group led by Nasser were the leaders of five individual committees. They were Abdul Hakim Amer, Kamal ed-din Hussein, Salah Salem, Zakaria Mohieddin, and Anwar Sadat. Robert Stephens, *Nasser – A Political Biography* (London: Allen Lane the Penguin Press, 1971) p.90

having attempted to concentrate power in his own hands. Nasser became Prime Minister and Chairman of the R.C.C. in his place, but Neguib returned to the position of President and took back both the other posts, only to be ousted again as Prime Minister by Nasser in April. However, as a matter of fact, the influence of Neguib had been declining; especially he suffered from rescinding his enthusiastic liberal measures. When a member of the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Nasser in October,⁵⁰ the organisation's leaders and core members were convicted of attempted assassination and six members were sentenced to death.⁵¹ On 14th of November 1954, Neguib had to step down from the position of President on suspicion of being involved in a Muslim Brotherhood conspiracy against the regime. It was alleged that during the investigations and trials of the Muslim Brotherhood and other so-called subversive elements, President Neguib had been in touch with them. Neguib was put under domiciliary confinement, and Nasser rose to the position of ultimate power in Egypt. After 1954, there was no legal opposition to Nasser's policies.⁵²

After Nasser had secured his position, Egypt began to assume an important role in the arena of international politics. Nasser emphasised Egypt's crucial roles in three areas - the Islamic, the African and the Arab circle - and Nasser's historical visit to the Bandung Conference in 1955 added a fourth - the 'non-aligned'⁵³. Egypt explicitly protested to the World Powers against the circumstances of the Cold War. In this context, Nasser led opposition amongst certain Arab states to the Baghdad Pact (later to become the Central Treaty Organisation), which the U.S. designed for the purpose of organising a worldwide chain of anti-Soviet alliances. After that, in September 1955, Nasser announced an arms deal with Czechoslovakia, in return for cotton and rice. It is obvious that this arms deal had the

⁴⁹ From 17th of January 1953 to 16th of January 1956. P.J.Vatikiotis, *op.cit.*, p.379.

⁵⁰ On 26th of October, while Nasser was addressing a rally in Alexandria to celebrate the signing of the Evacuation Agreement with Britain, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, a plumber called Mahmud Abdul Latif, tried to assassinate him. This incident was the starting point for a series of conflicts between the Muslim Brotherhood and Nasser's regime. From the start, Nasser's secular regime did not have any common consensus with the radically religious group of the Muslim Brotherhood.

⁵¹ In all, the People's Court tried over 875 persons and the military courts over 250 officers. Six members of the Muslim Brotherhood were executed, amongst them three lawyers, one merchant, a preacher and a plumber. As a result of this incident of treason, there were over 3,000 political prisoners in the country by 1955. P.J.Vatikiotis, *op.cit.*, p.384.

⁵² Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., *op.cit.*, p.101.

⁵³ Nasser got the inspiration for non-alignment as the basis for Egypt's strategy in international relations when he participated in the Bandung Conference. An encounter with President Tito of Yugoslavia was particularly influential in shaping Nasser's foreign policy. Tito had survived by aligning himself neither with the West nor the communist world. Together he and Nasser developed the concept of non-alignment for the purpose of maximising the Third World's interests in the context of the Cold War system. Tito became his closest colleague and influenced Nasser's policy line, notably when Nasser adopted a socialist, but not a totalitarian communist, system for Egypt. Derek Hopwood, *op.cit.*, p.44.

connections with the Soviet Union.⁵⁴

On 16th of January 1956, a constitutional foundation for Nasser's authority was established. The New Constitution, which provided for strong presidential power, was proclaimed in January. On 23rd of June, this Constitution was approved by a plebiscite, in which the citizens of the Egyptian Republic also elected Nasser as the President of Egypt.

2.5. Period of Nasser's Administration

2.5.1. The Suez Crisis and Its Consequences: 1956-1957

President Nasser's non-alignment policy, which implied a willingness to deal equally with both power blocs of the East and the West, was linked with the Egyptian intention to obtain funds for the ambitious construction programme of the Aswan High Dam. By this programme, Nasser intended to enlarge the cultivable area and generate electricity for industrialisation. Land and energy were the main solutions to the problem of Egypt's increasing population. Following offers of financial assistance from the U.S. and Britain and, separately, from the U.S.S.R., the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (I.B.R.D.) offered a loan of \$200 million in February 1956, on condition that the U.S. and Britain provide it with credits of \$70 million to meet the hard currency costs of constructing the dam.⁵⁵ This was an indication of the Western intention to hold onto Egypt.

However, Nasser's consistent attitude of non-alignment appeared pro-Soviet from the point of view of the West. In April 1956, Nasser's government officially recognised the People's Republic of China in spite of explicit opposition from the U.S. government. This was a provocative action as far as the U.S. and the West were concerned. Particularly, to the U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, who was a strong minded and inflexible Calvinist who regarded Nasser with hostility, Nasser's action was the last straw.⁵⁶ The U.S. finalised its

⁵⁴ The precise terms of this deal have never been disclosed. According to an American official estimate, Egypt purchased between 80 and 100 Mig jet fighters, 30 and 45 Ilyushin-28 light jet bombers, 100 Stalin and T34 tanks, hundreds of troop carriers, as well as artillery and ammunition. The value of this deal was estimated at approximately £150 million. Humphrey Trevelyan, *The Middle East in Revolution* (London: Macmillan, 1970) p.33. quoted in Robert Stephens, *op.cit.*, p.161.

⁵⁵ Dilip Hiro, *op.cit.*, pp.37-38.

⁵⁶ Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. *op.cit.*, p.106.

decision to withdraw financial aid for the Aswan High Dam on 19th of July.⁵⁷ A week later, on 26th of July, Nasser announced the nationalisation of the Universal Suez Maritime Canal Company, adding that all revenues from the Canal management would be invested in the construction of the Aswan High Dam.

This announcement produced an immediate response from the international powers. Britain, France and the U.S. protested strongly at this decision. An emergency international conference on the matter was held in London in August, and immediately afterwards, a committee, presided over by the Prime Minister of Australia, visited Cairo to submit proposals for a new scheme for Canal operation in collaboration with an international consortium. Nasser firmly rejected internationalisation. In the aftermath of this attempt at internationalisation, a series of subsequent attempts at compromise also ended in failure.

Britain and France had an anxious period after losing their vested rights in the Suez Canal. In this context, they finally resolved to take military action in conjunction with Israel. After the disclosure on 24th of October when an Arab allied military command had been established by Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, Israeli forces encroached on the Egyptian territory of Sinai on 29th of October, ostensibly to assault fedayeen bases of Egyptian army, and advanced towards the Suez Canal. On 30th of October, at a meeting of the U.N. Security Council, Britain and France vetoed the U.S. and Soviet resolutions calling for an immediate Israeli withdrawal.

The Anglo-French air strike began on 31st of October, followed by a full-scale invasion by airborne and marine corps on 5th of November. In the meantime, on 2nd of November, the U.N. General Assembly demanded an immediate cease-fire. On 6th of November, as a result of continual pressure from the U.S., the British Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, decided to announce the cessation of hostilities. The withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces was completed in a month. Israeli forces, which had occupied the entire Sinai Peninsula, withdrew from all areas, apart from the Gaza strip, which was retained for the purpose of securing a potential military base for the future, and Sharm al Sheikh at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, in order to secure the sea route to Eilat.

The Suez Canal was reopened under the full control of the Egyptian Canal Authority at the end of March 1957. This reopening respected the Constantinople Convention of 1888, which stipulated that the Suez Canal should be open to vessels of all nationalities at all times.

The Suez War could be seen as a military defeat but a political victory for Nasser. Although the Egyptian army lost some credibility and most of its military preparations, Nasser became the foremost warrior against imperialism and Zionism in the eyes of most Egyptians

⁵⁷ There was other interpretations of the reasons why the U.S. withdrew aid: The pro-Zionist lobby, and pressure

and Arabs.⁵⁸

2.5.2. Pursuit of the Integration of the Arab World - Union of Egypt and Syria

A general election was held in July 1957 in accordance with the 1956 Constitution. The first convention of 350 members elected was not expected to exert much influence over Nasser's government, since the candidacy of most members was controlled by Nasser.⁵⁹ As a matter of fact, Egyptian parliament under Nasser's regime could be seen as an amenable rubber stamp for Nasser's administration. Finally, it was dissolved in March 1958 immediately after the establishment of the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) through the union with Syria was proclaimed on 1st of February 1958.

Both countries were on the same side against the West and at the same time, pro-Egyptian sentiments in Syria were increasing with the rise in Nasser's popularity due to the Suez crisis. Although the first announcement of the union between Egypt and Syria was released in February 1958, it was not until 21st of July 1960 that the first National Assembly of the U.A.R. was convened in Cairo by President Nasser, after many complications.

However, the inauspicious destiny of the U.A.R. was revealed by Syria's withdrawal from the U.A.R. When Nasser replaced the two Regional Executive Councils and the Central Cabinet of the U.A.R. with a single central government for the purpose of enhancing his influence in the U.A.R. in August 1961, Syria became dissatisfied, and on 28th of September, the Syrian army seized control in Damascus, and Syria officially seceded from the U.A.R. After the failure of an attempt to restore the Union, Nasser said that he would not oppose recognition of Syria's independence. The secession of Syria from the U.A.R. severely damaged Nasser's leadership in the Arab region.⁶⁰

Nasser set about trying to redeem the situation. The U.A.R. (Egypt retained the full title) was reformed on 18th of October and a new system of proportional representation was proposed. A National Congress of Popular Forces, consisting of 1,750 delegates, representing

from the cotton farmers union, mainly from the southern states of the U.S., Robert Stephens, *op.cit.*, pp.190-191.

⁵⁸ Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. *op.cit.*, p.110.

⁵⁹ Over half of total of 2,500 candidates were disqualified after screening by the government-appointed National Executive Committee of the National Union which was established in May 1957. P.J.Vatikiotis, *op.cit.*, p.399.

⁶⁰ On the UAR and its problems, including Syria's secession, see Patrick Seal, *The Struggle for Syria* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), pp.327-334; Malcolm Kerr, *The Arab Cold War*, 2nd Edition London, (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1967), pp.2-58; and P.J.Vatikiotis, *The Egyptian Army in Politics- Pattern For New Nations*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961) pp.140-186.

not geographical constituency but economic and vocational interests, was convened in Cairo on 21st of May 1962. Nasser presented the National Congress with a draft National Charter outlining his programme for developing the U.A.R. along the lines of Arab socialism. A new democratic system of government was introduced, based on the Arab Socialist Union (A.S.U.) (replacing the National Union) and including popular councils at least half the members of which would be workers or farmers.⁶¹

A series of political upheavals in Syria and Iraq brought about a new phase of U.A.R. The Syrian coup and the overthrow of the Qassim regime in Iraq effected great changes in power in Syria and Iraq, which brought both nations into closer alignment with Egypt. On 17th of April 1963, the formation of a federation of the three countries under the name of the United Arab Republic was announced. However, rivalries arose in both Baghdad and Damascus between 'Baathists' and 'Nasserists'. Consequently, Nasser withdrew from the agreement, claiming that the Baathists had plotted Baathist dictatorships in Syria and Iraq and had ignored Nasser's suggestions for a wider nationalist representation.

Being at a standstill in the Arab union movement, Nasser took an important initiative in Arab league affairs by presiding over two Arab summit meetings in Egypt, which dealt with Arab policy on the international water issue related to the River Jordan, and also strengthened the armies of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. A further E£ 1 million was set aside for the formation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (P.L.O.). Nasser continued his attempts at Arab reconciliation, and appealed for the united actions to continue until the spring of 1965. Iraq, Kuwait, Yemen, Algeria and Lebanon agreed with Nasser's appeal, but Syria criticised the vagueness of anti-Israeli attitude. Despite this, as a result of his concerted efforts to take the initiative in the Arab world, Nasser may be considered to be one of the most prominent figures of Arab leadership.

2.5.3. Difficulties in Domestic Affairs and Economic Hardship

Nasser's popularity was absolute. However, he was bound, eventually, to be confronted with domestic hardship caused by poor economic performance. Even though Nasser polled over 99% of the votes in the presidential election of March 1965, there were more signs of dissatisfaction in the U.A.R. than at any time since he had come to power. When Nasser visited Moscow in August 1965, in a speech to Arab students, he revealed that an attempt to

⁶¹ P.F.Vatikiotis, *The History of Egypt*, pp.400-401.

assassinate him had been discovered, casting suspicion on the Muslim Brotherhood's involvement. This suggested an overall dissatisfaction in Nasser's performance.

In September 1965, after the new cabinet, presided over by Zakaria Mohi ed-Din, was formed, administrative characters changed and the security system was tightened up. Taxation was increased and measures of reduction of expenditure were activated due to increasing economic difficulties, particularly the severe scarcity of foreign exchange. For although wheat supplies were continued, and credit was obtained from both the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) and foreign countries, the level of imports, particularly food to feed the growing population, and the debt resulting from the first Five-Year Plan (F.Y.P.), caused a serious drain of foreign exchange reserves. Consequently, the U.A.R. faced a balance of payments crisis.

In this context, the second F.Y.P. was revised and extended over seven years, and President Nasser explained to the people that sacrifices were necessary in every field due to the scarcity of foreign currency. Yet although he had problems with foreign debt, he did not go back on his expensive commitment in Yemen, which demonstrated his desire for a regional hegemony in the Arab world. Zakaria Mohi ed-Din had to resign in September 1966, because of his disagreement with Nasser's retrenchment measures. When the U.A.R. defaulted on its settlement to the I.M.F. in December 1966, Egypt was on the verge of bankruptcy. The economic performance of Nasser's government is dealt with in detail in Chapter V.

2.5.4. 1967 War, Its Consequences, and the End of Nasser's Regime

The Arab-Israeli War of 1967 erupted as a result of Nasser's request for the withdrawal of the U.N. Emergency Forces from Sinai. Immediately after this request was granted by the U.N. on 16th of May 1967, on 23rd of that month, Nasser closed the straits of Tiran to place a ban on Israeli navigation, in order to blockade the crucial Israeli port of Eilat. His reputation in the Arab world was greatly enhanced by his anti-Israel actions. Israel, who proclaimed that the Gulf of Aqaba was an international sea lane, regarded Nasser's action as an overt declaration of war. In this context, King Hussein of Jordan finally signed a mutual defence agreement with the U.A.R. despite Israel's strong demand that he maintain a neutral position, as he had during the 1956 war. The armies of Iraq, Syria and Jordan began to mobilise along the Israeli border.⁶²

On 5th of June, Israel launched massive air strikes at the Arab allies' air fields, and at the same time, the Israeli land army invaded the Gaza strip, the Sinai Peninsula and the West

⁶² Lawrence Ziring, *The Middle East Political Dictionary* (Oxford: ABC-CLIO Information Services, 1984) pp.360-

Bank of Jordan. The outcome of the war was determined within a few hours of the air strikes, which destroyed the main body of the Arab air forces, enabling the Israeli land army to advance successfully on its target area. It was an unambiguous victory for Israeli.

By 10th of June, when all participants in the war accepted the resolution for an immediate cease-fire made by the U.N. Security Council, Israeli troops had occupied the whole the Sinai Peninsula as far as the Suez Canal (including Sharm al Sheikh), the West Bank of the Jordan (including Old Jerusalem), the Gaza strip, and Syrian territory extending 12 miles from the Israeli border. Nasser announced his resignation, but appeals from the population forced him to withdraw it.⁶³ He dismissed a number of senior army officers and himself took over the duties of Prime Minister and Secretary General of the A.S.U.

It was estimated that the loss of revenue from the Suez Canal, from the oil wells in Sinai and from tourism amounted to approximately E£ 12.5 million per month, or almost half Egypt's foreign currency revenue. Also, the withdrawal of a large part of the Egyptian force in Yemen damaged Nasser's influence as a prominent leader in the Arab world.

On 22nd of November 1967, after recurring violations of the cease-fire by both sides, the U.N. Security Council adopted a British resolution for a permanent peace establishment in the Middle East, and authorised the appointment of a U.N. special representative to assist in bringing about a settlement. This was Resolution 242,⁶⁴ which was slightly revised by the U.S. mediator, and later came to be known as the Roger Plan, after U.S. Secretary of State William Roger.⁶⁵ This plan has subsequently formed the basis for the creation of a peaceful atmosphere in the Middle East.

In the meantime, Nasser had to confront economic and political difficulties. A strict curtailment in the budget took effect in July 1967. The cost of restoration of the armed forces forced him to cut investment, despite Soviet aid and assistance from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. But the people were ready to tolerate austere measures in order to overcome the hardships of a near-bankrupt economy.⁶⁶ The continuing problem of a foreign exchange shortage obliged Nasser to turn to the West. Under these circumstances, diplomatic relations with Britain were restored in December 1967. As a result of reconciliation with the West, Nasser was able to obtain bridging loans from British, West German and Italian banks in February 1968, which enabled him to settle the outstanding debt to the I.M.F.

361.

⁶³ Robert Stephens, *op.cit.*, p.507.

⁶⁴ In essence, U.N. Security Council resolution 242 advised Israel to make peace with the Arabs by returning the territory it had occupied after the war. The resolution stressed "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war," implying that all of the captured lands had to be returned. Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. *op.cit.*, p.130.

⁶⁵ P.J.Vatikiotis, *History of Egypt*, p.410.

As a result of widespread demonstrations by students and workers throughout the country, Nasser became aware of the people's desire for state reform. On 30th of March 1968, he launched a scheme of state reconstruction in Egypt in line with the principles of democracy, science and technology. Even though he maintained the single party system, free elections throughout the A.S.U. were introduced and enormous changes were promised to the people. By the referendum on 2nd of May, the 'Declaration of 30th of March Programme' was overwhelmingly approved and officially promulgated. However, despite Nasser's schemes to reform the political system, the people were not satisfied. Further student demonstrations took place in November 1968. After closing the universities, Nasser became isolated and exposed.

Due to the shortage of foreign exchange caused by the continued closure of the Canal and the decline in the tourist industry, the U.A.R. had to be dependent on aid from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya, and on Soviet assistance. This dependency was humiliating for those who had strong nationalist sentiments. In this context, scepticism of Nasser's socialist line increased. There were indications that the civilian economic bureaucrats favoured some relaxation of stubborn state control in various economic sectors and more encouragement of private sectors and foreign investment. This need for reshaping the economic and political systems indicated that Nasser's policy line was coming to an end.

Nasser's death, on 28th of September 1970, came as a profound shock, and it was feared by many that it would reduce the opportunities of achieving peaceful atmosphere in the Middle East. One of the closest associates of Nasser and Vice-President at the time of Nasser's death, Anwar Sadat, was immediately appointed provisional President by the A.S.U. and cabinet members, being later elected official President in a national presidential election, and by mid-1971 he was firmly in control of the government of Egypt. Sadat subsequently eradicated all Nasser's policies and his legacy, and turned towards a pro-Western, open-door policy.

⁶⁶ Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. *op.cit.*, p.130.

3. South Korea: A History

3.1. The Middle Ages in Korean Peninsula – the Koryo (936 – 1392 AD) and Chosun (1392 – 1910) Dynasties: Germination and Growth of Confucianism in Korea as a Dominant Ideology

The etymological origin of Korea is 'Koryo' which means 'high level of beauty'. It was originally the name of a dynasty which came to the forefront of Korean history in the central area of the Korean peninsula in 918, after the collapse of the 'Post-Three Kingdoms and United Shilla Kingdom era' (*Husamgook, Tong-il Shilla Shidae*). During the Koryo dynasty period, the political system became similar to that of China, and in the 13th century Korea came under the sway of the Yuan dynasty of China.

Having been disgraced for a long while, the declining Koryo dynasty was terminated by General Song Gye Yi in 1392. He established the Yi dynasty and renamed the kingdom Chosun, with Seoul as the new capital. The Yi dynasty was able to achieve the unification of the Korean Peninsula under its rule, and it governed the kingdom with the strict ideology of Confucianism, supported by an exclusive elite class of scholar-officials. Chosun was not really an independent state. She became increasingly Confucianised as a vassal to China, then under the Ming dynasty.

Confucianism penetrated into the Korean Peninsula and provided the main ideological standard for ordinary life. It spread slowly but, after the establishment of the Tang dynasty in China in the early seventh century, Confucianism became much more influential in Korea. Most of the traditional relationships depended on Confucian principles, which were amended to take into account the peculiarities of the cultural situation in Korea. The appearance of revised Confucianism as the state creed, and rapid Confucianisation of political and social patterns and institutions during the Yi dynasty period brought about a sudden decline in Buddhism, which had been dominant ideology under the Koryo dynasty. At the same time, the growing number of public and private Confucian institutions resulted in an increase in the numbers of the educated elite class, the *Yangban* (literally, 'two categories of elites' – civil and military – but

referring to the civilian gentry, or upper class).⁶⁷ From that time on, Confucianism could be described as the dominant ideology of the Korean Peninsula, since the core elite class, *Yangban*, adhered to the doctrinal standards of Confucianism.

In this context, the Yi dynasty of the Chosun Kingdom came to be dominated by the elaborated ideology of Confucianism in more concrete ways. However, there was a problem in that Confucian doctrines contain the possibility of inner conflicts amongst elites educated along the lines of Confucian conservatism. These became the *Dang Pa* (Sect Conflicts), which subsequently took the form of protracted struggles in Korea. The power struggles amongst the *Yangbans* and between the monarchy and bureaucracy undermined the foundations of the dynasty. As the dynasty became weaker, Korea became vulnerable to Japanese invasions led by Toyotomi Hideyoshi in the late 16th century. Although Korea finally drove out the Japanese army, the Korean people suffered severely from the trauma of war. After a short while, Korea was at war again, this time against the Chung dynasty of Manzhou in the early 17th century.

Following the opening of Korea to the West in 1882, international power struggles and conflicts arouse in the Korean Peninsula, as first China and Japan, then Russia and Japan, fought each other for control of this geo-politically strategic point in East Asia, the unexpected Japanese victories in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 virtually decided the destiny of Korea, although nationalistic reformists like Ok Gyoon Kim and Young Hyo Park made every effort to maintain national independence.

3.2. The Colonial Era of Korea under Japanese Domination (1910-1945) : Humiliating Experiences under the Harsh Colonial Regime of Japan

One of the most tragic experiences of the Korean people throughout their history was the hardship caused by the Japanese invasion of Korea in 1905, and her forced annexation to Japan in 1910.

Even in the face of recurring invasions by foreign powers anxious to occupy the fertile peninsula, Korea had been able to uphold her sovereignty and to preserve her inherited land. However, Korea became a Japanese protectorate in 1905, according to the forced *Eulsa* (the

⁶⁷ David I. Steinberg, *The Republic of Korea – Economic Transformation and Social Change* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p.30.

name of the year according to the Korean traditional calendar) agreement with Japan. Finally, as Korea was officially annexed by Japan in 1910 with the abdication of Emperor Kochong, the last king of the Yi dynasty, Korea's independence came to an abrupt end. The Japanese colonial government in Korea (*Chosun Chongdok Bu*) was exceedingly brutal and exploitative. The basic freedoms of speech and the press were denied, the human rights of the Korean people were completely disregarded, farm lands were confiscated under various pretexts, economic and educational opportunities were extremely limited, and Korean workers and peasants alike were exploited under the repressive rule of the Japanese.

The Koreans started to rise up against the Japanese colonial government in various ways. The first and the most noteworthy uprising against Japan was the March 1st movement (3.1 *Woondong*). On the 1st of March 1919, almost two million Korean people demonstrated peacefully, expressing their desire for genuine independence from Japanese colonialism under the principle of self-determination which was proclaimed by Woodrow Wilson, the President of the U.S. It was a completely spontaneous action propelled by the entire nation's earnest desire for freedom. A provisional government of Korea in exile (established in Shanghai in April 1919 under the influence of the March 1st movement), and various non-violent as well as militant organisations of overseas Koreans, kept alive hopes for the eventual restoration of the Korean nation. The important fact to be noted is that Park was an officer in the Japanese army which operated massive military actions to destroy the liberation army for Korean independence in Manchuria. This vocational experience of Park's left a humiliating blot on his career which caused serious legitimacy problems when he came to power.

The Japanese endeavoured to implant their ideology in Korea by forcing the Korean people to adopt Shintoism, which is a Japanese traditional religion intermingled with Japanese cultures. In order to do this, the Japanese government took the first step towards Japanising Korea by distorting Korean history in a project called 'Project on the Historical Re-edition of Chosun' (*Chosunsa Pyunsoosa Saup*), and compelled the Korean people to change their own names to Japanese names (*ChangSsee Gae Myung*, meant 'creating surname and changing given name'). Worse than that, the Japanese government tried to destroy the unique aspects of Korea, such as her traditions, culture, religion and even her language. One of the most notorious provocations was 'the ordinance prohibiting Korean hair style' (*Dan Bal Ryung*). The traditional hairstyle of Chosun was a symbol of nobleness and self respect, so this law was extraordinarily humiliating for the Korean people, who respected their own culture and customs according to Confucian values. In addition to this, a religious ritual for worship of Japanese gods was enforced as part of the brainwashing process (*Shinsa Cham Bae* and *Dong Bang Yo Bae*).

3.3. Restoring Independence and Nation Building (1945 – 1950) : The Period of U.S. Military Administration⁶⁸ and The Establishment of the First Republic of Korea

15th of August 1945 was a day of jubilation for the Korean people, with the unconditional surrender of Japanese to the Allied forces. Immediately, the Japanese colonial government withdrew from Korean territory. The Cairo Declaration of November 1943, issued by the British Prime Minister, Winston L.S. Churchill, the President of the U.S., Franklin Roosevelt and Chiang Kai-shek of China, proclaimed that ‘in due course, Korea shall become free and independent’. This declaration painted the Korean people a picture of genuine independence, but the truth behind it was that world leaders intended to occupy Korean territory.⁶⁹ Under the circumstances, the Soviet Union accepted the Cairo agreement on condition of the trusteeship by dividing the Korean Peninsula into two parts, while proposals made by the U.S. in 1945 led to the division of Korea into two military zones: the area south of the 38th parallel under U.S. occupation, and the northern area under Soviet control.⁷⁰ From that time on, the Korean Peninsula has suffered from this division of the country.

In those days, nobody could predict what direction affairs in the Korean Peninsula would take. The political situation was absolutely chaotic. In this context, Mr. Abe Nobuyuki, the last Japanese Governor-General in Korea persuaded Un Hyung Yeo, a prominent left-wing nationalist, to form a political organisation to maintain law and order at the end of the period of Japanese colonial rule, in order to protect Japanese people in Korea and to guarantee their safety in the whole process of withdrawal. With these efforts by Nobuyuki, the Committee for the Preparation of the National Construction of Korea (C.P.N.C.K., *Geon Gook Joon Bi Wiwonhoe*) was launched into a political vacuum. Various levels of organisation appeared. Provincial,

⁶⁸ The U.S. military government was not formally organised until 4th of January 1946. Early civil-affairs teams were task forces until that time, however, after 12th of September, under Military Governor Major General A.V. Arnold.

⁶⁹ The phrase ‘in due course’ has been controversial. No firm consensus had been reached about when independence was to be realised or in what stages. Roosevelt had said after Cairo, at the Teheran meetings with Stalin, that it was to be “lengthy” and that Korea would “need some period of apprenticeship before full independence... perhaps forty years.” Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: an Intimate History* (New York: Enigma Book, 2001) p.777. At Yalta, he spoke to Stalin of twenty to thirty years. A State Department of the U.S. government briefing paper for Yalta supported a four-power trusteeship of Korea “as a single unit until such time as the Koreans are able to govern themselves.” See Carl Berger, *The Korean Knot – a Military Political History* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968) p.38.

⁷⁰ There have been serious arguments concerning who should shoulder responsibility for causing the division of the Korean Peninsula along the 38th parallel. For details of these arguments, see Wan Bhum Lee, *The Truth behind the Demarcation of the 38th Parallel* (Seoul: Ji Shik San Up Sa, 2001). Lee revealed that U.S. military officers were mainly responsible for the demarcation of the 38th Parallel.

district and local committees were organised to control the country. On 6th of September 1945, two days before the arrival of the U.S. occupation forces, the committee called a 'National Assembly' and established a 'People's Republic of Korea', claiming jurisdiction over the whole country and aiming at the establishment of a socialist government. In the meantime, Soviet troops, which had entered Korea in early August, quickly moved southward, and within a month the entire northern half of the Korean Peninsula had been occupied by the troops of the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, when the U.S. occupation authority arrived in the Korean Peninsula, in contrast to the Soviet authorities in the North, the U.S. authority refused to recognise the legitimacy of either the 'People's Republic' proclaimed by C.P.N.C.K. led by Yeo, or the Korean Provisional Government (K.P.G.) led by Ku Kim, based in China.⁷¹ While the People's Republic of Korea was established in the North, The United States Army Military Government in Korea (U.S.A.M.G.I.K.) was established in the South and operated until the proclamation of South Korea's independence in August 1948. And this government was proclaimed to be the only legitimate governing authority in South Korea.⁷² This was the critical moment when the nation was divided. From that time on, the Korean people have suffered numerous severe hardships brought about by this unexpected and tragic national division. One of the most tragic incidents produced by the division was the Korean War in 1950.

Towards the end of 1945, a number of political leaders in exile, such as Dr. Syngman Rhee from the U.S., Ku Kim and Dr. Kyu Sik Kim from China, and Il Sung Kim and other communists who had been released from Japanese imprisonment were on their way home. The returning communists rushed to establish a communist party in the South part of the Korean Peninsula, which was called South Korean Labour Party (S.K.L.P., *Nam Ro Dang*). S.K.L.P. was established by the coalition of three prominent communists Hun Young Park, Un Hyung Yeo, the leader of C.P.N.C.K., and Nam Woon Baek, the famous socialist economist. Later when the S.K.L.P. was banned by the U.S.A.M.G.I.K.,⁷³ it went underground and became the headquarters of the communist movement in South Korea. In 1947, Chung Hee Park joined this

⁷¹ Despite advice from the State Department advisors in Seoul that the K.P.G. should be returned forthwith, that trusteeship should be abandoned, and that the K.P.G. should be installed subject to U.S.A.M.G.I.K.'s veto, the return was blocked for about a month until a written promise was extracted from Ku Kim and made to General Albert C. Wedemeyer in Chungking that he and his group would not return as a government. Gregory Henderson, *Korea – the Politics of Vortex* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978) pp.129-130.

⁷² Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (S.C.A.P.), *Summation of Non-military Activities in Japan and Korea*, No.1 (September 1945) p.177.

⁷³ The freedom of political activity permitted by U.S.A.M.G.I.K. resulted in a proliferation of political parties and social organisations of all political orientations, each vying for prominence. U.S.A.M.G.I.K. attempted in vain to bring about a coalition of moderate nationalists and the non-communist left wing as the Cold War conflict against the Soviet Union intensified in international politics.

secret party planning a communist revolution. In addition to the blot on his career caused by his participation in the Japanese military, opposing the Korean liberation army, this record of participation in the S.K.L.P. was the fatal weak point for Park when he became President of South Korea.

In December 1945, three ministers representing the U.K., the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. entered into the Moscow Agreement. That agreement proclaimed a five-year trusteeship for Korea under a four-power regime including China. The objective of this agreement was stated as being "to guide the Korean people towards full independence."⁷⁴ Despite violent anti-trusteeship demonstrations against the agreement from both right and left-wings, the Allied occupation authorities resolved to put the Moscow plan into practice. The communists unexpectedly changed their attitude in favour of the Moscow plan, splitting the Korean people into two conflicting camps. In the South, where the U.S.A.M.G.I.K. ruled, communist movements were strictly prohibited under the pretext that such left-wing movements incited the people to violence. In fact, communist-directed labour strikes became pervasive in South, and intimidation by both ideological camps became out of control.

There were several attempts to stabilise this chaotic political situation. A joint commission of the U.S. and the Soviet Union was set up to establish a national government of Korea in consultation with Korean political and social organisations. The first session of the joint commission was held in Seoul, the capital of the South, in March - May 1946. The Soviet delegate insisted that only 'democratic' organisations should participate and that only organisations which supported the Moscow agreement were 'democratic'. It became clear that the Soviet Union sought to establish a national government of Korea dominated by the communists. After the breakdown of the first session in 1946 over consultation issues, the second session of the joint commission, held in the northern capital Pyongyang in May 1947, also failed to achieve any agreement, and in June, the commission's business was suspended indefinitely.

When the impossibility of building a genuinely unified Korea became clear, U.S.A.M.G.I.K. made a decision to establish a democratic republic, which would be a pro-American regime, just in the South. At the same time, the Soviet occupation authority likewise proceeded to establish a satellite regime under the leadership of Il Sung Kim, young communist. All anti-Soviet and anti-communist organisations were eradicated unless they became subservient to the communist leadership. By this means, a centralised communist state was established in the North, as Il Sung Kim formed his own party in defiance of Hun Young Park,

⁷⁴ Department of State Publication 5609, *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference* (Washington D.C., 1954)

leader of the S.K.L.P., whose headquarters were in Seoul, in South Korea.

The U.S.A.M.G.I.K. established a South Korean interim Legislative Assembly on 12th of December 1946. Subsequently, an interim Administrative Government was set up. Both organisations, which were composed mainly of moderate middle-of-the-road right-wing nationalists, were obliged to read U.S.A.M.G.I.K.'s mind on every occasion. Both these establishments were resentfully criticised by right-wing leaders such as Dr. Syngman Rhee and Ku Kim, who had explicitly demanded genuine independence. The relationship between the U.S. and those leaders took a turn for the worse, while anarchist movements which had been sceptical of both parts of the Korean Peninsula in terms of their ideological positions stirred up uncontrollable demonstrations. Under these conditions of extreme chaos, neither the interim Legislative Assembly, nor the interim Government, was able to play their roles effectively. The reason for this was that neither organisation had ever had any autonomy from the U.S.A.M.G.I.K. to tackle the impending problems, and both were regarded by the conservative nationalists as U.S. protégés attempting to extend the U.S. military occupation of South Korea. Even though U.S.A.M.G.I.K. had made a great deal of its intentions to assist the process of Korean unification, prominent leaders in the South had remained sceptical.

On 23rd of September 1947, the question of the unification and permanent government of the Korean Peninsula was submitted to the General Assembly of the U.N. After intense argument, the U.N. General Assembly formed the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea in November to observe the political process in general, and authorised it to supervise national elections in Korea to establish an official national government over the whole of the Korean Peninsula.⁷⁵

Both the U.S. and South Korean leaders accepted the U.N. resolution concerning the official formation of the nation by means of a U.N.-supervised election. However, the Soviet Union, which occupied North Korea, rejected the U.N. resolution and the U.N. Temporary Commission was refused permission to visit North Korea to arrange the schedule for the general election. It became obvious that the U.N. resolution would not work over the whole of the Korean Peninsula, and the Commission had to choose an alternative plan, to hold elections in those areas where it was possible, to be precise, in South Korea only. It seemed that the Commission must have assumed that U.N.-sponsored and supervised elections would take place in the North as well in the near future, that a National Assembly created by the first democratic elections in Korea would represent the entire country in terms of legitimacy, that the government to be established would be that of all Korea, and that the people in the North would

p.2. Quoted in Gregory Henderson, *op.cit.*, p.131.

elect their representatives to the National Assembly at a later date. Those assumptions were mistaken, due to a lack of knowledge about the North Korean situation, and to a misunderstanding of their intentions to build a solid communist regime under the circumstances of the intensifying Cold War.

While the right-wing nationalists, with Dr. Syngman Rhee at their head, welcomed such an alternative plan,⁷⁶ the moderate and progressive nationalists, such as Kyu Sik Kim, the head of the Democratic Independence Party, as well as Ku Kim, and extreme right-wing nationalists, vehemently opposed it, fearing that it would turn the temporary division of Korea into a permanent political partition. They visited North Korea and talked with Il Sung Kim and other communists, but failed to achieve their objective.⁷⁷

According to their power-building schedule, the authorities of the Soviet Union in the North Korea had already begun to transfer power to the Supreme People's Assembly and the Central People's Committee, both established in early 1947. Dr. Rhee's personal organisation, the National Society for the Acceleration of Korean Independence, pushed the U.S.A.M.G.I.K. to take immediate action for the genuinely self-governed independence of South Korea. The first general election in the entire history of Korean politics was conducted only in South Korea on 10th of May 1948, which produced a National Assembly, dominated in the main by the right wing.⁷⁸ Since this first Assembly enacted the first Constitution of the Republic of Korea, it has been called the Constituent National Assembly (*Je Hun Eui Hoe*). About 7.5 million people, constituting 75% of the electorate, voted for their representatives in every constituency. By means of this election, the first General Assembly was established. 198 representatives in all were elected from the South, while 100 unfilled seats were reserved for North Korean representatives.⁷⁹ The National Assembly established a democratic Constitution for the First Republic of Korea. In the initial stages of drafting the Constitution, the parliamentary government system may have been considered the most suitable system for the Republic of

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p.134.

⁷⁶ This decision was made with the approval of Dr. Seung Man Rhee, who was the most prominent leader at that time. He strongly suggested that the government of South Korea should be established before anything else. Thus, many commentators and historians criticised Dr. Rhee for his greed for obtaining power in South Korea. With regard to the responsibility of Dr. Rhee for the national division, see Kun Ho Song, "The Failure of the Establishment of the Unified Nation and the Opening of the Era of National Division," *A Re-appraisal of Forty Years from the Liberation* (Seoul: Dol Bae Gae, 1985).

⁷⁷ Gregory Henderson, *op.cit.*, p.134.

⁷⁸ The participation of left-wing politicians in the election was strictly prohibited by U.S.A.M.G.I.K. for the purpose of preventing the intervention of North Korean communists, and moderate nationalists boycotted the election to protest against the incompleteness of the election. Prominent political leaders such as Kyu Sik Kim and Ku Kim refused to take part in the first general election. Consequently, the first general election on 10th of May 1948 could be described as a half election, both geographically and ideologically. Central Election Management Committee, *The History of Election in the Republic of Korea* (Seoul: CEMC, 1973) p.298.

⁷⁹ *Han Kook Ilbo* (The Daily Korea) 26th of October 1985.

Korea, but this changed dramatically, and the Presidency system was finally chosen.⁸⁰ According to the first Constitution, Dr. Rhee was elected the first President of this First Republic of Korea, whose legitimacy was immediately recognised by the U.N. as the only legal legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula. On 15th of August 1948, the First Republic of Korea was inaugurated, and the U.S. occupation came to an end.

In August 1948, the communists in the North held an election and established the new 527-member Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.), which was proclaimed on 9th of September. From this time on, the Korean peninsula has been divided formally, and represents an unresolvable conflict.

3.4. The Korean War (1950 - 1953)⁸¹

The three year Korean War was the most tragic incident throughout the whole history of the Korean Peninsula. Its impact was not limited to Korean territory alone. Its political, economic and military implications have been quite serious in the arena of international politics as well.⁸²

The U.S. forces were withdrawn from South Korea in June 1949, leaving only a small military mission. The military forces of South Korea at that time were considerably weaker than those of the North, which had been strengthened with the help of the Soviet Union, in line with Khrushchev's regional strategy against the containment policy⁸³ devised by George Kennan of

⁸⁰ This dramatic change of political structure was due to Dr. Rhee's strong intention to dominate the country by means of absolute power. Jin Oh Yoo, *Reminiscences of Founding Constitution* (Seoul: Il Cho Kak, 1981) p.92.

⁸¹ In this thesis, the details of the origins of the Korean War are not dealt with. There have been many arguments on this issue which have attempted to establish real responsibility for this disastrous war, see Hak Joon Kim, *Sino-North Korean Relations, 1945-1984* (Seoul: The Korean Research Centre, 1985) Ch.3, 4 in Part I; Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, with an Introduction, Commentary and Notes by Edward Crankshaw, (tr. & ed.) Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1970); I.F.Stone, *The Hidden History of the Korean War* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1952); Robert R. Simmons, *The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow, and the Politics of the Korean Civil War* (New York: The Free Press, 1975); Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War* (2 Vols.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), Vol.I (Liberation and the Establishment of the Separate Regimes).

⁸² Hak Joon Kim, "Korean War" *Modern Korean Politics*, Korean Political Science Association (ed.) (Seoul: Bup Moon Sa, 1987) p.167.

⁸³ The Containment policy was the main aspect of the foreign policy of the U.S at the time of the Cold War. The idea of containment of the Soviet threat originated under George Kennan. He provided the foundation for all subsequent geo-strategic policy doctrines for U.S. military police actions around the globe. Kennan underlined containment and patience as the means to meet and combat Soviet expansionism. "For ideology as we have seen taught them that the outside world was hostile and that it was their duty to overthrow the political forces beyond their borders." (X, Foreign Affairs, 1947) Kennan was developing a notion of a mutually sustained antagonism between two opposites, that the Soviet Union was the exact opposite of the U.S. in ideology, and culture. He later concluded that the Soviet Union would fall due to its overdeveloped military and underdeveloped economic

the U.S. in the situation of the Cold War. Increased tensions between the North and the South culminated in the outbreak of the Korean War on 25th of June 1950, when a North Korean force of over 60,000 troops, supported by Soviet-built tanks, crossed the 38th parallel and invaded the South. Four days later, the North Koreans advanced furiously, finally capturing Seoul, the capital of the South. In the meantime, U.S. forces, whose assistance had been requested by the South Korean government, arrived on 30th of June.⁸⁴

In an immediate response to North Korea's invasion, the U.N. arranged a collective defence action in support of South Korea. Armed forces from sixteen countries of the U.N., attached to a unified command under the U.S. army, were dispatched to help drive back the incursion. Meanwhile, the North Koreans kept driving southwards, advancing so rapidly that they came to occupy most of the territory of South Korea, leaving the U.N. troops confined to the south-east corner of the peninsula. The Incheon landing operation on 15th of September was a major breakthrough leading to a reversal of the deadlocked situation in the U.N. troops' favour. The People's Army of North Korea was driven back, and U.N. troops advanced into North Korea. With an irresistible force, U.N. troops captured Pyongyang, and arrived at the Chinese frontier on the Yalu (*Ap Rok*) River in November.

On 5th of November, the first report of Chinese intervention in the war was received.⁸⁵ The People's Republic of China sent troops to assist North Korea. Approximately 200,000 Chinese crossed the Yalu River into Korea, forcing the evacuation of South Korean and U.N. troops. The Chinese then advanced into South Korea, but were driven back by a U.N. counter-attack on 15th of March 1951.

Peace negotiations began in July 1951, but hostilities continued until an armistice agreement was concluded on 27th of July 1953.⁸⁶ This tragic war left more than 800,000 casualties in South Korea, and enormous damage to property. The cease-fire line which was drawn on 27th of July 1953, roughly along the 38th parallel, remains the official boundary between North and South Korea, with a narrow De-Militarised Zone (D.M.Z.) separating the two frontiers.

system through the ceaseless containing the Soviet.

Taken from <http://www.geocities.com/s011023/coldwar3.htm>

⁸⁴ For details regarding the U.S. troops' entry into the war, see Glenn D. Paige, *The Korean Decision, June 24-30, 1950* (New York: Free Press, 1968)

⁸⁵ Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: the Decision to Enter the Korean War* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960) p.15-27.

⁸⁶ There were intense arguments about how to finish the war. General Douglas MacArthur strongly advocated expansion of the War to drive out all the Chinese troops and to build up a unified Korean government. By the contrast, President Harry Truman did not want to escalate this regional conflict into a World War III. As the result of vehement arguments between General MacArthur and President Truman, General MacArthur retired. After that, a new commander, General Matthew B. Ridgeway pushed forward with the armistice agreement programme. Hak

3.5. The First and Second Republics (1948 – 1961)

The First Republic of Korea, led by the first President Syngman Rhee, who was elected as President by the first general election in 1948, embarked upon a new phase as an independent state both nominally and in reality. However, the First Republic had to confront threats from communist movements which tried to overthrow the right-wing government. At last, a very serious communist-inspired military rebellion broke out in the southern area of Korea in October 1948. The rebellion was finally suppressed, but it demoralised the nation and increased the repressive character of the government. The democratic aspirations and trends of the pre-Korean War period diminished as President Rhee's government became more and more autocratic during and after the Korean War. Political and social conditions became chaotic as economic hardships multiplied.

As crises increased, President Rhee and his Liberal Party (L.P.) suffered from an obsession with communist threats. As a result of this psychological complex, Rhee's regime acted domineeringly towards its opponents, and various constitutional amendments were forced through the National Assembly. On 4th of July 1952, President Rhee forced the National Assembly to amend two articles of the Constitution which regulated the details of the election of the President.⁸⁷ This amendment has been called 'the selected amendment bill to the Constitution' (*Bal Chwe Gae Hun An*) which has had a disgraceful reputation. Taking advantage of these newly amended articles, President Rhee was able to maintain his regime in power. In 1954, the National Assembly adopted another series of amendments, including the exemption of the incumbent President from the two-term constitutional limitation in office, and the abolition of the post of Prime Minister.

In the 1956 presidential election, an opposition Democratic Party (D.P.) had a good chance of winning the election. However, the sudden death of Ik Hee Shin, the presidential candidate of the D.P., ensured victory for Dr. Rhee once again. The D.P. candidate for vice-president, Myon Chang, defeated the LP candidate, Ki Boong Lee.

As corruption inside the regime increased and repression by the police grew more severe, a strong desire for change prevailed, particularly amongst urban voters. At elections to

Joon Kim, "Korean War," *op.cit.*, pp.178-179.

⁸⁷ Jung Huh, *Testimony for Tomorrow* (Seoul: Saem Tu, 1979) p.22.

the National Assembly in 1958, the D.P. substantially increased its number of seats.⁸⁸ Aware of the danger of losing dominance, the L.P.-dominated National Assembly established a new national security law on 24th of December 1958, in order to control all the political actors under the pretext of anti-communism.

The death of the D.P. candidate, Dr. Pyohng Ok Cho, some weeks before the fourth presidential elections, again ensured the re-election of Dr. Syngman Rhee on 15th of March 1960. However, popular reactions against the corruption and non-democratic performance of Rhee's regime were increasing and student riots erupted throughout the country. The student uprising of 19th of April, known to Korean as the 4.19 Revolution, forced President Rhee to resign. Jung Huh was appointed provisional leader for the preparation of a genuinely democratic government. In June, the National Assembly decided to amend the Constitution in order to adopt a parliamentary system instead of a presidential system, in order to prevent the kind of personal dictatorship which Rhee had assumed in the First Republic. In August, the National Assembly elected Dr. Myon Chang as Prime Minister. This was the Second Republic of Korea.

Apart from the Land Reform Law of 1949, the First Republic had been unable to achieve any positive successes in terms of economic reforms. A protracted depression prevailed and deepened during the whole period of the First Republic. Even though basic investment in the production of items indispensable to life was carried out with aid from U.N. agencies and the U.S. government, South Korea remained economically depressed, suffering from shortages of energy, food and consumer goods.

Even though the Second Republic was established on the basis of the people's passion for democracy, it met with a series of difficulties: it had no mandate from the people, and neither nominal President Bo Son Yun nor Prime Minister Myon Chang showed a sufficient level of fortitude and practical ability in public administration.

Chang's new government of the Second Republic was indecisive in dealing with the legacy of Rhee's autocratic regime, and proved unable to deal effectively with serious ideological and social differences amongst various sectional groups. At the same time, it seemed unable to obtain new support or the loyalty of the people.

In this unstable situation, a split within the ruling D.P. emerged, and effective solutions to economic and social problems did not appear. With the exception of the F.Y.P., Chang's administration was unable to take appropriate measures for solving the country's serious economic problems. Meanwhile, there were continuous demonstrations throughout the country, as communist influence spread amongst students and intellectuals. Demands by students for

⁸⁸ L.P. took 126 seats, D.P. took 79 seats out of 233 seats. After the general election of 1958, two-party system

immediate contact with their North Korean counterparts, aimed at reunification, compounded by economic hardships in the South, increased the apparent threat to national security and stability. In a situation of unstable political authority due to the ceaseless discord within the parliamentary system, every social sector tried to satisfy its own interests, and became involved in politics with the sole purpose of expanding hegemony. This kind of situation could be described as a praetorian society, which tends to incur military intervention.⁸⁹ The Second Republic finally came to an end with the military coup carried out by Park.

3.6. Power Attainment and Military Rule (1961 – 1963)

On 16th of May 1961, a small group of young army officers led by General Chung Hee Park overthrew Chang's government. The military junta put an end to any political action. The National Assembly was dissolved, all political activities were strictly prohibited, and martial law was proclaimed throughout the country, prohibiting student demonstrations and enforcing censorship of the press. The Chief of Staff, General Do Yong Chang, became Chairman of a Supreme Council for National Reconstruction immediately after the coup. President Yun remained in office, but Chang's government was controlled by the military officers. Pledges were announced by the Supreme Council, safeguarding anti-communism and adherence to the U.N., with the intention of strengthening links with the U.S. and the Western bloc, and promising a full range of economic and political reforms, as well as the eventual restoration of civilian government after the political situation had been stabilised.

The Supreme Council had full powers over the military government and it acted as an official legislative organisation, and a 'National Reconstruction Extraordinary Measures Law' (*Gookga Jaegun Teukbyul Jochi Bup*) replaced the defunct Constitution of the Second Republic. In July 1961, when General Chang was arrested and convicted of anti-revolutionary conspiracy, General Park took up the chairmanship of the Supreme Council. In August, General Park announced that all levels of political activity would be permitted by early 1963, as a sign of a return to civilian governance. In December 1962, there was a constitutional amendment to restore an exceptionally centralised presidential system, while limiting the presidential term of office to a double four-year duration.

Taking into account the people's desire for a civilian government, the revolutionaries

anchored in Korean politics.

hatched a plan for launching an ostensible civilian government. They intended to maintain power by involving the civilian regime. In January 1963, the Democratic Republican Party (D.R.P.) was established by the initiation of military officers,⁸⁹ and it elected General Park as its presidential candidate. In mid-March, however, an alleged secret attempt to overthrow the military was exposed and Park announced that a national referendum would take place in order to obtain ratification for a four-year extension of military rule. The people's reaction was one of strong indignation. Consequently, Park was compelled to promise the establishment of a civilian government within one year.

In order to participate in the presidential election, in August, Park retired from the army and became the presidential candidate of the D.R.P. Freedom of political activity was restored for those who had no record of any political crime. In this election, the opposition was riddled with power struggles, and thus, divided. Finally, Bo Son Yun, came to the forefront as the candidate of the Civil Rule Party. Park, candidate of the D.R.P., won the election by a very narrow margin. In the general election of the National Assembly in November, the D.R.P. won a crushing majority of the seats. Officially, civilian constitutional governance was restored on 17th of December 1963, with the inauguration of President Park and the opening of the National Assembly.

3.7. Period of Park's Administration

3.7.1. The Third Republic (1963 – 1972)

Although the people's strong hope for a civilian government, The Third Republic, came true at last, all the crucial ministerial positions in the government were occupied by ex-military officers, and an absolute majority in the National Assembly was held by the D.R.P. Although Park's strong ambition of rapid economic development was realised under a series of state-led F.Y.P. (1962-1966, 1967-1971), the Third Republic had to confront quite a few serious

⁸⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968) p.194.

⁹⁰ The D.R.P. could be described as a prefabricated political party formed by the military intelligence agency of Park's military government. Confronted by the people's strong passion for the restoration of civilian government, the revolutionaries were forced to justify their power maintenance. Their final solution was Park's participation in civilian government after his retirement from the Army. Consequently, Park established a party as his advance guard for gaining power as a civilian leader. This was the D.R.P.. Out of 70 charter members of the D.R.P., only 7 members had political careers. David Cole and Princeton Lyman, *Korean Development: The Interplay of Politics*

difficulties in internal politics.

The most serious thing was the vehement resistance to the Korea-Japan Talks on a national scale. In March 1964, large-scale student demonstrations broke out in Seoul, in protest against negotiations with Japan to normalise official diplomatic relations between the two countries. Despite these demonstrations, the government decided to participate in an external war by dispatching troops to Viet Nam in co-operation with the U.S. Park proclaimed martial law in June 1965, and concluded the treaty normalising relations with Japan.

In order to deteriorate the influence of the ruling party, minor parties united in the form of coalition against D.R.P. in January 1967. It was the germination of the New Democratic Party (N.D.P.). However, in the May 1967 presidential election, the President Park defeated Bo Son Yun, candidate of the N.D.P., by a large margin, and the D.R.P. was able to occupy a substantial majority of seats in the National Assembly. After some incidents of disclosure of electoral violations involving the Park's D.R.P, the N.D.P. strongly demanded the nullification of the results and called for re-election for presidency.

In urban areas, as repugnance to dictatorship of Park's regime increased, the political influence of the N.D.P. was amplified. Subsequently, quite a few progressive intellectuals and students came to support the N.D.P. In this context, Park must have felt crisis consciousness. Consequently, the D.R.P. proposed a constitutional amendment in order to allow the incumbent President to serve a third term of office. (*Sam Sun Gae Hun*) A national referendum, which was manipulated by Park's hyperbolic propaganda of national crisis, approved the amendment. In the seventh presidential election, held in April 1971, President Park defeated Dae Jung Kim, candidate of the N.D.P.

On 4th of July 1972, Seoul and Pyongyang simultaneously announced a joint communiqué which stated the mutual corresponding between North and South to achieve national unification by peaceful means without outside intervention. A South-North Coordinating Committee (*Nam Buk Jo Jul Wiwon Hoe*) was established for the purpose of propelling the peaceful communication. Although this was the first historical moment of visible attempt for reunification from the both sides, many commentators regard this announcement as Park's disguising measure for overcoming domestic dissatisfactions caused by irregularities of presidential election in 1971.

3.7.2. The Fourth Republic: Autocratic rule by the Yushin Constitution (1972 – 1979)

With the strong drive of economic development of the two F.Y.Ps, during the period 1962-1971, Park was able to construct sound foundation, and the economic future of the nation seemed brighter. The sudden changes in the international situation, due to the peaceful atmosphere of détente and new developments in South-North relations since 1972 in corporation with the Nixon doctrine, provided the D.R.P. with convenient pretexts to perpetuate President Park's regime. After the consideration of international affairs, Park attempted to set up his life-time Presidency by means of another Constitutional amendment. A new Constitution was proposed by the Extraordinary State Council (*Bi Sang Guk Ga Wiwon Heo*) and enacted in November 1972. It was Yushin Constitution which was notorious for its role of supporting Park's harsh dictatorship.

Yushin Constitution abrogated the direct presidential election, and candidacy limits for the president was abolished. This Constitution guaranteed the President's exclusive and expanded powers, authorising him to issue emergency decrees and to establish the National Conference for Unification (N.C.U.) as an electoral college for the Presidency. In December 1972, N.C.U., was established, and it elected Park to be the President for another six year.

In the general election in 1973, the D.R.P. could take 71 of the 146 seats of the National Assembly. Meanwhile, a new political movement, named *Yushin Jung-Woo Hoe* ('Political Colleagues for Revitalising Innovation') was established as a subservient apparatus of the D.R.P. Seventy three of its members were elected by the N.C.U. President's recommendation made them members of National Assembly automatically despite they did not run for general election to be a member of National Assembly. Consequently, President Park was able to assure an absolute majority in the parliament.

Park's regime fulfil the targets of economy successfully during the period of the third F.Y.P. (1972-1976) and the fourth F.Y.P. (began in 1977), accompanied by successful industrialisation and an increase in per capita income. This, in turn, brought about remarkable educational and cultural development. However, the nature of Park's autocratic regime became more oppressive and violent.

The shameful incident happened in 1973. Exiled opposition leader Dae Jung Kim, who had been campaigning against Park in the U.S. and Japan, was kidnapped by secret agents of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (K.C.I.A.). They attempted to assassinate him, but failed. This incident created serious problems for Park's regime with the U.S. and Japanese governments. The incident of attempt of Kim's assassination set a fire on anti-government

demonstration and caused furious demands for the abolition of the 1972 Yushin Constitution. This chaotic situation continued to cause political instability in 1974 and after. In order to tackle the extremely chaotic situation, Park banned all anti-government activities and agitation for democracy, rendering the political situation more unstable. Against this background of political chaos, the first lady, President Park's wife, was killed on 15th of August in an assassination attempt against Park by a North Korean agent Sei Kwang Moon. Political situations were getting worse.

In May 1975, the Presidential Emergency Measure for Safeguarding National Security (*Guk Ga Anbo Bi Sang Jo Chi*) was declared in order to suppress the political opponents although its ostensible reason of enactment was to strengthen national security against a mounting threat of aggression from North Korea, following the fall of South Viet Nam. The measure brought about additional prevention on opponents and banned all kinds of political demonstration. In May 1978, N.C.U. elected President Park to be the President of Korea again almost unanimously. As the result of this non-democratic process of presidential election, the political situation of South Korea lapsed into greater turmoil of chaos.

3.7.3. Crisis and Park's Death

The Yushin Constitution could be described as the fundamentals of Park's remarkable achievement in economic development. However, it also played a role for supporting Park's notorious dictatorship. As time went on in the Fourth Republic, Park's regime under the Yushin Constitution came to a political crisis.

In July 1979, young N.D.P. leader Young Sam Kim was expelled from the member of National Assembly on a charge of anti-government speeches and negative comments at press interviews with *Time*. In subsequence, all the N.D.P. member of the National Assembly handed in their resignations in protest. Although Park attempted to demonstrate his conciliatory attitude toward opposition party members by means of releasing more political prisoners, ended in a failure. Vehement protests and demonstrations did not stop. Finally, in this political turmoil, Jae Kyu Kim, director of the K.C.I.A., assassinated President Park on 26th of October 1979. Park's 18 year regime came to an end all at once.

4. Summary

This chapter made a general survey of historical background of Egypt and Korea by focusing on the advent of Nasser and Park and their performance. Although Muhammad Ali's series of attempts of restructuring Egypt were effective in fact, incompetent successors of him could not continue the predecessor's achievement. In this historical circumstance, Nasser came to the front by overthrowing King Farouk's regime at the last resort and became a prominent leader in Arab world. However, Nasser's keenly enthusiastic attempts to achieve the regional hegemony by means of Arab unification ended in failure. The U.A.R.'s collapse, inefficient economic performance and defeats in 1967 War debilitated him. It is obvious that Nasser may be regarded as a great Arab leader, but his ultimate aims of Arab unity and Arab socialism were not achieved.

Before the modern era, Korea maintained her own strict social orders of Confucianism. As time goes on, she came to have experience of harsh invasion of modernised Japan. For thirty six years, Korean people had to suffer from disastrous colonialism of Japan. In the aftermath of World War II, the Korean Peninsula was divided as the result of the U.S. and the Soviet Union's intention of mandatory rule. When it comes to investigation in Korean history in 20th century, the two salient keys to understand Korean history were the Japanese colonialism and division of peninsular.

While Nasser solidified his political foundation by means of expressing his neutrality under the Cold War system, Park used the severe tensions between North and South. On the pretext of constant threats from the North, he justified his dictatorship and oppressed all democratic movements. The culmination of his dictatorship was the Yushin Constitution which contained Park's intention of lifetime presidency.

Nasser and Park's regimes were outstandingly in contrast in terms of their leadership characteristics, ideology and its domestic implications and economic strategy. This contrast between both leaders was based on the different traces of modern history between Nasser's Egypt and Park's Korea.

The next chapter is a discussion of the issue of legitimacy and leadership characteristics of both regimes as an analytical framework. In this discussion, legitimacy is illustrated as an independent variable for shaping leadership characteristics. This exploration will help to explain the causalities of both leaderships' performance and regime's style.

III. LEGITIMACY AND LEADERSHIP

CHARACTERISTICS

1. Introduction: The Personalisation of Power

One of the most frequently used terms in comparative politics is 'institutionalisation'. From time to time, it has been used as an indication of the extent of political development. The term 'institutionalisation' indicates a lack of that personal arbitrariness which could be a main cause of non-democratic politics. Thus, 'institutionalisation' can be set up as a prime target to be aimed at for those who want to establish genuine pluralism.

Therefore, in a well-institutionalised political system, where concrete and stable political institutions have taken firm root and are being managed by systematic regulations, political leadership is less likely to be determined by the personal characteristics of a particular leader. Although the most influence over the administration of the political system is obviously wielded by the person in the highest rank, the system itself plays a massive role in an institutionalised political system because of the existence of a consenting election system. Thus, individual leaders' characteristics and their idiosyncrasies are not the most influential factor in shaping a regime. Rather, political entities such as parties or interest groups are important factors in characterising the regime's makeup.

However, in Third World countries, the situation is different from that of most developed Western countries, which have institutionalised political systems. In the regions of the Middle East⁹¹ and East Asia,⁹² personalism has prevailed throughout the history of politics.

⁹¹ Bill and Springborg analysed the tradition of personalism in the Middle East politics originating from the Islamic root, which was established on the basis of the divine leadership of the prophet Muhammad. Secularist leaderships which were acknowledged by religious authority could achieve legitimacy and regime security without serious restriction. In some cases, these guaranteed regimes appeared as charismatic leaderships in line with the patrimonialism of the modern world. Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, Reza Shah Pahlavi in Iran and Nasser are good examples of those cases. James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, *Politics in the Middle East* (New York: Longman, 2000) pp.101-130.

⁹² While the personalism in the Middle East originated in the religious foundation of Islam, Park's personalism could be considered as depending upon the Confucian background of Korean politics, characterised by a completely

The prevalence of political personalism in the Middle East and East Asia could be attributed to the absence of any idea of people's sovereignty, and to the effect of the absolute political power wielded by certain dynasties and personal leaderships, which were intermingled with religious and cultural discourses rather than with an institutionalised political system as a rationalised process. Thus, the first step in the analysis of the political situations in these regions is to take a careful look at the aspects of personalism in politics, that is to say, their leader's characteristics, noticeable idiosyncrasies, ideological attitude, and so on.

Neither the regime of Nasser, nor that of Park, was democratic. Both regimes could be categorised as praetorian regimes based on military authoritarianism. In terms of personal characteristics, neither man showed any disposition towards the essential aspects of modern democracy, which Karl Mannheim proposed to be 'security, tolerance, openness, spontaneity, adaptiveness, and cooperation'. On the contrary, the most significant features of their regimes were the archetypal features of most authoritarian regimes: 'insecurity, intolerance, rigidity, and unfailing conformity'.⁹³

Although the regimes of Nasser and Park had many of similar features of a personal military leadership, and could be defined as military praetorian authoritarian regimes, there were significant differences between the two regimes as well. First of all, the existence of these differences could be attributed to various situational variables, such as aspects of international politics, economic conditions, and the domestic conflicts both regimes faced. In addition, the different characteristics of each leader are also important factors to be considered. Consequently, a combination of a situational approach with a traits analysis would provide the most concrete assessment of leadership characteristics. It is therefore essential to explore the historical background and personal experiences of both men, in order to determine the decisive factors behind the leadership characteristics of each regime: Nasser's 'Inclusionary - Extrovert regime' and Park's 'Exclusionary - Introvert regime'.

To discover the most crucial factor in determining leadership characteristics is not an easy task. As mentioned above, in order to carry out a precise analysis of particular leaderships, the leaders' personal traits and all surrounding situations should be considered simultaneously. Every single relevant variable which might affect the formation process of leadership characteristics should be considered in turn. However, this apparently ideal method, of


subservient attitude toward the superior powers. Even though the prevalence of the axioms of Confucianism has influenced dominant dynasties of the Korean peninsula and the East Asian countries, Park's was not able to utilise those traditions of unconditional respect for power effectively, since his coup overthrew a democratic and legitimate regime - the Second Republic of Korea.

⁹³ Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in An Age of Reconstruction*, trans. Edward A. Shils (N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1940), p.68. quoted in Ho Jin Kim, *op.cit.*, (Seoul: Bak Young Sa, 1997) p.109.

considering all relevant factors, and collecting and applying every single variable, could cause difficulty in finding that variable which is more important than any other in terms of its influence on the formation of leadership characteristics. Thus, in spite of the risk of over-generalisation, the legitimacy, as an independent variable, has been taken to be the most critical factor in determining leadership characteristics. The reason why the legitimacy factor was selected is that, despite the many characteristics out of all the similarities both leaders shared in common, there was a clear distinction between the two regimes in terms of legitimacy from the first moment of power attainment. The process of legitimacy formation of both regimes reflected situational factors such as the historical background. And both leaders' individual traits may be revealed by looking at how they responded to and tackled the issue of legitimacy.

In this chapter, as seen in Figure 3.1, legitimacy is regarded as the main independent variable to differentiate aspects of Nasser and Park's leaderships such as personality, leadership orientations, regime characteristics and distinctive outputs of ideology and economic policies.

Figure 3.1. Legitimacy and Leadership Characteristics



2. The Issues of Legitimacy and Regime Security

For every regime, legitimacy is essential for gaining sufficient support from the people and for maintaining the regime's security. Those leaders who come to power by non-democratic means are particularly sensitive to the legitimacy issue. As Emma Murphy has pointed out, "for all states legitimacy is considered to be a critical ingredient for preserving political stability and regime's long-term survival".⁹⁴

Legitimacy has been one of the most crucial subjects when it comes to classical comparative politics. Commentators have dealt with the term 'legitimacy' as the key subject in the analysis of a particular regime's performance. According to David Easton, legitimacy can be described in three different ways: the consented ideology structure, solid fundamentals of morality, and legal justice, which every political elite should firmly maintain.⁹⁵ Seymour M. Lipset defined legitimacy as 'the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society'.⁹⁶ Juan Linz suggested that legitimacy should be regarded as the most important indispensable precondition for securing a regime's stability and even the continued existence of a nation, because legitimacy performs a critical political symbolising function which can guarantee the regime's achievement of consensus, support, obedience and respect from the people.⁹⁷

According to Lipset, the lack of legitimacy may bring about vulnerability in the stability of a regime. This vulnerability could develop into a security crisis of regime. Lipset listed examples of the bases for legitimacy problems as follows⁹⁸: i) when power has been obtained through violent methods rather than by the fair competition of a democratic system, ii) when the regime's attitude towards the policy making process ignores democratic mechanisms, and neglects its duty to protect mass interests, iii) when the bureaucrats and regime's elites show inefficiency when it comes to the carrying out of an economic development programme, and iv) when people are aware of the instability of political situation.

Nasser's and Park's regimes are similar in terms of the power attainment process. Both

⁹⁴ Emma C. Murphy, "Legitimacy and Economic Reform in the Arab World," *The Journal of North African Studies*, Vol.3, No.3, (Autumn, 1998) p.72.

⁹⁵ David Easton, "A Re-assessment of the Concept of Political Support," *British Journal of Political Science*, No.4 (October, 1975) p.452.

⁹⁶ Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Anchor Books, 1963) p.64.

⁹⁷ Juan J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes-Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978) p.45.


⁹⁸ Seymour M. Lipset, *op.cit.*, p.80.

leaders carried out a military coup for the purpose of gaining power and were finally able to usurp the place of the former regime by military force. Consequently, it is possible to say that both regimes were far from genuine democracies in terms of legitimate power achievement. This is one of the main causes of their lack of legitimacy. Particularly, under military authoritarian regimes like Nasser's and Park's, since there were no institutional buffering systems to prevent social conflict and struggles amongst various political sectors, there existed the constant possibility of a crisis, in which the slightest mistake or inappropriate performance could exacerbate the regime's instability without any alleviating procedures. However, when it comes to Nasser and Park's legitimacy in terms of background to their coups, there were exceptional differences. Nasser overthrew King Farouk's regime, which had been criticised as a puppet of British imperialism. On the other hand, Park pulled down the only democratic government Korea ever had. Even though both leaders used the method of military violence, only Park's regime was in danger of being attacked as a reactionary regime which had destroyed the people's hopes for democracy.

According to Raymond Grew, a legitimacy crisis is the decisive factor behind the sequential crises threatening a regime's life. Without a sufficient level of legitimacy, a regime may confront major crises of identity, participation, penetration and distribution as shown in Figure 3.2. Amongst these four types of crises, the identity crisis caused by the lack of a feeling of belonging to a certain regime as a member, and the participation crisis, caused by a lack of enthusiasm for participating in political activity, are most influenced by legitimacy. In short, a regime's failure to secure legitimacy could quite possibly bring about the crises which cause the regime's collapse.⁹⁹

⁹⁹ Raymond Grew, "The Crises and Their Sequences," *Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United*

Figure 3.2. Reciprocal Relations of Crises




Linz also stated that the relationship between political development and legitimacy is a positive functional relation of reciprocally direct proportion. Without ensuring a sufficient level of legitimacy, no regime would be able to carry out administrative programmes successfully. Thus, in order to strengthen a regime's competence, legitimacy should be ensured. For newly emerged regimes in particular, legitimacy is essential.

As Linz pointed out, efficacy and effectiveness of a regime are directly proportional to its stability and performance. According to Linz, the problems caused by insufficient legitimacy could be settled by improving the regime's efficacy and effectiveness. Consequently, the first aim of regimes which suffered from a lack of legitimacy would be to try to increase the effectiveness and efficacy of various policies. Improved efficacy and effectiveness of policies help regimes to escape the legitimacy problem. In this context, a regime's security and stability might be settled when legitimacy problems are solved, as shown in Figure 3.3¹⁰⁰ As a matter of fact, Park's regime, which suffered from an initial lack of legitimacy, was forced to take this line in order to acquire legitimacy. Thus, Park's first move was to strengthen the efficacy and effectiveness of his regime's administration. The targets of rapid economic development and of improving the quality of life had to be achieved as quickly as possible.

States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978) p.25.

¹⁰⁰ Juan J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes - Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration*, p.19.

Figure 3.3. Structure of Causality of Leadership and Stability



Lipset emphasised the complementary mechanism of the functional relations between the effectiveness of a government’s administration and legitimacy. He suggested that a regime’s stability must be dependent upon whether or not the regime could attain effectiveness and legitimacy. Regimes which have secured effectiveness and legitimacy may be categorised as stable regimes and those which have not as unstable regimes. Lipset presents this suggestion in the following Figure 3.4¹⁰¹

Figure 3.4. Correlation between Legitimacy and Effectiveness

	Effectiveness	
	Weak	Strong
Legitimacy	Type D Very Instable	Type C Instable (Park’s Regime)
	Type B Relatively Stable (Nasser’s Regime)	Type A Very Stable

¹⁰¹ Seymour M. Lipset, *op.cit.*, p.68.

There is a vicious circle regarding the issue of legitimacy and effectiveness. If a regime's legitimacy is inadequate, effectiveness cannot be achieved. In this context, a weak regime which does not have an adequate level of legitimacy will try to obtain it by setting impracticable targets and tasks. A weak regime will try to emphasise the outward features of its policies for the purpose of tackling the legitimacy problem. This proclivity to showiness could drive the regime to concentrate on display effects or pretensions. In this kind of situation, the reasonable processes of policy making and evaluating feedback do not work properly due to the exclusion of the people from participation and criticism. This is one of the typical characteristics of authoritarian regimes.

Particularly, when it comes to the process of administration of policy, military authoritarian states adopting dependent developmentalism as their main economic strategy could be in danger of being confined within exclusive sectoral interests such as those of the military, domestic monopolised capitalists, technocrats and multi-national companies. Consequently, in most military authoritarian states, the rationality and effectiveness of the state's administration tend to decline, and reach the bottom line of inefficiency. This process of decline may weaken the overall capability of the regime, the foundation of the regime would be too fragile to maintain its security.

According to the literature on legitimacy, military regimes tend to embark upon new governance, carrying the problem of a lack of legitimacy from the beginning. In order to secure the regime's stability and to gain support from the people by overcoming this legitimacy problem, a military regime tries to force improvements in effectiveness and efficacy. These efforts, however, are eventually replaced by complacency and a disregard for the people's interests. In the end, the people refuse to accept the regime's governance, and the regime becomes more and more authoritarian, which in turn cause a loss of legitimacy. This whole process then is a kind of vicious circle.

In other words, the lack of legitimacy and the non-democratic features of a military regime make worse the situation of political instability and prevent the institutionalisation of a political system. Although there have been several cases of military coups that came into power with an emphasis on stability and the restoration of political order, in the long term, military intervention in politics has a detrimental effect on political stability. Ironically, military intervention is in inverse proportion to political stability. Irma Adelman and Cynthia T. Morris analysed this inversely proportional relation between the political influence of military regimes and political stability. They looked at 74 countries between 1950 and 1964 and calculated the

inverse proportion as $r = -.44$.¹⁰²

At the very first moment of a military coup, army officers adopt the rhetoric of their sacred mission to save the country, a sense of moral superiority over existing politicians, and a strong will to reform the old regime. However, having seized power, most military regimes tend to be poised on the edge of delinquency, due to the behaviour of core members, who abandon themselves more and more to corruption as time goes on.¹⁰³

Samuel Finer argues that a military regime would not be able to gain any legitimacy at all, in the long run, even if the regime's outward appearance is that of a democratic and legitimate political process. This is because military regimes rely on the armed forces and use officially-sanctioned violence as their main tool of governance.¹⁰⁴

Therefore, as mentioned before, as this problem exists from the outset, the military regime is obliged to focus on elevating the efficacy and effectiveness of governance in order to secure its stability. If after this the regime is unable to establish an appropriate bridgehead, it will either develop a new shape of authoritarianism, like extreme fascism, or a loose type of authoritarianism,¹⁰⁵ or collapse.

However, aside from this general presumption of the usual destiny of military authoritarianism, there are two notable exceptions to the generalised relationship between a military regime's destiny and legitimacy. These exceptions are the regimes of Nasser and Park.

Nasser carried out a military coup and overthrew the Farouk monarchy. Despite his carrying out the coup with the use of the armed forces, Nasser's coup was accepted as legitimate by the people. King Farouk, who was forced to abdicate by Nasser's new regime, had been regarded as a puppet who served British interests in Egypt. As a result, Nasser's new regime was automatically awarded legitimacy. Nasser was seen as a leader at the forefront of the struggle against foreign intervention, and as a saviour from the feudal system in Egypt. He was regarded as the hero who could bring real independence to Egypt. In this context, Nasser's military coup in 1952 was seen in some ways as national liberation from imperialism, and could be described as the first step towards the total eradication of colonialism.

By contrast, Park's government was quite a weak regime. It had similar features to what Finer and Nordlinger describe as a 'typically unstable military regime'. Because Park had

¹⁰² Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris, *Society, Politics and Economic Development* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967) p.282.

¹⁰³ Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on the Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp.10-11. E. Nordlinger, *op.cit.*, pp.126-128.

¹⁰⁴ Samuel E. Finer, "The Retreat to the Barracks: notes on the practice and the theory of military withdrawals from seats of power," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.7, No.1 (January 1985), p.16.

¹⁰⁵ Juan J. Linz, "The Transition from Authoritarian Regimes to Democratic Political Systems and the Problems of Consolidation of Political Democracy," paper presented at *IRSA Tokyo Round Table* (March 1982) p.14.

some serious stains on his career, it was impossible for him to be an attractive figure in the eyes of the people. Worse than that, he had overthrown the Second Republic of Korea, which was the first and only genuine democratic government in Korean history. The Republic that Park overthrew was established by the sacrifice of students' lives in the student revolution in April 1960. There was no way to rationalise or legitimise Park's military coup.

Thus, Park was troubled with the problem of legitimacy from the outset, and he put the issues of effectiveness and efficacy at the front of his mind in order to escape from this problem. This is the reason why Park gave priority to his economic development strategy, in order to show his regime's capability and efficacy. Under the circumstances, Park chose to adopt the iron fist method of governance. His regime was notorious for its repressiveness and cruelty. He suppressed the opposition and those people who longed for genuine democracy. He did not try to persuade people to support his regime with a benign attitude but instead used coercion.

However, in contrast with most repressive military authoritarian regimes as mentioned above, in spite of serious legitimacy problems, Park's regime did not immediately collapse, but instead enjoyed unrestricted domination of the country for eighteen years. Park was well aware of his vulnerability that forced him to adopt exclusive and repressive measures when it came to economic development policies, which involved small numbers of capitalists, technocrats and military officers.

Unlike Finer's predictions concerning the destiny of military authoritarianism, Park's regime was retained for eighteen years without any significant challenge from the opposition, or critical threats to its security. His economic developmentalsim was dramatically successful in taking advantage of the highly charged atmosphere in the Korean peninsula and the mutual hatred between the North and South. He made use of a strict anti-communist policy to control the people and depended totally on the U.S.'s Far East strategy in the Cold War era. At that time, South Korea was the faithful front-line agent of the U.S.¹⁰⁶

In short, even though there were various similarities between the Nasser's and Park's regimes, such as in the power attainment process, the designing of the military coup, and the attitudes of the military elites, the characteristics of the two leaderships were quite different,

¹⁰⁶ One would assume that the U.S.'s foreign policy would adhere to ethical principles and the universal values of human rights and democracy. But the U.S. government rarely criticised Park's repressive performance as a dictatorship. No matter how Park's regime perform, the only interest the U.S. had was in securing the stability of a strong military government sticking to anti-communism in South Korea, which could provide a crucial bulwark under their East Asian security strategy. For Park's regime, the U.S.'s military support and U.S. troops stationed in Korea were essential in order to secure his regime's existence. But, as the repression by Park's regime became more severe, the U.S. President Jimmy Carter's government intervened in Korean politics and began trying to withdraw U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula. In the middle of the tough period, the friendly relationship between the two countries was driven to the point of collapse, and Park was assassinated in October 1979, by his confidant General Jae Kyu Kim, the director of the central intelligence unit.

because of the variable of legitimacy.

2.1. The Legitimacy of Nasser's Regime

In terms of mass support and de facto recognition, Nasser had no trouble with legitimacy. Although he carried out a military coup with the armed forces, he was able to gain enormous support from people. Emma Murphy classified corporate values in the Arab World, which have provided legitimacy for regimes, as follows: i) Traditional and/or inherited rights to rule, ii) Anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, iii) Arab nationalism, iv) Populism and economic reform, v) Islam and religion, vi) Democracy and popular consent.¹⁰⁷

With regard to traditional and inherited rights to rule, due to the introduction of the concept of democracy and modernised values, the traditional monarchical system in the Middle East had been declining in terms of practical power and influence for several decades. Particularly, certain despotic monarchies which were in league with foreign powers were seriously weakened due to their loss of legitimacy. One of the best examples is King Farouk's regime in Egypt which was brought down by Nasser's coup in 1952. King Farouk's humiliating subservience to the British power, corruption inside the palace, and incapability of ruling the country had proven destructive of his regime's security. Even though it is obvious that this traditional and inherited right to rule is one of the sources of legitimacy in the Middle East, incompetent and degenerate monarchies or traditional regimes could not maintain the appropriate legitimacy.

As Emma Murphy describes, "The legitimacy of Nasser was undoubtedly initially greatly derived from his early success in persuading the British to withdraw from Egypt, both through treaty and ultimately through successful resistance to the Suez invasion."¹⁰⁸ With regard to foreign relations, adopting a firm attitude of 'Anti-colonialism and Anti-imperialism' was the right way to go about acquiring legitimacy. From the point of view of the Egyptian people, Nasser's coup, in overthrowing the old regime of King Farouk, was a heroic symbol of the eradication of a humiliating subservience to Britain which had been the culmination of imperialism and colonialism in the country. Above all, the dramatic nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956 was the trigger for encouraging the Arab people to have confidence in the

¹⁰⁷ Emma Murphy, *op.cit.*, pp.73-77.

possibility of genuine independence. His taking of an anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist stance functioned as the most important basis of legitimacy for Nasser's regime.

In addition to anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, Arab nationalism in line with the Arab unification movement, and economic policies in line with populism were important foundations for Nasser's legitimacy.

Nasser's main problem in establishing legitimacy concerned the relationship between Islam and his secular regime. Islam obviously played the most important role in integrating the Arab people. It regulated the way of life of Muslims in the Middle East. For the leaderships in the Middle East countries, Islam had become an essential mechanism by which to direct people, as well as the basis for their spiritual lives. Consequently, Nasser attempted to accommodate Islam and its leaders by spreading propaganda about his sincerity and faithfulness to Islam as a passionate Muslim. However, as the conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood escalated, Islamic political movements began to oppose Nasser's government. The highlight of this conflict between the Muslim Brotherhood and Nasser was the attempt to assassinate Nasser. After that incident, Nasser began a harsh suppression of all political actions of the Muslim Brotherhood. In a sense, the weak point of Nasser's legitimacy lay in his relations with Islam.

The establishment of democracy was not an important agenda for Nasser. Nasser's regime was obviously a military authoritarian government, far-removed from any idea of democracy from the very start. However, Nasser was able to strengthen his regime with his emphasis on anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, Arab nationalism and the populist economy drive. Since those attitudes exactly satisfied the people's demands, the characteristic features of Nasser's authoritarian 'Inclusionary - Extrovert Regime' appeared.

2.2. Legitimacy Vulnerability of Park's Regime

The mechanisms for acquiring legitimacy for leaderships in Korean politics since the Korean War may be categorised as follows: i) Career of anti-Japanese resistance, ii) Explicit attitude of anti-communism, iii) Participation in student revolution and movement for democracy in 1960, iv) Improvement in quality of life through rapid economic development.

As shown in the previous chapter II on historical background of Park, he did not have

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.73-74.

the necessary characteristics for acquiring legitimacy as the leader of the South Korean government due to his stained career.

First of all, one of the greatest concerns in modern Korean history after gaining the independence from Japan was the conviction and purging of the pro-Japanese perpetrators during the Japanese colonial era. After the restoration of independence in 1945, the most influential political leader Dr. Syngman Rhee, who later became the first President of South Korea, selected pro-Japanese, such as secret police members, bureaucrats, military officers, tax officials etc., who had worked for the Japanese colonial government in Korea, and appointed them to crucial positions in the government of the newly liberated South Korea. These were people responsible for various types of cruelty and violent atrocities during the colonial era. Although the new government desperately needed the help of those with administrative expertise, the Korean people were incensed by these appointments, many of them having suffered traumatic experiences at the hands of these same pro-Japanese officials during the previous administration.

Thus, the fact of having worked for the Japanese colonial government came to be noticeable drawback for any political leader. Park was no exception. He had attended the Manchuria military academy, which was a Japanese puppet institute situated in Manchuria as a base for the invasion of China. He was appointed an officer of the Japanese army after graduation and participated in a punitive force to extirpate the Korean liberation army which fought against Japan for Korean independence. In the end, this shameful episode in his career had come to trouble Park. But his subconscious might have continued to be influenced by pro-Japanese sentiment, in spite of his attempts at concealment. After taking power, he frequently praised the Japanese military culture which had inspired World War II, and later even tried to imitate the national reforming programme for revitalisation, the Meiji Restoration in his own Yushin Constitution, which was notorious for its repressive and anti-democratic structure.

The second problem relating to Park's legitimacy had to do with his association with the communist movement. While working for the Korean army as a lieutenant after the restoration of independence, he joined the secret communist party organisation of S.K.L.P. (*Nam Ro Dang*) which was strictly banned from performing any political activity. However, after the incident of the officers' rebellion in 1949 in the region of Yosu and Suncheon, he was arrested and convicted of treasonable acts. In this moment of personal crisis, he escaped from the danger of execution by revealing the list of his colleagues' names and the secret structure of S.K.L.P., and was eventually released. Ironically, after taking power, Park assumed a formidable anti-communist stance in another attempt to compensate for his lack of legitimacy.

Thirdly, Park's destruction of the genuinely democratic government that preceded him

also stood in the way of his acquiring legitimacy. During the Korean War, Park returned to the army. From that time on, he often expressed his enmity towards the communist movement. After the coup, he announced that the reason for his military intervention into politics, resulted from his concern that the chaotic situation under so-called the democratic government might cause another North Korean invasion. His propaganda implied that South Korea was not yet ready for democracy. However, overthrowing the first democratic regime Korea had ever had was not a trivial act. The Second Republic of Korea, which had been established with the sacrifice of many students' lives, was a legitimate government. Park obliterated this first historical step towards real democracy in Korea.

In the end, Park's troubled regime had no option than to choose performance on which to base its legitimacy. Within a very short space of time, Park had to justify his coup and provide reasons for breaking up the democratic regime. Under the circumstances, he was forced to focus only on the regime's performance, on material results that people could visualise easily, which were manifested as rapid economic development. This situation drove him to suffer from an obsession with concrete results. He had thus chosen the narrow road to short-term efficiency by turning his back on the chance of a friendly relationship with the people. This attitude was behind his 'Task-oriented' characteristics, which were linked to the 'Exclusionary – Introvert' characteristics of his regime.

In conclusion, of the functional relations of two choices available in developing countries between political participation orientations and policy seeking orientations, which Samuel Huntington devised¹⁰⁹, Park's regime could be described as a bourgeoisie model because his regime basically tried to make a strong exclusive coalition of a small number of capitalists and elite bureaucrats for the purpose of rapid development. Under his regime, all political participation was strictly limited and monitored by the regime, and social and economic inequality had to be allowed in order to propel economic growth. By contrast, Nasser adopted the populist model in order to concentrate on social and economic equality.

¹⁰⁹ Samuel Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, *No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976) pp.27-33. Huntington provided four models for the development of developing countries; Bourgeoisie Model, Autocratic Model, Technocrat Model and Populist Model.

3. Leadership Characteristics

Amongst all the variables that influence the success or failure of political development, the human factor must be one of the most crucial even in a 'well-institutionalised political system'. The human factor is the key to the achievement of democracy or other types of political development which have been sought for so long throughout the history of politics. And amongst all those involved in a nation's political life, it is obviously the leaders who are the most influential. The political leaders play critical roles in deciding the destiny of political development and the stability of their own political community, more than any other factor. Many scholars of comparative politics, such as Glenn D. Paige, Gabriel Almond, Dankwart Rustow, and James M. Burns, have emphasised this fact.

In the developing countries of the Third World which did not have any institutionalised political system, the variables of the characteristics and capabilities of the leadership were particularly important in deciding the destiny of those regimes. Therefore, to trace and analyse the characteristics of Nasser and Park's leaderships will be helpful in painting a concrete picture of the political situations in Egypt and Korea at that time. As mentioned above, the variable of legitimacy influenced enormously the nature of both regimes. Considering that variable, general approaches to the leadership theories and particularities of both regimes are dealt with below.

3.1. Definition of Leadership

When it comes to the management of communities or societies, some form of leadership is essential. In other words, leadership must exist for any society to be maintained and mobilised. No matter whether the society is the family unit, fellowship group, an ethnic community or a group of children playing, wherever a group exists, there is always a form of leadership.

Since the unit of the nation has become the biggest and the most influential unit among the many communities and societies of the modern world, political leadership occupies a position particularly worthy of study amongst the various types of leadership that exist today. Thus the performance of leaderships in nation states has become the most important variable in

the analysis of the nature of politics. Political leadership may be defined in various ways according to its function and its method of approach.

Julius Gould and William Kolb described leadership as “a behavioural process consisting of stimulating persons... to act integratively toward the achievement of group goals”. They see the basic principle of leadership as a tool for achieving the regime’s aims by mobilising the members of the society it rules.¹¹⁰

Similarly, D. Cartwright, and A. Zander described leaderships “the performance of those acts which helps the group achieve its objectives, moving the group toward its goals, improving the quality of the interactions among the members, and bringing the cohesiveness of the group of making courses”¹¹¹ Hemphill, Halpin, and Windor defined leadership in the simplest way: “behaviour of an individual when he is directing the activities of a group toward a shared goal”¹¹²

With regard to the diverse definitions of leadership, according to Fleishman, who tried to classify the different types of leadership, over the last five decades, there have been as many as 65 different classification systems developed to define the dimensions of leadership.¹¹³ Those classification systems can be categorised in broad point of view: i) focus of group process, ii) a personality perspective, iii) act - behaviours of leadership and iv) power relationship.

For the most part, the general ‘leadership’ has been taken to refer to the leading power with the highest political position. For example, in the case of countries adopting the president-centred polity, the position of president is the most important in terms of leadership approach. The ideal type of political leadership sets the legality of power and legitimacy forth as an essential premise.¹¹⁴ Kenneth Janda emphasises the issues of legitimacy and legality as being necessary factors in genuine leadership. He describes the concept of leadership simply as ‘the

¹¹⁰ Julius Gould & William C. Kolb in Murray G. Ross & Charles E. Hendry, *New Understanding of Leadership: A Survey and Application of Research* (N.Y.: Association Press, 1957); C. G. Brown & T. Cohen, *The Study of Leadership* (Illinois: Interstate Printing Co., 1958); Alvin W. Gouldner, *Studies in Leadership* (N.Y.: Harper & Brother, 1950); quoted in Seung Jo Han, *Viewing Korean Political Leaders through the Leadership Theory*, (Seoul: Dae Jeong Jin, 1992) p.22

¹¹¹ D. Cartwright & A. Zander (ed.), *Group Dynamics - Research and Theory* (N.Y.: Row Eterson, 1953) quoted in *ibid.*, p.23

¹¹² Hemphill, Halpin & Windor in C. A. Gibb, “Leadership,” *Handbook of Social Psychology* (ed.) by G. Lindzey (Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1954) quoted in *ibid.*, p.24.

¹¹³ E.A.Fleishman, "Taxonomic efforts in the description of leaders' behaviour: A Synthesis and functional interpretation" *Leadership Quarterly*, Vol.2, No.4, 1991, pp.245-287.

¹¹⁴ There are subtle differences between leadership and headship. Leadership is the activity of influencing people to cooperate toward some goal which they come to find desirable. The unique emphasis in the idea of leadership is upon the satisfaction and sense of self-fulfilment secured by the followers of the legal and legitimate leader. In contrast, headship does not use the mechanism of persuasion or acceptance, rather it tries to fulfil the goal through compulsive extortion. In the strict sense of the term, ‘headship’ is representative of an authoritarian regime’s performance, even though the terminology ‘leadership’ is consistently used in this thesis.

legitimate power'.¹¹⁵ Generally speaking, most military regimes which come to power through the use of military force confront a serious crisis due to a lack of legitimacy. Thus, it is unlikely that military regimes would express the genuine meaning of leadership. However, as long as a military regime maintains its security and performs well, its suppressive character could change into genuine leadership which is supported by the majority of the people. That is the reason why Park concentrated on the performance exclusively.

3.2. Approaches to Nasser and Park Leaderships

- Traits Approach and Situational Approach

Nasser and Park were good examples of personalised leadership in a praetorian regime, and it is quite true that their personal influence over politics and the policy making process was exceptionally great. In contrary to developed countries, which have a functionally institutionalised political system, the leaders of personalised military regimes are able to wield their power without any restrictions. They have unlimited autonomy in domestic leadership.

When it comes to leadership analysis, two tools may be used to analyse the substantial attributes of leadership. These are the traits approach and situational approach. The traits approach deals with the personality of a particular leader, which could influence the political leadership's performance. The situational approach emphasises the specific circumstances encompassing the political situation. These two approaches are mutually complementary when attempting to determine the real nature of the leadership. It may be assumed that the highly personalised polity tends to be much more affected by the traits of the leader than by the situation.

Personalisation and centralisation of power could not be regarded as appropriate techniques for achieving democracy in modern politics. One of the most important tasks of modern politics is to decentralise political power to the various levels of institutions in political entity and to institutionalise diverse political actions into a constant and stable form. The effective method of analysing modern politics looks not only at the political actors but also at political systems, institutions, and processes, and so on. But in the case of a military praetorian polity like Nasser's and Park's regimes, the personalisation of political power must be the major premise. In this context, the most important aspect of leadership analysis concerns the leader's personality.

¹¹⁵ See Kenneth F. Janda, "Toward the Explication of the Concept of Leadership in terms of the Concept of Power,"

However, when examining Nasser's and Park's regimes, the traits approach and the situational approach should be applied simultaneously, since although both regimes could be described as highly personalised praetorian regimes dominated by two prominent figures, at the same time, the importance of their geo-political situations in the context of post-colonial era and the Cold War system should not be underestimated. The situations in Egypt and Korea were closely connected to the strategies of international actors such as the U.S. or the Soviet Union.

3.2.1. The Traits Approach and Its Application to Nasser and Park

The traits approach focuses exclusively on the leader, and not on the followers or the situation.¹¹⁶ Taking the traits of the leader as the most relevant variable, this approach analyses politics within the framework of the leader's characteristics and with regard to how they influence into the political situation.

Representative examples of this approach are Thomas Carlyle's 'heroism', the 'Charisma theory' of Max Weber, Niccolo Machiavelli's 'The Prince', Confucius' 'Wiseman' and Plato's 'Philosopher's politics'. This approach focuses on the quality, talent, and characteristics of certain outstanding figures. But there exists a risk of overvaluation by giving them too much credit, and by becoming excessively absorbed in individual stories. For instance, Thomas Carlyle's heroic leadership theory¹¹⁷ is a work typically overestimating the probability of a particular individual's influence and its consequences. Another weak point of the traits approach is that one cannot deduce a general theory from an examination of individual cases by this method. Basically, it is impossible to classify human characteristics scientifically according to general standard, since each individual is influenced by different, highly complex situations. Therefore, no matter how remarkable a particular leader appears to be, he or she should always be examined according to the context of his or her situation.

Despite these limits to the traits approach, it remains one of the most popular methodological approaches to leadership analysis. In this context, Peter Northouse identified certain typical traits of leadership as the result of diverse experiments in traits leadership research. According to Northouse, five important traits are worthy of consideration when leadership characteristics are analysed. These are i) Intelligence, ii) Self-Confidence, iii)

Human Relations, Vol.13, No.4 (1960).

¹¹⁶ Peter G. Northouse, *Leadership - Theory and Practice* (London: Sage, 1997) p.18.

¹¹⁷ Thomas Carlyle, *On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966).

Determination, iv) Integrity, and v) Sociability.¹¹⁸

This classification of a leader's traits is meaningful when applied to the cases of Nasser and Park. Between the two leaderships, there are noticeable differences in terms of self-confidence, integrity and sociability, amongst the five traits. The most influential factor in causing these differences is the issue of legitimacy. As mentioned above, since Park had a psychological complex¹¹⁹ about his lack of legitimacy, it might be presumed that his attitude towards the outside world would become relatively reserved. Amongst the five traits Northouse identified, therefore, self-confidence, integrity and sociability could be considered to be affected by the issue of legitimacy.

i) Intelligence

Intelligence or intellectual ability is positively related to leadership. Having strong verbal ability, perceptual ability, and reasoning appears to make one a better leader. Although it is good to be bright, the research also indicates that a leader's intellectual ability should not vary too much from that of his or her subordinates. In situations where the leader's IQ is very different from that of the followers, it can have a counter-productive impact of leadership. Leaders with higher abilities may have difficulty in communicating with followers because they are preoccupied or because their ideas are too advanced to be accepted by their followers.

ii) Self-Confidence

Self-confidence is another trait that helps an individual to be a leader. Self-confidence is the ability to be certain about one's competencies and skills. It includes a sense of self-esteem and self-assurance and the belief that one can make a difference. Leadership involves influencing others, and self-confidence allows the leader to feel assured that his or her attempts to influence are appropriate and right.

iii) Determination

Many leaders also exhibit determination. Determination refers to the desire to get the job done and includes characteristics such as initiative, persistence, dominance, and drive. Individuals with determination are willing to assert themselves, they are proactive, and they have the capacity to persevere in the face of obstacles. Being determined includes showing dominance at times and in certain situations where followers need to be directed.

¹¹⁸ Peter Northouse, *op.cit.*, pp.17-18.

¹¹⁹ About psychological analysis of political leadership, see Margaret G. Herman (ed.), *A Psychological Examination*

iv) Integrity

Integrity is another of the important leadership traits. Integrity is the quality of honesty and trustworthiness. Individuals who adhere to a strong set of principles and take responsibility for their actions are exhibiting integrity. Leaders with integrity inspire confidence in others because they can be trusted to do what they say they are going to do. They are loyal, dependable, and not deceptive. Basically, integrity makes a leader believable and worthy of our trust.

v) Sociability

A final trait that is important for leaders is Sociability, which refers to a leader's inclination to seek out pleasant social relationship. Leaders who show sociability are friendly, outgoing, courteous, tactful and diplomatic. They are sensitive to others' needs and show concern for their well being. Social leaders have good interpersonal skills and create cooperative relationships with their followers.

Out of the qualities listed above, Nasser and Park both possessed the traits of intelligence and determination, both of which are necessary for the charismatic leadership of personalised regimes. However, in contrast to Nasser's populist attitude, which was supported by his integrity, sociability and self confidence, Park did not have a high enough level of these traits. It is clear that this deficiency could be attributed to his natural characteristics. In addition, there is the strong possibility that Park's complex about his background as a pro-Japanese military officer, his participation in the communist movement, and his overthrow of a civilian democracy, influenced his traits as a leader. As a matter of fact, in the course of his career before seizing power, he did seem to have self-confidence, integrity and sociability to some degree. However, once he came to power, he changed gradually into a much more reserved character and adhered strictly to the single aim of economic development and improvement in the quality of material life. Many scholars, including Ho Jin Kim, have suggested that the dramatic changes in Park's character after he came to power were caused by the legitimacy problem which he had throughout the period of his regime.¹²⁰

Table 3.1 illustrates the overall layout of major traits differences between Nasser and Park.

of Political Leaders (New York: Free Press, 1977)

¹²⁰ Ho Jin Kim, "Leadership and Ruling strategy of Chung Hee Park," *How To Review the Modern History of Korea – Chung Hee Park & 5.16*, Dong-A Ilbo (Dong-A Daily Newspaper ed.) (Seoul: Dong-A Ilbo Sa, 1990) pp.36-38.

Table 3.1 Major Traits of Nasser and Park

Traits	Nasser	Park
Intelligence	Strong	Strong
Determination	Strong	Strong
Self-Confidence	Strong	Weak
Integrity	Strong	Weak
Sociability	Strong	Weak

Nasser and Park shared the characteristics of intelligence and determination. As prominent leaders, their verbal ability and shrewdness were beyond the ordinary level. During their periods in office, both leaders showed clear-cut judgement when confronted with a critical decision. They both had determination to achieve their aims for their countries' future. Although in outward appearance their policy lines were strikingly in contrast, they shared the same tenacity of purpose.

However, in terms of self-confidence, integrity and sociability, there was remarkable contrast between the two leaders. Park was less self-confident than Nasser. Park was somewhat pessimistic and passive. Due to his lack of self-confidence, Park did not attempt to persuade people into actively supporting his regime. On the other hand, Nasser seemed to be full of self confidence. Despite several failures, and despite suffering the blows of severe defeats in a series of wars, he was brimming with confidence, that is, until his defeat in the 1967 War.

Integrity is revealed in a leader's adherence to a strong set of principles, and concerns the honesty and trustworthiness of a leader's behaviour and pledges. Nasser had no trouble at all in this matter, but Park at times showed a lack of integrity, and lost credibility, for example by his inconsistency in political pledges, and several deceptions such as a couple of fraudulent amendments to the Constitution for the purpose of his life-time presidency.

Sociability is an index of a leader's relationship with the populace. According to Jeong Ryum Kim, ex-chief-secretary of the Presidential office, Park was definitely introvert and did not have an affinity with the public.¹²¹ He tended to avoid standing in front of the public, and preferred office work, devoting himself to administration like a bureaucrat. By contrast, Nasser had massive support from the populace. It seemed that Nasser did not have any problems with his sociability.¹²²

¹²¹ Jeong Ryum Kim, *Chung Hee Park* (Seoul: Joong Ang Ilbo Sa, 1997) p.136.

¹²² Interview with Dr. Hoda Abdul Nasser, President Nasser's daughter (8th of March 2000, at Al Ahram Newspaper Company, Cairo, Egypt)

3.2.2. The Situational Approach and the Reciprocal Action Approach

When it comes to leadership analysis, one of the most widely acknowledged approaches is the situational approach. The substance of this approach is simple. Different and complex situations require different kinds of leadership. Northouse illustrated the fact that to be an effective leader requires that an individual adapt the leadership's characteristics to the demands of different situations.¹²³

In other words, as well as the leader's traits, situational factors should be regarded as independent variables in this approach. David C. Korten considered situational variables to be major factors in forming leadership characteristics. He explained the process by which leadership characteristics reflect situational change. The advantage of the situational approach is that it prevents researchers from ignoring even trivial data which might be relevant to the analysis.

However, as with the traits approach, it is impossible to produce general theories with the situational approach. Situations may come to the fore at any time, at any place, without any limitations. Consequently, it is difficult to use situational factors as decisive variables for determining leadership characteristics. In a sense, the empirical procedure and inductive process should include consideration of all situations. In this context, the reciprocal action approach, dealing with mutual relations between the traits variables and situational factors, is worthy of attention.

Based on the reciprocal action approach, Glenn D. Paige identified six basic variables which explain leadership behaviour. Those variables are leader's personality (P), role (R), organisation (O), task (T), value (V), and situation (S). In addition, he devised a theoretical formula using these variables to determine the political leaders' behaviour, as below:

$$\text{PLB (Political Leader's Behaviour)} = f(P, R, O, T, V, S) + e \text{ (e= various variables)}^{124}$$

Paige shows the functional relations between the factors which shape a political leader's behaviour. He supposes that the six basic factors simply play the role of independent variables to cause the formation of the political leader's behaviour (PLB), a dependent variable affected by six factors P, R, O, T, V, S and some other variables. It is clear that those six factors influence the formation of leaders' behaviour. However, in order to look at the formation of the

¹²³ Peter Northouse, *op.cit.*, p.53

¹²⁴ Glenn D. Paige, *The Scientific Study of Political Leadership* (New York: The Free Press, 1977)

leadership behaviour of Nasser and Park, the legitimacy variable should be considered. In this context, this formula could be revised and applied to the case studies as follows:

$$\text{PLB of Nasser and Park} = f \{f(L), O, S\} + e$$

$$f(L) = P, R, T, V$$

$$L(\text{Legitimacy}) = f(PC, P') \text{ (PC = Personal Career, P' = Performance)}$$

The political behaviours of Nasser and Park could be determined by the intermingled actions of the various factors as mentioned above. In order to apply the legitimacy variable, a sub-functional relation formula should be activated. Making an exception of situational factor (S) and organisation factor (O), the rest of variables - P, R, T, V - could be considered to be affected directly by the issue of legitimacy of leaders. The formation of legitimacy depends upon a leader's personal career and performance. In short, personal career and performance establish the legitimacy of the leadership, and the functional relations of this legitimacy affect the formation of P, R, T, V except Situational factors. Functional relations of legitimacy and situational factors finally play the role of determining leadership behaviour, as mentioned above.

According to the functional relations above, there was no difference in basic matters of organisation. But other variables such as personality, role, task, and value were significantly different. Those differences were determined by the issue of legitimacy. Therefore, this reciprocal action formula suggests that the starting point for the formation of political leadership behaviour is the issue of legitimacy.

4. Typology of the Leadership of the Two Regimes

There are two dimensions in the classification of leadership. The first is the individual leader's idiosyncrasies which produce a personality stereotype. The other dimension is the classification of leadership on the basis of their roles as decision makers.

4.1. Idiosyncrasies of Personality

The issue of legitimacy was crucial in determining the style of political leadership of both Nasser and Park. Both leaders had a similar home background, growing up poor, country-bred, and both had similar vocational experiences as military officers as well. However, while Nasser adopted the line of Egypt's liberation from British colonialism, Park opposed the Korean liberation movement for restoring independence from Japan. In addition, since he overthrew the first civilian democratic regime by his military coup, he was forced with the problem of a lack of legitimacy. The difference in terms of legitimacy between the two leaders caused their distinctively different styles. Based on the personality models of political leadership devised by Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle,¹²⁵ three categories of leadership personality are dealt with here in order to clarify Nasser's and Park's personal leadership idiosyncrasies.

4.1.1. Doctrinaire Nasser vs. Opportunist Park - Adherence to Leader's own Ideology and Belief

Every leader has his or her own ideologies or beliefs, no matter whether those ideologies are well articulated or not. Every ideology has its own explicit ideal to aim at, and clearly states the appropriateness and pertinence of this ultimate goal. Leadership may be characterised according to the attitude held by the leader toward that ideology. In Nasser's and Park's cases, we see the contrast between doctrinarism and opportunism. A doctrinaire leader adheres to the ideology or belief system and obstinately persists in his or her own way without

¹²⁵ Ki Taek Lee, *The History of the International Politics – Theoretical Review* (Seoul: Bak Young Sa, 1987), pp.309-329.

compromise. In contrast, an opportunist leader does not show a consistent adherence to a particular ideology. As the situation changes, the leadership's ideological fundamentals or belief systems may be altered. This could be said to be a pragmatic tendency, but frequent changes in political position can also cause credibility problems.

This factor of attitude toward ideology may be approached from two points of view, which are the leader's emotional commitment to his beliefs, and the rational use of these beliefs to form concrete strategies in practical matters. In Nasser's case, both his emotional commitment and his rational application were relatively strong. He consistently adhered to his own beliefs - Arab nationalism and Arab Socialism - except at the very first moment of the seizing power. Although there was a process of trial and error in his efforts to realise Arab cause, and although he sometimes even showed uncertainty and vacillations in executing his policies, the core of the Arab cause was not affected. This consistent adherence to the doctrinal principle of Arab cause makes him a doctrinaire.

On the other hand, Park basically had the attitude of opportunism. This is demonstrated by his career: he was a military officer in the Japanese army during the World War II, but after the War he became a strict anti-Japanese official. And, in spite of his background in joining the communist movement before the Korean War, after the Korean War he betrayed his colleagues in the communist movement of South Korea, S.K.L.P. - *Nam Ro Dang*, and abandoned his passions and beliefs in favour of his safety. As soon as he assumed the reigns of government in 1961, he tried to play down his former characteristics. Using the rhetoric of 'Korean Style Nationalism', he mobilised the people of Korea to share the common goal of rapid economic development that had been set up by his regime. At the same time, he consistently expressed fanatical adherence to the policies of anti-communism. At first glance, he might appear to have doctrinal characteristics, but he had no absolute values or ideals. In terms of ideology, he focused exclusively on developmentalism, which could indicate that Park had no solid and concrete ideology except anti-communism.

4.1.2. Idealist Nasser vs. Realist Park

The classification of doctrinaire and opportunist is derived from the attitude of the leader towards an ideology, as described above. The second classification in terms of idiosyncrasies concerns the idealist and realist categories which are determined by the feasibility of realisation. It is true that a leader who takes full responsibility for a regime cannot be categorised as either a pure idealist or a pure realist. Every political leader must have some

realist characteristics, and he or she is required inevitably to stand in the middle of the spectrum dividing idealism and realism.

However, examples of both the idealist and the realist ends of the spectrum do exist. On the whole, particularly in foreign policy, idealists tend to put universal and eternal values before any other values. In contrast to idealists, the interests and benefits of their own community or nation take priority over all other things.

In terms of priority in policy making, idealist leaders tend to devote themselves to the improvement of the welfare system and the expansion of the social security network. Realist leaders concentrate on rapid economic development. Economic growth is the most important factor to be considered for realist leaders.

In this context, Nasser could be described as an idealist, and Park as a realist character. Under the slogan of Arab cause, Nasser intervened in the Palestine Liberation War and took part in the Yemen War. Realist Park showed exactly the opposite tendency to the idealist Nasser. When Park had to decide whether the South Korean army should take part in the Viet Nam War or not, Park first waited to see the U.S.' promise to provide financial support was going to be kept, and only when the U.S. ambassador, Winthrop G. Brown announced U.S.' military support to Korea as compensation for entry into Viet Nam War did Park send his troops in.¹²⁶

4.1.3. Fighter/Gambler Nasser vs. Planner/Prudent Park

This classification of styles relates to outward appearance when it comes to putting into practice various policies. This classification can be seen particularly when a leader confront problems in policy execution, when he or she may be seen to have the style of a fighter or that of a planner. A fighter style leader tends to act according to his or her intuition, and tackles any challenges, even in deadlocked situations, recklessly and without reluctance, especially in situations related to national dignity. A planner style leader could be described as a commercial

¹²⁶ With regard to Korea's participation in Viet Nam War, two aspects had to be considered. First of all, in order to maintain security in the Korean Peninsula, and to assist Park's economic development drive, two divisions of the U.S. army and one division of the air force were required in the Korean Peninsula as a 'tripwire' to prevent the collapse of the military balance. When the U.S. showed its intention of moving one or two of these divisions to Viet Nam, Park had to decide whether to enter the Viet Nam War. The Brown memorandum guaranteed that the U.S. would not move any of its forces to Viet Nam if the Korean army joined in the war. *Chosun Daily Newspaper*, 10th of March 1966, 29th of June 1965, quoted in Dong A Ilbo Sa, *How To Review the Modern History of Korea* (Seoul: Dong-A Ilbo Sa, 1990) pp.204-213. Secondly, financial benefit from the U.S. was considered to be the main motivation for taking part in the war. As a result of the participation of the Korean army in the Viet Nam War, from 1965 to 1970, the U.S. government supported \$9.27 billion total. That amount of money was critical for re-vitalising the Korean economy. Gap Je Cho, *Spit on My Grave - Biography of Park Chung Hee Vol.6*, (Seoul: Chosun Ilbo Sa, 2001) pp.366-357.

leader who would be interested in calculations of profit and loss. This type of leader does not want to be the principal actor but would prepare to operate behind the scenes. Sometimes, the planner style of leadership can be said to be discreet leadership which is somewhat indecisive.

Nasser was one of the most prominent examples of fighter style leaders. At crucial moments, he played for high stakes in spite of the existence of risks.¹²⁷ The most prominent example is the series of incidents about the time of the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956. Right after the withdrawal of financial support by the U.S. for building the Aswan High Dam, Nasser turned more determinedly toward the U.S.S.R. With the help of the U.S.S.R., Nasser was emboldened to nationalise the Suez Canal. In fact, in the eyes of Britain and France, Nasser's regime was considered a real threat to the vested rights of Western colonial powers in the Middle East. Thus, the Suez Canal Crisis provided the British and French with an opportunity to eradicate Nasser's regime and his influence in the Middle East. They tried to seize the Suez Canal and the surrounding area. Their plans were aborted, because the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. intervened in order to prevent any unexpected escalation.¹²⁸

Park's leadership style was that of a typical planner. His main consideration at every stage of policy enforcement was the statement of profits and losses as a result of policy execution. Outwardly, his strong economic development drive appeared to be led by a fighter style leadership, but, as a matter of fact, the economic development programme was a carefully drawn up plan, and it was carried out according to minutely detailed smaller plans without any digressions. His calculations were extremely detailed. In developing four stages of economic development programmes, Park played the role of expert official in charge of every phase as well as that of President. He performed elaborate analyses and predictions concerning the overall agenda for public administration like an experienced bureaucrat.¹²⁹

Park managed overall national security issues in a cool, unemotional manner. When a North Korean guerrilla attempted to assassinate Park at his presidential residence on 21st of January 1968, the threat of war hung over the Korean Peninsula. Park managed and controlled this crisis in collaboration with the U.S. The assassination of the first lady Young Soo Yook by a North Korean secret agent in 1974 at the ceremony for National Liberation Day, and the brutal murder of two American officers by North Korean soldiers at the Panmunjom which is the neutral area for conferences between North Korea and the U.N. Commission Officers in the

¹²⁷ Interview with Mr. Sami Sharaf, former director of central intelligence unit in Nasser's government. (6th of March, 2000 at Heliopolis, Cairo)

¹²⁸ Lawrence Ziring, *op.cit.*, pp.358-359.

¹²⁹ In Park's autobiography *State, Revolution and Me*, there are far more references to economic statistics and numerical statements than there are to his personal experiences. Particularly, Chapter II of that book covers the details of the economic situations and the targets of the development programmes which were carried out by Park.

Joint Security Area in 1974, seriously threatened the security of the Korean Peninsula. However, Park cool-headedly managed to prevent the outbreak of war. Many commentators evaluated Park's actions at those moments as the deeds of a well-trained leader who is good at handling the practical details of politics and who does not lose his temper.

4.2. Role Orientation of Leaderships

The other criterion for classification of leadership characteristics is the 'role orientation' of leaders, which refers to the central concern leaders choose for their strategy. This criterion directly influenced the formation of the two regimes' characteristics.

By using this criterion, two comparable leadership tendencies may be identified, which are the popularity-oriented (follower-centred) leadership and the task-oriented bureaucrat leadership. Popularity-oriented leadership has a solid base of mass support from the people and various other sectors in the country, and it exercises autonomous and active leadership. A task-oriented regime sets up a national agenda for concrete programmes as the most important target to be fulfilled, and concentrates on the performance of various programmes by putting much emphasis on tasks. This type of leadership tends to be able to achieve an efficient performance by the regime much more easily.

Even though Nasser's regime consisted of a military authoritarian government, it was a follower-oriented populist regime which gained massive support from the people. Consequently, despite a certain amount of disorganisation and inconsistencies in economic and foreign policy during the first stage of the regime, Nasser never lost people's support during his reign.

Park's regime, on the other hand, was a typical task-oriented regime. It had the character of an entrepreneurial state. Not only did Park lack mass support from the people, he was also troubled by strong anti-regime sentiments that spread amongst intellectuals and students. He suppressed and controlled anti-regime sentiments and the people's passion for democracy with the tools of a formidable anti-communist ideology and a strong drive towards economic development. He perceived that the regime's life would rely on the success of economic development programmes. Thus, he consistently stood at the forefront of economic development and formed an exemplary task-oriented leadership of an entrepreneur state.

4.2.1. Nasser's Popularity-Oriented (Follower-Centred) Regime - Political

See Chung Hee Park, *State, Revolution and Me* (Seoul: Ji Gu Chon, 1997) pp.95-138.

leader as Statesman

As mentioned above, Nasser's leadership, according to the role orientation criteria, could be categorised as a 'popularity / follower – oriented' leadership. His regime's reform programmes and the emphasis of his administration were determined by his aim to satisfy the desires of the people and to govern in their interests. Nasser's Egypt was one of the populist regimes.

The foundation of Nasser's follower-oriented regime was the fact that Nasser had gained sufficient legitimacy to secure autonomy without the problems which the old regime or the propertied classes might have caused. Park was only concerned with the pursuit of profit and rapid development with the help of a small number of capitalists and technocrats, and he totally ignored the concerns and interests of the people. By contrast, Nasser blamed the bureaucrats and politicians for their corrupt nature and incompetence. He tried to establish a new people-centred political system. Examples of this attempt were the Liberation Rally, the National Union and the Arab Socialist Union.

Nasser conducted a land reform policy for the purposes of eradicating the feudal system and captivating the peoples' hearts. In the aftermath of land reform, he designed a series of populist 'state capitalism' policies in order to create populist state. Although it might have been mere rhetoric, his catchphrase 'Arab cause' for Arab Nationalism penetrated the minds of people throughout the whole country. In this context, his appeals for the Arab cause were very persuasive.

In his foreign policy, he took into account Arab pride and Egyptian dignity as well as actual benefits. Under the severe Cold War system, his policy of non-alignment as a prominent leader of a post-colonial country put him high in public estimation. For example, the Suez Crisis was the incident which restored Arab pride and eradicated defeatism in Egypt once and for all. In addition, his persistent refusal to join the Baghdad Pact was seen as a courageous action.

However, there were limitations in his populist drive and in his efforts to create a socialist economy. Those limitations caused the problems of inefficiency which undermined the solidity of the regime without, however, seriously affecting its security. In addition to this inefficiency, immoderate foreign projects, such as the intervention in Yemen, and enormous support for the liberation of African states like Algeria are now seen as excessive.¹³⁰ These cases are examples of inconsiderate actions caused by Nasser's over-passionate idealism, which

¹³⁰ Interview with Dr. Muhammad Said Selim, Faculty of Politics and Economics (5th of March, 2000, Cairo University) Dr. Selim argues that the excessive ambition of Nasser to be a regional leader in the African, Arab, and Islamic circles caused structural inefficiency and financial crisis in Egypt.

would not be found in the entrepreneur-type leadership of a task-oriented regime like Park's.

With this follower-oriented populist leadership, Nasser established the 'inclusionary – extrovert' characteristics of his regime. Seeking regional hegemony was the main target of Nasser's regime.

4.2.2. Park's Task-Oriented Regime - Political leader as Entrepreneur¹³¹

Park's regime could be categorised as a 'task-oriented' leadership which disregarded people's desires and expectations, and sought his own ends. This leadership could be called an entrepreneur leadership due to its similarities to the C.E.O. (Chief Executive Officer) leadership of private companies. He proclaimed a moratorium in improvements to the welfare system, the social security network, fair distribution, human rights and freedom, and justice and equality, until the economic situation had fulfilled various stated conditions. In stead of realising improvements in these areas, he focused on the improvement of the regime's efficiency and on its security.

He described the most important role of the President of Korea as that of supervisor of economic development.¹³² Consequently, he adhered to his master plan for development throughout the whole administrative system. He would personally supervise all plans, processes and results. Indeed, he played the roles of planner, executive, and supervisor, as an entrepreneur type leader.

Park's leadership style can be described as that of an authoritarian who saw himself as a sort of guide in a patriarchal society. He constantly examined detailed programmes of economic development and examined every doubtful point. Although, he had an authoritarian ruling style, he was quite different from the pre-modern authoritarian leaders who were influenced by the Confucian mentality of patrimonialism. Rather, he played the role of President of Korea as a chief businessman or planner of public administration. The most important factor for him was the regime's security and stability, and he was of the opinion that he could not maintain his regime without proper legitimacy acquired through popularity. He decided to make his own propaganda for the target fulfilment and attainment of his goals through rapid economic development.

In other words, as a result of his initial lack of legitimacy, the only type of leadership open to Park was the task-oriented type of leadership. The most feasible way to gain stability for

¹³¹ Eugene Lewis, "The Political Leader as Entrepreneur," in *Political Leadership*, Barbara Kellerman (ed.) (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986) pp.250-264.

a leadership which did not have adequate legitimacy or charisma was to demonstrate positive results to the people as soon as possible. Temporarily gained popularity, made by showmanship or any particular disguising gestures to impress the people, without solid support base from the people's attachment, was not making any difference at his situation. Therefore, he took the way of task-oriented leadership to direct the developmentalism.

Despite its various problems, it is true that Park's regime achieved a high rate of economic growth and improved the overall quality of life throughout the country. From 1962 to 1978, the Korean economy showed consistent growth by achieving an average annual growth rate of 9.4%. To say the least, in the field of economic development, Park's task-oriented leadership was successful. However, serious problems still existed, such as the lack of democracy, human rights and fair distribution. The strong emphasis on efficiency was the reason behind Park's choice of an excessive centralised organisation and mobilisation system. As a result of this excessive centralisation, the policy making process became stiff, and the apparatus for collecting public opinions came to become closed. In addition to that, the concept of profit became the most precious value throughout the country, which consequently became dominated by an excessively competitive spirit. That excessive competitive spirit caused inter-regional and inter-industrial inequality, and elite centralism.¹³³

¹³² Chung Hee Park, *op.cit.*, p.45.

¹³³ Ho Jin Kim, *op.cit.*, p.437.

5. Summary

This chapter examined the matter of legitimacy and explored a typology of the leadership of the two regimes in order to clarify both regimes' difference and its implication. The concept of legitimacy was exemplified as an independent variable for leadership characteristics formation as well as an influential factor for regime's security and stability, followed by proposition of the approaches to Nasser and Park' leadership traits.

It has been noted that many studies about the legitimacy and leadership have been carried out in order to understand the nature of political power relations. In developing countries which demonstrate highly personalised political regime, the legitimacy issues are crucial for regime's stability and security due to low-level of political institutionalisation.

In this chapter, with the comparative framework of legitimacy and leadership characteristics, the different features between Nasser and Park and noticeable typology of traits, idiosyncrasies, and role orientation of both leaderships were proposed. As the result of exemplification, the nature of Nasser's leadership may be described as **'sufficient level of legitimacy - doctrinaire / idealist / fighter style – popularity oriented'** leadership. In contrast, Park's leadership can be classified as **'insufficient degree of legitimacy – opportunist / realist / planner style – task oriented'** leadership. These sequential differences in typology of both leaderships caused the regime's characteristics - **'Nasser's inclusionary / extrovert regime and Park's exclusionary / introvert regime'**.

In this context, following chapter is to demonstrate the ideology formations and its domestic applications of both regimes. In order to explain both regimes' nature in a concrete way, the following chapter emphasises Nasser and Park's ideologies as their solid epistemological attitude and subsequent applications in domestic policy as a tool of finding shape of both regimes' intrinsic attributes.

IV. FORMATION OF IDEOLOGY & ITS DOMESTIC APPLICATIONS

1. Introduction

In this chapter, the epistemology of both regimes is dealt with in terms of ideology formation. Exploring and analysing the ideology of a particular regime is an essential part of the process of understanding the regime's characteristics, since most of the policies and outputs of political regimes are formed on the basis of an ideology.

The approach adopted when analysing the ideology of a Western country where democracy is practised is quite different from the approach adopted when analysing the ideology of non-democratic Third World country. One of the most important roles of ideology in Western countries lies in providing various options of policy-making to the people, who then have the right to choose by means of the voting system. From a wide spectrum of policies they are able to choose whatever they want in line with the genuine needs of the situation. The ideological spectrum may provide the people with many options. This is the typical role of ideology in Western Europe. By this mechanism of ideology, the various demands of the people converge into an appropriate policy through the institutionalised voting system.

On the other hand, in Third World countries, particularly in newly emerging countries or those with new military governments, ideology functions in totally different ways from in the West. The roles of ideology in Third World countries lie mainly in integrating and mobilising the populations. Through frequent and incremental political upheavals over a long period of time, Western countries have been able to achieve a high level of integration through the democratic process. However, in many developing countries in the Third World, the possibilities of achieving political consensus are relatively rare, because in many cases political regimes rose to power through sudden political upheavals. In this context, because national integration was seen as the crucial element for a regimes' security, many leaders of Third World countries tried to develop mechanisms which would achieve such integration.

According to Dekmejian, the two obstructions to national integration are the absence

of a strong sense of personal and national identity and the lack of a concordance between subjects and rulers.¹³⁴ He described ideology as a method of providing the people with a set of values and myths that would lead to national integration. He examined this idea in the context of the Third World.¹³⁵ In Dekmejian's view, a minimum of ideology is essential before the task of nation-building can even begin.

In this context, one of the major functions of ideology is to unite 'idea (thought)' and 'practice (action)'¹³⁶. Ideology legitimises a regime's actions. While in developed countries, policies are made through the discussions and considerations that are produced by ideological premises, in Third World countries ideology performs the role of justifying the actions and policies of the government on the basis of their 'superior morality' and 'rationality'. They persuade and sometimes even force people to accept their policies by means of an ideology that they have constructed for their own sake.

By using this process repeatedly, the government's ideology acquires legitimacy and becomes a powerful tool in ruling the people. After an ideology is widely propagated and internalised, it acquires its own dynamics, whereby it restricts thoughts and limits actions. Regimes in countries that came into being after World War II made particular efforts to establish their legitimacy as quickly as possible. They tried to create concrete ideologies to satisfy the people. Nasser and Park were in this position.

In this chapter, the two major ideologies introduced by Nasser and Park are examined. In order to investigate the nature of each of these regimes, the first important step is to track their ideological attitudes and their maturing process. By doing this, it is possible to draw a clear distinction between Nasserism – a positive and offensive ideology and Parkism – a negative and defensive ideology.

¹³⁴ R.Hrair Dekmejian, *Egypt under Nasir - a Study in Political Dynamics* (London: University of London Press, 1972) p.48.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ George I. Blanksten, "Ideology and Nation-Building in the Contemporary World," *International Studies Quarterly* Vol.11, No.1 (March 1967) pp.3-4.

2. Overall Review of the Ideologies of the Two Regimes

The term 'Nasserism' has been broadly accepted and used in the academic arena of Middle East Politics. Nasser's political ideology may be categorised as one of the most important in the Middle East in the 1960s and 1970s. As recently as 1997, a conference on 'Nasserism' held by the Moshe Dayan Centre in Israel testified to the significant implications and profound impact of Nasserism, in spite of fact that Nasser had passed away almost 30 years previously.

As seen by the hyperbolic expression of Muhammad Hassanain Heikal, "In Egypt, Nasserism was *hukm* (rule), but elsewhere in the Arab world, it was *hulm* (a dream)"¹³⁷, Nasserism has various implications in Middle East politics and was one of the most important key points from which to access the core of Middle East politics in the 1960s and the 1970s. Nasser's ideology aimed to play the role of compass, in order to find a way to the ultimate destination of the Arab people's prosperity, and in order to seek the crucial map which would show the glorious future of the Middle East at that time.

However, nowadays, three decades after his death, Nasserism is considered to be a moribund ideology. Even though some nostalgia remains, Nasser's successor, President Anwar Sadat, tried to obliterate Nasser's legacy by replacing Nasserism with an open-door policy (*infitah*), and by taking a pro-Israel stance. This was a new phase in Egyptian politics. Sadat aimed to extinguish all the passion and ambitions of Nasser and to adopt the policies of Western capitalist states in order to introduce a new dependent development strategy with capital aid from the West. This was diametrically opposed to Nasser's policy of non-alignment and commitment to Arab cause. The present President Hosni Mubarak has adopted the same approach as Sadat. In the final analysis, many commentators have concluded that Nasserism is defunct. In their opinion, none of the variables of Nasserism remain relevant vis-à-vis the Middle East. Particularly since the collapse of the Cold War system, the outstanding features of Nasser's non-alignment policy seem to have lost their meaning.

Nevertheless, there are still many people who have a strong attachment to Nasser.¹³⁸ Certain people at the grass roots even regard him as Salah al-Din's (Saladin) reincarnation.

¹³⁷ Fouad Ajami, *The Arab Predicament*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) p.68, quoted in Woodward, *op.cit.*, p.97.

¹³⁸ For young students, Nasserism is considered to be one of the effective alternative methods for creating prosperity in the Arab countries even nowadays. At Cairo University, there are some active groups doing research on Nasser's ideology who aim to realise Nasser's philosophy in Egypt. They call Nasser 'Nasser the Great'.

Muhammad Said Selim analyses this symptom with regard to the present situation of deprivation in Egypt.¹³⁹ After Nasser's death, there arose a mentality amongst the Egyptian people that Egyptian national honour had been besmirched and that her self-respect as an outstanding Arab leader severely damaged. In this context, it is worthwhile taking a close look into Nasser's ideology and its formation process, in order to understand the nature of his regime. Whether Nasserism was a well-organised ideology or not, it may nonetheless be regarded as a picturesque ideology expressing the Arab mentality.

Especially now, having been through such turmoils as the Gulf and Afghanistan Wars, the Arab people have begun seriously to question the basis of their self-respect. It seems that the Arab cause is on the brink of catastrophe. In these circumstances, Nasserism could yet be one of the empirical options to be considered as a methodological alternative for restoring prosperity of the Arab world.

It was also necessary for Park's regime to engineer a relevant ideology. However, in Park's case, there were no explicit features in the formation of his ideology. Whereas Nasser proclaimed a striking policy of non-alignment, and took the initiative in the Middle East with the notable ideologies of Arab nationalism and Arab socialism, Park had very few options to choose from for his own regime. After the Korean War, in the ongoing quasi-war situation, he had to follow the Eisenhower doctrine as leader of the front-line country of the U.S. This was the only choice open to him if he wanted to keep his regime secure with help from the U.S.

Consequently, Park carried out his own policies in strict accordance with the U.S. initiative. With this devotion to U.S. strategy, he was able to obtain financial and military support from the U.S., which allowed him to concentrate on domestic affairs. In comparison with Nasserism, Park's ideology could be described as a self-defensive and passive ideology. In this context, strict anti-communism along the lines of McCarthyism¹⁴⁰ prevailed throughout

¹³⁹ Interview on 5th of March 2000 at the Department of Politics and Economics, Cairo University.

¹⁴⁰ Throughout the 1940s and 1950s America was overwhelmed with concerns about the threat of communism growing in Eastern Europe and China. Capitalising on those concerns, a young senator named Joseph McCarthy made a public accusation that more than two hundred "card-carrying" communists had infiltrated the United States government. Though eventually his accusations were proven to be untrue, and he was censured by the Senate for unbecoming conduct, his zealous campaigning ushered in one of the most repressive times in 20th-century American politics.

While the House Un-American Activities Committee had been formed in 1938 as an anti-Communist organ, McCarthy's accusations heightened the political tensions of the times. Known as McCarthyism, the paranoid hunt for infiltrators was notoriously difficult for writers and entertainers, many of whom were labeled communist sympathisers and were unable to continue working. Some had their passports taken away, while others were jailed for refusing to give the names of other communists. The trials, which were well publicized, could often destroy a career with a single unsubstantiated accusation. Amongst those well-known artists accused of communist sympathies or called before the committee were Dashiell Hammett, Waldo Salt, Lillian Hellman, Lena Horne, Paul Robeson, Arthur Miller, Aaron Copland, Leonard Bernstein, Charlie Chaplin and Group Theatre members Clifford Odets, Elia Kazan, and Stella Adler. In all, three hundred and twenty artists were blacklisted, and for

South Korea. Park tried to set up a system of controlled capitalism with just a few military-based elites and capitalists who were obedient to the government. In doing this, he needed to stick to a strongly anti-communist ideology in order to coerce those who protested against the government, and this drove him to develop a rigid ideological attitude.

Some intellectuals who sought to establish genuine democracy felt a deep hatred of the government's repressive anti-communist ideology. Ironically, however, over the past decade, Park's rigid ideology, hated so much by elites at the time, has become the object of adoration amongst modern elites, due to the incompetent performances produced by the civil democratic governments since the collapse of the military regime.

As mentioned before, while Nasser's ideology may be categorised as an active and dynamic one, Park's ideology could be described as possessing a passive and negative character. These characteristics of the ideology adopted by each regime played an important part as independent variables. These ideological differences led to different outputs of policies as dependent variables. Before discussing these differences in detail, however, it is important to examine the nature of ideology in general. The first task of this chapter is therefore to explore the general concepts of ideology, which will make it easier to understand both regimes' characteristics.

many of them this meant the end of exceptional and promising careers.

During this time there were few in the press willing to stand up against McCarthy and the anti-Communist machine. Amongst those few were comedian Mort Sahl, and journalist Edward R. Murrow, whose strong criticisms of McCarthy are often cited as playing an important role in his eventual removal from power. By 1954, the fervour had died down and many actors and writers were able to return to work. Though relatively short, these proceedings remain one of the most shameful moments in modern U.S. history.

Taken from <http://www.pbs.org/wnet/americanmasters/database/mccarthyism.html>



3. Theoretical Review of Ideology

3.1. The Concepts and Origins of the Term 'Ideology'

The term 'ideology' was brought into existence by post-Enlightenment thinkers and ideologues. They regarded this term as indicating a 'Science of ideas'. For them ideology was just a temporary means for eradicating illusionary prejudices and for getting to the truth.

As Yoo points out "all the ideas of human-beings originate from the senses"¹⁴¹, all ideas start from the senses. Senses that are consistent and logical produce organised thought. This type of thought then constructs a series of beliefs, ideas, and values that produce the reasonable attitudes of man.

Whenever people organise their senses, the essential first step is to have consistent criteria for observing, analysing and evaluating their own senses. It is impossible for man to speculate without concrete criteria. Because without criteria, standards, creed and a dogmatic framework, men cannot have their own views, and it is necessary to have an ideological outlook when political situations are analysed.¹⁴² Inside every dynamic society, there must be a systematic network of faiths, values, objects and traditions. Ideology plants this network into every member of a society. The internalised network is ideology.¹⁴³

In other words, ideology is an organised belief system of society members towards politics and political values.¹⁴⁴ Although Daniel D.Raphael satirises ideology as "prescriptive doctrine that is not supported by rational argument",¹⁴⁵ internalised systems of ideology are important amongst the criteria needed to appreciate political situations and to legitimise certain political actions. One of the major roles of ideology is that of mediator between a government and the people.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴¹ Joon Soo Yoo (ed.), *Modern Society and Ideology* (Seoul: Koryo Won, 1983) p.11.

¹⁴² David Flaker, *Marxism, Ideology and Myth* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1971) pp.8-9.

¹⁴³ Daniel Bell, "Ideology and Soviet Politics," in Richard Cordell (ed.), *The Soviet Politics System: A Book for Reading* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970) p.105.

¹⁴⁴ Karl Lowenstein's description of ideology is that of an integrated pattern to explain the human attitude toward the life and existence of man in society. Karl Lowenstein, "Political Systems, Ideologies and Institutions: The Problem of Their Circulation," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol.IV, No.4 (1953), p. 691. Quoted in Geuk Chan Lee, *Politics* (Seoul: Bupmoon Sa, 1987) p.301.

¹⁴⁵ David D. Raphael, *Problems of Political Philosophy* (London: Macmillan, 1990) p.17.

¹⁴⁶ Duk Kyu Chin, *Modern Politics* (Seoul: Hakmoon Gwa Sasang Sa, 1993), p.216.

3.2. Constituent Factors of Ideology

Goran Therborn enumerates the constituent parts of ideology by asking the following three questions.¹⁴⁷ First, ‘What exists in real?’, and ‘What does not exist?’ In other words, ‘Who am I?’, ‘What is this world?’, ‘How were nature, society, human being created?’ Being faced with these questions and trying to find the answers, the substantial identity of real existence may be established and we analogise what the real world is. This is the first epistemological step of ideology formation, which can act as a basis for understanding our present situation and historical context. Nasser and Park must have tried to consider and evaluate their own situations, and this would have been the starting point for the formation of their ideologies. This is related to the interpretation of the present situation as a epistemological function of ideology.

Because ideology contains the mechanisms for responding to present situations, it must also contain the criteria for analysing and interpreting the political situation. With these criteria, ideology makes conjunctions with real situations. Ideology does not transcend the political realities and historical context.

Secondly, ‘What is good?’ ‘What is real justice, beauty, attraction and what is worth seeking?’ and ‘What are the opponents of those?’ By asking these questions, what we want and seek can be visualised. At the level of regime, leaders try to set up their ideal values in order to run their own governments, according to their idea of the ideal state, the values of ideology, and regulations in line with their concepts of justice.

Ideology draws a picture of a utopian situation. At this point, ideology has to ask itself ‘What ought to be?’ As Sargent comments, ideology presents a generalised map about what one should do and what society should be to the people. It simplifies the complicated world in order to make it more understandable.¹⁴⁸ It is necessary to explore Nasser’s and Park’s epistemology of aims (ideal states) in this thesis.

Thirdly, ‘What is possible and impossible?’ By considering this matter, ideology can be more realistically and feasibly formulated. It is thus related to the concrete, practical method of making the ideology come true, and includes various methods, prescriptions, institutions, and procedures. Ingersoll states that ideology has its own evaluating system and viewpoint of the future. For a better future, every strategy to be adopted by a particular regime is controlled by

¹⁴⁷ Goran Therborn, *The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology* (London: Verso, 1980) pp.18-19.


¹⁴⁸ L. T. Sargent, *Contemporary Political Ideologies*, rev. ed. (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1972), p. 1. Quoted in Myung Nam Lee, “A Study on the Structure and Functions of Political Ideology,” Ph.D. dissertation, (Seoul: Yonsei University, 1985), p.43.

ideology. He emphasises this practical strategy as being the core of ideology formation. These strategies are manifested as various types of policy.¹⁴⁹

3.3. Process of Ideology Formation

The formation and evolution of a ruling ideology is not merely the product of the thinking of a small number of elites or ideologues. It also requires various foundations and situations on which to develop. On these foundations, consistent and logical ideas will be organised by ideologues. And these ideologues firmly believe that people in society should accept these ideas. Through people’s acceptance, a universal dominant ideology for the era could emerge.

Figure 4.1. Stages of Ideology Formation¹⁵⁰



¹⁴⁹ David E. Ingersoll, *Communism, Fascism and Democracy* (Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1971), quoted in Myung Nam Lee, *op.cit.*, p.43.

¹⁵⁰ Duk Kyu Chin, *op.cit.*, pp.224-225.

According to Figure 4.1, the basic necessary conditions for ideology formation are historical context, people's desires, and traditions. All the foundational conditions converge into a general discourse that reflects all the situations of the society in question. If this general discourse is accepted by the society, it develops into a systematic theory. Social elites make policies in line with this theoretical infrastructure. The performance of these policies is reviewed and evaluated afterwards. After going through these dialectic processes certain paradigms are constructed. These paradigms could evolve into a systematic epistemology. This ideology has to be revised and modified through continuous feedback in line with the situations of the society. If there are great changes in the historical context, then a new discourse might come to the fore, and ideology transition could occur.

In this general process, a point worth nothing is the role of the specific leaders in non-institutionalised countries. The critical choice of policy is in their hands and they can intervene in the process of constructing a discourse, and sometimes manipulate public opinion. As in the cases of Nasser and Park, this kind of action makes the ruling ideology subservient to the regime.

Sometimes, there are struggles and conflicts in the process of constructing this ruling ideology, when leaders try to impose a particular ideology without gaining consensus from the people. This might cause a crisis for the regime. The management of ideology and its imposition are crucial tasks for leaders of newly emerging countries.

3.4. Dominant Ideology vs. Ruling Ideology

One of the important features of the ideological analysis in this chapter is the differentiation between 'the ruling ideology' and 'the dominant ideology'. The ideological suffix '-ism' denotes the long history of an ideology. Sometimes, an '-ism' evolves into new phases according to circumstances, and sometimes certain '-isms' disappear. Consequently, this kind of ideology is the reflection of a society's overall situation and the accumulation of a society's views. This comprehensive ideology dominates a society no matter who the leader is. This is known as the dominant ideology.

Dominant ideologies are formulated through a long process of frequent feedback. Historical contexts and situations are fused into dominant ideologies. Members of a society

should sympathise with this ideology. These dominant ideologies are related to causality of the social structure. For example, the dominant ideology of Marxism sets the existence of a dominant class - capitalist - forth as a premise.¹⁵¹ Such an ideology is not simply an '-ism', but was reflected in the features of a society which served to defend the ruling class. Thus ideologies were the 'legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic' principles that reinforced capitalist society.¹⁵²

Dominant ideologies are formed from various political situations, cultural backgrounds, and people's consciousness, etc. Eysenck classified the process of dominant ideology formation and its effects on society. He suggested four stages of ideology formation, which has a pyramid shape: i) acknowledgement of the facts, ii) having certain opinions on those facts, iii) activating attitudes to respond to those facts, iv) ideology. Eysenck suggested that from the very first stage of awareness of a specific fact to the final stage of the completion of a particular ideology, the process of accepting and rejecting certain issues continues. Through this process, a form of ideology may finally be set up.¹⁵³ This is a typical point of view of the inductive process of ideology formation. Most dominant ideologies have been developed through this process.

The other main type of ideology is the ruling ideology, which is defined as a specific regime produced in a short while for effective ruling performance. It is made by regimes and disseminated by them without considerable time for review. Nasser and Park's ideologies can be categorised as this type of ideology. Illogical and irrational ideologies have rare chances to become established and accepted by the people. So those who devise and introduce a ruling ideology into their respective societies must consider the fact that they have to develop their ideologies into the shape of the dominant ideology in the future.

Every regime should have consistency, concrete targets that need to be achieved and articulated logic with which to persuade the people. Those who create ruling ideologies are constantly considering this formation. Nasser and Park both gained power by means of coups, and they needed to construct their respective ruling ideologies as quickly as possible. Due to the sudden collapse of the *ancien regimes*, chaotic situations of political unpredictableness followed right after the coup in both countries. In these circumstances, each leader had to explain why he had to come to the forefront of politics, what he was going to do, and decide how to demonstrate his capability to eradicate all the corruption and incompetence of the outgoing regime. For each of them, ideology was simply any kind of symbolic pattern that

¹⁵¹ Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (Moscow: Progress Press, 1976) p.67.; The argument about dominant ideology in Marxism may be found in Nicolas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill & Bryan S. Turner, *The Dominant Ideology Thesis* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980) pp.7-11.

¹⁵² Karl Mark & Friedrich Engels, *Selected Works in One Volume* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1984) p.5.

¹⁵³ Hans .J.Eysenck, *The Psychology of Politics* (London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1968) pp.111-113.

served to provide the people with a political identity and direct their political attitudes, whether it had special distinguishing features or not.

In a developed society, it is believed that a particular ideology that supports a radical political movement will perish. When Daniel Bell predicted the end of ideology, he asserted that the 20th century would not be motivated by outmoded ideology but activated by technology and new modes of systems.¹⁵⁴ He thought Marxism was invented and introduced under the impulse of a radical revolutionary drive. It is true that Marx and Hegel discussed this kind of impulse.

He suggests that once a particular ideology acquires a concrete form, the ideology itself will disappear. But when he declared the end of ideology in 1962, the whole world was suffering from the mutual resentments of the two greatest ideological alliances. More importantly, many ruling ideologies which were devised by the Third World's leaders, such as Nasserism and Parkism, were embarking on a new phase of realisation.

This kind of ruling ideology was far from such dominant ideologies as Liberalism, Democratism, Capitalism, and Socialism. The ideologies introduced by the Third World military regimes were to a certain extent improvised. Their sequences of logic were weak. Nevertheless, there is still reason to explore these ruling ideologies, however improvised, since they provide a touchstone for understanding and evaluating the regime's characteristics. It is necessary to observe how the ideologies changed and where they were headed.

In short, the process of creating ruling ideologies is deductive. Such ideologies could be said to be transplanted ideologies, which have been devised in response to the specific intentions of leaders or ideologues. In a chaotic society, newly emerging leaders of that society would invent or import a particular ideology in order to guarantee their regime's security and to attain their own goals.

Roger Eatwell invented the appropriate category of 'ideology as elite power'. This approach relates more to the way in which elites seek to ensure conformity and support. In the past - Nasser and Park's era - this may have focused on physical repression, but at present, media moguls, or even the state education system, are more typically seen as the basis of conformity.¹⁵⁵ Nasser and Park's ideologies, which are explored in this thesis, may be considered to be ideology standing on the personal intentions as Eatwell proposed above. As ideologies of leader's power, Nasserism and Parkism are surely the ruling ideologies.

¹⁵⁴ Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties* (N.Y.: Collier Books, 1962)

¹⁵⁵ Roger Eatwell, *Contemporary Political Ideologies* (London: Pinter, 1999) p.3.

3.5. Prominent Ideologies in the Middle East and East Asia

3.5.1. Ideologies in the Middle East

In the Third World countries, particularly the newly emerging regimes of the Middle East, the power to influence was limited. The new regimes' own authority did not work properly in governing the countries. People's concerns and participation were limited to parochial matters. Political actions and feedback worked only at the level of small communities or village unit.¹⁵⁶ The central governments of newly emerging countries experienced difficulties in their desire to acquire strong public support, and there was a lack of efficiency in government administration. Amongst the people there was concern that their authentic political discourse would be damaged by Western influences.¹⁵⁷ Under these conditions, religion-based identity and ethnicity-based identity came to the forefront of the ideological spectrum in the Middle East.

One of the main reasons for the rising importance of a religion-based ideology such as Islam, and an ethnicity-based ideology such as Arab nationalism, was the radical change in traditional values and norms caused by the impact of the modern world. Robert Bellah argues that traditional values contradicted the developmental logic of the modern world.¹⁵⁸ He notes that traditional society had been controlled by a prescriptive value system. In his view, the important thing in that type of society was to keep the system running by the 'mechanism of prescription and obedience', not by 'democratic mechanisms'. This value system had a comprehensive and broad influence over traditional society, which has been associated with the catechisms of religion or attachment to ethnic homogeneity. Thus, rigid leaders who retain these traditional values tend to stick to the fundamental ideology of religion or nationalism.

Bellah suggests that major changes would be necessary in these societies in order to overcome the rigid traditional values and to proceed to a new phase of political and economic development. Movements propelled by sacred religious initiatives, for example, rather than external value systems could challenge the traditional society more successfully.¹⁵⁹ One of the reasons behind the dramatic emergence of Islam fundamentalism in the Middle East lies in this context.

¹⁵⁶ Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernising the Middle East* (New York: The Free Press, 1958), p. 47.

¹⁵⁷ Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in David Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 64.

¹⁵⁸ Robert Bellah, "Religious Aspects of Modernisation in Turkey and Japan," in Jason. L. Finkle and Richard. W. Gable, *Political Development and Social Change* (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 183-190.

The term 'social solidarity' is an important one to consider with respect to the identity of the Middle East. Primordial factors like language, ethnicity and tribe are related to the production and maintenance of social solidarity and individual identity. The nationalism of Third World countries is an embodiment of those primitive factors. There were severe identity and culture crises in the Middle East after World War II, where independence movements prevailed. Nationalism functioned to alleviate these tensions and strengthen solidarity. The best way to establish the authority of a new government in the Middle East was through nationalism. It merged all the primitive identities of the society into one consenting synthesis – the nation, which prevented societies from system break-up. Arab nationalism, which is one of the most outstanding features of ideology in the Middle East is in the same category. In the process of moving from anti-imperialism to post-colonialism, the nationalist idea of the 'Arab cause' gained in influence, and played an important role in creating solidarity amongst the Arab peoples against imperialism.

Bruce Borthwick classified the significant features of ideology transformation in the Middle East under the heading 'ideological changes after 1798'. He itemised four major features of the ideologies in the Middle East, which are liberal democracy, Islamic fundamentalism, Arab socialism and communism.¹⁶⁰

Liberal democracy, which culminated right after World War II, was the best option for those who were desperate to be liberated from the oppressions of Shahs, Sultans and Kings. It was introduced as an enlightened ideology which could be used to destroy the exploiting system that had been handed down by the Ottoman Empire. It was considered as an efficient tool for providing economic prosperity by propelling technological progress in conjunction with affiliation with the West. However, some countries which adopted the democratic ideology as a constitutional law had to face side effects, such as an economic crisis and the instability of the regime. Particularly, the defeat in the first Middle East War caused an extreme crisis of confidence and loss of self-respect amongst the populations. Consequently, many people in those countries tried to find an alternative ideology for themselves.¹⁶¹

Some advocates of the modernisation of the old system by importing Western values believed in the superiority of technology and overall capabilities of the West from their observations of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. However, the reckless acceptance of European liberalism without contemplated contextualisation and proper criticism resulted in a

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p.189.

¹⁶⁰ Bruce Maynard Borthwick, *Comparative Politics of the Middle East* (Englwood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1980) pp. 61-62.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p.66.

failure to achieve prosperity.

As a result of this failure to adopt liberal democracy, the religious aspects came to the forefront as an efficient factor in ideology formation. Islam had been the single most influential factor in the lives of those who lived in the Middle East. They had a deep nostalgia for the Rashidun Caliphs'¹⁶² era. Against this background, people in the Middle East felt as if Western influence was impinging upon prosperous heritage their own history. This kind of resentment brought about resurgence in Islamic revivalism as the ultimate solution. The advocates of liberal democracy were a few intellectuals, landlords, and some capitalists. On the other side were those who strongly embraced Islamic revivalism, who included farmers, small craftsmen, and merchandisers. Sentiments of resistance against elites and government leaders built up among those who supported Islamic revivalism, because they felt that the advocates of liberal democracy were incapable, corrupt and were allowing and even encouraging the proliferation of the filthy Western culture to which they were opposed.

The Muslim Brotherhood movement was one of the most influential movements of Islamic revivalism in this context. Islamic revival movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood emphasised the negative aspects of Western influence and pointed to Islam as the inevitable choice for the main ideology of the Middle East. Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, pointed out that one of Egypt's most serious problems were the uncontrolled expansion of Western culture and a lack of Islamic passion on the part of the leaders of the country. He declared that for this reason the secular leaders of the Muslim world were unsuitable for the Middle East.¹⁶³

This view of resistance clashed with the secular regimes. The Muslim Brotherhood plotted to overthrow the pro-British King Farouk's regime and tried to destroy all the legacies of Western culture. After being outlawed by Nasser in 1954,¹⁶⁴ the Muslim Brotherhood resorted to underground activity to resist Nasser's regime. At present, Islamic revivalism appears to be an efficient alternative ideology once more. It has been gaining in popularity at grass roots level.

Another prominent ideology in the Middle East was Arab Nationalism, which rose in importance after the failure of both liberal democracy and the Muslim Brotherhood movement.

¹⁶² When Muhammad the Prophet died, a caliph –successor- was chosen to rule in his place. The caliph had temporal and spiritual authority but was not permitted prophetic power; this was reserved for Muhammad. The caliph could not, therefore, exercise authority in matters of religious doctrine. The first caliph was Abu Bakr. He was succeeded by Umar, Uthman and Ali. Sunni Muslims recognise these first four, or *Rashidun* (the rightly guided). Muslims regard this era as the most prosperous and the most legitimated period.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p.70

¹⁶⁴ In 1954, the Muslim Brotherhood tried to assassinate Nasser for his secular hard line policy against Islam. Nasser had commented, "I do not know at all how I can rule the country by the holy Quran". This comment was provocative to the Muslim Brotherhood and to all Islamic revivalists. And even he described the struggle with Islamic revivalists as a Holy War. J.Lacouture, *op.cit.*, p.128.

The two best examples of Arab nationalism are Baathism, which was founded by Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din Baytar, and Nasserism.

Baathism's slogans were 'unity', 'freedom', and 'socialism'. It was clearly stipulated in the party constitution that the socialist doctrines they espoused were fairness in distribution, economic justice, the reformation of means of production, and civil equality.¹⁶⁵ Although the Baathists aimed to establish a socialist government in the Middle East, their first step was to build Arab nationalism. It was believed that through the integration of the entire Arab population, genuine socialism could be achieved. Through the establishment of a genuine united Arab country, a glorious and prosperous era could be achieved for Arabs. This kind of nationalist movement attracted most Arabs.

As for Marxism in the Middle East, any kind of communist movement has generally been banned, although, ironically, communist ideology had a great influence on the people in the Middle East. Marxists reproached the monarchical regimes in the Middle East, such as that of King Hassan of Morocco, King Hussein of Jordan, and the ruling family in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf areas, for being 'reactionary' and 'feudalist'. In addition, communists criticised 'bourgeois nationalists' such as President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, and President Hafiz al-Assad of Syria for leading regimes that 'promote anti-communism, anti-democracy, and extremely chauvinistic nationalism'.¹⁶⁶

In the Arab world, the most radical thought came from a number of young radical intellectuals. The disastrous defeat for the Arabs in the war with Israel in June 1967 stimulated these intellectuals. To the radical intellectuals, this humiliation was caused by serious inadequacies in the values and structures of Arab society, such as the state of 'tribalism', the traditional patriarchal society, where all decisions are left to the 'father or elder' or some other important person, and by the misunderstanding of science and technology, which leads "to merely benefiting from the fruits of modern science without touching its roots or achieving a serious understanding of its motivating forces."¹⁶⁷

The radical intellectuals called for revolt against the past and the present-day values and structures of Arab society. To them Arab nationalism and liberal democracy have failed because they are semi-revolutionary. Marxism best expresses their radical mood and promises a

¹⁶⁵ Michel Aflaq, *Fi: Sabil al_Ba'ath (In the way of Baath)*, (Beirut: Dar al-Talia, 1959), p.210 quoted in Chong Pyong Park, *A Study on Nasser's Authoritarian Regime - Political Economics View*, Ph.D. dissertation (Seoul: Kyong Hee University, 1994) p.94.

¹⁶⁶ B.Borthwick, *op.cit.*, p.80.

¹⁶⁷ Abdul Daher, *Current Trends in Arab Intellectual Thought*, Rand Publication No. RM-5979-FF (December, 1969) pp.22-23, quoted in *ibid.*, p.81.

thorough and complete revolution.¹⁶⁸ However, that radical paradigm of seeking revolutionary change in the Arab world has been criticised by the people who have attached themselves to the Islamic world view and its value system.

In this context, Borthwick describes ideologically undetermined situation in the Middle East as follows:

By the year 1979, after a century and three quarters of Western influence, change in some form has come to all the countries of the Middle East. They have acquired advanced weapons, organised their armies along modern lines, and established modern ministries and government departments with staffs of educated persons. They have imported large quantities of consumer goods, and in some countries established industries of their own. The material change and modernisation of the government and administration have been significant, but an overarching belief system to integrate all this and give meaning to society has not yet been found. While liberal democracy is now pretty much a historical phenomenon, nationalism, Marxism and Islamic revivalism are very much alive, and their proponents are competing for popular support and state power in just about every Middle Eastern country.¹⁶⁹

3.5.2. Ideologies in East Asia

The ideological features of East Asia are quite different from those of the Middle East. In the Middle East, the appropriate ideology has been pursued by a process of trial and error. However, post-World War II East Asia has been a fierce battlefield under the difficult conditions of the Cold War.

By means of the revolution, Mao Zedong took power in China after defeating Chiang Kai-shek's regime, and the People's Republic of China played a major role in the Cold War system. As most communist regimes do, the Chinese government swept away all kinds of capitalist legacies, chauvinistic nationalism, and religions etc., which meant that there were no longer many opportunities for different ideologies to gain a foothold in China.

In Japan, after World War II, only pro-American liberal democrat regimes have come to the forefront of politics. In spite of the existence of the communist and socialist parties, Japan's major ideology has not changed at all. Since Japan has been a country of strategic importance in the U.S. foreign policy of containing the Soviet Union, the U.S. government has monitored and manipulated the Japanese government in maintaining their ideology.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p.28.

Needless to say, both Korean regimes are attached to their own ideology - communism in the North and liberal democracy in the South. There has been no room for other ideologies. In this context, both regimes have used ideology as a tool for mass control.

In East Asia, the hottest fighting front of the Cold War was the Korean Peninsula, where the severe tensions between two camps - the communists and the pro-West capitalists - prevailed. The communist camp covers North Korea, China, and the Russian line, and the liberal camp covers Japan, South Korea and the Taiwan line. In this tense context, there is unlikely to be a chance for other types of ideology to appear in either camp.

The Chinese and North Korean communist camps adhered strictly to dogmatic communism, so they prohibited any kind of revisionism such as cultural and structural approaches to real politics. The Chinese 'Cultural Revolution' performed by Mao, and '*Joo Che Sa Sang*' (Independent thought) carried out by Il Sung Kim in North Korea, are good examples of that kind of ideological tenacity.

In Japan and South Korea, the first target of both regimes was rapid economic growth with the help of the U.S., and neither country had any autonomy to choose an alternative ideology.

After World War II, therefore, it was possible for Middle East regimes to explore and test a wide spectrum of ideological features. In East Asia, on the other hand, the tense, confrontational situation produced by the Cold War made it difficult for countries to try out alternative ideologies. That is one of the reasons why Park did not propose and create a ideological era immediately after his coup.

¹⁶⁹ B.Borthwick, *op.cit.*, p.82.

4. Two Dimensions of Ideological Analysis - Nationalism & Socialism

In order to clarify the differences between Nasser and Park's regimes, two comparative ideologies are dealt with - nationalism and communism / socialism. The classical subject for discussion in an ideology argument is the 'left-right' issue. The most popular ideology that newly emerging regimes are inclined to use is nationalism. Nasser and Park explicitly stated that their regimes aimed to bring about national prosperity through the building of a concrete nationalism. However, on the left-right issue, their points of view and practice were quite different.

4.1. Nationalism

Before dealing with the comparison of both regimes in terms of the ideology of nationalism, an exploration of modern nationalism in the context of the French revolution is necessary. French nationalism could be described as the archetypal nationalism in the modern history.¹⁷⁰ One of the most prominent features of French nationalism is that it came into being spontaneously without any external influence. In other words, Western nationalism arose from the confrontation between political, economic and cultural modernisation on the one hand, and feudalism on the other. As civil rights increased, the bourgeoisie expanded. European nationalism was propelled by these newly emerging middle class citizens. They wanted to change the class system and feudal order into a new modern order regulated by law and the free market system.¹⁷¹ This kind of new order also succeeded in putting alienated classes such as workers and peasants who had no political rights under the system of absolute monarchy, into the new political system as members who had genuine political rights. This was the moment when European nationalism was born.¹⁷² This nationalism was based on liberalism, which was reflected in the idea of the interest of civil citizens.¹⁷³ So the European nationalism inspired by

¹⁷⁰ Duk Kyu Chin, *op.cit.*, pp. 230.

¹⁷¹ Ki Byuk Cha, *Nationalism*, (Seoul: Han Gil Sa, 1990) p.146.

¹⁷² Hans Kohn, "The Concept of Nationalism," Nak Chung Baek (tr. & ed.) *What is Nationalism* (Seoul: Changjak Gwa Bipyung Sa, 1988) p.18.

¹⁷³ Peter Alter, *Nationalism* (London: Edward Arnold, 1994) p.19.

the French revolution in the 18th century has been called 'civil nationalism'.¹⁷⁴

In the 19th century, a new type of nationalism that was different from civil nationalism appeared in Europe. The peculiarity of this later version of nationalism lies in its external origin.¹⁷⁵ This type of nationalism was inspired and established by the few elites who were stimulated by external factors. The most typical example of this type of nationalism was German nationalism, which was stimulated by the threat of Napoleon the First.¹⁷⁶ After the Napoleonic War, Germany was falling behind England and France in the development race. While England was dominating the international scene through the industrial revolution, and while France had a new visionary phase of development after the French revolution, Germany could not be united as one nation. She was a peripheral state in Europe, confronting external threats.

This type of nationalism that was stimulated by external factors progressed at two levels. The first level was a cultural one. Ideologues needed to encourage the people by elevating their self-respect. The best way to increase self-respect was to exalt their cultural superiority. They emphasised on excellence of national idiosyncrasies and the positive characteristics of the people's traditions, which was backed by Herder's proposition.¹⁷⁷ This approach concentrated on the unity of the nation, sacredness, fame, and even on blood and language. This nationalism tended to be personalised and exaggerated to incorporate divine elements on occasion, and thus may be referred to as extreme cultural nationalism.¹⁷⁸

The other level was economic. A policy for enhancing wealth and military strength was essential for Germany, since she lagged far behind other competitors for colonial hegemony. List, an outstanding German economist in the Historical School, proposed the industrialisation of the national economy, and suggested an economic development strategy led by strong intervention and control from the state, which was different from the neo-classical approach that prevailed in Europe at that time.¹⁷⁹ This approach became the foundation of 'economic nationalism'. With this concept of nationalism, Germany was able to achieve rapid economic development under the supervision of Bismarck's cabinet. The state's active intervention in the whole economic system accelerated the speed of development. This German nationalism that emphasised state intervention was a role-model for many developing countries. Indeed, Park's

¹⁷⁴ Yong Hee Lee and Jae Bong Roh, *Korean Nationalism* (Seoul: Su-Moon Dang, 1977) p.15.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p.16.

¹⁷⁶ Ki Byuk Cha, *op.cit.*, p.151.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p.154.

¹⁷⁸ Hun Mo Gil, "Problems of Historical Studies in Nationalism," *Public Lecture Series of Korean History I* (Seoul: Il Cho Gak, 1995) p.156.

¹⁷⁹ Joo Sung Lee, *Study on the Economic Thoughts of List* (Seoul: Bup Moon Sa, 1994) pp.61-85.

economic policy originated from this model.

In general, the reason why economic nationalism made the policy of industrialisation the first priority was because industrialisation could be an efficient starting point for economic development. Its far-reaching effects influence entire sectors of the related economy. Economic nationalists regarded industrialisation as the key to political and economic autonomy. In addition, developments in industry are the basis of military power and thus play an important role in national security.¹⁸⁰

The third type of nationalism, apart from civil nationalism and economic / cultural nationalism is 'protest nationalism' which may be found in Third World countries. This type of nationalism emerged from the vortex of the independence movements in the Third World countries. From a broad perspective, this type of nationalism may be categorised as a form of economic / cultural nationalism, inspired by Germany. Protest nationalism was stirred up by external factors such as the miseries of the colonial situation and resistance to colonial legacies. This nationalism is not moved by civil society but by a few elites and exclusive members of a military junta. The difference between economic / cultural nationalism and this protest form of nationalism is that protest nationalism is produced under conditions of a total deprivation of national dignity by external invaders.¹⁸¹ Therefore, the ultimate aim of this form of nationalism is the achievement of political independence by escaping from colonial exploitation. Thus, it may be called 'political nationalism'.¹⁸² In the 20th century, after World War II and as the colonial era ended, there were attempts to transform protest nationalism into an economic / cultural nationalism in certain Third World countries. This was in order to achieve rapid development under the catchphrase of 'the wealth and military strength of the country'.¹⁸³ However, many countries in the Third World were unable to overcome their 'protesting behaviours' which had been internalised during the long period of the independence movement.¹⁸⁴

In general, Nasser's nationalism may be categorised as 'protest / political nationalism' although it also contained features of his passion for economic development and related policies. Other peculiarities may be found in his nationalism, apart from this category. He did not only

¹⁸⁰ Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987) Moon Goo Kang (tr.) (Seoul: In Gan Sarang, 1991) p.63.

¹⁸¹ Yong Hee Lee and Jae Bong Roh, *op.cit.*, p.26.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, p.20.

¹⁸³ In Nasser's *Philosophy of Revolution* and in Sukarno's *Ruling Ideology*, features of economic nationalism may be found quite frequently. Mary Matossion, "Ideologies of Delayed Industrialisation," in Jason L. Finkle & Richard W. Goble, *op.cit.*, pp.47-58.

¹⁸⁴ In their relations with old colonial rulers, emotional resentments obstruct the newly independent countries from getting on with their old masters and stepping forward on a mutually beneficial basis.

focus on the national identity of Egypt (*al-Wataniyya*) but also on the expanded ethnic identity of the Arabs (*al-Qawmiyya*). In order to do this, he used an ornate diplomatic rhetoric to deal with the issue of Arab unity.

In contrast, Park's nationalism was a type of 'economic / cultural nationalism'. Even though he seemed uninterested in the ideology of nationalism, his development strategy depended on the logic of 'national potentiality' that was related to state-led capitalism. In order to reach the target of economic development, the putting into practice of all other precious political values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights was postponed.¹⁸⁵

4.2. Class Consciousness & Socialism

In terms of the 'left-right' view of ideology, Nasser's regime was diametrically opposed to Park's. While Nasser's socialism was not dogmatic but practical, Park's extreme anti-communism was quite the opposite.

Both regimes are similar in the sense that they used the identity of the 'nation' for the sake of their regime's security with the intention of integrating the people. However, their nationalism was affected by the tense international atmosphere. In the case of Park, he had no free will to choose his own ideology, because as an important agent and a leader of a strategic bulwark for the U.S. during the Cold War, Park's regime was forced to adopt a hard-line anti-communism as a formal ideology.

At that time, newly emerging countries and military regimes were bound to be influenced by the bipolar international system. As the Cold War grew fiercer, the two major representatives of each camp, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, were in fierce competition to win countries over to their side. Therefore, newly emerging countries were forced to join one of the major camps and were then obliged to become a faithful of that camp.

The new regimes were unable to decide which side to join on the basis of their own inclinations or beliefs, but instead, had to choose on the basis of national interest or matters of regime security. One good example of this is Park's case. He was a strict socialist when he was in his 20s, but ironically his regime's ideology was extreme anti-communism. Nasser's case was different. At first, he tried to build up a strong nationalism, but when this failed, he transformed his nationalism into a socialist ideology by mixing nationalism and socialism.

¹⁸⁵ The reason why Park's nationalism can be seen as similar to 'economic nationalism' is that he pushed forward the Korea-Japan talks about compensation for war and colonial sufferings in 1963, despite the nation's strong opposition.

5. Nasserism - Pursuit of Regional Hegemony: Arab Nationalism and Socialism

5.1. Ideological Influences on Nasser

5.1.1. Consciousness of National Identity

It is necessary to explore Nasser's life in terms of ideological stimulation in order to pursue deeper levels of analysis. As Hopwood points out, "Nasser throughout his life was subject to a series of political influences which helped to shape his eventual ideology. His point of view was modified as the external circumstances which shaped it changed."¹⁸⁶

When examining Nasser's ideology, two important subjects must be discussed. The first is nationalist mentality and the other is socialist mentality. Nasser experienced harsh British colonial governance throughout his adolescence. During this period Nasser thought that Egypt was a tragic victim of the colonial system and believed that Egypt had been troubled with deprivation because of imperialism. For him, the ultimate solution for escaping from this agony was to liberate Egypt from Britain. Anti-Western sentiment and resentment to colonialism were probably beginning to grow when he was very young.

His favourite reading when he was a little boy was the biography of great figures in world history such as Alexander the Great, Mahatma Ghandi, and Napoleon Bonaparte. Outstanding figures that dedicated themselves to the national interest moulded his heroic idealism and gave him the opportunity to think about leadership.

His uncle Khalil Hussein Kalil had a particularly strong influence on him. Kalil had been jailed frequently on charges of organising and participating in anti-British demonstrations. He was also convicted as a planner of serious riots in Alexandria in 1921.¹⁸⁷

During the year Nasser lived with his uncle, he received many practical lessons in how to be a revolutionary, which provided him with substance for innumerable boyhood dreams.¹⁸⁸ Through these experiences, Nasser became able to understand the problems of Egypt which had

¹⁸⁶ Derek Hopwood, *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1981* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982) p.102.

¹⁸⁷ Robert Stephens, *Nasser - a Political Biography* (London: Allen Lane the Penguin Press, 1971) p.26.

been caused by British and Western intervention and exploitation. In addition, his political sensibility increased.

This period enlightened him with regard to the Arab cause and some broader issues. After the experience of his uncle's arrest, he seems to have found time for a good deal of reading, mostly history, politics, and biographies of famous men by Arab and Muslim nationalist authors – biographies of Prophet Muhammad, Jamal ed-din al-Afghani, and Muhammad Abdu etc. He especially enjoyed the writings of Mustafa Kamil, who was perhaps Nasser's chief hero of the East, the brilliant young demagogue who founded the Egyptian National Party (E.N.P.).¹⁸⁹ His own paradigm of the real situations of Egypt and the Arab world began to grow from this time onwards.

As he entered El Nahda School in 1935, a political movement occurred. From that time on, his political character came to the forefront of public life. He took part in various student demonstrations. At that time, various student political movements were active from the extreme left wing to the extreme right and from extremely secular movements to religious fundamentalism like the Muslim Brotherhood.

Nasser did not have the chance to join the Muslim Brotherhood, but he worked for the Wafd party, and Misr el Fatat (Young Egyptian movement). However, his main involvement was with the National Party founded by Mustafa Kamil. This party urged people to withdraw from all British influence unconditionally. This satisfied Nasser's passion for genuine independence from Britain. Nasser attached himself to this party, which was more belligerent and more rigid than other political movements or organisations in Egypt.¹⁹⁰ His passion regarding the genuine independence of Egypt from Britain could be found in a letter that he had written to one of his colleagues. He cited this letter in his book 'Philosophy of the Revolution'.¹⁹¹

By the time he reached manhood, he had chosen a life as an army officer. With the modern military education that was introduced into Egypt by Britain, he might have taken a neutral position, but he still felt resentment towards Britain and Western imperialism. Britain was still the biggest obstruction in his mind, and during World War II, he sympathised with the

¹⁸⁸ Robert St. John, *The Boss* (London: Arthur Barker Ltd., 1960) p.20.

¹⁸⁹ Robert Stephens, *op.cit.*, p.32.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.34.

¹⁹¹ "Today the situation is critical and Egypt is in an impasse. It seems to me that the country is dying. Despair is great. Who can end it? Where are the men ready to give their lives for the independence of the country? Where is the man who can rebuild the country so that the weak and humiliated Egyptian can stand up again and live free and independent? Where is dignity? Where is nationalism? Where are the so-called activities of our youth? They say the Egyptian is a coward, that he is afraid of the slightest sound. He needs a leader to lead him in the struggle for his country. By this means this same Egyptian would become a thunder-clap which would make the walls of

Axis in a similar fashion to Italy, although he did not express similar feelings. Interestingly, when the military junta seized power in Egypt in 1952, many of them thought that they should imitate the system of the Fascist military regime as their prototype for building a new state.¹⁹²

Nasser's anti-imperialism was ignited by the humiliating Abdin Palace affair. This incident and the events which followed opened the gates for the next wave of revolutionary nationalism which was to break the king's morale and his popular influence, and showed that the 1936 Treaty was built on force, not friendship. According to Sadat, this incident was one of the main triggers for a revolution. Nasser and his closest colleague, Abdul Hakim Amer, were determined that Egypt would never again suffer such a humiliation. The real revolutionary conspiracy dates back to this time. The movement had now passed from the theoretical to the militant phase.¹⁹³

The other factor that influenced Nasser's nationalism was Israel, when David Ben Gurion proclaimed unlimited immigration and immediate independence. This contradicted the slow-steady independence plan of Dr. Chaim Weizman. The result was the Palestinian War. Nasser participated in this war and his resentment of imperialism escalated.

It is worthwhile noting the gap between Egyptian nationalism and Arab nationalism. Nasser had his eyes opened to the wicked acts of imperialism through the agonies that Egypt had experienced. Egyptian people tend to think of Egypt as superior to any other Arab country. They take pride in the glorious and prosperous history of the Paranoiac era. Lee refers to this feeling of superiority: "amongst the Egyptian people, there have been some common feelings about their superiority to other countries"¹⁹⁴ Even though Nasser's nationalism was transformed from Egypt-centred nationalism into the new phase of Arab nationalism, becoming Nasser's representative ideology, the very first stepping-stone of Nasser's nationalism was his Egyptian identity.

5.1.2. Consciousness of Class

tyranny tremble...."

¹⁹² Panayiotis J. Vatikiotis, *The Egyptian Army in Politics* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1975) p.48; Reports have appeared from time to time indicating the dependence of the military regime in Egypt since 1952 upon German advisers in military training and the operation of mass media. What is interesting about these reports is the allegation that German personnel in the service of the U.A.R. Government were of Nazi background. In a famous political biography of President Nasser., *The Boss: the Story of Gamal Abdul Nasser*, the author Robert St. John intimates that key German personnel in Egypt adopted Egyptian names. Another work, *Behind the Egyptian Sphinx: Prelude to World War III?* (Philadelphia and New York: Chilton Co., 1960), by Irving Sedar and Harold Greenberg, suggests an alliance between a rising Germany and a Nasser-dominated U.A.R.

¹⁹³ Anwar Sadat, *Revolt on the Nile* (London: 1957) p.41.

In Khatatba where Nasser was brought up, there was poverty and squalor, as there had been everywhere else he had lived, and the houses were just as dark and dreary, and the filth in the road was no different, but this was the country.¹⁹⁵ In such surroundings, it is only natural to have strong feelings about matters of equality, and wealth and poverty, which then develop into class-consciousness. Nasser's ideology was not formed by imagination alone, but also by real experiences and a critical mind. There is a strong possibility that his experiences and observations of desperate indigence were connected to his class-consciousness. In that environment, it was quite natural for him to have primitive socialist sentiments. However, there are no signs any attachment to classical scientific socialism. His first concern was the dignity of Egypt, which is found in his speech "they had the right to hold their heads up as the foundation of the Egyptian nation".

Although the foundations for socialism were strong in Egypt, scientific socialism was not successful enough to become a major ideology. Egyptians thought that the problem of colonialism was much more serious than the class conflict, and hence their resentment was aimed at external invasive powers rather than at internal capitalists. Even Moscow was regarded as one of the colonial power bases, like London or Washington, by the Egyptians.¹⁹⁶

5.1.3. Pursuit of the New Ideology

Legitimacy is the moral basis of authority.¹⁹⁷ Without appropriate legitimacy, a regime's long-term survival and its political stability cannot be guaranteed.¹⁹⁸ So the formation an ideology is a first step towards legitimacy. In Egypt, an acceptable formula for the orderly transfer of power from one group to another did not really exist. Non-democratic action to many people, therefore, seemed to be the only means of change available.¹⁹⁹ However, regimes that take power through non-democratic action are critically unstable, and lack proper mechanisms to persuade people to acknowledge them.

In this context, as a practical measure, the Free Officers attempted to formulate an ideology that would justify the coup. More than that, with this formal ideology they hoped to be

¹⁹⁴ Ki Taek Lee, *The History of International Relations*, (Seoul: Bak Young Sa, 1987) p.211.

¹⁹⁵ Robert St.John, *op.cit.*, p.18.

¹⁹⁶ Peter Woodward, *Nasser* (London: Longman, 1992) p.33.

¹⁹⁷ Hrair Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985) quoted in G. Hossein Razi, "Legitimacy in the Middle East," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 84, No.1 (March, 1990) p.70.

¹⁹⁸ Emma C. Murphy, *op.cit.*, p.71.

¹⁹⁹ Derek Hopwood, *op.cit.*, p.85.

able to persuade the people to support them, despite the uncertain future.²⁰⁰ With the Suez incident in 1956, when Nasser's regime was asked to express ideological viewpoints, Nasser became eager to construct a new ideology. Leaders of Nasser's government were relatively open-minded and willing to explore and experiment with alternative ideological principles. They did not adhere blindly to authentic ideologies but tried to be eclectic and pragmatic.²⁰¹ Nasser announced that he was embarking on a search for a new ideology to suit Egypt in 1958. He asserted that this ideology should not be a copy of any external ideology, but that it should be an indigenous ideology that would be a creative and flexible principle for Egypt's prosperity. This attitude is expressed well in Nasser's speech:

It is no easy task for we have to design the structure of our new society as we build it. Our circumstances differ from those of other nations and this is why we cannot imitate the pattern of any other society; as each community follows the mode of evolution and the pattern best suited to its circumstances. Our blind imitation of any system would ignore the nature of our society and the different factors influencing it and would thus be incompatible with the needs of this people.

We are required to study the experience of other nations and to benefit by it but under no circumstances can we copy it. This is why we say that we not only build our society but we also design its pattern as we go. This pattern is modified by the nature and circumstances of our changing societies and its requirements. This is why it is a continuous process. The broad lines of this pattern are socialism, cooperation and democracy, and our task is to adapt these principles to our circumstances and to proceed with the work of building a growing integrated society.²⁰²

George Lenczouski divided the formulation process of Nasser's ideology into four stages: i) the phase of Egypt centrism 1952-1955, ii) the pan-Arab phase, 1955-1958, iii) the domestic socialist phase, 1958-61, iv) the pan-Arab socialist phase 1961-1964.²⁰³

According to Lenczouski, for the first half of Nasser's regime, he appeared to adhere to a nationalist ideology. After World War II and the Korean War, as the Cold War becoming more intense, Nasser mobilised people under the slogan of the 'Egypt and Arab nation'. But due to the failure of the establishment of the U.A.R., Nasser had to embark on a new journey with a

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p.84.

²⁰¹ R.Hrair Dekmejian, *Egypt Under Nasser: a Study in Political Dynamics*, (London: Univ. of London Press, 1972) p.64.

²⁰² President G.A.Nasser, *Speeches and Press Interviews, 1958*. (Cairo: UAR, Information Dept.) pp.291-292.

²⁰³ George Lenczouski, "The Objects and Methods of Nasserism," in Jack H. Thompson & Robert D. Reischauer (ed.) *Modernisation of the Arab World* (Princeton: D.Von Nastrand Company, Inc., 1966) p.198.

new identity, that of a 'socialist ideology'. From that moment on, Nasser tried to integrate 'Arab' and 'Socialism'.

5.2. Arab Nationalism

In developing countries, nationalism is the easiest ideology to establish in a short time. It does not require complicated theoretical background as socialism does. With merely the sentiment of coalition and unity in a nation, nationalism can be established without serious conflict, because instincts that are linked by the same ethnic background can be much stronger than any other ingredients in the formation of an ideology.²⁰⁴ Nasser recognised this.

5.2.1. From Egyptian Nationalism to Arab Nationalism

Arab identity is the most important characteristic of this region. However, lacking a sense of national identity, the initial reaction of Egyptian intellectuals to European imperialism (political and economic) manifested itself in the pan-Islamic movement presided over by the non-Egyptian, non-Arab, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani.²⁰⁵

After the Abdin Palace incident, the major motivation behind Nasser's coup in 1952 was anti-British nationalism, that had hitherto not been developed. Suppressive ruling and exploitative intervention by Britain was the optimum environment for anti-British nationalism to appear. As a result of this, the easiest and the most efficient way to move the people was through nationalism.

The two identities which constitute nationalism must first be addressed. The first is ethnicity-based identity - *al Qawmiyya*, and the other is individual nation-based identity - *al Wataniyya*. In the very first stage of Nasser's governance, it seemed that his priority was Egyptian nationalism, but his overall rhetoric about nationalism concerned the Arab cause. This indicated that that Arab identity (*qawmiyya*) was a more efficient basis on which to unify Egyptians, since Arab identity was broadly linked with the Islamic *ummah* community identity that had taken root in all Egyptians. Islam prohibits Muslims from following an individual state's own interests.

²⁰⁴ R.Hrair Dekmejian, *op.cit.*, p.50.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p.83.

As Arabic intellectuals who had studied abroad and been influenced by modern nationalist ideology returned to their countries, nationalist movements appeared in full scale. They elaborated nationalism, in order to make it more acceptable and applicable in the Middle East.

With this development of nationalism, a critical issue was raised in the Middle East concerning what kind of regime would be best suited to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. As a matter of fact, early Arab nationalism began with the Arab elites' consciousness of the Ottoman's Turkish nationalism. They regarded Turkish nationalism as a critical threat to Arab safety. In this context, Ibrahim Pasha, son of Muhammad Ali of Egypt, introduced a total equality policy to the region, no matter what one's ethnic background, immediately after he had annexed Syria. There was no discrimination under the governance of Ibrahim Pasha in Egypt.

However, as soon as he lost power, certain Christian intellectuals brought the Arab cause to the forefront. Those who had studied abroad in places like the American University in Beirut were worried about the dominance of Islam in the Middle East. Ironically the first step taken for Arab nationalism was by Christian intellectuals with the intention of avoiding Islamic influences and Turkish nationalism. As European intellectual influences on Egypt intensified, a number of diverse movements came into being to replace the worn-out tenets of pan-Islamism.

In this context, before the establishment and organisation of a concrete form of Arab nationalism, Egypt-centred nationalism was at the front line of ideology.²⁰⁶ This kind of Egypt-centred sentiment in ordinary Egyptian people might have been caused by nostalgia for the glorious moments of the Paranoiac era, and the Ptolemaic Empire. As Nadav Safran observes, "It was still necessary to provide an ideological rationale for a specifically Egyptian nationalism..."²⁰⁷ In an attempt to endow the new state with a distinctively Egyptian "cultural personality", the Paranoiac past was revived and revitalised. Amongst the intellectuals who advocated an 'Egypt first' policy based on Pharaohism were some of the country's foremost journalists, especially Fikri Abaza, Ihsan Abd al Quddus, and Mustafa Amin - who continued to press their case well into the early period of the revolution.²⁰⁸

With this mentality, Egyptian intellectuals made every effort to transform the mythic

²⁰⁶ It is obvious that Nasser did not emphasise Egyptian nationalism alone. He asserted that with its strong attachment to Arab identity, Egypt should play a leading role in the Arab world. An Egypt-centred interpretation of history was highlighted by giving examples of Arab heroes from Egypt such as Salah al-Din, al-Ayubi. Against this background, Nasser proclaimed a Cairo-centred movement of Arab unity. There were beliefs among the ordinary Egyptian people that Salah al-Din was reincarnated in the body of Nasser. R.H.Dekmejian, *op.cit.*, p. 80.

²⁰⁷ Nadav Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961) p.143.; R.H.Dekmejian, *op.cit.*, p.87.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p.87.

features of Egyptian nationalism into reality by emphasising Orabi's Egyptian nationalist movement rather than Muhammad Abdu's Islamic reformative revivalism. However, this effort was not successful. The tenets of Egyptian nationalism that they tried to establish were constructed in line with Western values that did not fit the Egyptian mentality. Also the Muslim ethos arose amongst the people. In this context, intellectuals who tried to adopt Western forms of nationalism were alienated. In short, Egyptian nationalism had been found to be irrelevant to the Egyptian situation. Its direction and underpinning imparted a sense of artificiality with respect to the existing Egyptian ethos. Hence, the duplication of European ideas and forms became a great disappointment for Egypt.

At this moment, Nasser's personal identification with Arabism pushed the remaining supporters into the background. The predominant theme expressed throughout April 1953 was Egyptian nationalism. However, during 1953 Arab nationalism already slightly exceeded that of Egyptian nationalism. After 1953, Arab nationalism maintained its yearly cumulative preponderance over Egyptian nationalism and starting in 1955 registered a sharp increase, while Egyptian nationalism became relatively insignificant.²⁰⁹

5.2.2. The Evolution of Nasser's Arab Nationalism

Nasser's idea of nationalism was pragmatic rather than theoretical or dogmatic. For him, an ideology was not an absolute solution, but was flexible and adjustable to the changing situation. His ideology had been influenced by his experience of certain crucial incidents. A series of incidents like the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty,²¹⁰ the attempt to assassinate the Egyptian

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.93-95.

²¹⁰ The outbreak of the Italian-Ethiopian war in 1935 made Britain the dominant foreign power in Egypt, amenable to redefining Anglo-Egyptian ties. The result was the signing of an Anglo-Egyptian treaty in 1936, valid for 20 years. It gave Britain the exclusive right to equip and train the Egyptian military. While it required Egypt to expand its transport and communications facilities and make them available to the British forces, it entitled Britain to build as many new air bases as it wished. It signified a formal end to the posting of British troops outside the Suez Canal zone, subject to Egypt building up its defence capabilities to a sufficient level. British troops were to be stationed specifically to guard the Suez Canal until such time that the two signatories agreed that Egypt could do the job alone. Britain retained the right to take over all defence and communication facilities in the event of war. The treaty disappointed Egyptian nationalists. In the 1950 general election, the nationalist Wafd party won decisively. Reflecting the popular mood, which sought to avenge the humiliation suffered by the Arabs in the Palestine War, the Wafd government pressed Britain to withdraw its troops from Egypt. When London stonewalled, Cairo unilaterally abrogated the 1936 treaty in October 1951. The ensuing official non-cooperation, reinforced by popular guerrilla actions, made the British base in the Suez Canal zone virtually inoperative. The tussle between London and Cairo paved the way for the overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy in less than a year. The Nasser regime was anxious to see the departure of the 70,000 British troops who were occupying 300 sq. miles of Egyptian territory. It signed an agreement with London in October 1954 for a British withdrawal by the end of the year. Dilip Hiro, *Dictionary of the Middle East* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996) pp.14-15.

Prime Minister in February 1942, and the Palestine War in 1948, all affected the development of Nasser's particular brand of nationalism.

Most of all, the Palestinian War awoke him to the plight of the Arabs. In Part III of the *Philosophy of the Revolution*, the first traces of the evolution of Egyptian nationalism into Arab unity nationalism begin to appear.²¹¹ Furthermore, at the level of international politics, Arab unity was essential for them to protect themselves from foreign powers under the conditions of the Cold War. Arab unity was thus imperative because of economic, political, geographic and especially military reasons. Nasser became more interested in Arab nationalist ideology, based on al-Qawmiyya identity, than in Egyptian nationalism, founded on al-Wataniyya identity.

As Dekmejian points out, Nasser's Arab nationalism depended on an emotional attitude, so it may be said that his nationalism was not the result of refined procedures of theorisation but of intuition and experience.²¹² It is relatively easier to progress in an emotional way, full of resentment towards a particular regime, or with a sense of deprivation, towards the establishment of nationalism, than on a theoretical basis. This emotional type of nationalism might, however, be vulnerable to various criticisms.

Abdallah al Rimawi criticised Baathism as unscientific romanticism, which had emotional origins. He asserted that Nasser's conventional logic of Arab nationalism needed to be turned into a genuine scientific revolutionary nationalism.²¹³ Accepting this kind of assertion, Nasser adopted the Hegelian view of history to formulate his nationalism. In the tradition of Marx and Hegel, history is viewed as an inevitable process, in Nasser's case moving toward Arab unity.²¹⁴ He reached the conclusion that the ultimate stage of Arab development is a united Arab nation.²¹⁵

In short, the ultimate aim of Arab nationalism is to have one Arab nation. The U.A.R. Charter mentioned this hope and possibility in more explicit terms:

Unity... is identified with the Arab existence itself. Suffice it that the Arab Nation has a unity of language, forming the unity of mind and thought. Suffice it that the Arab Nation is characterised by unity of history creating unity of conscience and sentiments. Suffice it that the Arab Nation enjoys unity of hope, the basis of the unity of future and fate.²¹⁶

²¹¹ R.H. Dekmejian, *op.cit.*, p.101.

²¹² *Ibid.*, p.102.

²¹³ Abdallah al-Rimawi, *Nationalism and Unity* (Cairo, 1961) p.44, quoted in *ibid.*, p.102.

²¹⁴ United Arab Republic, *Arab Political Encyclopedia* (Cairo: January - February, 1962) p.155 quoted in *ibid.*, p.104.

²¹⁵ United Arab Republic, *Press release of the U.A.R. mission to U.N.*, Oct. 1961, p.6., quoted in *ibid.*, p.104.

²¹⁶ United Arab Republic, *Charter* (Cairo: Information Department, n.d.) p.93, quoted in *ibid.*, p.105

And this hope was supposed to be embodied by establishing the United Arab Republic.

5.2.3. The United Arab Republic

Even though there were many efforts to unite the Arab region into one nation, over a long period of time, these attempts at integration were not very successful. It may be said that the most significant attempt at Arab unity was the United Arab Republic, despite its short-term destiny. The United Arab Republic was the product of the efforts made by the Syrian Baath party and Nasser's government.

5.2.3.1. The Arab Baath Socialist Party

The officially-named the Arab Baath Socialist Party emerged in March 1954. The Baath party was the product of the amalgamation of two political parties – the Arab Baath party and the Arab Socialist Party. The original Arab Baath Party led by Michel Aflaq and Salah Bitar was established in 1943 under the slogan “The establishment of one Arab nation which has an eternal mission”. Aflaq and Bitar had connections with the communists in Paris, where Aflaq lived as a student. However, after a short while they realised that communism did not suit Arab nationalism, and so broke off all relations with the French communists. A residual Marxist influence made them choose a slogan which included ‘socialism’ when they organised the Baath party.²¹⁷ The other faction that composed the Baath party was the Arab Socialist Party, based at Hama, north of Syria. Akram Hourani led this party.

The Baath party was composed of a well-organised army and well-educated intellectuals. Although its headquarters were located in Syria, its branches were scattered across Lebanon, Trans Jordan and Iraq. Baath was a pan-Arabic party both nominally and in reality.

Until 1947, the dominant political trend related to the issue of Arab unity. Baath noticed this trend and promoted Arab unity through the official propaganda of the party. In 1952, Baath joined the military regime of Adib Shishakli who intended to unite Syria and Egypt, and to set up good relations with Saudi Arabia. From this time on, the Baath party came to prominence as a major actor in the Arab unity movement.

Baath advocated Arab United Nations under the federation system, in which individual states would have the right to administer their own domestic affairs. With regard to ideological

fundamentals, Baath insisted on socialism. Most of the members of Baath were moderate socialists who believed in a peaceful social evolution.

The implications of the emerging Baath party may be summarised as follows. First, in addition to proclaiming Arab unity as their ultimate aim for the sake of the Arab peoples, their attitude concerning how to achieve this aim was flexible. They eschewed fantasies like the glorious Arab Empire, and focused on a loose type of federation of the Arab states. Secondly, Baath was the first political party that had multi-national branches with a single aim - Arab unity. Lastly, Baath was the only party proclaiming Arab unity that took the reins of government

5.2.3.2. Concrete Action for Arab Unification

During the first stage of the revolution, Nasser experienced big political fluctuations. He dismantled the political parties in Egypt and suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood. He also experienced severe conflicts with General Neguib after the coup, and controversial land reform policy, amongst other issues. His abilities to deal with these fluctuations were demonstrated to the Arab people, and thus he was able to assume a solid position as a prominent leader of the Arabs. A remarkable incident, which allowed him to win over massive support from the Arab people, occurred when he refused to accept and join the Baghdad Pact. Nasser's refusal to join the Baghdad Pact despite pressure from the West was seen as a heroic action in the eyes of the Arab people.²¹⁸

Incidentally, one of the main reasons Nasser did not join the Pact was because he did not want to have his efforts disrupted by external intervention when he tried to establish an Egypt-centred pan-Arabism.²¹⁹ Even though such duplicity existed behind his attitude towards the Pact, his actions were interpreted as resistance to Western imperialism by the people. At any rate, Nasser's confrontation with Western power was impressive from the point of view of the Arab people. The agreement in 1954 between Egypt and Britain on the withdrawal of British troops from Egyptian territory made a huge impression on the Arab people. From that time on, Egypt started to play the most important role in the Arab world.²²⁰

The Bandung Conference was a critical moment for Nasser. His 'positive neutralism' came to be his trademark in the arena of international politics. Nasser used this approach not

²¹⁷ Their official slogans were "Freedom, Unity and Socialism"

²¹⁸ G.Lenczowski, *op.cit.*, p.200.

²¹⁹ R.W.Baker, *op.cit.*, p.38.

only as a principle in foreign policy but also as a propeller for the Arab unity movement. According to Nasser himself, if any Arab governments had a negative opinion about his positive neutralism, this government should be regarded as an adversary of the Arabs.²²¹

With this legitimacy, Nasser consolidated his ideas on the Arab unification movement from 1953, one year after the coup. Until 1958, when the United Arab Republic embarked on a new phase in world politics, Nasser's regime solidified the fundamentals for Arab unity and disseminated propaganda for this unity on a large scale. On 27th of September 1955, Egypt concluded that the Egyptian-Saudi Joint Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia would be the first step in approaching Arab unity. In April 1956, Yemen joined this agreement. The Collective Solidarity Treaty was signed by Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia on 19th of January 1957. Then followed the third and fourth Arab Culture Councils in 1957 and 1959.

The culmination of Nasser's steps towards legitimising Arab unity was the Suez Crisis in 1956. Britain, France, and Israel, responding the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in July 1956, succeeded in occupying Egyptian territory, but were defeated in the political arena in terms of international relations. For Nasser, this war became a crucial diplomatic triumph. In contrast to the Orabi's revolutionary movement in 1882, which resulted in British troops' occupation of Egypt, the nationalisation of the Suez Canal brought about the withdrawal of Britain from Egypt. Britain's attempt to overthrow Nasser's regime by means of the military action of the Suez War totally failed,²²² and this attempt reaffirmed amongst the Arab people the idea that imperialism and Zionism should be their first enemies. All these circumstances provided a fertile nursery for the growth of the Arab unity movement.

5.2.3.3. The Establishment, Evolution and Collapse of the U.A.R.

In February 1958, Egypt and Syria finally agreed to join together to form the U.A.R. At that time, the political situation in Syria was extremely unstable. For the Syrian Baath party and the government, the only way to tackle the troublesome internal situation seemed to be by merging two countries together. Part of the reason why the political and military leaders of Syria sought a union with Egypt was to forestall the rise of the communist movement in Syria.²²³ Communist leaders like Deputy Prime Minister Khalid al-Azm strongly opposed the union with Egypt, because that kind of nationalist movement on the basis of specific ethnic

²²⁰ L.Binder, *Ideological Revolution in the Middle East*, p.211.

²²¹ G.Lenczowski, *op.cit.*, p.200.

²²² Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., *A Concise History of the Middle East* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979) p.110.

background was prohibited according to communist principles.

Nasser was proclaimed President of the U.A.R., and Cairo was established as its capital city. In March, one of the monarchical states in the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen, joined in a loose federation type union with Egypt, which created the United Arab States. Nasser became a figurehead of the Arab unity movement.

However, this union had only a brief life-span. Once Syria had been affiliated with the U.A.R., its president, Nasser, extended to the Syrian region his own policy of nationalising all banking systems, insurance, finance companies and major industries. Many members of the Syrian elite felt alienated and isolated from the policy-making process. Significantly, the most important political positions of the U.A.R. were allocated to Egyptian bureaucrats. Immediately after the establishment of the U.A.R., former Syrian President Shukri Quwatli stepped down from his presidency as the 'first registered citizen of the U.A.R.'. Former Syrian Prime Minister Sabri Asali was appointed as a trumpery Vice President in Cairo.

In the early stages of unification, it was not obvious to what extent the Baath party intended to share power with Egypt. However, at that time, Syrian Baath was losing its influence and popularity with the Syrian people in the fight against the communists. In these circumstances, the only option the Baath Party had was to join the U.A.R. with Egypt. Nasser banned all political parties in Syria and merged all the parties into a monolithic organisation - the National Union - that was a monopoly party in the U.A.R. Even the Baath party, which was a major participant on the Syrian side, had to be dissolved.

The establishment of a unified military command, in which Syrian military officers were relegated to subordinate positions, created widespread disaffection amongst the officer corps. As a result of the election of 1959, the mass resignation of Syrian officials from the U.A.R. government brought about vehement arguments between Nasser and the Baathists concerning who should have the initiative in Syrian politics. From that moment on, the Baathists came to realise that Nasser was not being cooperative with the Baath Party, and that he was only concerned with the acquisition of Syria.

Consequently, these factors created broad discontent with Nasser's arbitrary decisions and his exclusive behaviour that lacked proper consideration for his Syrian partner. This led Syria to withdraw their participation in the U.A.R. in September 1961 amid growing animosity against Egypt. Yemen dissolved its federation with the Union of Arab States in December the same year.

²²³ D.Hiro, *op.cit.*, p.330.

5.2.3.4. Summit Conference of Egypt, Syria and Iraq in 1963

After the Syrian secession from the U.A.R. in September 1961, the Baath party tried to find a way to unify Arabs once more. However, the Syrian government did not have any potential, nor any feasible plans for Arab unification. So two prominent leaders of Baath, Aflaq and Bitar came to the conclusion that Arab unity could not be accomplished without Nasser's cooperation. They believed that Nasser might realise his mistake when his efforts to unify the Arabs through the U.A.R. had ended in failure.

On 1st of March 1963, the military wing of the Baathist movement took control of the country and established a National Revolutionary Command. This meant that, for the first time, the Baath party could take the helm of the whole state. A new Syrian revolutionary cabinet was organised. Most core positions of the new cabinet, including Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Domestic Affairs, and Minister of Economic Development were held by sincere Baathists. Amongst the twelve cabinet members, the Baath party appointed five Nasserists, which indicated the Baathists' intention of renewing relations with Nasser in order to find a way of uniting the Arabs once more. At the same time, the majority of the cabinet members of Abdul Salam Muhammad Arif's revolutionary cabinet in Iraq were Baathists who sought Arab unity.

In early March 1963, the tripartite talks amongst Egypt, Syria and Iraq for the unification of Arabs were held. At these talks, there were dissenting opinions about the form Arab unity should take between Nasser and the Baathists. The Baathists tried to stick to a form of Arab federation that would guarantee each participant in the unity equal political rights, but Nasser wanted to a return to the original form of the U.A.R. in 1958. However, eventually Nasser agreed to the Baathists' proposal of a federation-type Arab unity.

The most difficult issue that needed to be discussed concerned the party system for the new republic. The Baathists supported a multi-party system, whereas Nasser was firmly in favour of a monolithic super-party system like the Liberation Rally, the National Union and the Arab Socialist Union. Nasser thought that it was necessary to set up a monolithic party for mass mobilisation in order to confront more effectively any possible reactionary movements. However, the Baathists were unwilling to accept Nasser's idea of a monolithic super-party system, because in their experience, the National Union, which was established in Syria due to Nasser's urging in 1958, had stripped Baath of its own rights and freedom.

Vehement arguments on this matter did produce slight progress towards the creation of a possibility of resurrection of the United Arab Republic, but after five months of discussion without agreement the talks ended in failure. The main reason for this failure was the

disagreement about who should assume the core of the power in the new republic.

5.2.3.5 The Failure of the Arab Unity Movement and Its Implications

After the collapse of the U.A.R., and the failure of another attempt at unity, Nasser faced political turmoil. Houari Boumedienne overthrew one of the most important pro-Nasserist regime, Ahmed Ben Bellah's government in Algeria, in 1965. In Iraq, after Arif's sudden death, anti-Nasser Baathists regained influence in Iraqi politics after General Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr seized power in 1968 and asked the Iraqi Baathists to help form his government. In addition, Kuwait had withdrawn from the Arab common market and moved into cordial relations with the Saudi Arabia of King Faisal who represented the strongest opposition to Nasser.

Many countries of the Arab League, such as Jordan, Sudan and Lebanon, were experiencing problems of domestic instability. Magreb countries, such as Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya, were maintaining their individual standpoints apart from Nasser. In Syria, anti-Nasser sentiments prevailed throughout the country. There was not a single country to back up Nasser's Arab unity movement except North Yemen.

In terms of population, industrial development, and military power, Egypt was the most powerful nucleus state as a matter of fact. However, the economic situation in Egypt was deteriorating, which meant that Egyptian influence in the Arab countries concerning the building of one Arab state decreased.

As a matter of fact, the U.A.R. was the amalgamation of only two nations out of twenty two other countries in the Arab League. From a hypothetical point of view, the possibility of the success of the U.A.R. was not very high from the beginning, because conservative regimes in the region and progressive secularist regimes had been very unlikely to agree to the idea of making one Arab polity.

As time went by, the passions of pan-Arabism and Arab unity decreased, but the identity of individual states grew inside the region. In this context, the struggles at the level of individual Arab states deepened, and this frustrated those who were strongly in favour of Arab unity.

For Nasser, the Baathists, and other leaders who were committed to the Arab cause, unification remained imperative for economic, political, geographic, and especially military reasons. Yet Nasser's preferred means of achieving unity were quite different from the ideas of other leaders, who tried to set up a loose type of Arab confederation on the basis of the secured rights of each individual state, as shown by the first effort to build the U.A.R., and by the

Summit Conference in 1963. Nasser's Egypt-centred unity,²²⁴ based on the logic of the 'nucleus' state Egypt's main role was not accepted by the major partner, Syria. Besides this, although all those who were in favour of Arab unity felt passionately about it, unity movements went wrong because of the lack of a well-planned time schedule for unification process, and a lack of properly thought out arguments with which to persuade the Arab people.

In conclusion, the power struggle concerning Arab unity was a crucial matter. The management of core power holds the key to the solution of Arab unity in the future.

5.3. Arab Socialism

At the very beginning of Nasser's regime, in the immediate aftermath of the coup, Nasser drove forward his economic development plan in association with the industrial capitalists. He showed a very pragmatic attitude in choosing his major approaches to economic development. At this stage, his first aim was to eradicate the colonial legacy by the expatriation of foreign influence. His domestic development method seemed to be a kind of capitalist strategy.

After his efforts to get financial support to build up Egypt's economy to a competitive level were rejected, his disillusionment with Western capitalist states deepened. According to Dekmejian, the growing unattractiveness of the Western model, coupled with the elite's propensity to extend the scope of its power, pushed the system toward a socialistic orientation. The final adoption of Arab socialism, however, marked the end of the pragmatic phase. There is no evidence to indicate that Nasser had strong socialist leanings, either before or after the revolution.²²⁵

Nasser came to the conclusion that a firmer ideology was necessary to enable Egypt to modernise itself and he came to socialism as a last resort in the Charter of 1962. He announced that he would devote himself to the socialist ideology.

Although Nasser proclaimed himself to be a scientific socialist, the socialism that he devised was quite far removed from classical scientific socialism. One of the most fundamental principles of scientific socialism is materialism, but a materialism based on an atheistic attitude

²²⁴ Nasser's action demonstrated that Nasser himself assigned this dual leadership - Egypt and Arab - role to himself and to Egypt. G.A.Nasser, *Philosophy of Revolution*, pp.61-62.

²²⁵ R.H.Dekmejian, *op.cit.*, p.98.

could not be accepted at all by the Egyptian Muslims.²²⁶ So Nasser made an effort to devise a new application of socialism, which might suit the specific requirements of his country. As Nasser commented, “The broad lines of this pattern are socialism, co-operation and democracy, and our task is to adapt these principles to our circumstances and to proceed with the work of building a growing, intended society”²²⁷

In an interview with a German broadcasting company in early 1965, Nasser invented the term, “Arab implementation of socialism” when asked about his view of the differences between original socialism and his own brand of socialism. This was an explanatory version of the Arab socialism that was one of Nasser’s main ideologies. There were different expressions for Arab socialism similar to Nasser’s, however. Ali Sabri suggested ‘Socialist implementation in Egypt’ and the former Deputy President, Kamal ad-Din Rifat proposed the phrase ‘The Arab road to socialism’. Nasser addressed students at Alexandria University clearly in these terms:

Socialism in general means the eradication of man’s exploitation by man. But the socialist application varies from one country to another. There are people who like to call it Arab socialism on the basis that this is socialism with a particular trademark. It is my opinion it is an Arab application of socialism and not an Arab socialism. I believe that there is only one type of socialism and that there are basic socialist principles.²²⁸

The first job in adopting Arab-featured socialism was to criticise the existing dogmatic Marxism and to highlight its limitations and its fallacies in practice. Nasser was critical of the developmental stage of communism. Since the proletarian dictatorship succumbs to the monolithic communist party’s autocracy, it is unlikely that the ideal of ultimate communism can be achieved. Nasser explained that Arab socialism adopted the principle of “democracy for all the people” and advocated the settlement of all class conflicts peacefully, unless the intrigues of reaction forced it to take a different course of action²²⁹ He also asserted that a new phase of contextualisation and application had to follow authentic Marxist theory without any dilutions. For Nasser, this new version of Marxism was Arab socialism, which could act as a practical

²²⁶ Instead of adopting a historical materialism opposed to the Islamic catechisms, Nasser justified his socialistic approach by proposing and exemplifying the ideal of the Islamic ummah community which appears in the Quran and Hadith. The principles of the ideal socialist community of ummah were equality, social justice, prevention of monopoly, and the limited right to property. These principles might be attractive to Arab peoples for their character of genuine justice, supported by God.

²²⁷ D.Hopwood, *op.cit.*, p.100.

²²⁸ Fawzi Najjar, “Islam and Socialism in the U.A.R.,” *Journal of Contemporary History* Vol.3, 1968, pp.188; quoted in John Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat - The Political Economy of Two Regimes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) p.324.

²²⁹ Nissim Rejwan, *Nasserist Ideology: Its Exponents and Crisis* (N.Y.: John Wiley & Sons, 1974) p.94.

means to achieve social justice, and was much more likely to be realised. He publicised his new brand of socialism as the most peaceful method for reaching the state of ultimate justice, not by the Marxists' revolutionary mechanism of conflict and violence, but by the mechanism of consensus and persuasion.

Heikal confidently advocated Arab socialism in 1961 by comparing Arab socialism with classic communism. He pointed out seven differences between Arab socialism and classic communism. The first difference is the view of class. Communism advocates the dictatorship of the proletariat as represented by the communist party, whereas Arab socialism suggests "the melting away of class differences". According to Heikal, Arab socialism does not intend to destroy the bourgeois class in severe class conflicts, but tries to integrate the classes of society by reducing the possibility of class conflicts in a moderate way. Nasser thought that the most appropriate identity for this integrated society must be 'the Arab identity', thus he put the word 'Arab' in front of the word 'socialism'.

The second point of difference follows from the first: "Communism considers every man of property an exploiter, and therefore seeks his destruction... Arab Socialism differentiates between property belonging to the exploiting classes and property which represents work and endeavour." While communism liquidates the exploiter physically, Arab socialism tries to disarm and disable him, and then welcomes him into the new society, in which all classes are transformed into a single class.

Thirdly, Arab socialism seeks property and capital redistribution through compensation, but in communism, property and titles are made forfeitable by the government without any proper compensation or consideration.

The fourth point related to the view of private individuals and the role of the 'state'. Communism regards an individual as a unit of labour, but Arab socialism regards an individual as a crucial element in the composition of a society. In this context, the 'state' in communism is merely a puppet of the ruling class which acts as a preserver of vested interests. However, in Arab socialism, the 'state' plays a crucial role in protecting peoples' right and interests.

The fifth point concerns the means of achievement. Communism justifies severe conflicts, revolutionary sacrifice and violence, as necessary for the achievement of an ideal communist society in the future. Arab socialism, on the other hand, seeks people's happiness in the present, not the future. Heikal gave Stalin's performance as an example, and criticised communism as an 'ideology that is completely preoccupied with the future'

The sixth point of difference between communism and Arab socialism, Heikal continues, is "the difference between literal duplication and free adaptation, between inertia and movement, and between blind dogmatism and free thoughts." Heikal classified Arab socialism

as an empiricist ideology, and communism as a doctrinaire's ideology. As Nasser put it "we do not open books and copy from them; we open the book of our reality and try to find solutions for our situation"

The final point which Heikal makes is the difference in the political institutions. According to him, "Communism requires that the organisation of political action be exclusively in the hands of the communist party... Arab socialism believes that the organisation of political action should embrace the whole nation, and should be based on a frame of national unity." Heikal concludes his comparison with a brief polemic against the communists, "Those who believe that evolution has only one way before it, a way whose beginning is capitalism and whose inevitable end is communism, imagine that history marches in a blind alley. Such a blind alley never existed!"²³⁰

The Arab socialism that Nasser proposed seemed to have something in common with Islamic principles of humanism, such as equality, social justice, and brotherly affection. Nasser's version of socialism did not satisfy the Soviet leaders and ideologues. They wanted a whole-hearted adoption of classical Marxism and had little patience with the Egyptian compromise. ²³¹ Dogmatic Soviet ideologues denounced Nasser's socialism for its misinterpretation of genuine communism, and its deviation from the authentic path of communism. They alleged that Nasser's socialism was not real socialism, but fatalism, the absence of faith in science and its findings, was slovenly, refused to submit to the requirements of life, and also rejected the planning or regulation of life.

Nasser's Arab socialism is a typical example of a ruling ideology. It was formed on the basis of the leader's strategy, not of his ideological beliefs. Arab socialism grew in importance as an alternative to pan-Arabism when Cairo's position as leader of the Arab nationalist movement was threatened following Syria's secession from the U.A.R. in September 1961. Rejwan notes that the immediate rise of Arab socialism after the collapse of the U.A.R. meant that Nasser tried to use his socialist ideology as an alternative ideology to maintain his position in the region.²³²

Nasser recognised socialism as an ideology that had two implications in practice. The first was its potential for achieving rapid modernisation and development. The second was its potential role in providing the basis for a social welfare system for the Egyptian people. Although Nasser adopted socialism as his main ideology, however, this did not mean that the

²³⁰ Muhammad Hassan Heikal, *Al Ahram*, 4th of Aug. 1961, quoted in *ibid.*, pp.96-98.

²³¹ Nasser's closest relationship was with President Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, who taught him the concept of a socialism not subservient to Soviet communism, and worked out in the closest possible conformity with local conditions. *Ibid.*, p.101.

²³² *Ibid.*, p.99.

Egyptian economic system was controlled only by socialism.²³³ Socialism in Egypt consisted of a mixed economy where the private sector, which included light industry, private possession of property, and domestic business transactions, coexisted with a broad public sector. Nasser's economic system under the slogan of Arab socialism may be understood as a unique socialist economic system. It adopted the merits of capitalism despite the Charter, which officially proclaimed that capitalism had been eradicated.²³⁴

5.3.1. Official Statement of Arab Socialism - The Charter

In May 1962, Nasser promulgated The Charter of National Action as the official guideline for Egypt. It proclaimed that Egypt was to embark on a course based on the principles of socialism. This was the first serious attempt to define an ideology of the revolution.

The Charter was largely devoted to socialism and referred to it as the only way to achieve economic development and modernisation. The two aims of Arab socialism were said to be 'justice' and 'sufficiency'. It read, "This is not confined to the mere re-distribution of the national wealth among the citizens but foremost and above all it requires the expansion of the base of this national wealth, so as to accede to the lawful rights of the working masses. This means that socialism, with its two supports, sufficiency and justice, is the way to social freedom"²³⁵ According to the Charter, there is no way to reap the fruits of everyone's toil if Egypt does not stick to the principles of socialism. Nasser asserted that it was Egypt's destiny in the 20th century to adopt socialism as its major ideology. "The socialist solution was a historical inevitability imposed by reality, the broad aspiration of the masses and the changing nature of the world in the second part of the 20th century"²³⁶ The Charter also stipulated the establishment of a new integrating organisation, Arab Socialist Union (A.S.U.), which could be a crucial factor in bringing about major changes in Egyptian and Arab politics.²³⁷ It describes the real situation and the expected state of the Egyptian economy in detail. In fact, it seems that the Charter attempted to explain and justify all those policies that had been formulated by Nasser's regime following the 1952 coup. It also attempted to provide a firm doctrine for comprehensive development in Egypt, which included politics, economics, social-cultural potentiality, and

²³³ Raymond William Baker, *Egypt's Uncertain Revolution under Nasser and Sadat* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978) p.175-176.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.177.

²³⁵ Chapter 6. "On the Inevitability of the Socialist Solution," *The Charter of National Action*, p.227.

²³⁶ *Ibid.* p.227.

²³⁷ Panayiotis J.Vatikiotis. *The History of Egypt*, p.400.

amongst other things, to facilitate a prosperous future for Egypt.²³⁸

The most important achievement necessary for progress in Egypt was the management of the economy. Consequently, the first socialist issue to be tackled was that of nationalisation and of dealing with the private sector. The principles for dealing with the public and private sectors demonstrated clear distinctions between Nasser's Arab socialism and classical socialism. These principles were summed up in the Charter as follows:

First, in the field of production in general: The major skeleton of the production operation, i.e. the railways, roads, ports, airports, the sources of energy, the dams, means of sea, land and air transportation and other public services should be within the framework of public ownership.

Second, in the field of industry: The majority of the heavy, medium and mining industries should be part of public ownership. Although it is possible to allow private ownership in this domain, such private ownership should be controlled by the public sector owned by the people. Light industries must always be beyond monopoly. Though this field is open to private ownership, the public sector must have a role enabling it to guide that industry in the people's interests.

Third, in the field of trade: Foreign trade must be under the people's full control. Thus all import trade must be within the framework of the public sector. Though it is incumbent upon private capital to participate in export trade, the public sector must have the main share in that field to preclude all possible fraudulency. Insofar as a percentage could be set in that field, the public sector must be in charge of three quarters of exports, while encouraging the private sector to shoulder the responsibility for the remaining share. The public sector must have a role in internal trade. The public sector should, within the coming eight years – the remaining period of the first overall development plan for doubling the national income in ten years - be in charge of at least one quarter of the internal trade means service and distribution against reasonable profit which under no circumstances should reach the extent of exploitation.

Fourth, in the field of finance: Banks should be within the framework of public ownership. The role of capital is a national one and should not be left to speculation and adventure. In addition, insurance companies should be within the same framework of public ownership for the protection of a major part of national savings and to ensure its sound orientation.

Fifth, in the domain of land: There should be a clear distinction between two kinds of private ownership - that which opens the gates to exploitation, and non-exploiting ownership which does its share in the service of the national economy while serving the interests of the owners

²³⁸ Patrick O'Brien, *The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System: From Private Enterprise to Socialism 1952-1965* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966) p.132.

themselves. In the field of ownership of rural land, the Agrarian Reform laws have limited individual ownership to one hundred feddans. Yet the spirit of the law implies that this limitation should cover the whole family, namely father, mother, and children out of age, to avoid clustering together maximum ownerships allowing some form of feudalism. This spirit can be made to rule within the coming eight years provide the families affected by that law sell the land in excess of those limits in cash to the Agricultural Cooperative Societies or to others.²³⁹

As can be seen from the above principles, the Charter proposed nationalisation of major industries and the expansion of the public sector in order to establish a socialist state, but this did not mean the total eradication of the private sector. Instead, the Charter advocated the coexistence of private and public sectors on the premise that the public sector had the initiative in the overall economic system. As the Charter states, "By encouraging competition within the framework of the general economic planning, the private sector is also an invigorating element in the whole economy."²⁴⁰

Although private possessions were allowed in specific areas such as land, light industry and the domestic trade market, the level of production and the whole production process had to be supervised by the government. All the actions of and output from the public sector were controlled and managed by the state itself. Managing organisations in the public sector had to be supervised by the cabinet that was chaired by the President. The official process by which individual companies in the public sector were controlled followed a four-stage process, along a chain of command which consisted of: 'President - Minister - Chief Officer of Cooperative - Chief Executive Officer of Company unit'. Some small enterprises in the manual industry, which did not depend on massive cash flows or a high-level of technology, remained in the private sector, but the government controlled these companies by restricting the supply of raw materials and capital.²⁴¹

In the field of trade, the Charter stipulated that domestic trade should be limited to 65% of public sector goods, and international trade should be no higher than 25% of the whole public sector. However, as it became known that 219 people had monopolised the whole market, all the wholesale trading companies were nationalised.²⁴² Only some personal service areas, which depended on personal labour, such as individual lessons and individual transportation

²³⁹ *The Charter of National Action*, pp.230-232.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p.242.

²⁴¹ Ahnad N. Azim, "Egypt: The Origins and Development of a Neo-Colonial State," in Burch Berberoglu (ed.) *Power and Stability in the Middle East* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1989) p.7.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, p.7.

companies, remained in the private sector.

Though the Charter admitted that capitalism was an efficient ideology in making good economic progress, it considered capitalism to be a new form of colonialism for exploiting other developing countries. This idea originated from the observation that the economic achievements in the developed countries heavily depended on the exploitation and the plundering of other nations. With this logic, the Charter proposed a confrontational attitude towards the Western countries and concluded that the underdeveloped peripheral states were not able to achieve economic development through capitalism since they could not overcome the dependence system of the world economy. Patrick O'Brien pointed out that the Egyptian capitalists were not reliable. They made great fortunes by exploiting the labourers, and had monopoly power in every industry without taking any business risks.²⁴³

One of the most noticeable features of the Charter lies in Chapter 9 - Arab Unity. As mentioned above, the U.A.R. was brought to an end by Syria's secession in 1961, which meant that Nasser's drive for Arab nationalism had lost its momentum. In this context, Nasser proposed the formation of a new socialist ideology by means of the Charter. Nasser's undying passion for Arab unity can be seen in Chapter 9 of the Charter.

Nasser emphasised the role of the U.A.R. but showed a changed attitude towards the speed of achievement by saying that "Arab unity is not a uniform constitutional form that must inevitably be applied. It is rather a long path with several stages leading to the ultimate aim"²⁴⁴ Practical steps towards Arab unity were refined and proposed in the Charter as follows: i) A peaceful start, ii) Scientific application of all the progressive concepts of unity, iii) Practical efforts to fill the economic and social gaps stemming from the difference in the stages of development of the various peoples of the Arab Nation, iv) Paving the way for new intellectual trends for overcoming intellectual disintegration in the Arab world.²⁴⁵ Despite the fact that the main purpose behind Nasser's proclamation of the Charter was to launch a new socialist ideology for Egypt, the noticeable implication of the Arab unity factor in the Charter was that Nasser did not give up his passion for pursuing hegemony in the Arab world by means of the Arab unity movement which he had initiated. In this context, Arab socialism came to the fore in the Arab world as a major ideology, which may be described as an eclectic socialism mixed with Arab nationalism.

²⁴³ P.O'Brien, *op.cit.*, p.202.

²⁴⁴ *The Charter of National Action*, p.257.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p.258.

5.3.2. An Advance Guard of Arab Socialism: The Arab Socialist Union

5.3.2.1. Germination of the A.S.U.

In his speech in July 1961 at the National Congress, Nasser was very emphatic about the necessity of a new political organisation to replace the National Union. The reason Nasser worked out such a detailed plan for this was because all political parties chased their own classes' interests, and depended on the exclusive coalition of feudalists and capitalists, not on the ordinary people. From his experiences Nasser concluded that there were no political organisations for all the classes of Egypt, particularly for the people at grass-roots level. He thought that reactionary politicians had spoiled the National Union, and so believed that a comprehensive and pure organisation was required to represent all the Egyptian people properly.²⁴⁶ With the new organisation, Nasser intended to strengthen his regime through coalitions with people at the grass-roots, particularly the labour and peasantry class.²⁴⁷

As the National Congress officially acknowledged the Charter, the A.S.U. was proclaimed as a unitary political organisation in Egypt. The principles of Arab socialism that the Charter proclaimed were 'freedom', 'unity' and 'socialism'.²⁴⁸ The A.S.U. was launched as an advance guard of Egypt's socialism.

Although the Arab Socialist Union was established as a replacement for the National Union, its pyramid-shaped structure, covering village levels at the base up to the government at the top, was not appreciably different from that of the National Union. However, there were two notable differences between the National Union and the A.S.U.²⁴⁹

The first difference was the introduction of vocational representation. This meant that in excess of 50% of the A.S.U. had to be composed of labourers and farmers at every level of the organisation. The second difference lay in the 'workshop unit representation system'. All workshops, companies, cooperatives, administrative organisations, syndicates and national enterprises had the right to elect their own representative by voting. The delegates elected through this system represented around 18.5% of the A.S.U. This system was devised as a reflection of Nasser's attempt at broad nationalisation and industrialisation that required an efficient method of mobilising and controlling labourers in the industrial sector. After the

²⁴⁶ *Le Monde*, 13th of March 1962, quoted in A. A. Malek, *Egypt*, p.343.

²⁴⁷ Jung Yeol Yoo, "The Study on the Party System of Underdeveloped Country," *The Middle East* (Seoul: Ea Moon Gak, 1988) p.9.

²⁴⁸ D.Hopwood, *op.cit.*, p.90.

²⁴⁹ P.J.Vatikiotis, *The History of Egypt*, p.400.

collapse of the U.A.R., Nasser had to prevent reactionary groups from opposing his government, and his priority was thus the interests of the workers in an effort to restrain potential adversaries.²⁵⁰

Nasser described the Arab Socialist Union as ‘the Union of labourers’ forces’ (Tahaluf al-Quwa al-'Amilah), but his ideas about the working class had only a diagrammatic existence. Nasser did not think that labourers were able to have any organising autonomy for their own interests.²⁵¹ Even though Nasser admitted to the existence of class struggle and to the inequality which prevailed in society, he did not accept the Marxist’s doctrine of inevitable violent class-based revolution. Basically, Nasser thought that once labourers and farmers become the majority in a society, there would be no need for a violent revolution. Nasser’s vision of the A.S.U. was as a method for achieving the goal of an ideal Arab socialism by peaceful means.

5.3.2.2. Structural Reform of the A.S.U. by Ali Sabri

In 1968, the number of members of the A.S.U. was five million, among them half a million people played a leading role in the Union, and the number of core members having rights of decision-making at every level was approximately 20,000. Out of a total of 6,888 basic units, 314 (4.6%) basic units were delegated from the urban areas, 4,103 (59.5%) basic units belonged to the rural areas, and 2,435 basic units were ‘workshop units’ (35%).

Figure 4.2 The first organisation of the Arab Socialist Union (1963 - 1965)

The President (al-Rais)

▼ (appointment)

The Supreme Executive Committee (al-Lajnah al-Tanfidhiyya al-Ulya)

▼ (appointment)

General Secretariats (al-Sikritariyyah al-Ammah)

|| (independent relationship)

Provincial Council (Majlis al-Muhafazah)

▲ (election)

²⁵⁰ Ilya Harik, “The Single Party as a Subordinate Movement: The Case of Egypt,” *World Politics* Vol.26, No.1 (Oct. 1973) p.86.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p.87.

District Council (al-Majli al-Mahalli)

▲ (election)

District Executives (al-Haiah al-Tanfidhiyya al-Mahalliyah)

▲ (election)

Basic Units (20 committees) (al-Wihdat al-Asasiyya)

▲ (election)

Members of the Union (Udwiya al-Ittihad) (recruited by recommendation)

▲ upward participation / ▼ downward commanding / || equilibrium

Members of the Supreme Executive Committee and the General Secretariat's were appointed by President Nasser. Generally, Free Officers and their aides were recruited as members of the General Secretariats, and the majority of members of the Supreme Executive Committee of the A.S.U. were mostly Nasser's ministers and advisers.

The structure of the A.S.U. was quite hierarchical. The apogee of this hierarchy was the President. He had the ultimate right to appoint people to crucial positions in the A.S.U., but at the level of counties and districts, leading members were elected by free votes from the members. Consequently, influential members at the county or district level were mostly intellectuals, educated farmers, teachers and public servants. Nasser's land reform policy after the coup enlarged the opportunities of political participation for those people who had had no power to take part in political affairs when they were dominated by exclusive groups of great land owners. Those who had possessed more than 25 feddans were not allowed to be elected as representatives at any level.²⁵²

At the highest levels, there was no clear distinction between the A.S.U. and the general administrative organisation of the Egyptian government. Many high positions in the A.S.U. overlapped with those of government officials. After all, the A.S.U. functioned as a governmental organisation.²⁵³

In 1965, Ali Sabri took up the post of Secretary General of the A.S.U., and made an effort to introduce radical reforms to the organisation. He tried to isolate local elites that had been elected to the 'basic units' that made up the base of the A.S.U. pyramid. He then took the next step of formulating 'leadership groups' in all villages, cities, factories and work places. The

²⁵² Leonard Binder, "Political Recruitment and Participation in Egypt," in Joseph Lpalombara and Myron Weiner (ed.), *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965) p.233.

²⁵³ D.Hopwood, *op.cit.*, p.91.

members of such ‘leadership groups’ were not selected by mean of elections, but by the appointment of provincial governors and the national secretariat. These ‘leadership groups’ were his ambitious device for having control over the entire system. The leadership groups were supposed to play a key role in Sabri’s reformed organisation.

The Sabri initiatives would have made the A.S.U. a formidable structure with professional full-time agents, quasi-military organisations, and carefully selected activists at all levels, to lend a sense of direction and purpose to an otherwise formless congregation. Sabri’s ultimate targets of radical reform were much more ambitious. He proposed these targets in an interview with Lutfi al-Kholi,

- i) to place the direction of the public sector and the administration under the A.S.U. in order to evict the ‘reigning bureaucracy’
- ii) to place the labour unions and professional syndicates under A.S.U. control, and promote revolutionary elements within them
- iii) to form a Central Committee that will be the brain of the A.S.U. and will supervise the government.²⁵⁴

Sabri’s intention of reorganising the A.S.U. was to make the A.S.U. a more hierarchical system.²⁵⁵ He abolished the ‘Provincial Council (Majlis al-Muhafazah)’ and ‘District Council (Majlis al-Mahalli)’ which were elected, and put another executive group – the Provincial Executives (al-Haiah al-Tanfidhiyya al-Muhafazah) into the chain of command.

Figure 4.3 The new shape of the A.S.U. created by Ali Sabri (1965 - 1968)

The President (al-Rais)

▼ (appointment)

The Supreme Executive Committee (al-Lajnah al-Tanfidhiyya al-Ulya)

▼ (appointment)

General Secretariats (al-Sikritariyya al-Ammah)

▼ (appointment)

²⁵⁴ John Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat - The Political Economy of Two Regimes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) p.323.

²⁵⁵ I.Harik, *op.cit.*, p.94.

Provincial Executives (al-Haiah al-Tanfidhiyya al-Muhafazah)

Provincial Council (Majlis al-Muhafazah) : abolished

▼ (appointment) District Council (Majlis al-Mahal) : abolished

District Executives (al-Haiah al-Tanfidhiyya al-Mahalliyah)

▼ (appointment)

Leadership Groups (al-Haiah al-Qiyadiyyah)

▼ Basic Units (20 committees) (al-Wihdat al-Asasiyya)

Members of the Union (Udwiya al-Ittihad)

(▲ upward participation by election / ▼ downward commanding by appointment)

Sabri's passion was too strong to be accepted by many others. With his newly-structured A.S.U., he tried to step into the next stage by destroying old elites and vested interests, and to put the state bourgeoisie in the public sector and the civil service. This caused severe protests, particularly from technocrats like Aziz Sidqi. Non- professional people were present at all levels of the public sector. Many people agreed that the interference of the A.S.U. committee in administration and production activities caused trouble. It is quite clear that the A.S.U. was established as a political organisation to mobilise the people, but its intervention in the government's administration resulted in the overall weakness of the Union and in severe tensions between the A.S.U. and many other political actors. The defeat in June 1967 put an effective end to the reforming process.²⁵⁶

5.3.2.3. Corporatist Character

In order to strengthen and guarantee his regime's security, Nasser needed to have a comprehensive political organisation which could mobilise the people in line with the regime's intentions. With this organisation Nasser tried to create a good relationship with the public and private sectors. This was the factor of corporatism.²⁵⁷

In other words, since ideological propaganda could not control the whole workforce at every level, a comprehensive political organisation that could persuade all workers to join was essential. For this purpose, Nasser decided to create a corporatist political organisation.

²⁵⁶ J. Waterbury, *op.cit.*, p.324.

²⁵⁷ E.K. Trimberger, *op.cit.*, p.278.

Waterbury agreed with the view that the A.S.U. was the apparatus of corporatism, but he pointed out that the Egyptian attitude towards corporatism was quite eclectic and steady. So the completed form of corporatism in Egypt came to appear with the establishment of the A.S.U., which followed the failures of two prominent political organisations - the Liberation Rally and the National Union.²⁵⁸ The Liberation Rally was organised by the Free Officers who tried to mobilise Nasser's support groups, but it was unsuccessful due to a deficiency in planning and management techniques, the Free Officers' lack of political experience and skills, and the absence of a firm ideology.²⁵⁹ After the dissolution of the U.A.R., the National Union was accused of being a tool of the reactionary group, and was finally replaced with the A.S.U.

As mentioned above, the A.S.U. regulation required that at least 50% of the membership should be allocated to farmers and labourers through the principle of 'work force or vocational unit representation'. This regulation was enacted in order to encourage their active participation. This was the first step toward corporatism.²⁶⁰ With regard to Alfred Stepan's view of corporatism as part and parcel of the broader process of restructuring relations between the various sectors of society and the state,²⁶¹ the organising 'corps' units, which did work similar to Ali Sabri's reforms, played the role of agents for the state of Egypt.

In short, the main purpose of the A.S.U. in the relationship between the state and its units was to encourage mass mobilisation and to control and supervise political participation at every level in Egypt. By means of its propaganda, the A.S.U. conducted surveillance of potential reactionary groups, and instructed the people to be obedient to the regime, which is a typical feature of corporatism. In this context, it may be said that the A.S.U. functioned as an advance guard of Nasser's authoritarianism.

²⁵⁸ J. Waterbury, *op.cit.*, p.312.

²⁵⁹ Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) p.309.

²⁶⁰ E.K. Trimberger, *op.cit.*, p.284.

²⁶¹ Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society, Peru in Comparative Perspective*, p.47.

6. The Ideology of Park – Mechanism for Domestic Control and National Security

Unlike Nasser, President Park formulated no significant creative ideology. Chung Hee Park came to power through the military coup of May 1961. The coup had overthrown the Second Republic of Korea that had been established by the 19th April student revolution in 1960. The Second Republic of Korea was a legitimate republic, and was being run completely democratically. As a result, Park's regime embarked on a new government with a serious lack of legitimacy and security.

In this context, Park's only option for survival was to depend entirely on support from the U.S. Under the harsh conditions of the Cold War, from the beginning of his regime, he had no autonomy to decide on an ideology. Park's regime was forced to become a faithful front-line camp of the U.S. in the Cold War, and hence there was no room for progressive ideologies such as Marxism or socialism. Only a thorough anti-left ideology prevailed throughout the country, with the sole objective of domestic integration, which caused great suffering to the people who wanted a democratic regime.

Ironically, Park's anti-communism made a contribution towards the rapid development of the Korean economy by means of strong mass manipulation, and the reign of terror. There have been controversial arguments when evaluating Park's performance. However, quite a few scholars and commentators believe that Park's performance was essential as far as the rapid development of the Korean economy is concerned, but that many of the people suffered greatly at the hands of his tyrannical authoritarian regime.

6.1. Park's Nationalism - For the Development of the Economy

6.1.1. Nationalism in Park's Ideology

In the first stages, Park and his military junta had no specific ideological attitudes.²⁶²

²⁶² At the early stage of Park's military regime, right after the coup, his first actions in an attempt to gain public

The only thing that his ideological attitude could be presumed to obtain was a revolutionary pledge. From the pledge, which was proclaimed by the revolutionary council straight after the coup, anti-communism was clearly his main ideal. At that time, the U.S. government and even the communist regime of North Korea did not have any idea at all as to what Park's ideological attitude really was. Park contrived to win over some intellectuals, politicians and journalists to his side by giving them important positions in the government, and he had them work out an ideological rhetoric for his regime.²⁶³

6.1.1.1. The Military Administration Period (1961 – 1963)

On 16th of May 1961, Park overthrew Myon Chang's the Second Republic government by means of a coup designed by parts of the Korean Army and the Marine Corps. Their rhetoric of legitimisation for the coup was mainly criticism of the Myon Chang's government with the descriptions of "the incapability of the politicians", "the increasing threats of the North Korean communists" and "the extremely chaotic situation of Korean Society"²⁶⁴ At the same time, Park employed rhetoric that expressed his intention to move into a new ideological phase such as, 'Firm anti-communism', 'Economic development', and 'Establishment of a new political order'.²⁶⁵ After the 'Five-year economic development plans' were released, his main targets were set up as being an 'independent economic system', 'industrialisation', 'expansion of main industries' and 'aspirations for economic growth'.²⁶⁶

In fact, at that time, an elaborate ideological framework had not been worked out, and just a few slogans and some rhetoric were used as propaganda to persuade people to accept the new military regime. At that time, the concept of 'nationalism' had not yet appeared.

6.1.1.2. The First Half of the Third Republic (1963 – 1967)

support were to round up gangsters and remove the corrupt government officials. By doing this, he seemed to gain support from the progressive press such as Dong-A Ilbo, and Sasanggye. But Park's regime in its first phase had no concrete ideas about the future. Sang Woo Lee, "Park Chung Hee's Regime, The Backdrops of His Power 2 - Improvised Ideology of 16th of May Revolution," *Shin Dong-A*, May 1985.: Yoon Keun Kim, *Marine Corps & 5.16 - Behind Story & Autobiography of General Kim*, (Seoul; Bumjo Sa, 1987) pp.184-187.

²⁶³ Although most intellectuals protested against the suppressive ruling style of Park's government during his whole term as President, not a few of intellectuals supported Park's regime. Those who helped Park's government to formulate ideologies and logic to persuade the people were admitted into core position of the regime. See Sam Woong Kim, *Traitors*, (Seoul: Chung Sa, 1989).

²⁶⁴ Speech at the National Press Club of the U.S.A. (16th of November 1961).

²⁶⁵ Inauguration Speech of Supreme Committee for National Rehabilitation (3rd of July 1961).

Park did not keep his promise of transferring power to the civil government as soon as possible.²⁶⁷ Instead of stepping down from power and returning to the Army, Park retired from military service and took part in the presidential election under the slogans of ‘liquidation of the disgraceful history of Korea’,²⁶⁸ and ‘completion of the sacred military revolution’.²⁶⁹ Park’s mention of ‘nationalism’ made its first appearance at this time. ‘Liberal democracy based on nationalism’ was his first mention of nationalism.²⁷⁰ Although it appeared that this general concept of nationalism included the idea of Western democracy, hidden intentions lay behind it. In reality, whenever a contradiction between the values of democracy and the national interests appeared, Park would stand on the side of the national interest. This was merely a plausible excuse for his non-democratic and autocratic actions. In this context, he emphasised a ‘unique type of democracy in Korea’²⁷¹, which was different from authentic Western democracy, in that he declared that the key to genuine democracy lay solely in economic development.²⁷²

The other noteworthy point is the Korea-Japan agreement on the normalisation of diplomatic relations in 1963 on the premise of compensating Korea for colonial exploitation during 1910-1945. When Park signed the agreement, his speech read “In rapidly changing international relations, one is necessarily required to have a broad and comprehensive attitude towards the world in order to be able to stand as a dynamic member of the world.²⁷³ Compromising with Japan is an essential part of the process of gaining financial aid to build up our economy”²⁷⁴

Nationalism on the Korean peninsula is inspired primarily by resentment of Japan. As mentioned in previous chapter, for the Korean people, who had been opposed by Japanese military rule for 36 years, the notion of ‘nationalism’ was automatically linked to anti-Japanese sentiments. It is quite ironic that Park tried to bring about reconciliation with Japan in order to obtain funding for his development plans under the slogan of ‘nationalism’. The concept of Korean ‘nationalism’ is incompatible with pro-Japan sentiments. Massive protests followed Park’s decision to sign the Korea-Japan agreement on the normalisation of diplomatic relations.

²⁶⁶ The Annual Administrative Policy Speech (5th of January 1962).

²⁶⁷ Verse 6, Pledge of Revolution (12th of August 1961).

²⁶⁸ Speech at accepting candidacy for the 7th presidential election (30th of August 1963).

²⁶⁹ Speech at the ceremony of General Park’s retirement from the R.O.K.Army (13th of August 1963).

²⁷⁰ The public commitment of the presidential candidate (23rd of September 1963, Korean Broadcasting System).

²⁷¹ Speech at the canvassing tour for President at Choong Ang High school (28th of September 1963).

²⁷² Speech at the 19th Celebration Ceremony for National Independence Day of the Republic of Korea (15th of August, 1964).

²⁷³ Special Statement by the Presidential Office concerning Korea-Japan Talks for reestablishment of diplomatic relations (26th of March 1964).

²⁷⁴ Presidential message to the people (26th of June 1964).

6.1.1.3. The Second Half of the Third Republic (1967 – 1972)

In 1967, Park was inaugurated as the 6th President of the Republic of Korea. He invented a new concept of nationalism - 'Nationalistic democracy'- which was based on the ideas of national independence and national subjectivity.²⁷⁵ According to this, all politics had to be dependent on economic objectives, and the most important goal was 'efficiency'.

On 4th of July 1974, joint communiqué between North and South Korea regarding a peaceful reunification process between the two sides, peace movements, and a strong hope for unity throughout the whole Korean peninsula, was proclaimed. However, Park insisted on accusing the North Korean leader Il Sung Kim as a 'warmonger'²⁷⁶ and criticised the North Korean government for being an 'invader and inhumane'.²⁷⁷ As a leader of a developing country, he explained to the people that his priority should be to obtain foreign funds for development, in spite of the fact that this would imply a political dependency on foreign countries. For him, the first concern was not 'national dignity or self respect' but 'foreign capital and techniques'²⁷⁸ for development.

Outwardly he emphasised national independence and dignity, but practically he sought to attract foreign capital, with the rhetoric that economic prosperity meant genuine national independence. At the first stage of development, all developing countries have to depend on foreign countries that can provide financial aid.

He also drew the finalised line of the wage level for labourers with the statement as follows: "A reasonable wage not dependent on productivity would encourage labourers to keep their jobs. Frequent higher wage demands from labourers could not be good for the whole nation,"²⁷⁹ He made no attempt to disguise his intentions of sacrificing the interests of the work force.

6.1.1.4. The Fourth Republic – the Yushin Constitution (1972 – 1979)

The gateway to the Fourth Republic of Korea was the enactment of the Yushin Constitution in 1972. In his inauguration speech, Park showed a tendency towards a type of statism which would cause totalitarianism by saying that "under the new Yushin Constitution,

²⁷⁵ Speech about "The Desire for a Self-Supporting Economy" (15th of April 1967, Korean Broadcasting System).

²⁷⁶ Press Conference (25th of April 1969).

²⁷⁷ Speech at the Graduation of the Korean Military Academy (30th of March 1972).

²⁷⁸ Press Conference (25th of April 1969).

²⁷⁹ Speech at the Commemoration of Labour day (10th of March 1971).

all Koreans should regard themselves as being part of the country and hence should devote all their energy to build up national strength”.²⁸⁰ The Yushin Constitution was devised on the assumption of Park’s presidency for life by abolishing the presidential elections, and this increased the problem of legitimacy for Park’s regime.

Against this background, an absolute form of authoritarianism aimed at controlling all actions and even the slightest movement had spread throughout the country. At this time, Park’s rhetoric was ‘prosperity of the nation through firm national security’²⁸¹. This emphasis on the issue of national security prohibited people from expressing their own political views and from seeking freedom and human rights.

6.1.2. The Characteristics of Park’s Nationalism

As mentioned above, Park continued to emphasise ‘nationalism’ and ‘independence’. It thus appears that the word ‘nationalism’ meant a lot to Park’s regime. His interpretation of ‘nationalism’ had specific characteristics as follows: First, he had a negative view of Korean history. He seemed to have a sort of derogatory feelings about the historical background of Korea.

It is of no use at all to look back at our disgraceful history before our gaining liberty from Japan, and to bewail our misfortune. I had to hang my head in shame whenever I thought of the dishonourable experiences throughout our history... But the most regretful thing is that we were not able to build a great wealthy country even though 19 years had passed.²⁸²

In addition, he criticised Korean history as one of factionalism. This kind of criticism was exactly the same as that used by the Japanese colonial government to contempt for Korea.²⁸³ Park enumerated the negative factors of Korean history: i) lack of self confidence, ii) lack of pioneering spirit, iii) egoism, iv) excessive expectation of windfall income, v) lack of

²⁸⁰ Inauguration speech of the 8th Presidency (27th of December 1972).

²⁸¹ Annual Press Conference (13th of January 1973).

²⁸² Speech at the 19th Celebration Ceremony for National Independence Day of Republic of Korea (15th of August, 1964).

²⁸³ Man Yeol Lee, “Historiography of Scholars under Japanese Colonialism,” *Korea’s Recognition of History* (Seoul: Chang Jack & Bipyoung Sa, 1976) pp.515-519.

honour, vi) lack of sound criticism.²⁸⁴ All these factors were taken from a historical view of Korea under imperialism and from the point of view of toadyism.

The only positive feature of Korean history for him was 'the legacy of overcoming national crises'. Over the past four thousand years, Korea had been invaded by most of the dynasties of China, Japan, and Mongolia, more than a thousand times. Nevertheless, Korea had never ceased to exist and had not been annexed by any foreign power, except by the Japanese military government during 1910-1945. Park explained that the reason why Korea had been able to survive the invasions was due to the existence of outstanding messianic heroes who appeared and saved Korea in times of crisis. Park focused on this kind of messianism. He reasoned that even though the competence of the Korean people as a whole was exceptionally weak, a few gifted heroes always appeared to save and revive the country. This was a typical leader-centred paradigm.

In general, those who try to formulate a nationalist ideology as their main source of motivation tend to focus on excellence, potential, and unrealised capability, and try to mobilise the people by encouraging pride in their identity. Yet Park used miserable examples and displayed the wretchedness of their heritage before the people in order to make them feel as if they needed a heroic figure to save them and their country. This epistemology of history was constructed in order to justify a military coup which overthrew the most legitimate government in Korean history.

Secondly, Park laid the blame for the national crises exclusively on internal and not external factors. His blame was directed particularly at the separatism and factionalism of the Chosun dynasty of the Yi monarch, incompetent leadership, an irresponsible elite and an apathetic population in modern Korean history. He did not mention external exploitation and foreign influence. This type of conclusion causes problems, because when it comes to a national crisis, if external factors such as imperialism or colonialism are totally ignored, the diagnosis of cause and result may well be wrong.

One of the political mentalities which prevailed in Third World countries was the sentiment of anti-imperialism. Japan, the U.S. and the Soviet Union were all recognised as imperial powers, but Japan is the most notable imperial state from a Korean perspective.

In fact, due to Japan's deforcement, Korea experienced a painful period under the tyranny of the Japanese government. Also, the occupation of South and North Korea by the U.S. and the Soviet Union respectively caused the division of the Korean peninsula. However, it appeared that Park was completely unaware of this, but rather on occasion actually showed

²⁸⁴ Chung Hee Park, *The Pathway to the Future of our Nation* (Seoul: Dong-A Chulpan Sa, 1962) pp.85-96.

affection towards Japan. A letter Park wrote to his brother-in-law just before the coup reveals his attachment to the Japanese culture when he cites a poem about a Samurai's pledge. Even as President of Korea, he still enjoyed singing Japanese military march songs.

His strong attachment to Japan was shown when he established the Yushin Constitution. The Yushin Constitution that was enacted in October 1972 was the crystallisation of his passion to replicate Japan in his regime. The Yushin Constitution was a real duplicate of the Meiji Yushin in Japan, which gave rise to the modernisation of Japan. So his role-model for economic development was definitely Japan in this context. His admiration for Japan meant that he was unlikely to possess any anti-imperialist sentiments. The only positive view that Park had of Korean history, 'The legacies of overcoming national crises' was just rhetoric to mobilise the people by making them see the present situation as another serious crisis in Korean history.

Thirdly, Park emphasised the idea of heroism. According to him, in order to make progress, heroic leadership is necessary. Throughout Korean history, sporadically emerging heroes had led the people to security and prosperity. This emphasis relates to his self image, and was tantamount to putting himself forward as one of the prominent heroes of Korean history:

My first concern is how to destroy defeatism, and how I can create self respect and and independent spirit among the people. I am quite sure that if a certain leader who has patriotic consciousness and the feeling of the sacred mission to revive our country was at the head of our country, then we would see a prosperous Korea and new opportunities of national revivalism....²⁸⁵

This tendency to identify himself as a hero became much stronger after the launch of the Yushin Constitution. Presidential elections were abolished and replaced by the Electoral College voting system which fully supported Park's regime and guaranteed his life-long presidency. Park thought of himself as a pre-destined leader for the development of the Korean economy. This way of thinking was probably caused by a kind of obsession.

The fourth feature of Park's nationalism was that national development was identified solely with economic progress. This view dominated the country for eighteen years, the whole of his period in office. As seen in the 'Revolutionary Pledge', the escape from extreme destitution was the first objective of the coup in 1961. Rapid economic growth was the decisive factor when it came to policy making. Therefore economic development overrode all other factors, such as politics and culture, and individual sacrifice for the sake of this development

²⁸⁵ Chung Hee Park, *Potential of Nation*, p.89.

was taken to be a necessary condition. This was a strong form of statism far-removed from the classical form of nationalism. For the sake of economic development, the notion of 'nationalism' was utilised as a mass-mobilising mechanism.

Park's strong drive for an independent economy was emphasised throughout his period of rule, however it was practically impossible to set up a completely independent system. In the development process, Park's government had to rely on foreign capital and technology. Also, they had to convert from the Import Substitution Industry (I.S.I.) policy to an export-oriented drive, which deepened their dependence on foreign countries.

The fifth aspect of Park's peculiar nationalism was its limited application in terms of geography. The concept of 'nation' indicated South Korea only, even though South and North Korea have many things in common, such as the same language, the same characters and system of writing, and the same culture. He frequently stressed the idea that the 'state' should take priority over the 'nation'. Although Park talked a lot about peaceful reunification with North Korea, it seemed that he always had feelings of enmity against North Korea.

In brief, Park's concept of nationalism may be summarised as follows; i) nationalism could be achieved only through economic development, ii) the cause of the national crisis must be related to the absence of an heroic leader, iii) nationalism is incompatible with pluralism or factionalism, iv) Korean history is a shameful history, v) North Korea should not be included in the term 'nation', which was the goal of Park's regime.

6.1.3. Economic Nationalism – The Issue of the Korea-Japan Talks on Compensation for Colonialism

The term 'economic nationalism' implies that the first priority of nationalism is economic development. This concept originates in Park's belief that all meaningful achievements in non-economic fields, such as politics and culture, necessarily require the strong fundamentals of economic progress. Park mentioned his 'economic nationalism' when he wrote, "Our first priority must be economic prosperity rather than politics or culture"²⁸⁶

Park concluded that the student revolution of April 1960 and the coup of 1961 occurred as a result of economic hardships. "The real reason that we had to go through two political upheavals was destitution. People strongly wanted to escape from the indigent conditions, this desire to escape from their poor situation brought about our revolution"²⁸⁷ He

²⁸⁶ Chung Hee Park, *State, Revolution and Me*, (Seoul: Ji Gu Chon, 1997) p.313.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid*, p.309.

defined the meaning of politics thus, “Politics is not a special thing. It is not a philosophical, or an ethical, or a cultural thing. Politics is just an apparatus to help people make enough money for living. That is it.”²⁸⁸

Whenever Park had to make a decision on policy priority, his ‘economic nationalism’ influenced his policy making process and put economic goals at the top of the list. Amongst his five grand objectives of ‘Independence’, ‘National Security’, ‘Reunification’, ‘Democracy’ and ‘Industrialisation’, ‘Industrialization’ had always been emphasised as a matter of urgency. It is understandable that, with limited resources, Park had to find a way of enlarging those resources, and increasing financial affluence, in order to pursue other objectives afterwards. Indeed, to Park’s regime, it was obvious that economic development could strengthen national security. He said, “There is no better way of rooting up communism than by an economic revival that has grown by the sweat of our brows and our tears of sacrifice. In other words, if we can build a better, richer society, then we have defeated communism.”²⁸⁹ He continued to comment on democracy and culture, “Needless to say, genuine democracy could be achieved through establishing economic fundamentals”²⁹⁰ “Without food and money, there will be no culture.”²⁹¹ Park even identified his coup in 1961 as ‘the gateway to the National Industrial Revolution’²⁹²

In short, the most outstanding feature of Park's nationalism was his excessive emphasis on economic factors as a trigger for national prosperity, amongst the many other items on the national agenda. He used ‘nationalism’ as mere propaganda for legitimating his harsh drive towards economic development. Even though he put the notion of ‘nationalism’ at the forefront, he was not interested in promoting nationalist sentiments by means of persuasive propaganda concerning national historical background, national potential, or self-respect.

The Korea-Japan Talks of 1963 were a clear watershed for Park. They provoked a feeling of hostility towards Japan. At that time, the Korean people felt a severe form of enmity towards Japan, not only because of the trauma caused by their colonial experiences, but also because of the feeling that Japan had actually benefited from one of the most tragic incidents in their history, the Korean War. For the Korean people, it was clearly unfair that Korea had been divided rather than Japan, when Japan was actually responsible for the Second World War.²⁹³ In

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p.259.

²⁸⁹ Chung Hee Park, *The Pathway to the Future of our Nation*, p.281

²⁹⁰ Chung Hee Park, *State, Revolution and Me*, p.338

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p.313.

²⁹² *Ibid.*, p.314.

²⁹³ Most Korean people believed that Japan should have been held responsible for World War II. As Germany was divided into two parts, Japan should also have been divided. But Korea was divided. This was traumatic for Koreans.

addition, after the restoration of independence, notorious pro-Japanese factions, who had been living off the Japanese colonial government during the colonial period, were appointed as high-ranking officials by the U.S. military interim government and President Syngman Rhee. Most pro-Japanese factions were cruel to those who were involved in independence movements and persecuted them. Thus, it was deemed unacceptable that pro-Japanese factions from the colonial era should live well without being prosecuted.

In this context, Park ignored people's resentment towards Japan, because he was aware that it would be impossible for him to propel an economic drive with the limited aid of the U.S. Thus, he had to forge a coalition by official diplomatic means with Japan, who could give the Korean government a good deal of financial aid.

In this situation of great resentment towards Japan, anti-Japan movements were an obvious choice for a nationalist drive. But Park ignored the people's sentiments and instead sought financial aid in practical ways, the Korea-Japan Talks of 1963 being a good example of this. From 1945 until that time, there had not been a single attempt at reconciliation with Japan. Park's first concern was not to satisfy the people's feelings, but to obtain practical benefits in the form of war compensation.

The Korea-Japan Talks became an arena where Park's 'economic nationalism' clashed with the 'protest nationalism'²⁹⁴, which originated in the Japanese colonial era. The only reasons for continuing with the Korea-Japan Talks in the face of such massive protests were economic.²⁹⁵ In order to obtain funding, Park had to put up with severe protests. Those who protested against the Korea-Japan Talks of 1963 believed that a compromise settlement would force Korea under Japanese influence again, in the form of an economic domination, which could be seen as second occupation of Korea by Japan. Park's 'economic nationalism' was diametrically opposed to the 'protest / resistant nationalism'²⁹⁶ which was very common in countries newly liberated from colonial power.

6.1.4. Ideological Influences on Park

The reasons behind Park's choice of a strict form of 'economic nationalism' for

²⁹⁴ Byung Ki Song, "Wijung Chuksa Movement," Yong Hee Lee, and Jae Bong Roh, *op.cit.*, p.63.

²⁹⁵ There is a different interpretation for the reasons behind the Korea-Japan Talks. Park's preference for Japanese culture and his experience as an officer in the Japanese army could have been the reasons behind the Talks; Dong Sung Kim, *A Study on Korean Nationalism* (Seoul: Orum, 1995) p.178, p.183.

²⁹⁶ K.H.Yoo described the Korea-Japan Talks as the conflict between 'calculative patriotism – pro-talks' and 'emotional patriotism – con-talks'; Kun Ho Yoo, "Turmoil and Completion of Korean-Japanese Agreement," *60 Big Affairs agitating Modern Korea*, (Seoul: Shindong-a, 1988) p.149.

enhancing the state's wealth can be traced to some extent. The most efficient method of attaining legitimacy for an unstable regime is to show the people concrete result such as improvement in the quality of life as quickly as possible. As mentioned in previous chapters, Park's regime was fragile because Park and his military junta overthrew the fully legitimate democratic government. He needed a carrot to offer the people as proof of his regime's successful performance. Consequently, he had to concentrate on the economic drive.

In addition to this, Park's ideal role model for political performance was the Japanese Meiji Yushin (Reformation), and his ultimate objective was the wealth and military strength of the state. This objective of Park's nationalism was a very close imitation of the Meiji Yushin's. In order to achieve the target of building a wealthy nation, therefore, Park concentrated on the economy.

It is helpful to look at Park's educational background in order to understand his pro-Japanese sentiments. He was born in 1917 under the rule of Japanese imperialism. From 1932, when he was 15, to 1944 when he was 27, he went to Daegu teacher training school which was organised by the educational authority of colonial government of Japan, Manchuria Military Academy, and the Japanese Military Academy in succession. During the most sensitive, juvenile and adolescent period of his life, he had been socialised under the austere Japanese education system including military academies, aimed at cultivating elites who could devote themselves to the expansion of Japanese military imperialism.

According to Gap Je Cho's close investigation into Park's school life, under the Japanese school policy of discriminating against Korean pupils, which included prohibiting the use of the Korean language and forcing pupils to change their Korean names to Japanese ones, Park might have developed strong contempt for the Japanese oppressors and a feeling of helplessness. However, there is no clear evidence of his resentment against the Japanese military imperialists, rather, he seems to have admired Japanese bellicosity, a typical example being the Samurai culture.²⁹⁷ Instead of being involved in independence movements, as many nationalists would have been, he concentrated on getting promoted as high as possible in Japanese military. In gaining this promotion, he tried to overcome the experience of personal sufferings under Japanese persecution that he had had to endure. It is understandable that he had strong attachments to the military. His values had been seriously influenced by military sentiments due to his 10 years' experience and education in Japanese military academies. Indeed, he quite often expressed a preference for a nationalism originating in Japanese

²⁹⁷ Gap Je Cho, *Park Chung Hee*, (Seoul: KKachi, 1994) p.62, p.69, p.90.

militarism at the round table discussions when he was designing the coup.²⁹⁸

The origin of Japanese military nationalism was the Meiji Yushin. The Meiji Yushin was a prominent ruling ideology aimed at the elevation of Japan's position in the world, which mobilised people under the slogans of 'industrialisation' and a 'wealthy and strong Japan'. It played a part in justifying the state-led authoritarian mobilisation system.²⁹⁹ The Japanese nationalism that Park tried to copy and transplant into Korea can therefore be categorised as a similar type to the 'German economic nationalism' of the 19th century, as mentioned above.³⁰⁰

The practical character of Park's nationalism originated in his attachment to Samurai or the Japanese code of the warrior. The Samurai culture clearly contrasted with the traditions of Confucianism which prevailed throughout the Chosun dynasty. Confucianism focused on forms, morals, and justice, whereas the Samurai culture emphasised power, usefulness, and material gain.³⁰¹ Park criticised the 'Yangban (aristocratic)' culture in Korea, which had emphasised morality and formality throughout the 500 years of the Chosun dynasty. He asserted that the tradition of the 'moral state of Korea' should be replaced by the 'pragmatic state of Korea', which can be seen to represent the 'economic state'. Joong Myung Chun's recent research into Park's nationalism concluded that Park's idea of the pragmatic 'economic state' was a noticeable feature of the desire to escape from the obstinate tradition of formalism and moralism. Chun described Park's term of government as 'the era of exception'.³⁰²

It seems that Park became drawn to the Samurai culture while attending the military academies in Manchuria and Japan. The principles of education of those academies combined to produce an attitude of 'unconditional winning'. The atmosphere of this educational background must have influenced the formation of Park's nationalism.³⁰³

6.1.5. Changes in Park's Nationalism

From the moment he took power, Park showed no interest in 'national dignity' per se, despite the fact that he had always spoken of nationalism as though it were a trademark of his

²⁹⁸ Byung Joo Lee, *Portraits of the President* (Seoul: Seo Dang, 1991) pp.95-96.

²⁹⁹ Yoshimi Yoshiaki, "Formation of Fascism in Japan," in Takahashi Hanahachiro, T.S.Choi (tr.) *Modern History of Japan* (Seoul: Jishik Sanup Sa, 1981) pp.191-195.

³⁰⁰ Chalmers Johnson has described the Leninist-Stalinist totalitarian model and the Bismarckian-Meiji authoritarian model as two noteworthy policy-models of late developmental states.: Chalmers Johnson, *Japan: Who Governs? - The Rise of the Developmental State* (New York: W.W.Norton & Company, 1995) p.45.

³⁰¹ Joon Seok Han, *Literary Culture and Military Culture* (Seoul, Dana, 1991) p.63.

³⁰² Joong Myung Chun, *Seeing through Korean Politics* (Seoul: Gil An Sa, 1995) pp.17-37.

³⁰³ Joon Seok Han points out that the successful achievement of Korean economic development in the 1960s and 1970s was due to the importation of the military culture which had been introduced by Park from Japan into

regime. He just used the term 'nationalism' as rhetoric to cover up his other intentions. The way he made use of the terms changed slightly throughout his regime. At first, in an attempt to acquire legitimacy for his regime, he used the rhetoric of the 'national crisis' in order to gain the support of the people. In the late 1960s he used the phrase 'national awakening and national development' to mobilise people towards a concrete target of economic development. In the 1970s, his desire for a life-time presidency encouraged him to devise a new slogan: 'unique type of Korean nationalism and democracy' to overcome massive protests against his dictatorship.

Consequently, he used nationalism in order to legitimise his regime, to achieve social stability, and to increase the pace of economic development. Approaching the 1970s he tried to link nationalism with national security, related to anti-communism. Outwardly he expressed himself as a genuine pro-unification agent, but his attitudes and policies relating to the unification of the Korean peninsula were based on extreme anti-unification sentiments.

His constant attitude of pro-Japanese and pro-American dependence proved that his nationalism was merely a device to make his regime more effective and to legitimise his rule. In short, his nationalism was the product of a mixture of personal background, attachment to Japanese militarism, and the regional political situation, including the division of the Korean peninsula.

Park's nationalism functioned as his major ruling ideology. This ideology played a crucial role in the rapid economic development of Korea, but it sacrificed political and economic independence to external powers such as the U.S. and Japan. At the same time, it consolidated the harsh authoritarian order by the centralisation of power and excessive emphasis on efficiency. This modified nationalism undermined the fundamentals of national unity. Although toadyism was officially rejected, penetrations of the U.S. and Japan's intervention in various parts of the country deepened, and their influence increased. Ironically, the penetration of external power into the country caused a weakening of 'national consciousnesses', yet all these things were justified as necessary parts of economic development.

Park's methods of administration were dictatorial. He made decisions without consultation. Due to the immaturity of civil society and a political system that was not institutionalised, these characteristics of his leadership were quite effective. In this context, Park's economy-centred nationalism was connected to the motivation for industrialisation. 'Revolution from above'³⁰⁴ propelled the state-initiated industrialisation. Even though there were numerous side effects of that forced industrialisation, Park's regime was able to achieve a high-level of industrialisation and economic development that could support a regular army and keep

Korean politics as a principle of state management. *Ibid.*, p.157.

the state's administration system running. At the same time, this material infrastructure stimulated civil society to come to the forefront of politics, which suggests that the formation of fundamentals is linked to the democratic institutionalisation of politics. At least Park's prediction was fulfilled. He said that the economy should be considered as the first priority, and then political freedom and democracy would follow automatically.

However, Park's nationalism caused a serious crack in Korean politics. He believed that political freedom should be limited temporarily in order to achieve industrialisation more efficiently. As the growing civil society and the increasing desire for political freedom caused by the economic development put pressure on Park's regime, Park began to regard all the protests against his government as anti-national rebellions. This showed that Park's regime had become one of extreme authoritarianism.³⁰⁵ Park clashed with the 'civil nationalists', who believed that the most important values for building sound nationalism were democracy and freedom.³⁰⁶ In the 20th century, civil nationalism became a universal value to be sought after by those who tried to establish nationalism beyond the territories of the West. Korea was no exception. The Korean people experienced the student revolution in April 1961, which meant that they had come to realise the meaning of genuine democratic movements in terms of the sovereignty of the people. It showed the seeds of an awareness of civil nationalism in the Korean people. Although the seeds of that awareness were sown in 1960, however during the period of Park's regime, it was thoroughly overwhelmed by Park's economic nationalism movement. With rapid economic development grew civil consciousness, which became strong enough to struggle against an economic nationalism which was only interested in development.

A deep-rooted dilemma for Park's nationalism was that he had to enjoy a 19th century-type nationalist movement for rapid development within a 20th century environment ripe for the spread of freedom and democracy. The political conflicts and the severe cracks in society during Park's regime originated in this fundamental dilemma. But these cracks and conflicts were unavoidable.

6.2. Anti-Communism

³⁰⁴ See E.K. Trimberger, *Revolution From Above* (New Brunswick: Transaction, Inc., 1978).

³⁰⁵ Sei Joong Kim "Study on the Formation Process and Development of an Authoritarian Regime in view of the power politics approach," Presented at the annual conference of Korean Political Science Association in 1993.

³⁰⁶ Sei Joong Kim, "October Yushin and the Democratisation Movement – an Elite Perspective Approach" Korean Political Science Association (ed.), *Modern Political History of Korea* (Seoul: Bup Moon Sa, 1995) pp.442-480.

Ideologies with the prefix ‘anti-’ can hardly be seen to compose an elaborated ideology. Anti-communism cannot be said to have any notable ideological features. Merely proclaiming an adverse position to communism cannot express a regime’s political vision and lead the people in line with the philosophy of the leadership. However, under Park’s regime, anti-communism meant a lot to the Korean people and to Park himself.

Since the Korean War in 1950, South and North Korea have felt extreme hatred towards each other. Further, it may be said that both leaders, Park and Kim, secured their respective regimes against the dangers of collapse by taking advantage of this mutual hatred. They utilised this hatred as a tool of domestic suppression. Some political movements for freedom and democracy against Park’s government were repressed and incapacitated by violent gales of anti-communist sentiment on charges of acts that were advantageous to the enemy, that is, the North Korean government. Using ‘anti-communism’ to justify suppression was a major technique of Park’s regime in managing anti-government movements. Consequently, even though Park’s anti-communism was not an elaborated form of ideology, it is worth exploring in order to clarify Park’s performance.

As mentioned above, it seemed that Park might have suffered from an obsession born when he was deeply involved in the South Korean Labour Party movement³⁰⁷ before the Korean War. Any kind of pro-communist expressions, even somewhat progressive argument in favour of working class rights, were strictly prohibited. Park’s anti-communism was definitely not a well-organised ideology. However, in all activities under his regime, anti-communism played a key role as an effective guiding code to instruct all social issues such as unification, politics, economy, and military issues. The anti-communism of Park’s regime was automatically linked with anti-North Korean ideology in various ways.

6.2.1. Park’s Anti-Communism Law and the Issue of Unification - Method of Domestic Suppression

Immediately after the coup in 1961, Park’s new military government employed a

³⁰⁷ The South Korean Labour Party (S.K.L.P., *Nam Ro Dang*) movement that was founded by Hun Young Park, one of the most prominent communists in Korean history, was a remarkable communist movement in the southern part of the Korean peninsula before the Korean War. At that time, many intellectuals and students in South Korea were attracted by this communist movement. When Chung Hee Park was in the Korean Army as an officer, he became a member of this party as a result of the influence of his communist elder brother, Sang Hee Park. But as soon as he was arrested by military police in 1949, he disclosed the party’s secrets and was released. After two years of retirement, he returned to the Army in the turmoil of the Korean War.

severely suppressive policy regarding the various opinions about reunification with North Korea. Park made a resolution concerning unification, which was that there was no way to unify the Korean peninsula other than by ‘totally defeating and eradicating communism’. He regarded even the mention of a ‘peaceful process of unification’ as an undermining threat. This strongly worded resolution resulted from a sense of impending crisis on the part of the military regime. Finally this resolution materialised into an Anti-Communism Law³⁰⁸ on 3rd of July 1961.

The increasing expectation of unification and the pervasive unifying movements throughout the country after the student revolution of April 1960, threatened the very reason for the existence of the military regime.³⁰⁹ In this context, two remarkable incidents – the indictment for Yong Joo Hwang’s article and the prosecution of Min Ho Suh, who suggested peaceful communications with North Korea – took place.

The Chief Executive Officer of one the most influential media companies the Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation, Yong Joo Hwang, was arrested in November 1964 in violation of the Anti-Communism Law. He contributed an article entitled “Indomitable desire for a united government of Korea – the contents and direction of nationalistic democracy” to a journal called *Se Dae* (‘generation’) in October 1964. In that article, Hwang made four important suggestions which were: i) The North Korean government should be acknowledged as an independent government, ii) Both governments should sign a nonaggression treaty, iii) Both Korean governments should join the United Nations simultaneously, iv) A federation of both regimes and general election under the supervision of the U.N. should be considered in the future.

He was prosecuted for violating Article 4 of the Anti-Communism Law, which prohibits praise, encouragement, and sympathy for North Korea. According to the announcement made by the Attorney General, only the opinion of ‘defeating and eradicating Communism’ was allowed to be proposed and expressed by law.

From that moment on, this article was abused politically and became an effective tool in the suppression of Park’s political opponents and activities that were opposed to the government’s policies. The incident of the prosecution of Congressman Suh was one of the most outstanding examples of that abuse. The leader of the Democratic Socialist Party, Min Ho Suh, asserted that the unification of Korea should proceed in accordance with the U.N.’s initiative, and communication at the civil level by parties, such as the exchange of letters, should be activated in order to create an environment of unification. His idea of letter

³⁰⁸ The Law regarding punishment for participation in communist-related movements and assistance to the movements, which was composed of sixteen articles and an additional clause. This law was abrogated and attached to the State Security Law in 1980.

³⁰⁹ Man Yeol Lee, “The Development of the Korean Christian Movement for Reunification,” *Study on Christian History* (Seoul: Institute for Korean Christianity History Studies, 1992).

exchanging for the separated families in both countries was regarded as helping the enemy. This case was pretty controversial. Even though there were some opinions that this case exceeded authority, nobody could alter the conviction. Suh was imprisoned for seven years. These two cases became the starting point for Park's severe suppression of opinions opposed to his regime with the censorship tool of the legal apparatus – the Anti-Communism Law.

Consequently, discussions concerning reunification came to be extremely limited under the thought control censorship of Park's regime. Park made this matter clear: "Kim's North Korean government is a war criminal. There is absolutely no possibility of seizing a chance to talk and compromise with them"³¹⁰ Park thought that the North Korean government did not belong to the authentic and acknowledged nation of Korea, because he believed Kim was just a puppet of the Soviet Union. Therefore the direction of Park's idea of unification was not one of 'national peace construction' but one of 'economy first, unification second' based on the premise of economic superiority to North Korea.

However, in the late 1960s, the era of détente came to the forefront of international politics. Time was ripe for a new phase of peace construction. The Nixon doctrine provided the logic for this détente. In these circumstances, South-North Korean talks on peaceful coexistence were unavoidable. The South-North Joint Communiqué for peaceful reunification was announced on 4th of July 1972 after the exchange of secret envoys. It was not long before Park's hidden intentions were revealed. He used this peaceful atmosphere to launch a new constitutional republic – the Fourth Republic, guided by the Yushin Constitution. On 17th of October 1972, he made a special announcement about the new constitutional scheme being a crucial method for a peaceful unification. But, in fact, this constitution was aimed at achieving Park's lifetime presidency.

As a matter of fact, under this new constitution, there were some noteworthy changes in Park's standpoint on unification. He started expressing the notion of 'mutual competition with the North' instead of 'defeating and eradicating the North'. This reflected the fact that the South's economy had overtaken that of North Korea. The seven-year programme for the economic development of North Korea fell through and was extended by three more years in order to hit the targets. On the other hand, South Korea's five-year economic development plan was very successful. It meant that the economic fortunes of the two countries, favouring North Korea in the 1960s, underwent a dramatic reversal in the South's favour in the 1970s. In short, Park showed a slight change in his way of thinking about unification from one of extreme hatred towards the North Korean communist regime to proposing the concept of competition

³¹⁰ Press conference, *Dong-A Ilbo* (East Asia Daily Newspaper) 9th of June 1966.

with the incompetent communist regime. However in spite of this slight change, he strictly prohibited broad discussions and the making of statements about the unification topic without the government's official permission.

6.2.2. Anti-Communism for National Defence and Security - Participation in the Viet Nam War

Park's anti-communism was also connected with the concept of national defence and security issues. In 1965, as the Viet Nam War escalated and intensified, Park asserted emphatically that it was time to set up a regional alliance for solidarity under the slogan of anti-communism. At the same time, he emphasised the crisis situation in national security in South Korea due to the U.S.'s regional focus being now restricted to the Viet Nam front. He said, "It is quite predictable that while the eyes of the whole world are on the Viet Nam War, China and North Korea might play a very dangerous game, such as invading South Korea"³¹¹. Actually he was arguing from a self-centred angle. His participation in the Viet Nam War was justified as essential for maintaining peace and democracy in South East Asia, but he blamed North Korea for its support of the communist Viet Cong as an act of aggression. "North Korea is one of the main parts of this war of aggression, Kim is invading Viet Nam now... But we are just protecting our friendly nation, Viet Nam, and freedom because Viet Nam requested our help"³¹². The U.S.'s intervention and the Korean Army's participation in the Viet Nam War were justified as a 'modern crusade for the protection of freedom'.

At that time, most intellectuals in South Korea taking critical stances against Park's regime had understood the meaning of entering into the Viet Nam War very superficially. In reality, there was no military pact between South Korea and Viet Nam. Viet Nam was not a member of South East Asia Treaty Organisation (S.E.A.T.O.), and there were no obligatory conditions in the mutual defence treaty between Korea and the U.S. Therefore, there was definitely not a single obligation to take part in the Viet Nam War.

Park used his explicit ideology of anti-communism to justify his participation in the war. However, his intention was to acquire financial compensation from the U.S. for his part in the war. Park believed that he would be able to get massive financial and military support from the U.S., and he predicted that it would give rise to a special procurement. With this economic boom, Park intended to propel the second term of the five-year economic development plan.

³¹¹ *Dong-A Ilbo*, (East Asia Daily Newspaper), 12th of June 1965.

³¹² *Dong-A Ilbo*, (East Asia Daily Newspaper), 10th of June 1968.

Park made the decision for the Korean Army to participate in the war in March 1966. This would stop the U.S. government from reducing military aid that had been supplied by the Kennedy administration, and Korea would get the \$1.5 billion as a long-term loan in consideration for her part in the war. In addition, participation in the Viet Nam War was accompanied by the export of civil manpower. In 1968, the component ratio of whole exports indicated that exports to Viet Nam took third place behind the U.S. and Japan, and the invisible trade balance was 36% of all exports in 1968 due to the special procurement boom caused by the war.

Park's regime gained much greater autonomy as a result of the Viet Nam War. The government had exclusive power to distribute capital to various sectors. In this context, Park could launch his ambitious and controversial policy – the heavy chemical industry drive.

6.2.3. Anti-Communism and the Ideology of Dependent Capitalism - Contradictions with Nationalism

The other role of Park's anti-communism was as an instrument for supporting dependent capitalism. In creating the sense of an impending security crisis in confronting the North Korean communist regime, Park made the people believe that the only solution was to achieve superiority through rapid economic development. Park mentioned this immediately after the coup, "Except winning the war, the best way to defeat the invasion of the North is the realisation of unbeatable economic fundamentals that can be built only by concrete plans and programmes"³¹³

The motivation for development was thus provided by identifying an adversary. This formulation subordinated economic factors to political logic. As a result, practical economic theories to do with development strategy came to be a matter of secondary consideration. Park's political aims outweighed all other economic considerations. Therefore strategies of economic development for Park's regime came to be guided by the state's control and initiative. This state-led economic development strategy was heading for dependent capitalism based on exclusive monopolies and benefits to particular companies.

For this purpose, Park desperately needed money from the outside. He highlighted the competitive situation on the Korean Peninsula and the severity of the Cold War. Whenever he tried to get financial aid from outside, he would emphasise the fragile situation in Korea and threaten the American-centred Western bloc by mentioning the possibility that they could lose

their front line in the Cold War system.³¹⁴ In this context, it is worth taking a look at the process of the Korea-Japan Talks of 1963.

The American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, pushed Park to develop a formal partnership with Japan, even though resentment of Japan was still rife in Korea. Until that time, there had been no official diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan since 1945, the year of liberation. The U.S. government focused a practical containment strategy to prevent the Soviet Union and communist China from advancing southward into East Asia. In order to contain the two great communist powers, an alliance between South Korea and Japan was essential.

Actually Park thought that South Korea had protected Japan in the battles against the communists. So he guessed that South Korea deserved compensation equivalent to the cost of protecting Japan against communist intervention. Park agreed to the U.S.'s proposal and officially demanded compensation for the Japanese colonial invasion. He attempted to justify his efforts to normalise diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan by the ideology of anti-communism. He urged people to accept that the present security situation was critical, and tried to persuade them that it was less important to express national resentment and hatred towards Japan, than to gain substantial financial aid in order to secure the country from the communists' threats. However, people's revulsion towards the talks increased.

On 29th of January 1964, the Secretary of the State for the U.S. arrived in Korea to call upon the Korean government to begin talks with Japan. This visit stimulated anti-Japanese and anti-American sentiments and caused a student demonstration on 24th of March. With that as a beginning, on 3rd of June, a nationwide demonstration broke out to protest against the Korea-Japan Talks. At first, the protest only dealt with opposition to the Korea-Japan Talks, but later this protest developed as resistance and opposition to Park's regime itself. The demonstrators raised controversial issues in public, such as the illegitimate coup in 1961, widespread corruption in the government, tip-off politics, monopolised comprador capital, and dependence on external power.

Confronting serious resistance to the regime and even facing demands for a change of political power, Park proclaimed martial law and arrested the leaders of the demonstration. They were prosecuted for high treason. Immediately after these prosecutions, on 18th of July, the Minister of Home Affairs announced that the demonstrations had been manipulated by North Korea. On 14th of August, the Public Prosecutor's Office gave out the results of the investigations into the demonstrations, and announced that the extreme leftist movement, the 'People's Revolutionary Party' had planned and executed all demonstrations.

³¹³ *Dong-A Ilbo*, (East Asia Daily Newspaper), 2nd of June 1961.

The Korean Central Intelligence Agency (K.C.I.A.) arrested 41 members of the 'People's Revolutionary Party' including progressive intellectuals, journalists, professors and students. According to the K.C.I.A., this party had been supported by North Korea, had planned to overthrow Park's regime and tried to establish a socialist regime, which would be backed up by North Korea. However, close investigation proved nothing concerning any intentions of rebellion or treason. Nevertheless, Park ordered the General Prosecutor's Office to proceed with the indictment for treason. This order repelled the prosecutors in charge, and three prosecutors resigned.

However, the Minister of Justice presented the results of the investigation differently. "The People's Revolutionary Party was established according to the North Korean Labour Party's platform, and it manoeuvred from behind at all the demonstrations from 24th of March to 3rd of June in order to overthrow the South Korean government".

In spite of this strong accusation by the Minister of Justice, there was no proof that this party had any connection with the North Korean government. Finally only 12 members of the P.R.P. were accused of violations of Article 4 of the Anti-Communism Law – 'Regarding Praise, Encouragement and Sympathy for North Korea'.

Movements to oppose the policy of dependence on external support, particularly Japan's financial loan and the U.S.'s military aid, proclaimed that this dependence would cause big trouble in the future. It was asserted that deepening the dependence would subject Korea to a second colonial agony. Park's response to these movements was to charge them with pro-communism. Most student movements at that time such as the 'Comparative Study Conference of Nationalism', 'East Berlin Students Movement', and 'Unity Revolution Party' were accused of being pro-communist movements backed by North Korea. However, it has been proved that most of these allegations were unfounded.

Park tried to depend on external sources to accumulate capital, and for investment for industrialisation. Park was able to finalise the compromise with Japan by an agreement to normalise diplomatic relations on 22nd of June 1965.³¹⁴ However, as these talks met a deadlock due to massive protests, Park used his anti-communist ideology as a way out of the difficulties. Confronting the nationwide demonstrations resulted in damage to his 'nationalistic democracy'. In addition, the government's violent suppression of opposing groups through harsh martial law and the garrison decree undermined the regime's authority.

³¹⁴ *Dong-A Ilbo*, (East Asia Daily Newspaper), 9th of June 1961.

³¹⁵ Detailed compromises were made as follows, i) Unconditional grant type aid - \$3 billion, ii) \$2 billion loan at the annual interest rate of 3.5% by Japanese government, iii) Private industrial loan - \$1 billion. Yong Bok Kim, "Korea-Japan relations - A distorted connection," in Research Fellowship for Korean Politics, *Beyond Park Chung Hee* (Seoul: Pooreun Soop, 1998) p.371.

7. Conclusion

As discussed above, while a dominant ideology is formed by means of a long process of inductive reasoning, a ruling ideology may be invented in a deductive manner and put into practice by leaders for the purpose of effective ruling. The leaders of newly emerging countries or military regimes that took power by means of military coups needed to set up a concrete ideology to secure their regimes. Constructing a ruling ideology for the purpose of administration was the first job that leaders of such regimes had to accomplish.

Nasser's representative ideology was a combination of nationalism and socialism. When he first launched nationalism as his formal ideology, he focused on an Egypt-centred nationalism. However, the predicament of the Arabs influenced him to give it a broader identity - Arab nationalism. He made enthusiastic efforts to realise the glory of the Arab world by means of Arab unity. The first concrete outcome was the establishment of the U.A.R. with Syria. Due to Nasser's monopoly of power in the Republic, and Syrian feelings of being deprived of and isolated from power, the U.A.R. finally and somewhat inevitably collapsed.

Nasser tried to move into the next phase of his ruling ideology, which was Arab socialism. Although he described his official ideology as socialism, he did not give up the 'Arab cause'. So he devised a combined ideology, namely, Arab socialism. The specific ethnic indication of Arab and the universal concept of socialism were organised into Nasser's prominent ideology. His socialism was quite different from classical 'scientific Socialism'. Arab socialism refused to accept the notions and preconditions of classical Socialism such as the 'dictatorship of the proletariat', the 'materialistic view of history', the 'inevitable destruction of capitalism', and the 'necessity of violent revolution'.

Nasser's Arab socialism was a moderate and modest form of Socialism. The ultimate aim of Arab socialism was Arab unity, resting on social justice and perfect equality. However, defeat in the 1967 War against Israel weakened the passion for this new type of socialism as a method of Arab unity. It seemed that Nasser was not interested in the elaboration of his ideology in terms of theory, but that he focused on the performance of the ideology. The function of Nasser's ideology was to help him attain hegemony in the Arab region. By emphasising Arab unity, he was able to bring into being a united state, the U.A.R. In spite of its brief lifespan, it made Nasser one of the most outstanding figures in the history of the Arab world. Nasser's ideology was also linked with anti-imperialism, anti-Western sentiments, and a non-alignment policy to form a positive and extensive type of ideology.

Park's ideology was in complete contrast to that of Nasser. While Nasser's ideology played a role in his attaining hegemony in the Arab region, Park's ideology focused on the regime's security and its preservation. Like Nasser, Park had chosen nationalism as his main ideology, but there was a big difference between Nasser's nationalism and Park's nationalism. While Nasser tried to escape from the imperial system and build up a strong unified Arab state with the nationalist sentiment, Park's nationalism depended on foreign powers. The first aim of Park's regime was rapid economic development, as a result of its initial lack of legitimacy. By achieving rapid development, Park tried to gain legitimacy through performance. This nationalism could be categorised as the 'economic nationalism' that Germany espoused in the 19th century.

The other ideology of Park's regime was anti-communism. As with his nationalism, Park made thoroughly use of anti-communism for the purpose of regime security and economic development. He suppressed those who opposed his regime by accusing them of being pro-communist. The Anti-Communism Law was an effective tool with which Park could coerce the opposition.

V. OUTPUT OF ECONOMIC POLICY

- STATE CAPITALISM VS. STATE-LED CAPITALISM

1. Introduction

1.1. State and Development

Mark Cooper emphasised the emerging role of the state by commenting, “one of the most dramatic developments in the social structure of the Third World countries in the post World War II era has been the expanding role of the state”³¹⁶, The issue of the ‘role of the state’ has come to the fore as the main agenda by which to explore the development of Third World countries.

The World Development Report, issued in 1983 by the World Bank, accentuated the importance of the state’s role³¹⁷ in the economy of developing countries. According to the report, the dominant role played by the state in the economy is one of the chief characteristics common to most Third World economies.³¹⁸ This may be described as the ‘developmental role of the state’. In other words, economic performance and the state-led development programme are given prime importance in Third World countries, rather than, for instance, security or welfare matters. The growth of the economy in Third World states is synonymous with the growth of

³¹⁶ Mark N. Cooper, “State Capitalism, Class Structure, and Social Transformation in the Third World: The Case of Egypt,” *International Journal of Middle East Study*, Vol.15, (1983) p.451.

³¹⁷ It is obvious that there are various meanings of the word of ‘state’. The first concept is the traditional one that the ‘state’ is composed of the government and the public sector. Secondly, the state can be seen as being composed of the leaders and managers in the commanding positions of the political institutions, including the President, Prime Minister and members of the cabinet. Lastly, in the broadest sense, ‘state’ encompasses not only the government and the economic apparatus, but also ideological state apparatuses, such as the government education system and the means of communication. Mourad Magdi Wahbar, *The Role of the State in the Egyptian Economy* (Ithaca Press, 1994) p.4.

³¹⁸ IBRD, *World Development Report* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) pp.48-49. In the developing economies, the contribution of ‘state-owned enterprises’ to total capital formation is ‘at least a quarter and in a few cases significantly more’. The state is also the largest employer in the modern sector in many developing

the state itself. This manifests itself as growth in state employment, state investment, state revenue and the output growth of state-owned enterprises.³¹⁹

In this context, one of the most prominent roles of the state may be defined as leading and supervising the development programme. It is well known that in the case of late-developed countries, the state plays a 'developmental role in capitalist transformation'.³²⁰ As mentioned above, the role of the state is not limited to supplying material resources and guidance, but it also needs to promote an ideology of developmentalism to legitimise the modernisation project itself. Gellner's linkage³²¹ of nationalism to industrialisation and Gershenkron's emphasis on the importance of 'an ideology of delayed industrialisation' as being necessary to "break through the barriers of stagnation in a backward country... to place its energies in the service of economic development"³²² emphasise this point. The slogan of 'Defensive modernisation' in the Meiji Yushin era in Japan, as well as various other types of developmentalism in many developing countries in the Third World, illustrate how the state invents and promotes specific logics and ideologies to legitimise its modernisation project and mobilise both human and material resources.

While developmentalism accompanies modernisation, its role often goes beyond legitimising the modernisation project. It is also used to justify authoritarian politics. It is well known that many Third World nations confronting the people's demand for democratisation perversely established military and authoritarian regimes in the 1960s and 1970s under the pretext of 'national development'. In these countries, the catchphrase 'national development and economic progress' played a key role in protecting the authoritarian regime. It is natural that most leaders of authoritarian regimes put the first priority of their political direction on economic development, for the sake of their regime's security. Related research into 'modernisation of developing countries' shows that only the state is able to generate the most efficient energy to propel the developmental programme in developing countries.³²³

This developmental state must have strong autonomy to make the most of its capability and mobilise the state's resources up to the highest level, for the purpose of propelling its development strategy by preventing class struggle, and conflicts among various interest

countries. *Ibid.*, p.5.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.49.

³²⁰ See Peter Evans, *Embedded Autonomy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) and Charlmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).

³²¹ See Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

³²² Alexander Gershenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962) p.29.

³²³ Related articles can be found in Min Ho Gook (ed.), *Political System and Economic Success of Newly Industrialised Countries in East Asia* (Gwang Joo: Jeon Nam University Press, 1995).

groups.³²⁴ The administrative process of planning and managing this development programme is not only an economic or business matter, but also an obviously political matter, because the process of development may well be accompanied by political conflicts and social dissatisfaction. Consequently, the capability of a developmental state depends on its political autonomy. In this context, it is understandable that there is a tendency for the state to be inclined to adopt an authoritarian regime in order to achieve that autonomy. Since liberal democratic mechanisms have not been settled in developing countries, these developmental states use the authoritarian ruling method to control the political tensions and conflicts which are the inevitable side effects of the developmental process.³²⁵ In the authoritarian regimes of Nasser and Park, economic development was the priority, ahead of all other policies. They had strong state autonomy even though the means they chose for development were different.

1.2. The Overdeveloped State in Post-Colonial and Peripheral Countries

The concept of the 'peripheral state' has been used as a topographical metaphor that symbolises its situation of isolation from and exploitation by the core states. Before exploring the nature of peripheral states, it is necessary to differentiate between two terms. These terms are 'peripheral' and 'post-colonial', used as descriptive terms of the nature of the state in the Third World. Even though both terms refer to a similar phenomenon, there is a slightly different nuance. Most peripheral states are post-colonial in the sense of their having had a past experience of foreign military intervention and political domination by external powers. The nature of the state in these colonial societies is bound to be determined to a large extent by the colonial power.³²⁶ It is clearly the case that, as post-colonial states, Nasser's Egypt had been influenced by the administrative methods of British colonialism and Park's Korean government had been affected by the Japanese domination over the Korean peninsula.

³²⁴ For a general discussion about the relations between state and development, see Linda Weiss & John M. Hobson, *States and Economic Development*, (London: Polity Press, 1995).

³²⁵ Sei Joong Kim, "Historical and Political Understanding of the Industrialisation System of Park Chung Hee," *Korean Political Science Review*, Annual Conference of Korean Political Science Association 1999, p.2.

³²⁶ This situation is quite obvious in the administrative and repressive apparatus that exists to extract surplus value and channel it to the centre of power. The functions of these apparatuses change in post-colonial societies, but their structure remains as it was before the post-colonial era. Therefore a strong police force or an efficient tax collecting system can be used by the colonial power or by its post-colonial successors.

The difference between a post-colonial state and a peripheral state can be seen as one of stage.³²⁷ For the first few years after liberation from the colonial country, the independent state is usually administrated by colonial legacies such as its police system, government organisation and taxation system, because newly liberated states do not have the capability to invent a totally new administrative system of their own. However, as more determinants become relevant, the state becomes increasingly shaped by developments within its society, as well as by the world economy. This process of de-colonisation is important in the course of strengthening the Third World state. During the colonial period, the state apparatus is strengthened in order to maximise surplus extraction. For example, a national army, and a police force are created, fundamental infrastructure such as railways and motorways are built, and a bureaucratic organisation for taxation and agricultural work is activated. In this context, with the sudden withdrawal of the colonial power, an 'overdeveloped' state remains with strong state autonomy until it is transformed into a peripheral state.³²⁸

In the overdeveloped post-colonial state, the expanding role of the state originates from the intention to increase the influence of local capital. Therefore, at the very first stage of industrialisation, it is necessary for industrial expansion to take place so that there can be a unified market system. Also, nascent industries need to be protected and subsidised and an orderly and docile labour force needs to exist. This leads the nascent bourgeoisie to call for a strong, industrialising state capable of promoting its interests. As it grows stronger, the state is able to acquire increasing autonomy from the bourgeoisie and gradually starts to replace the bourgeoisie in the task of industrialisation.

A noticeable feature of an overdeveloped state is the importance of the army as a repressive apparatus, which has a legal monopoly on violence. The army has several advantages which allow it to control the state. The military authority is a force for modernisation, indoctrinated with the necessity for efficiency and modernity, and it is also relatively well organised and disciplined. The army has the monopoly on violence, which allows it to extract surplus value from society through the control of the state apparatus. The army is also trusted, in the first instance, by the industrialising bourgeoisie, to control the population, integrate the national market, and cooperate in the modernisation and industrialisation of the economy. However, as the military circle increases its power and influence over the whole economic sector, they come to realise that the rising industrial class is unable to undertake the task of

³²⁷ Clive Y. Thomas, *The Rise of the Authoritarian State in Peripheral Societies* (London: Heinemann, 1984) pp.64-66.

³²⁸ Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies : Pakistan and Bangladesh," in Harry Goulbourne, (ed.), *Politics and State in the Third World* (London: Macmillan, 1979) pp.40-41.

industrialisation and modernisation and so take over its economic functions.³²⁹ In these circumstances, the army, the most efficient apparatus of an overdeveloped state, becomes the prime activator of economic development.

Alavi's concept of the 'overdeveloped' state is not just limited to the cases of Pakistan and Bangladesh with which he dealt. Rather, it is relevantly applicable to most Third World countries, which have experienced colonialism before the independence. At the same time, Saul applied Alavi's proposition of the 'overdeveloped state' to Tanzania,³³⁰ and Choi applied it to the Korean political situation.³³¹ With the autonomy and power of an 'overdeveloped state' inherited from colonial countries, economic development could be planned and propelled much more energetically by the state. The reasons why the economic functions of the state have been stressed in these countries is due to the underdevelopment of the private sector caused by the undifferentiated capitalist mode of production, and the state directly possessing the means of production and controlling the whole economy as a major actor.³³² In other words, the state has to perform crucial roles, such as those of supplier and distributor, by taking charge of the directorship of the economic system, rather than merely acting as a supervisor, or a mediator of a free market system. This role of director of the economic system gives the state much stronger autonomy.³³³

1.3. State Capitalism vs. State-led Capitalism

There was strong desire to build up genuine self-determination in newly emerging countries after both World Wars. Even though many nations gained nominal independence, practically, they were still influenced by foreign powers in various ways. In this context, aiming at the completion of independence, every government in the newly emerging countries attempted to realise unimpaired self-determination. Due to the after-effects of colonialism, reactionary groups remained influential and attempted to control the newly liberated government. In these the circumstances, the new leadership had to confront those groups which

³²⁹ Guillermo O'Donnell, "Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State," *Latin American Research Review*, Vol.13, No.1 (1979) pp.3-38.

³³⁰ John S. Saul, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Tanzania," *Socialist Register* (London, 1974) pp.349-372.

³³¹ Jang Jip Choi, "The Formation of the Overdeveloped State, and the Cracks in the Political Structure," *Study on Korean Society* 3 (Seoul: Hangil Sa, 1985) p.191.

³³² Hamza Alavi, *op.cit.*, p.62.

were trying to protect their vested interests. In this context, situations of impending internal conflicts called for radical intervention by a strong regime, such as a military leadership.

Park's coup took place in this kind of atmosphere. In spite of outward differences from Park's case, in a similar context, Nasser's coup was aimed at the eradication of British colonial intervention and the building up of Egyptian sovereignty. Both leaders probably felt the same kind of sentiments, specifically that if the situation were to continue, their own independence would be at risk.

The first task of Nasser and Park was to strengthen their power bases and to solidify their support at the popular level. In order to do this, they needed to press for improvements in the quality of life, which meant a rise in the standard of living. First of all, when they came to power through the coup, they did not have a concrete ideology nor an elaborated strategy related to economic policy. Both leaders' economic orientations were probably shaped through their respective experiences. They came to demonstrate their own strategies for economic development after many trials and considerations. The two economic policy lines that emerged were strikingly in contrast to one another.

According to Amin's view, the newly independent Third World country dominated by the petty bourgeoisie had a 'choice of paths of socio-economic development', either towards capitalism or towards socialism.³³⁴ Which path was chosen seemed to be mainly a matter of the taste and preferences of the particular person in power, the political regime.

The development and fate of the economic structures in the Third World countries depend largely on the nature of the political regimes in the given countries, on their social and political orientation, and on the evolution of their economic policies.³³⁵

... the progressiveness of the economic measures taken by the state, and of the state sector itself, is proportionate to the progressiveness of the ruling circles in the developing country concerned.³³⁶

The most decisive factors in formulating a development strategy and its characteristics, therefore, are the regime's inclinations or the leadership's preferences. In this context, Nasser chose a pro-socialist 'state capitalism' for economic development. On the other hand, Park's

³³³ Clive Y. Thomas, *op.cit.*, pp.76-77.

³³⁴ Samir Amin, *Unequal Development* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976) pp.97-98.

³³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.111

³³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.126.

policy line could be identified as 'state-led capitalism', which had a pro-capitalist slant. To trace the implications of their economic policy options, these two kinds of orientation must be examined. This chapter explores the characteristics of and the differences between the two orientations, and examines the reasons why the two leaders adopted very different lines of economic policy.³³⁷

1.3.1. State Capitalism - Pro-Socialist Option

Even though there are a variety of definitions of 'state capitalism', the most concise one is "a system where the state owns and manages whole enterprises for the purpose of making a profit by the mechanisms of efficient control and supervision until whole private sectors will be replaced by public sectors".³³⁸

There are two contrasting lines of interpretation of state capitalism. According to the socialist theoreticians of the Soviet and Third World countries, state capitalism is as one of the

³³⁷ The aim of this chapter is not to analyse the causality and process of the two leaders' economic management in detail, but to compare and trace the characteristics and the result of both conservative economic strategies for an overview. In a dependent society, the concept of economic development was analysed in various ways. Commentators in the main have studied the development in terms of Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs), and many Marxists have placed emphasis on the terminology of development in the developing countries. Regarding Newly Industrialised Countries, see James Caporaso, "Industrialisation in the Periphery: The Evolving Global Division of Labour," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.25, No.3 (1981); David B. Yoffie, *Power and Protectionism: Strategies of the Newly Industrialising Countries* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983). A Marxist analysis may be found in Bill Warren, "Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialisation," *New Left Review*, No. 81 (1973); Martin Landsberg, "Export-Led Industrialisation in the Third World: Manufacturing Imperialism," *The Review of Radical Political Economics*, Vol.11, No.4 (1979); Joan Robinson, *Aspects of Development and Under-development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). A critique of Warren from the leftists can be found in James Petras (with Philip McMichael and Robert Rhodes), "Industrialisation in the Third World," in Petras, *Critical Perspectives on Imperialism and Social Class in the Third World* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978). These approaches emphasise mainly the internal and external conditions and the concrete process of development of developing countries, but the interactions between external and internal variables related to dependent industrialisation, and the mutual interactions between political variables and economic variables have been neglected. Hence, these approaches could not help us to understand the developing phase as a whole, which includes class struggles, and correlations between economic factors and political factors and between internal and external aspects. These kinds of limitation were tackled logically by some post-dependency theorists such as Cardoso, Evans and so on. In analysing dependent developments, they were interested in the role of the state and its reciprocal relations with private sectors. Simultaneously, they notice the relations between political factors and economic factors. It is easier to understand the relations between state capitalism and state-led capitalism in the light of these correlations of internal, external factors or state, private sectors.

³³⁸ James Petras, "State Capitalism and the Third World," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol.6, No.4 (1976) pp.90-97. Young Bum Cho, *Capitalism in the Third World: Marxist State Capitalism and the North-South Conflict* (Seoul: Han Wool, 1985); the perfect form of state capitalism could be realised by socialist states. In socialist countries, the major actor in production and making a profit is the state itself. Further, in a competitive market, the state could provide the labour force with the highest level of wage, thus, the state could monopolise the surplus profits created. Edward S. Malecki, "Theories of Revolution and Industrialised Societies," *Journal of Politics* (November 1973) pp.948-985.

steps on the way to the realisation of genuine communism.³³⁹ On the other hand, the scholars of the capitalist line assert that state capitalism is not a comprehensive system but just an institution for temporary adjustment. This line is requested when the nationalisation of the private sector is needed due to circumstances beyond the control of private enterprises, such as the creation of a munitions boom for national security reasons.³⁴⁰ However, originally, the notion of 'state capitalism' was invented by Marx and developed by Lenin, which means its etymological origin came from socialist theoreticians. Particularly, when Lenin drew up the New Economic Policy (N.E.P.) in 1921, this interim strategy to achieve genuine socialism was described as a stage of 'state capitalism'.

Many scholars have explored the generalised form of the politics and economics of state capitalism in the Third World. They seem to agree on the characteristics of state capitalism at the descriptive / empirical level. Cooper summarises those characteristics of state capitalism as follows,³⁴¹

- 1) The origin of state capitalism lies in weak peripheral economies with a weak national bourgeoisie and disorganised popular classes.
- 2) State capitalism involves a nationalistic reorientation of economic resources through moderate agrarian reform, nationalisation of basic industries, centralization of finance, and an expansion of social services.
- 3) There exists a state-centred interest group which is grounded in this reorientation of economic activity and which attempts to dominate society through essentially bureaucratic means.
- 4) The societies remain capitalistic, in spite of the expanding role of the state. In fact, the expansion of the state is seen as a buttress to capitalism.
- 5) State capitalism fails to transform the society in its fundamental structure and is quite unstable.

Nasser's Egypt may be seen as one of the best examples of these characteristics of state capitalism. Egypt broadly reduced the private sector without eradicating whole private companies. She nationalised and controlled much economic activity, without reforming the

³³⁹ Karen Pfeifer, "Three Worlds or Three World Views? - State Capitalism and Development," *Middle East Report: Middle East Research and Information Project* (Washington D.C., 1979) p.6.

³⁴⁰ Economist Rudolf Goldshield tried to systematise state capitalism in terms of macro-economics. He urged the state to be a grand entrepreneur in order to confront unbeatable individual capital. His proposition to move to state capitalism is clearly categorised as a capitalist view of state capitalism. *Doo San Encyclopedia of Social Science* (Seoul: Doo San Chulpansa, 2000) p.427.

whole system of new economic relations. This measure of nationalisation could be seen as dependent on the populist nature of the regime.

In this type of populist system, the state dominates the economy, but cannot transform it, neither into a genuine socialist economic system which guarantees perfect equality nor into a dynamic capitalist system. The two-fold failure of the transformation to a more stable system of socialist or capitalist economy renders it rather unstable, not in terms of a potentially genuine transformation, but in terms of a perpetual oscillation between various mixes of the public and private sectors inside the structure of the economy. This oscillation is quite a common phenomenon observable in Third World countries which take state capitalism as their main strategy for running the economy.³⁴²

1.3.2. State-led Capitalism - Capitalist Development Strategy

As mentioned above, state intervention in the economy is one of the most conspicuous factors in Third World countries. State-led capitalism is characterised by a specific typology of state intervention in the economic system, which is distinguished from state capitalism by the approach to dealing with private companies. Even though the state controls and supervises the private sector in a very strict manner, the state never tries to transform the dominant private sector into the public sector. In state-led capitalism, the relationship between the state and private enterprise may be described as a companion relationship, where the state plays the role of a superior companion taking a commanding position and the private companies are obedient to the state as inferior companions.³⁴³

Put simply, state-led capitalism does not attempt to replace whole private enterprises with nationalised companies. On the contrary, it has the somewhat limited intention of making some leading public companies play the role of 'test pilot', in specific areas where there are high risks for private investment, such as building up the fundamental infrastructure. Also, other frontier industry and high technology industries, which need massive investment into basic scientific research and development, could be the subject of state intervention. With the guiding and leading role of the public sector, state-led capitalism makes an effort to activate the private

³⁴¹ Mark N. Cooper, *op.cit.*, p.451.

³⁴² *Ibid.*, p.452.

³⁴³ This dominance-subservience relationship between the state and the private sector is a typical feature of so-called 'Korea Incorporated', which is contrasted with 'Japan Incorporated', that indicates that the private sector is on an equal footing with the state. Il Sagong, L.P.Johns, *Economic Development and the Role of the State and Entrepreneurs* (Seoul: Institute of Korean Economy Development, 1981) p.99.

sector until private companies are able to become the main actors based on market mechanisms. Ultimately, the government of state-led capitalism hands over the state-owned public enterprises to the private sector through steady privatisation when the capability of the private sector reaches the required conditions.³⁴⁴

An unequal development strategy is a feature of state-led capitalism. The economic development drive depending on ‘market rationality’ is not yet applicable to state-led capitalism due to the unripeness of capitalism. It has to depend on ‘planning rationality’ instead.³⁴⁵ According to ‘planning rationality’, state-led capitalism should choose a few industries for investment from amongst all the economic sectors. This system of selection inevitably causes an ‘unequal development strategy’. Concentrated investment is focused on the industrial sector and bigger enterprises, rather than an agriculture and smaller companies, in order to maximise the investments effect – the so-called ‘laser beam effect’.³⁴⁶

In order to drive forward this unequal development strategy, it is necessary for the state to provide the economy with an adequate level of technology and capital. The state plays a crucial role in importing and introducing technology and capital from foreign countries. By putting into practice various export supporting policies, and by proclaiming reformed financial, fiscal, and revenue policies, the state becomes the main actor in controlling and supervising the private sector.³⁴⁷

Practically, this ‘planning rationality’ development strategy can be fruitful. For instance, the Korean state-led capitalism under Park allowed the state to achieve a fundamental reform of the industrial structure, increase GNP, and dramatically develop the manufacturing industry.

Table 5.1³⁴⁸ The Overall Results of State-led Capitalism in Korea

	1962	1972	1981
GNP per Capita (\$)	87.0	306.0	1,607.0
Manufacturing Industry (%)	11.1	22.3	35.9
Heavy Chemical Industry (%)	28.6	34.9	51.1
Gross amount of Export (\$m)	54.8	1,624.1	21,253.8

³⁴⁴ Kwang Joo Park, *The State Theory of Korean Authoritarianism: Praetorian Neo-Mercantilism under the State-led Capitalist System* (Seoul: Ingan Sarang, 1999) pp.198-199.

³⁴⁵ Dal Joong Chang, *Economic Control and Political Authoritarianism: The Role of Japanese Corporations in Korean Politics, 1965-1979*, (Seoul: Sogang University Press, 1985) p.90.

³⁴⁶ For further reading on the ‘laser beam effect’, see Albert Hirschman, *The Strategy of Economic Development* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959); Joel Migdal, “Policy and Power: A Framework for the Study of Comparative Policy Contexts in Third World Countries,” *Public Policy*, No.25 (Spring 1977) pp.251-254.

³⁴⁷ Concerning state intervention in the private sector by the mechanism of control and supervision, see Il Sagong, L.P.Johns, *op.cit.*, pp.108-177.

³⁴⁸ Gwang Ho Yoo (ed.), *Modern History of Korean Economy*, (Seoul: Institute for Korean Studies, 1987), p.178.

The negative aspects of state-led capitalism are clear. The cosy relationship between politics and economics causes a weakening in the autonomy of private companies, and consequently politics comes to dominate economic sectors. In this context, a preponderance of the state sector in the exclusive relationship between politics and economics leads to an excessive dominance by the state over other sectors. This means that political movements demanding the transformation of the authoritarian regime into a genuine democracy are not able to pursue their demands. In addition, since the state fully supports and gives big favours to the big private enterprises, the working classes are prevented from pursuing their own pursuit of rights and interests. The state controls the wage system, but stands on the side of enterprises, which causes resentments amongst labour organisations.

In short, the main characteristic of state-led capitalism is a development strategy formed from the coalition economic system between the public and private sector. The state performs both planning and controlling roles as a strict supervisor. The most outstanding difference between state-led capitalism and state capitalism is that under state-led capitalism, the private sector is built up and encouraged under the guidance of the state.³⁴⁹ Korea under Park's regime is one of the best examples of state-led capitalism. Park established a few state-owned companies such as the Pohang Steel Company (POSCO), the Korean Electric Power Company (KEPC), Korean Telecom (KT) and the Korean Petroleum Company (KPC). At the same time, he made big concessions to private conglomerates (*Chaebol*) such as Samsung, Hyundai, Daewoo, and LG, by means of preferential treatment, such as waiving taxation, giving financial support, and guaranteeing them a monopoly of specific sectors. As a result of the rapid growth of private conglomerates under the guidance of state supervision, many state-owned enterprises were privatised after the 1970s. After this wave of privatisation, the main role of the state changed to that of supporting actor.³⁵⁰

1.3.3. The Core Differences between State Capitalism and State-led Capitalism

In order to compare the concepts of state capitalism and state-led capitalism, it is necessary first to establish some criteria for comparison. Three criteria which differentiate state-

³⁴⁹ Peter L. Berger, Won Hee Lee (tr.), *Revolution of Capitalism*, (Seoul: Eul Yoo Munhwa Sa, 1987) p.185.

³⁵⁰ Sang Cheol Yoon pointed out that the reason why privatisation in Korea went well without any problems was the absence of a public enterprises' bourgeoisie. Sang Cheol Yoon, "State-Capital Relations Viewed through the Analysis of Korean Public Enterprises: Focus on 1960s and 1970s," in Association of Korean Social History Studies (ed.), *Social Change after the Independence*, (Seoul: Moonhak Gwa Jisung Sa, 1986) pp.163-187.

led capitalism from state capitalism are proposed by focusing on the state's roles: i) the matter of the degree of state intervention in economic management through indirect involvement, ii) the extent of dependency on the world capitalist system, and iii) the state's attitude towards the populace class (mainly working classes).

First, under state-led capitalism, nominally the state professes itself to be a liberal actor operating on the primary principles of the free market economy. Outwardly, there are no restrictions on the private capital's sphere of economic activity or on the accumulation of capital. However, in some situations, the state might override this principle of a free market economy and intervene for a particular purpose, for example, to achieve rapid growth in GNP in a short space of time. This means that the role of the state is exceptionally broad and strong.

State-led capitalism does not intend to accomplish the radical change by overthrowing the existing class structure by opposing dependence on foreign economies. One of the principal purposes of the state sector in becoming the dominant actor under state-led capitalism is to exert its best efforts to attract foreign capital. In a situation of deficiency of investment funds for industrialisation in developing countries, foreign capital might be the only means of achieving economic development. In this context, the state, which has monopolised the right to distribute foreign loans, holds absolute power over all economic sectors. All private companies have to be aware of the state's intentions and obey its' will, in order to rotate sufficient capital. With this method of intervention, the state plays the most influential role in the management of even the private sector.

Secondly, countries adopting state-led capitalism depend on world capitalism much more than those adopting state capitalism. Generally, state-led capitalist states adopt neo-mercantilism³⁵¹ as their main strategy for economic development. This means that the economy might be dependent on the market at a global level. Such a state tries to introduce foreign capital into its economy to boost its fundamental industry through investment. In so doing, its economy inevitably becomes dependent on the world market.

By contrast, state capitalism is relatively independent of the influence of the world capitalist system. All the resources required for economic development in state capitalism should be gained on the basis of sufficiency. It regards financial flows from the outside as the first step towards a new phase of dependency on imperial powers. The political masters of state capitalism try to nationalise whole sections of the private sector and to confiscate the properties

³⁵¹ The main features of neo-mercantilism are trade protectionism, as industrialisation-centred strategy for development, the principle of development first, distribution second, and economic nationalism. Joel S. Migdal, *op.cit.*, pp.251-255; Edgar S. Furniss, *The Position of the Labour in a System of Nationalism* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1920) p.7., quoted in Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, Vol.II*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1968) p.966.

of foreigners.

The third point is that, for the most part, the economic drives of state-led capitalism tend to favour the propertied classes. In order to concentrate on the accumulation of capital, state-led capitalism intentionally ignores the interests of the lower classes. Thus, the accumulated capital might be invested directly in state economic development programmes propelled by small numbers of big companies, and not in the welfare system. In this context, the national profits tend to be shared by a few oligopolistic clusters. Welfare concerns are inclined to be neglected under the pretext of the present task of rapid development. Young Myung Kim satirised this attitude of the state in state-led capitalism as indicating an entrepreneurial character, rather than the genuine meaning of the state, which should act according to the people's interests.³⁵² It could be said that the most important priority of state concern is 'economic profit' rather than overall improvement of people's quality of life. Under a state-led capitalist regime, while those who demand equal distribution of outputs from economic production are suppressed, small clusters of capitalists and entrepreneurs are fully supported by the state. Industrialisation is the state's first step towards improving the structure of the economy. After the political upheavals of 1971 (October Yushin) in Korea, an extreme feature of the capitalist-favoured policy was vigorously pursued.

The Korean economic drive was justified by its rapid growth. It is said to be the most successful example of a state-led capitalist development policy. Even though the state-led capitalist strategy does not guarantee economic development automatically, in the Korean case at least, it is obvious that the state-led capitalist strategy was successful in achieving rapid economic development. However, some commentators and economists assert that Korea's striking development was achieved by threatening methods of mobilising the people and the suppression of dissent in the context of an acute mutual antagonism between South and North Korea. Because of this, commentators assert that Park's economic drive should be seen as a provisional method which might only be affective for a temporary period.

³⁵² Young Myung Kim, *Military Dominance and Political Economy in the Third World - A Comparative Study of Brazil, South Korea, Peru and Egypt* (Seoul: Han Wool, 1986) p.120.

2. Egypt - State Capitalism

When the Free Officers' coup took place in 1952, most Egyptians were living in poor and unhealthy conditions. The average real income level was extremely low, and worse than that, the national income was exceptionally unevenly distributed. Egypt's per capita national income was about £42 sterling which was just one tenth of Britain's. Particularly, in the agricultural sector, the average annual income of ordinary farmers was only £22 sterling per year, and a labourer's average daily wage was merely 10 pence.³⁵³ Life expectancy for males at birth was only 35 to 36 years. Even though special procurements due to World War II and the Korean War brought about a slight increase in income in Egypt, the population explosion counterbalanced the increase. Under these conditions of deprivation, the matter of the improvement in the people's quality of life had to be settled without delay. There was no option for the Free Officers. This poverty played a role in encouraging Nasser's regime to act on behalf of the lower-middle classes instead of choosing to represent the bourgeoisie.

As a matter of fact, at the moment of seizing power, the economic preference of the new military regime was not obvious. Trimberger commented that the ambiguity in the economic direction of the military regime was due to the Free Officers' preoccupation with preventing reactionaries from compromising the regime's security. Nasser's circumspection in concealing his regime's strategy was thus a means of restraining reactionary groups until the regime had achieved a sufficient level of security and stability.

As Hamrush attests, "When the armed forces moved on the evening of 23rd of July, the abolition of feudalism was one among the goals they sought to attain, but they had not prepared a project or an integrated plan...".³⁵⁴ The military junta's first priority seemed to be the eradication of feudalism and colonial legacies resulting from Western imperialism. In an interview with Al Ahram Newspaper, although Nasser revealed his uncertainty about a concrete direction for his regime, his intention to eradicate the unpleasant legacies of the *ancien regime* was in evidence. He also hinted at the existence of differences in political ideas among the Free Officers, which might cause possible disagreement when they made a decision on economic development strategy;

³⁵³ Patrick O'Brien, *The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966) p.1.

³⁵⁴ J. Waterbury, *op.cit.*, p.265.

The political ideas of the Free Officers differed, according to their temperaments and the family or social milieu from which they came. ...What we all wanted was to purge the army, rid the country of foreign occupation and establish a clean, fair government which would work sincerely for the good of the people. Once in power, we found ourselves faced with the difficult problem of establishing a political, social and economic programme. It was necessary to improve. We did our best. The divergence of political ideas then obliged us to separate from those who did not agree to apply the majority decisions of the Council of the Revolution and then those of the Government we set up.³⁵⁵

It may thus be argued that, at the very first moment of coming to power, Nasser had no concrete idea as to the direction Egypt should take, or how to achieve the desired prosperity. However, after a while, as soon as Nasser felt confident of his regime's security, he was able to begin to construct his own policies and to reveal his idea of reforming Egypt along the socialist lines of state capitalism.

2.1. The Foundations of Egypt's State Capitalism

In order to examine the foundations and the results of Egypt's state capitalism, two dimensions must be considered. The first is the international background affecting the appearance of state capitalism in Egypt, the second is the domestic conditions behind its appearance.

2.1.1. International Background

In fact, the notion of state capitalism can be applied to most peripheral states' economic policies, especially those which have been carried out by progressive left-wing regimes. In the situation of bringing to an end the era of colonialism after World War II, the international atmosphere changed dramatically. In the midst of this reshuffling of the world order, the rapid emergence of state capitalism in the peripheral world may be attributed to the decline of the influence of traditional colonialism in the developing countries. As the traditional

³⁵⁵ Robert Stephens, *op.cit.*, p.112.

colonial powers' influence diminished, newly emerging states came to possess "the room for freedom of the state to act in international relations"³⁵⁶ in spite of its short duration. Those changes in international politics made the leaders of peripheral states feel that they could try to pursue their own strategies without the intervention of foreign powers. Nasser's revolutionary policy utilised this atmosphere in international relations.

After a while, the world order was reorganised in line with the Cold War system, replacing the chaotic vortex of the decolonisation era. The U.S. and the Soviet Union came to the forefront of international politics as the main actors in the bi-polar system, replacing the colonial system of the Western European countries. At the beginning of the Cold War, Egypt was beyond the concern of either of the superpowers.

During this transition period, there were two important issues holding the U.S.'s strategic interest. The focus of the whole world was on the Korean War, and on the possibility of its escalating to World War III. The participation of the People's Republic of China in particular frightened the U.S., due to the possibility of bringing about another World War. The Korean Peninsula was not just a frontline of Korean Civil War but the hottest battleground of the Cold War.

Another major concern of the U.S. at that time was to restore and revitalise Europe, and to create a débouché in the European market. Also, as the Cold War became more intense between the West and the East, Nasser was able to maintain relative autonomy when it came to dealing with the Eastern and Western blocs. Consequently, Nasser was able to display his ability to operate between the two superpowers by adopting his representative foreign policy - his non-alignment policy. Nasser proclaimed his policy of neutrality in foreign relations at the Bandung Conference in 1955 held by nationalist leaders such as Nehru, where Sukarno demonstrated the growing autonomy of the Third World in international politics.³⁵⁷

At the beginning of Nasser's emergence, as British influence as a symbol of colonialism steadily diminished and East-West conflicts escalated, the new regime in Egypt was able to acquire relative autonomy. In this context, Nasser and the Free Officers came to realise that they would be able to accomplish radical reforms.

Nasser's state capitalism was introduced by the Free Officers, who recognised that the international atmosphere was favourable to strong state autonomy. However, in the late 1960s, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the 1967 War defeat, the weakening of state

³⁵⁶ Ellen K. Trimberger, *op.cit.*, Ch.5; Barrington Moore Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966) Ch.8.

³⁵⁷ Gamal Ahmad Amin, "External Factors in the Reorientation of Egypt's Economic Policy," in Malcolm H. Kerr and El Sayed Yassin, (eds.), *Rich and Poor States in the Middle East* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982) pp.294-299.

autonomy was one of the causes for the collapse of Egypt's state capitalism.

2.1.2. Domestic Factors

Egypt had no experience of genuine laissez-faire economic system at any period in her history. Even though, between 1860 and 1952, Egypt had nominally claimed to operate by the free market system, this was always controlled by the state sector. This was because, historically, the state sector had to control the irrigation systems, which had always been a most important issue for the Egyptian economy, based as it was on predominantly agricultural production. As a typical hydraulic society, Egypt could rely on the monopoly of the state to deal with any potential conflicts caused by managing the irrigation system.

The new military regime had to confront a crucial question immediately after the coup in 1952. The question concerned how they could reshape Egypt and how to develop the economy as soon as possible. Even though Egypt had been troubled with poor conditions in the agricultural sector, which had been the basis of the Egyptian economy throughout history, there was not much room for reforming the structure of the agricultural sector at that time.

Consequently, the only possible option for Nasser was to focus on large-scale industrialisation as quickly as possible. But there existed certain obstacles to industrialisation, such as capital deficiency, low level of technology, high cost of raw materials and lack of availability of foreign exchange. Thus, Nasser could not allow the private sector be a major actor in economic development, in such a situation of poverty which lacked any proper fundamentals.

In addition, because Nasser's political style was hard-shelled and stubborn, he managed the Egyptian economy in an autocratic manner without any room for flexibility. He strictly adhered to the principle of the state's direct involvement and leadership in economic development. Nasser believed that greater government intervention in the economy and central planning were essential for guaranteeing rapid growth. In this context, the principles of an expanded public sector and direct intervention by the state in the economy were accepted.

2.2. The Performance of Egypt's State Capitalism

In this thesis, the concept of state capitalism is applied only to the radical reformation of the economic structure that was targeted by peripheral states' governments. The first steps in the establishment of a firm state capitalism should be to strengthen the state sector, to deal with any potential reactionary groups and to attain popular support as far as possible. Therefore, the typical strategies of state capitalism may be described as follows: i) dissolution of oligarchic dominance through land reform, ii) nationalisation of main industries and financial institutions, iii) achievement of relative autonomy in the international arena, iv) a populace-centred distribution policy.

This classification is the same as that of Petras and Cooper,³⁵⁸ but different from that of Fitzgerald,³⁵⁹ which placed great emphasis on the entrepreneurial function of the state. Although the idea of the entrepreneurial role of the state might be essential in order to expand understanding of the increasing load of the state under the dependent capitalist system, it is not helpful in classifying various types of state intervention. This is because the entrepreneurial function of the state is not only applied by regimes which adopt state capitalism, but is also introduced by various other types of regime in developing countries.

2.2.1. Land Reform - Dissolution of the Oligarchic Class and Strengthening of the Middle Class

The first step towards changing the outdated structure of the Egyptian economy was to dissolve the old elites and introduce the process of industrialisation. The embodiment of that step was the all-important Land Reform Law issued in September 1952,³⁶⁰ just six weeks after the coup. By proclaiming Law 178 (1952), land ceilings were imposed, which effectively limited the enormous power of the agrarian bourgeoisie. The main concerns of the Land Reform Law, which have been amended twice (1961, 1969), were with placing a limit on ownership of land, with the process of land redistribution, and with organising and managing collective farms. The original intention behind the Law was not to destroy whole system of private land ownership, but to dissolve the oligarchic stratum which dominated the whole country before the

³⁵⁸ James F. Petras, "State Capitalism and the Third World," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol.6, No.4 (1976), pp.432-433; Mark Neal Cooper, *The Transformation of Egypt: State and State Capitalism in Crisis, 1967-1977* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982) p.16.

³⁵⁹ Alex Dupuy and Barry Trudu, "Problems in the Theory of State Capitalism," *Theory and Society*, Vol.8, No.1 (1979); E.V.K. Fitzgerald, "State Capitalism in Peru: A Model of Economic Development and Its Limitations," in McClintock and Lowenthal, *The Political Economy of Peru, 1956-1978* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979)

³⁶⁰ Nadia Ramsis Farah, "Political Regimes and Social Performance: The Case of Egypt," in Saad Eddin Ibrahim

military coup. For the purpose of eradicating this potentially reactionary group, which was the most representative and influential power base of the *ancien regime*, Nasser’s first action was land reform.

The table below illustrates the changing phases of land ownership in Egypt in the five decades prior to the coup of 1952. It clearly shows the overall inequality in land distribution for more than fifty years. This long-term inequality had caused the landowning class to stick to the *ancien regime* as crucial supporters, anxious to protect their own properties and assets.

Table 5.2. Landownership 1894-1952

	Small holdings (less than 5 feddans)			Medium-sized holdings (5 to less than 50 feddans)			Large holdings (50 feddans and more)		
	Area (000fds.)	Owners (000s)	Ratio	Area (000fds.)	Owners (000s)	Ratio	Area (000fds.)	Owners (000s)	Ratio
1894	935			1,778			2,006		
1900	1,113	761	1.46	1,757	141	12.5	2,244	11.9	188.6
1910	1,370	1,247	1.10	1,636	132	12.4	2,459	12.4	198.0
1920	1,549	1,714	0.90	1,725	140	12.3	2,261	13.5	167.4
1930	1,715	2,053	0.84	1,755	144	12.2	2,307	12.8	180.2
1941	1,910	2,348	0.81	1,775	148	12.0	2,158	12.0	179.8
1952	2,122	2,642	0.80	1,817	148	12.3	2,042	11.8	173.0
Percentages									
1894	19.8			37.7			42.5		
1900	21.8	83.3		34.3	15.4		43.9	1.3	
1910	25.1	89.6		29.9	9.5		45.0	0.9	
1920	28.0	91.8		31.2	7.5		40.8	0.7	
1930	29.7	92.9		30.4	6.5		39.9	0.6	
1941	32.7	93.6		30.4	5.9		36.9	0.5	
1952	35.5	94.3		30.4	5.3		34.1	0.4	

Source: Robert Mabro, *The Egyptian Economy 1952-1972* (Oxford: Oxford Univesity Press, 1974) p.61.

The enactment of Law 178 in 1952 fixed a 200 feddan ceiling on individual possession of land, and strongly prohibited private mortmain, except the right to transfer another 100 feddans to wives and children. All landowners who possessed more than 200 feddans were forced to dispose of their excess area of land with an entitlement to compensation in the form of national bonds. The requisitioned land was divided into small units and distributed to the small-size land farmers or propertyless farmers. Selling and subletting this distributed land was strictly prohibited and subdivision through inheritance was not permitted.³⁶¹

Other laws concerning the elaboration of land reform as major amendments to the original Land Reform Law in 1952 were introduced in 1961 and in 1969. The Second Agrarian

(eds.) *Developmentalism and Beyond* (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1994) pp.136-137.

Reform Law of 1961 adjusted the ceiling on personal possession of land down to 100 feddans, and in August 1969, the ownership ceiling was lowered to 50 feddans.

The distribution of land ownership after the enactment of a series of Land Reform Laws is set out chronologically by Waterbury, as shown below:

Table 5.3. Distributional Impact of Land Reforms³⁶²

Law	Year	Related Matters	Effected Area (feddans)
Law 178	1952	The First Agrarian Reform Law (Ceiling up to 200feddans)	450,305
Law 152	1957	Taking over public waqf land	110,451
Law 127	1961	The Second Agrarian Reform Law (Ceiling up to 100feddans)	214,132
Law 44	1962	Taking over private waqf land	38,336
Law 15	1963	Prohibition of ownership of agricultural land by foreigners	61,910
Law 150	1964	Transferring sequestered property to public ownership	45,516
		Coop purchases of land (Ceiling up to 50 feddans)	25,807
		Land turned over to agrarian reform by organizations and agencies	25,979
Law 50	1969	The Third Agrarian Reform Law	30,000
Total			1,002,436
Land returned as a result of legal appeals			72,137
Net takeover			930,299
Distributed as of 1967			754,487 to 318,000 families

On the whole, through the reforming process, large land ownership diminished as a proportion of the total cultivated surface. Just before the establishment of the First Agrarian Reform Law in 1952, only 0.4% of landowners possessed 33 percent of the cultivated area, those who had more than 50 feddans lost 15 percent of the cultivated area.³⁶³ From the 1952 reform to 1965, 671,000 feddans were distributed to small landowners who had less than 5 feddans, and the cultivated area of medium sized holding owners (five feddans to fifty) steadily increased. Nasser’s land reform resulted in a new phase in the structure of land ownership. The political and economic influence of large landowners - 0.5% of total landlords - who possessed 35% of the whole cultivated area before the coup moved to middle-range landowners.³⁶⁴

The noticeable point is the maintenance of stability and the strengthening of the influence of the middle-range landowning class holding 21 to 50 feddans. At the initial stage, this class, which possessed 21 to 50 feddans, constituted the rural middle class, but after land

³⁶¹ R. Mabro, *op.cit.*, p.65.
³⁶² J. Waterbury, *op.cit.*, p.266.
³⁶³ *Ibid.*, p.267.

reform it moved up and came to be categorised as the rural upper class. Table 5.4. shows that, at the moment of promulgating the Land Reform Law in 1952, the number of this class of medium-sized land owners - 21 to 50 feddans - was 22,000, but had increased to 29,000 in 1965. Their cultivated area increased to 815,000 feddans from 654,000 feddans during the same period.

Table 5.4. The Changing Phases of Land Owning Structure in Egypt (1952-1965)

		Small Holdings	Medium-sized Land Owners			Large-sized Land Owners			Sum
		<5 feds.	5 - 10	10 - 20	20 - 50	50 - 100	100-200	>200	
Land Owners (000s)	1952	2,642	79	47	22	6	3	2	2,801
	1965	3,033	78	41	29	6	4	0	3,191
	Variation	+391	-1	-6	+7		+1	-2	+390
Land Surface (000fed.)	1952	2,122	526	638	654	430	437	1,177	5,984
	1965	3,693	614	527	815	392	421	0	6,462
	Variation	+1,571	+88	-111	+161	-38	-16	-1,177	+478
Result of Variation	Land Ceiling	+1,353						-875	+478
	Other Policies	+218	+88	-111	+161	-38	-16	-302	

Source: Mahmoud Abdel Fadil, *Development Income Distribution and Social Change in Rural Egypt*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975) p.24

It may be said that land reforming process under Nasser’s regime was performed and propelled with political, rather than economic, connotations. Actually, agrarian reform was a political issue of great significance even before the 1952 coup. The full implications of a labour-surplus society with relatively fixed cultivable land resources came to be connected with serious political issues. There was sporadic political violence in rural areas regarding the matter of harsh tenancy agreements.³⁶⁵

In this context, the first aim the reform process was to reshuffle the landowning structure, which had been dominated by the large-sized landowners, the main actors of the Egyptian oligarchic class. Mahmoud Hussein suggests that Nasser’s land reform policy was intended to incapacitate the oligarchic class from the core of political activity, and that, in addition, it threatened the existence of the dominant class which was strongly united by the

³⁶⁴ C.P. Park, *op.cit.*, p.142.

³⁶⁵ After the World War II, land hunger drove up cash rents to the extent that about 60% of all Egypt’s land was let out each year at rates that equaled 75% of net income. Gabriel Saab, *The Egyptian Agrarian Reform 1952-1962*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1967) p.11; J. Waterbury, *op.cit.*, p.264.

agrarian bourgeoisie.³⁶⁶ Through this process of land reform, the new military government was able to debilitate the vested power coalition of the *ancien regime*.³⁶⁷ This meant that state capitalism in Egypt strengthened its own autonomy to a sufficient degree in domestic politics. The reactionary movements against Nasser's government were gradually emasculated.³⁶⁸

Unlike Nasser's treatment of the agrarian bourgeoisie, his treatment of the industrial bourgeoisie was not aimed at dissolution or debilitation. Because the level of industrialisation of the Egyptian economy was relatively low at that time, industrial capitalists were not regarded as posing a serious threat to the regime. As British influence in Egypt had been eroded by the end of World War II, the regime was able to secure its autonomy by means of the initial land reform without any further obstruction, even at this early stage. With this autonomy, Nasser's government was able to expand its reform programme into other areas such as nationalisation, and expanding the public sector.

Class-consciousness was not prevalent in Egypt at the early stage of Nasser's regime. The state was not dominated by specific strata. However, as the proportion of state intervention in the Egyptian economy extended, the state came to manifest its concern with class issues. The rapid expansion of the public sector created a 'state bourgeoisie'. However, the appearance of this 'state bourgeoisie' did not mean that the state sector possessed full autonomy from the class structure, but only indicated that the state had started to exert a strong influence on the Egyptian economy.

2.2.2. Nationalisation and Extension of the Public Sector

While the Revolutionary Command Council (R.C.C.) immediately proclaimed their intentions to industrialise after the coup, due to its rudimentary level of understanding of the economy, a concrete strategy for industrialisation was not proposed for quite a while. This uncertainty drove the members of the R.C.C. to seek and adopt the forms of economic development typical in other developing countries, according to a number of basic assumptions

³⁶⁶ Mahmoud Hussein, *Class Conflict in Egypt, 1945 - 1970* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975) p. 125.

³⁶⁷ Nasser's antagonism of the classes of capitalists, landowners, and industrialists clearly contrasted with the Prussian leader Bismark's attitude toward those classes. A. Perlmutter's analysis of J. Petras and R. Laport, which claimed that Nasser's and Bismark's attitude to the ruling classes such as capitalists, industrialists, and landowners had similarities is not accurate. See Amos Perlmutter, *Egypt: Praetorian State* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1974) p.59; James Petras & Robert Laporte, *Cultivating Revolutions* (New York: Vintage, 1971) p.285.

³⁶⁸ Strategically, Nasser's government resorted to some appeasement measures such as exact compensation for the land reform and nationalisation, and the issue of national bonds and distribution to investors to prevent those ruling classes from resisting Nasser's regime. Patrick O'Brien, *The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System*, (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1966) p.210.

concerning a rapid economic development drive led by the state which was similar to Park’s state-led capitalism.³⁶⁹

The equivocal stance on economic strategy in the early stages of Nasser’s regime is illustrated by the fact that Egypt’s economy remained dominated by the private sector until the nationalisation of the Suez Canal. The state did not intervene deeply in the economy. The role of the state was confined to some irrigation projects and the development of small parts of the social welfare system. This kind of noncommittal attitude was caused by the Free Officers’ efforts to avoid the enmity of countries of the Western bloc, who might be suspicious if they thought Egypt was inclining towards a progressive, leftist line. However, more fundamentally, the core members of the coup did not have solid confidence or concrete programmes for political and economic development, but only an obscure sense of nationalism or nominal reformism.

Table 5.5. Public and Private Shares in Industrial Investment, 1952-960³⁷⁰
(E£ million: current prices)

	Public Share	Private Share	Total
1952-53	1.4	28.1	29.5
1953-54	4.6	22.6	27.2
1954-55	6.0	27.6	33.6
1955-56	7.9	41.3	49.2
1956-57	8.5	22.6	31.1
1957-58	5.1	30.5	35.6
1958-59	17.4	30.4	47.8

sources: Figures for public investment from Patrick O’Brien, *op.cit.*, 1966, p.328, citing *NBE Bulletin* 4 (1961): pp.408-409. Total figures from Donald C. Mead, *Growth and Structural Change in the Egyptian Economy*, (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, 1967), p.290; UAR Statistical Atlas, 1962. It does not seem plausible that there was on private investment in 1959-1960. These figures therefore must be taken as indicating general trends and relative orders of magnitude.

The critical watershed for the transition into energetic state capitalism was the Suez War. Nasser’s regime embarked on a radical full-scale intervention in the economy at the outbreak of the Suez War in 1956. Between 1956 and 1957, the private sector began to be transformed into the public sector. Nasser’s government confiscated many foreign interests in the Egyptian economy for the purpose of capital accumulation. The state annexed the banking

³⁶⁹ Those basic assumptions were not very different from the state-led development strategy seen in Korea. Those assumptions were the state’s role in taking on big projects which the private sector was incapable of implementing, due to the necessity of heavy industrialising projects and manufacturing, and the importance of the agricultural sector. J. Waterbury, *op.cit.*, pp.57-58.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p.62.

sector in order to control the financial system. A series of radical drives for state initiative in the economy fuelled the rapid transition into state capitalism. In January 1957, a series of laws were introduced. Through Law 22, 23, and 24, the whole banking sector related to foreign trade was fully Egyptianised.³⁷¹

Nasser nationalised the Misr Bank (Bank of Egypt)³⁷² and the Ahali Bank (Central Bank) in February 1960 and also the Belgian and International Banks in early 1961. At the same time, he embarked upon a new diplomatic policy - positive neutralism – towards the Arab world as well as Third World countries, which showed his intention to stand on the side of the Eastern bloc and establish a socialist way of economy – state capitalism. A series of nationalisations after the Suez War indicated Nasser's intention rapidly to expand the public sector. After the promulgation of Laws 117, 118, and 119, Nasser's government unreservedly proclaimed itself a socialistic regime, which meant that they tried to expand the public sector as much as they could. After that, Egypt's economic system gradually started to take on a centralised character, which may be defined as a planned economic system. The state's possession of private property expanded enormously, as Mabro states,

By 1963 public ownership had extended to all financial institutions, public utilities, and transport (except taxis), and to almost all industrial establishments of significant size, to large construction and haulage firms, department stores, and big hotels. The public sector also controls the export-import trade and the marketing of major agricultural crops.³⁷³

Between 1952 and 1966, approximately E£700 million' worth of shares and assets were transferred to the public sector.³⁷⁴ Eventually the public sector's investment extended to 90% of the total investment in Egypt, until Sadat's open door policy (infitah) in 1974 changed the form of Egyptian economic policy.³⁷⁵

³⁷¹ "Nine banks, including Barclay's and Credit Lyonnais, were sold to the Egyptian public sector banks. Nearly two hundred foreign-owned insurance companies were purchased by three newly created Egyptian insurance companies. Other French and British control of the Economic Organisation, a public holding company created in January 1957" quoted in *Ibid.*, pp.68-69.

³⁷² At the time of nationalisation, Misr Bank had E£100 million worth of deposits, and ran a monopolised company of textile production. A plausible excuse for the dissolution of the big conglomerates such as the Misr group was 'destruction of monopoly'.

³⁷³ Robert Mabro, *The Egyptian Economy: 1952-1972* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p.125.

³⁷⁴ After land reform, through a series of nationalisation policies, Nasser's state capitalism acquired many assets. By the land reforms of 1952 and 1961 Egypt was able to acquire approximately E£203 million, Suez Canal Company shares were worth E£27 million, acquisition of British and French companies was worth E£30 million. Through the nationalisation of Bank Misr, the Egyptian government attained E£100 million. And following nationalisations of private enterprises during 1961-1967, it made approximately E£402 million. Anouar Abdel Malek, *Egypt: Military Society* (New York: Vintage Books, 1968) pp.151-155.

³⁷⁵ Khalid Ikram, *Egypt: Economic Management in a Period of Transition* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University

Waterbury lists the economic levers in the hands of the state, with its new, aggressive regional policy based on Arab socialism, during the second year of its Five Year Plan.³⁷⁶

- i) all banking and insurance
- ii) all foreign trade
- iii) all 'strategic' industries, and, in a general way, all medium and heavy industries; all major textile, sugar-refining and food-processing plants
- iv) most maritime transport and all air transport
- v) all public utilities and urban mass transit (except taxis); some interprovincial transport, modest public housing
- vi) limited portion of urban retail trade
- vii) major department stores, hotels, cinemas, and theatres
- viii) all newspapers (taken over in 1960) and publishing houses (monopolistic control of importation and distribution of newsprint and other paper)
- ix) all reclaimed land, a large segment of land taken over through land reform, all main irrigation and drainage canals
- x) agricultural credit and basic agricultural inputs - fertilisers, certified seed, pesticides
- xi) all major construction companies
- xii) large infrastructural assets such as the High Dam (and all others) and the Suez Canal; all ports and port facilities

The catchphrase 'Arab Socialism', devised and expressed by Nasser's regime, justified the radical state interventions, even though Nasser's economic policy did not depend on a concrete classical socialist ideology but more on the situation that he was in. Indeed, as Mabro points out, "nationalisation is ultimately a political action related to Nasser's persistent drive for hegemony",³⁷⁷ Nasser's state capitalism was thus strongly linked to his political intention of attaining regional hegemony. It meant that his economic management could not be characterised as 'revolutionary' 'authentic' or 'ideological' founded on concrete conviction. Rather, his state

Press, 1981) p.22.

³⁷⁶ J. Waterbury, *op.cit.*, p.76.

³⁷⁷ R. Mabro, *op.cit.*, p.128.

capitalism could be considered to represent 'improvised', 'pragmatic' and 'realistic' attitudes responding in line with the situational variations, without an immutably solid doctrinal standard.

2.2.3. People-centred attitude

For Nasser's military regime, the most important matter of concern was the regime's security itself. For a long time, the Egyptian people had suffered from extreme destitution, legacies of colonial intervention and Farouk's oppressive administration, and so it was obvious that the new military regime's first target was to destroy the remaining vestiges of colonialism and Farouk's feudalism. In order to do this, Nasser needed the support of the majority – the lower middle class and the poorest class - and hence proceeded to adopt the egalitarian policies related to equal distribution for the poorer classes.

As a matter of fact, it was relatively easy for Nasser as a new leader of Egypt to gain the support of the populace. Resentment at the *ancien regime* was massive. Nasser merely had to demonstrate an attitude of concern for the people. In this context, it can be seen that one of the most important differences between Nasser's economic management and that of Park was Nasser's people-centred attitude. Although land reform was not enough to improve the desperate situation of the poorest class, it brought about opportunities for the lower-middle class to become involved in the process of extensive redistribution of cultivated land to the people in the name of equality and justice.

In addition to land redistribution, Nasser's government improved various laws and regulations relating to general welfare such as education, the public health service, and social welfare facilities for poverty-stricken people.³⁷⁸ Amended labour laws granted new benefits to manual workers in construction and industry, and the 'employment drive' committed the government and the public sector to recruiting a large number of new employees. The Egyptian people could share the benefits of this series of people-oriented policies.³⁷⁹

Populace-centred policies brought about an enormous socio-economic redistribution of wealth. As a result of this, centralisation of wealth started to decline at a remarkable pace. At the same time, as possibilities for social mobilisation proliferated, the existing alienated class was encouraged to take part in the political and social process as a vigorous actor. Most of all, the extended public sector and full-scaled nationalisation gave Nasser's government the opportunity to develop for pro-worker policies.³⁸⁰

³⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p.109.

³⁷⁹ *Ibid.* p.109; Ikram, *op.cit.*, pp.24-25.

³⁸⁰ Ikram, *op.cit.*, p.24.

Despite the series of people-centred policies enthusiastically put into practice by Nasser, some serious problems were encountered. First of all, there were problems of financial deficiency in meeting the cost of constructing and maintaining the social security network. The social structure of Egypt maintained its capitalist characteristics without a conversion into genuine socialism, which meant that the redistribution of political powers and economic wealth could not be attained. With the limited resources available, the construction of an ideal welfare system was impossible. In addition, these policies diverted the resources needed for investment in industrial production. Part of the reason for the high cost of redistribution and greater equity was inefficiency in the public sector production process and the stimulation of consumption at the expense of production.³⁸¹

This kind of people-oriented economic policy made the financial situation of Egypt more difficult and weakened state autonomy due to the resultant lack of capital resources.

2.3. The Limits of Egypt's State Capitalism

State capitalism had serious shortcomings and led to vulnerability. This vulnerability can be seen at two levels – the domestic and international levels. First, there is an inevitable contradiction between two axes - the issues of 'development and distribution'. The contradiction between the issue of capital accumulation for industrialisation and that of equal distribution has been considered to be a common problem in state capitalism. Generally, it is not possible for peripheral states to possess a sufficient level of political autonomy and economic resources to be able to fulfil both targets simultaneously. The regime of a developing country which adopts the state as the imitator of economic development has to face the dilemma of choosing between capital accumulation and the distribution of wealth.

In a similar context, at the international level, one of the most decisive limits to state capitalism is the contradiction between the state's efforts to maximise capital accumulation and its efforts to gain economic independence. Without financial aid from outside, it is quite difficult for developing countries to find adequate funds for investment and for driving their economic policies. Thus most developing countries which try to achieve rapid economic development experience the conflict of choosing between state autonomy and capital

³⁸¹ J. Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat - the Political Economy of Two Regimes*, p.207.

accumulation.

All state capitalist endeavours to industrialise independently of foreign intervention have been in vain, because of the lack of indigenous capital resources. In this context, the state's autonomous policies are damaged by the powers of Multi-National Companies (M.N.C.s), Centre-states, and international finance organisations for the evangelising open door economy in the world market system. The industrial bourgeoisie connecting with foreign capital also weakens state autonomy. Decreased state autonomy decelerates the progress of restructuring the economic system and increases the pressure to open the economy to the outside. As a result of these limitations, Egypt eventually abandoned her autonomous progressive policies and transferred to conservative state-led capitalism in the 1970s, as soon as Sadat came to power.

2.3.1. Tensions between Accumulation and Distribution

In general, most developing countries in the Third World have been troubled with a critical dilemma between the diversification of social strata and a deficiency of resources to satisfy the various social strata. As social strata become more diverse, each stratum starts claiming its own rights and privileges. These states are forced to choose between two things: people-centred progressive reforming and developmental industrialisation ignoring the people's welfare.³⁸² If a developing country were to try to achieve both these goals, the results would probably be a total failure in economic management.

In terms of economics, a double target strategy - accumulation and distribution - might cause ineffectiveness of the public sector and a total lack of resources for investment in industrialisation, since massive resources would be invested directly in the reforming process, such as land reform, and the strengthening of the welfare system.

In terms of politics, state capitalism generates discontent in all social classes. While the upper class is dissatisfied with the reforming policies, lower classes complain that the ongoing economic reformation is inadequate to satisfy their needs and desires.

In this context, while the upper class affirms that privatisation is the only way to realise economic prosperity in the long run, the lower class demands more benefits from the government and emphasises the necessity of constructing a comprehensive welfare system. These ceaseless double-sided attitudes and conflicts tend to weaken state autonomy, which means that those attitudes also tend to weaken the basis of state capitalism.

³⁸² Hirschman categorised the typology of dependent states as 'entrepreneurship' for capital accumulation and 'reformer' for the distribution. See Albert O. Hirschman, "The Turn to Authoritarianism in Latin America and the

The socialist strategy of economic management of Nasser's state capitalism could not be transformed into a genuine socialist economy. And it is obvious that his strategy was not designed to change in the direction of a dynamic capitalist system. Consequently, the overall economic system under Nasser's regime was relatively unstable, since there was no clear distinction between state-ownership and non-state-ownership in the public sector.³⁸³ The fundamental problems of the Egyptian economy under Nasser's government derived from the process of transition from a feudal system to a modern capitalistic system, but the state of Egypt was unable to realise where the problems were coming from, and in which direction it was headed. They had no idea how to accomplish this radical transition.³⁸⁴

Due to its failure to put into practice appropriate economic policies, Nasser's government attained neither the dynamic development resulting from being propelled by capitalism, nor the radical structural reform which is produced by the creation of a genuine socialist state. This failure not only upset those who hoped eagerly for the creation of an egalitarian state, but also let down the industrial capitalist class as a result of the state's excessive intervention in the private sector.

Nasser's effort to fulfil the various social demands led to a financial resource crisis. As a result of this crisis, the state was forced to expand the public sector exorbitantly. The financial crisis intensified and the overall economic conditions of Nasser's government went downhill rapidly, due to an extremely low level of productivity within the public sector and the monopolisation of monetary resources by the upper class.³⁸⁵

Since excessively high consumption and demands for class-based benefits on the part of dominant groups such as the state bourgeoisie and the upper-middle class impeded essential investment in primary industry, the improvement of the productivity of domestic industry was barely accomplished. In these difficult conditions of low productivity in the industrial sector, and due to Egypt's economic situation of financial deficiency, Nasser's government was unable to invest in industry in a capitalist way, or to adopt a system of populist redistribution in a socialist way.

Inexperienced public sector administrators exacerbated the financial crisis. The systems and structures of the public sector were inordinately inefficient. Nasser's defeat of 1967 War has generally been considered to be the main cause of the crisis in his regime, but the failure of state capitalism as the development strategy which Nasser adopted for Egypt was a

Search for Its Economic Determinants," in Collier, *The New Authoritarianism*. pp.87-98.

³⁸³ Cooper, *op.cit.* p.2.

³⁸⁴ Hussein, *op.cit.*, p.95.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid*, p.35; J.Waterbury, *op.cit.*, pp.90-100.

more important factor to be considered as undermining the regime's credibility.

Confronting this weakness of the state capitalism of Nasser's government, Sadat's Egypt was inclined to rely on the conservative dependent development approach supported by Western capitalist states. The first concern of economic policy was dramatically changed to capital accumulation. In order to do this, the incentives of investment for the private sector were increased and an open-door policy (*infitah*) was adopted by Nasser's successor immediately after his death.

2.3.2. Deepening Economic Dependency and Radical Changes in the Environment of International Politics.

Egypt's state autonomy achieved by the nationalisation of key industries was self-contradictory. Even though Nasser had chosen a policy of non-alignment, the autonomy he gained from the Western countries meant military and economic dependence on the Soviet Union. For that reason, the dependence of Egypt on external powers did not disappear when the Western powers were expelled from her territory, but was merely transferred to another one.³⁸⁶ In the Cold War atmosphere of the late 1960s, it was hard to find a developing country which was completely independent of both the West and the Soviet Bloc. Genuine state autonomy existed only in rhetoric at that time.

However, after the 1967 War, as financial aid and military support from the Soviet Union sharply decreased, Nasser could not drive economic policies according to his version of state capitalism and he was incapable of supporting the Arab - Africa liberation movements any longer.³⁸⁷ This meant that U.S. influence in the region increased. Consequently, political and economic intervention by the U.S. in Egypt and some other Middle Eastern countries deepened considerably. In this context, the destiny of developing countries such as Egypt was certainly dependent on one of the two power blocs no matter what their own ideological attitudes were.

Economic interventions in the Middle East by the Western countries illustrated 'neo-colonialism', whereby foreign powers regarded some Middle Eastern developing countries as a new market for their exports and countries from which they could import raw material including oil and natural gas. This was particularly the case for the U.S., which had difficulty in dominating and penetrating the worldwide export market due to competition from a newly rising rival Japan and the restored European countries. Third World countries such as those of

³⁸⁶ J. Waterbury, *op.cit.*, pp.395-399.

³⁸⁷ G.A. Amin, *op.cit.*, p.300.

the Middle East came to be recognised as potentially fertile frontiers in terms of international trade interest. The oil resource in particular was the main target of the M.N.C.s of the U.S. and Europe. Moreover, due to his defeat in the 1967 War, Nasser's situation was deteriorating.

As a result, Nasser's state capitalism may be described as a failure, and the regime was thus unable to ignore pressure for an open-door economy from technocrats, commercial capitalists and industrial capitalists.³⁸⁸ The failure of state capitalism thus led to the open-door policy under Sadat's government shortly after Nasser's death.

2.3.3. Changes in State Capitalism in Egypt

The innate limits of Egypt's state capitalism caused various problems in the country's economic situation. The economic predicament appeared in forms such as balance of payments deficits, unbalanced national finances, severe inflation, and a high-level of unemployment. As a last resort, Egypt changed its economic strategy to a conservative policy of privatisation from 1974 onwards, which was similar to the Korean economic strategy of state-led capitalism.³⁸⁹

Egypt's open-door economic policy was officially proclaimed in October 1974 by Sadat. By amending Law 43 (32nd Amendment), the influx of foreign investment was permitted and encouraged in various sectors of the Egyptian economy. This 32nd Amendment granted many benefits to foreign investors in order to induce direct investment into Egypt.³⁹⁰ Contrary to Sadat's expectations, however, the Amendment did not immediately lead to a rapid influx of foreign capital in the form of direct investment. According to Abdel-Khalek, foreign capital was going into non-productive sectors, such as banking, insurance, and various service industries, instead of into building an infra-structure for industry and agriculture, which was urgently needed.³⁹¹ These circumstances deepened the dependence of Egypt's economy upon foreign capital.

Abdel-Khalek points out that some businesses were much more dependent upon foreign capital than others. These included banks, investment companies, the tourist industry, transportation, mass communication, various service industries and advisory projects. Some sectors like general industry and agriculture remained in domestic hands. Therefore, as Abdel-

³⁸⁸ Gouda Abdel-Khalek, "The Open Door Policy in Egypt: Its Contribution to Investment and Its Equity Implication," in Kerr and Yassin, *Rich and Poor Countries*, pp.263-264.

³⁸⁹ Indirect state intervention in the economy by controlling the private sector, heavy reliance upon external powers, excluding the people's participation in the decision-making process, and withholding investment in the welfare system.

³⁹⁰ Abdel-Khalek, *op.cit.*, pp.263-270.

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p.271.

Khalek states, the preponderance and concentration of investment by the preference of Egypt's financial management in the specific areas where foreign capital poured in as mentioned above symbolised the trend for the Egyptian economy came to depend on the world capital system.³⁹²

Infitah was accompanied by rapid and wide-ranging privatisation. Even during the last stages of Nasser's government, partial privatisation had been formally introduced with the official proclamation of the open-door economy in 1968³⁹³. This was the trigger for embarking on radical privatisation. However, more than 75% of the GNP was produced by the public sector even under Sadat's government. Marvin Weinbaum claims that this public sector was the prime cause of depression in the Egyptian economy, due to chronic problems such as over-employment, deficiency of investment resources, controlled prices, and an inappropriate wage system etc.³⁹⁴

This change to the privatisation of the public sector led to an inevitable slowing down in the economic reform process. Overall welfare conditions and redistribution deteriorated.³⁹⁵ In conclusion, Nasser's attempt to adopt and manage a state capitalist strategy was discarded by the subsequent regime because he was unable to overcome the typical innate contradictions of state capitalism: the contradiction between accumulation and distribution in the face of extremely limited resources.

³⁹² *Ibid*, pp.272-273; see Waterbury, *op.cit.*, pp.123-158.

³⁹³ Waterbury, *op.cit.*, p.167.

³⁹⁴ Marvin G. Weinbaum, "Egypt's Adjustment to a Global Market Economy: The Role of the U.S. Economic Assistance," paper presented at the 79th Annual Conference of Association of American Political Science (Chicago, 1983) p.11.

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.13.

3. Korea - State-led Capitalism

Commentators and scholars frequently use adjectives such as ‘remarkable’, ‘extraordinary’, ‘dramatic’ and ‘spectacular’ to describe South Korea’s economic performance, which was led by President Park during the 1960s and 1970s.³⁹⁶ Table 5.6. illustrates Park’s economic performance in a concrete way. One reason for this effusiveness is that the South Korean economy has, to all appearance, consistently achieved and often surpassed the ambitious targets set by planners for economic growth and development as Table 5.7. demonstrates. In this process, the initial actor, the state, played a strong leadership role, which the Koreans had never experienced before. It is said that this kind of economic performance could not have been achieved in South Korea without the active role of the state. This characteristic of economic leadership was different from Nasser’s, although both Korean and Egyptian leaders demonstrated a similarly strong charismatic leadership.

Table 5.6. Economic Performance under Park’s Regime

	The Rate of Economic Growth (%)	Export (\$ million)	Per capita GNP (\$)	Population (000)	Agricultural Sector / Industry
1961	5.6	40.7	82	25,766	38.7%
1962	Annual Ave. 9.3	54.8	87	26,513	39.8%
1972		1,624.1	318	33,505	28.7%
1979		15,055.5	1,640	37,534	22.9%
1980	-3.7	17,504.9	1,592	38,124	17.8%

sources: Yong Bok, Kim, “Was Developmental Dictatorship Necessary?,” *Beyond Chung Hee Park*, p.268.

Table. 5.7. Targets and Achievement of Park’s Programme of Economic Development

Growth Rate	1 st FYP (1962-1966)		2 nd FYP (1967-1971)	
	Target	Achievement	Target	Achievement
GNP	7.1%	8.3%	7.0%	11.4%
Agricultural Sector	5.7%	5.5%	5.0%	2.0%
Manufacturing Sector	15.1%	14.8%	10.7%	20.9%
Social Infrastructure	5.4%	8.9%	6.6%	13.2%

sources: Man Jei Kim, *Modernisation of Korean Society and Economy* (Seoul: KDI, 1985) p.271.

³⁹⁶ In 1962, the GNP of South Korea was \$23 billion and National Income per capita was merely \$87. But in 1979 when Park’s regime ended, the GNP was \$614 billion and NI per capita was elevated to \$1,640. Economic Planning Board, *Major Index of Economy* (Seoul: E.P.B., 1989).

Like Nasser, Park was initially unable to show the people a concrete direction, which he intended to take in order to improve the desperate economic conditions. Also, his ideological character was uncertain. At first, it was not obvious whether he preferred a progressive, socialist direction, or that of a more conservative capitalism. This kind of uncertainty was understandable, because at that time the class structure of South Korea was undifferentiated, and the officers who led the coup were unprepared to adopt a well-defined development strategy. So they did not have a detailed economic development plan when they first took up the reins of power.

In this context, the new military government was urged to choose an appropriate strategy to achieve rapid economic development and to clarify the direction in detail as soon as possible. Inevitably, Park's regime had to confront the problem of a lack of legitimacy, because the regime that they had overthrown known as the Second Republic, had been established by the student revolution of 19th of April 1960, and was a genuinely democratic regime set up by Koreans themselves without any foreign help or intervention, though there had been a certain amount of chaos during it. The new republic had adopted the European parliament system as its political model and the overall appearance of the political system was remarkably democratic.

Park's military regime thus faced the displeasure of the nation for having led 'the armed forces that demolished the democratic government'. Park's regime made a decision to acquire legitimacy through rapid economic development, as a symbol of the capability of the government. The lack of legitimacy of Park's regime pushed Park to seek a quick demonstration of his efficiency by selecting the strategy of economic development. In this context, Park was obliged to adopt a 'developmental state' scheme which emphasises state's capability to achieve development as the origin of legitimacy.³⁹⁷

The general character of the bureaucrats and military elites in the early stages of Park's regime cannot be described as 'radical' or 'progressive' but relatively 'conservative', even though they had solid backgrounds in the low-income working class and propertyless class. This conservative attitude was connected to state-led capitalism. The state provided protection for domestic capitalists by allowing monopolisation of specific industries, but on the other hand, the low-income working class and propertyless class were denied share in the fruits of economic development, even though they dedicated themselves to the government's strong drive for economic development by providing labour at very low wages. With limited human capital and a lack of natural resources and capital, Park's regime inevitably had to depend on foreign funds and support, which could provide basic 'seed money' for economic development.³⁹⁸

³⁹⁷ Andrew Cooper, "State Power and Pattern of Late Development: A Comment on Zhao and Hall," *Sociology* Vol.28, No.2 (1994) pp.539-546.

³⁹⁸ This kind of development strategy can be described as 'dependent development' a term which was devised by

3.1. Foundations of Korean State-led Capitalism

3.1.1. Peculiarities of Korea - Background of Korean State-led Capitalism

3.1.1.1. Strong Hierarchical System - Confucianism

Similar to other East Asian states such as China, Taiwan and Japan, Korea has been heavily influenced by Confucianism and this continues even up to the present moment. Confucianism consists of a strongly hierarchical structure based on a 'commanding – obedience' system.

The first introduction of Confucianism into Korea was by the Kingdom of Koryo in 12th Century. After the establishment of Yi dynasty of Chosun Kingdom in 1392, Confucianism was declared as the main principle of administration of Chosun. From that time on, it has continued to influence Korean society until now. The fundamentals of Confucianism, which were introduced and adopted in Korea, have been a strict obedience and dedication to the powers in conjunction with a strict social hierarchy. All peoples of community are obliged to demonstrate their faithfulness and allegiance to the higher positions. Traditional hierarchy of Korean culture proposes the oneness of the utmost group of 'King – Teacher – Father' (System of *Goon Sa Bu Ilche*).³⁹⁹ People should be forced to be obedient to that group. In addition to that, there have been gender and generation discriminations that men are considered to be superior to women, and elders superior to youngsters. It may be said that these traditional background of Confucianism played a conducive role of political authoritarianism in Korea. According to Erich Fromm, the consciousness of 'superiority and inferiority' and 'dominance and obedience' is one of the crucial foundations of authoritarianism.⁴⁰⁰ Although the Korean people were occasionally troubled by the harsh rules of an oppressive regime, the basic attitude towards that troublesome regime was one of subservient obedience.

Peter Evans, and the term 'associated dependent development' was invented by Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The concept of state-led capitalism includes basic elements of dependent development, but more important subjects of state-led capitalism are the analysis of characteristics and process of state intervention in economic development and its results.

³⁹⁹ Gregory Henderson, *Korea: the Politics of the Vortex* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968) p.25.

Confucianism emphasise the role of good government and good quality of education in order to build up a better community. Particularly, in thought of Mencius, one of the influential thinkers of ancient China, the ideal government is the rule of a wise king, and practical organisations of scholar-bureaucrats. People should believe the ruler's capability and capability, and, of course, obedience as well. In this context, a peculiar aristocratic system of strata in Korea appeared. It was *Yangban* system which divided the aristocracy into two categories of the scholar-bureaucrats and military noblemen. This concept of social hierarchy which had been accepted by people without any serious resistance helps to explain the nature of Korean state-led capitalism which was performed by strong drive of state sector and bureaucrats.

Although the Confucian tradition has brought many benefits to Korea, it has influenced the people with negative perspectives, too. First of all, there has been a serious vocational discrimination in Korea. (*Sa-Nong-Gong-Sang*, hierarchical system of the scholars–farmers–artisans–tradesmen) Confucianism had looked down on some practical business field of economy and hence has instilled a strong anti-business sentiment in the minds of the Korean people. Furthermore, the exceptional emphasis on the value of family has produced the nepotism which caused inefficiency and corruption. Park had to attempt to eradicate this legacy of nepotism as soon as he began the economic development programmes.

3.1.1.2. The Legacies of the Colonial Experience

Experience of Japanese colonialism is one of the backgrounds of state-led capitalism executed by Park's government. Although there was very strong resentment to Japanese influence in Korea, many bureaucrats and military officers were educated under the Japanese system and particularly, President Park himself had a strong affection towards Japanese culture and whole social systems in general. He internalised the core values of Japanese culture and concrete method of economic development.

The aspect of contemporary Japan that Park's regime admired most was its ability to industrialise and achieve rapid economic development by means of opening the country to the Western world. Meiji Yushin, which was performed for the purpose of achieving the mercantilistic aim of "enriching the nation and strengthening arms" (*Bu Gook Gang Byung Chaek*) was a standard to imitate for Park's government. Although, they felt severe resentment against Japan, Koreans could not deny the fact that Japanese financial support had played a key role in the reconstruction of the nation after the Korean War. This understanding is connected to

⁴⁰⁰ Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (New York: Avon Books, 1972), pp.163-201.

the Korea-Japan Talks in 1963, one of the most severe ordeals for Park.

3.1.1.3. The Impact of the Korean War

The most tragic moment throughout the whole history of Korean peninsula is Korean War. It is obvious that Korean War affected the geopolitics of international relations in 1950s. In addition to the implications of Korean War in terms of international politics, its consequences of Korean economy were enormously significant as a fundamental of economic development. It is ironic that the disastrous devastation of economic situation, caused by Korean War, encouraged the sentiment of solidarity of various sectors of Korean people for the sake of revitalisation of own country.

As well as sentiment of solidarity, the Korean War brought about revolutionary changes in prevalent value system which had been influenced by Confucianism over five centuries. First of all, the preference of governmental or academic careers above vocations of practical business field almost disappeared. People tended to choose more practical and profitable vocations such as mercantile field or military service. In addition to that, total destruction of economic fundamentals of Korea eradicated social prejudice of class consciousness and enlarged social mobility.

One of the most significant consequences of Korean War is that the miserable situation of War made a hotbed of new professionalism of military sector. Military officers who had been trained by Japanese Army education system were able to get a political influence as the result of the War. After the War, power of military sector in Korea dramatically increased.

In addition to the role of making nursery for appearance of new professionalism of military sector, the result of participation in the War of multi national armies of U.N. had a great impact on the mentality of Korean people. Because Korean people had been troubled with ceaseless invasions by outer countries, xenophobic sentiments had prevailed throughout the history of the Korean Peninsula. Under the circumstances of prevalent xenophobic mentality in Korea, Yi dynasty of Chosun Kingdom strictly adhered to the seclusionism. However, the U.N.'s entry into the war brought about a new stage of accepting the outer powers as partners for the sake of mutual benefits. Having experienced this kind of friendly mentality with outer powers for the first time, Korean people realised that it was possible for them to work together with foreigners for mutual benefit. This experience was a crucial moment for South Korea when it comes to her entire dependence on Western influence of state-led capitalism.

3.1.2. State Autonomy of Park's Government

In terms of the relationship between state and society, traditionally, the state sector in Korea has dominated all levels of society. For a long time after independence, the state sector of Korea was able to sustain its dominance over society due to its overdeveloped state system and undeveloped society sector. This state dominance over society in Korea was strengthened and maintained by successive military authoritarian regimes.

Visible achievements of rapid economic development transformed the situation in state-society relations, which meant that the state's dominance over society decreased. In addition, as the Korean economy entered the international economic system, the character of Korean society became more diverse, and social class structure was divided into many levels. Therefore the penetration capability⁴⁰¹ of the state naturally diminished, and the power of the people correspondingly increased.

However, unlike Latin American countries, in spite of the awakening of people's class consciousness, class struggle itself, which might have been organised by the proletariat, barely existed under Park's government. In fact a number of progressive parties which had emerged to protect the rights of the working class did not survive under Park's regime.

The working class in Korea had very little opportunity to participate in politics as a major actor. They had no experience of organising a representative system for the protection of their interests, because the state strictly prohibited any kind of political movement by the working classes or any form of organised labour groups. In addition, the Confucian ethos, which emphasises harmony, peace and obedience, restrained the working class from resisting the government. This attitude could be described as 'necessitarianism' or 'fatalism'.

Anti-communist sentiments strengthened the autonomy of Park's government. The disastrous experience of the Korean War deeply affected the Korean people. Severe resentment against the North Korean government and the communist bloc arose from the hardships of the War. Also, the continuous threat from North Korea drove Park's regime towards strict anti-communism. In this context, all progressive thoughts and expressions were condemned as pro-communist and sometimes progressive scholars or commentators were even prosecuted with the charge of treason. There was a prevailing tendency in Korea at that time to consider the labour movement and the pro-communist movement as the same thing. In these circumstances, Park's regime was able to exercise considerably more state autonomy compared to other regimes in the

⁴⁰¹ Binder and Coleman listed five types of crisis in developing countries as follows, i) identity crisis, ii) participation crisis, iii) legitimacy crisis, iv) penetration crisis and v) distribution crisis; James S. Coleman, "The Development Syndrome: Differentiation - Equality - Capacity," in Leonard Binder et al., *Crises and Sequence in Political*

Third World, in order to control and mobilise the country.

On the other hand, when it came to foreign affairs, state autonomy was relatively weak. Korea achieved independence from Japan immediately after World War II, not by herself but as a result of decisions made by external powers. The Yalta conference made the critical decisions concerning the mandatory administration of the Korean peninsula, and divided it into two. While the Soviet Union occupied the northern part of the Peninsula, the U.S.'s military government in South Korea (U.S.A.M.G.I.K) administered the country for three years. At first, the South Korean government had to rely on the U.S. Extreme poverty made the Korean elites dependent on the U.S. The support from the U.S. in the form of aid funds and goods was crucial for the Korean people in the South.

Due to a lack of capital and natural resources, and because of the weakness of the domestic market, the Korean economy had to depend on the international market system and on the world trade system. This meant that the Korean economy was extremely vulnerable to external economic forces. Consequently, the well-balanced tripartite alliance of state-foreign capital-domestic capital⁴⁰² which can be seen in Brazil, did not exist in Korea. The state of Korea was deeply dependent on foreign capital. There were no initiatives to negotiate with M.N.C.s.

3.2. Performance of Korean State-led Capitalism under Park's Regime: Induced Modernisation⁴⁰³

3.2.1. Export-Oriented Drive

Bella Balassa asserted that the developmental strategy in some N.I.C.s in East Asia was carried out through the method of a strong export-oriented policy standing on the principle of comparative advantage in world trade economy. Export-oriented drive contributed to build up the fundamentals of economies of scale and overcame the limits of domestic market capacity. Thus, technocrats of N.I.C.s tended to adhere firmly to outward economy – export-oriented

Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) Ch.2, pp.73-100.

⁴⁰² Peter Evans, "Shoes, OPIC, and the Unquestioning Persuasion: Multinational Corporations and the U.S. - Brazilian Relations," in Richard Fagen (ed.), *Capitalism and the State in the U.S. - Latin American Relations* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979) pp.305-310.

⁴⁰³ To further an understanding of the notion of 'induced modernisation', see Szymon Chodak, *Societal Development*

drive.⁴⁰⁴ Park's export-oriented drive was one of the most outstanding examples of the developmental strategies of N.I.C.s.

After the success of Park's military coup, the Korean economy began a process of rapid industrialisation and development. In spite of the initial desperate conditions, the GNP of South Korea had grown by almost thirty times in the two decades after Park embarked on his first Economic Development Five-Year Programme (E.D.F.Y.P.) in 1962. The Korean economy underwent a fundamental reformation and transformation. Manufacturing and heavy & chemical industries replaced primary industries such as agriculture, fishing, and forestry.

Korean economic policy could be characterised as strongly outward-orientated, as reflected in the rapid increase in and sustained level of its export of manufacturing products. According to statistics, the ratio of exports, as a proportion of GNP, remarkably increased from 7.4% in 1967 to 27.2% in 1977 and 36.7% in 1987. The share of Korean trade in the world trade arena was elevated dramatically from an insignificant proportion in 1962 to 2% in 1990.⁴⁰⁵ There is noticeable substantiation that outward economies in certain countries have grown faster than those depending on the domestic production and relatively closed market system. Even recent research shows that open economies are clearly associated with superior economic performance.⁴⁰⁶ In some ways, it might be true to say that the benefits of outward economy are greater than what might be reasonably attributed to the achievement of allocative efficiency alone.⁴⁰⁷ The Korean preoccupation with an export-oriented economy could be described as the most important motivator of Park's economic strategy for rapid development. As a matter of fact, Park had no choice but to adopt an export-oriented strategy due to the limitations of Korea at that moment, such as a small domestic market, a surplus labour force, a small cultivatable surface, and insufficient capital.⁴⁰⁸ Another reason for Park's immediate choice of the export-

(London: Oxford University Press, 1973).

⁴⁰⁴ Bela Balassa, "The Lessons of East Asian Development: An Overview," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol.36, No.3, April 1988, p.279.

⁴⁰⁵ Korean Development Institute, *The Overview of Korean Economy 1960s-1990s* (Seoul: KDI, 1999) p.2.

⁴⁰⁶ David Dollar, "Outward-oriented Developing Economies Really Do Grow More Rapidly?: Evidence from 95 LDCs," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol.40, No.3, April 1992, pp.540-542.

⁴⁰⁷ Korean Development Institute, op.cit., p.2; Krueger and others argue that open economies are more flexible than import-substituting economies because they have greater 'cushions' of unessential imports to squeeze under adverse circumstances. Anne O. Krueger (eds.), *Export-Oriented Development Strategy: The Success of Five Newly Industrialising Countries*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985); According to Westphal, Kim and Dahlman and others, openness can also facilitate the absorption and mastery of foreign technology. Larry E. Westphal, (eds.), "Exports of Capital Goods and Related Services from the Republic of Korea," *World Bank Staff Working Paper* No. 629 (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1984); Nishimizu and Robinson have shown that the rate of technical progress was faster in countries with outward oriented policies than in those pursuing an import substituting strategy. Meiko Nishimizu, Sherman Robinson, "Trade Policies and Productivity Change in Semi-Industrial Countries," *Journal of Development Economics*, No.16 (1984) pp.177-206.

⁴⁰⁸ Paul W. Kuznets, *Economic Growth and Structure in the Republic of Korea* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977) p.106; Rob Vos, "External Dependence, Capital Accumulation and the Role of the State: South Korea

oriented strategy was former President Rhee's poor record of growth, caused by the failure of his ambitious import substituting industrialisation (I.S.I.) policy. Under Park's regime, while exports were an obsession, major efforts were directed at import substitution for two products - arms and rice.⁴⁰⁹

Exports were strongly encouraged by some supporting organisations such as the Korean Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA)⁴¹⁰ and the Korean Trade Association (K.T.A.). These organisations set and monitored entire procedure of export drive continuously, allocated credit and fund for enhancing export motivation, and maintained an export-friendly tax and trade scheme. The notable feature of KOTRA is that it was not a governmental organisation. KOTRA was established by export-orientated companies themselves, despite it was clearly an instrument to propel export drive in line with the government's main objective. This is one of the distinctive aspects of the Korean state-led economy. In the similar context, K.T.A. was a leading apparatus in promoting contact between government and private sector. The KTA's Special Fund for Export Promotion established in 1969 was accumulated and reserved as 1% of whole imports.⁴¹¹

The encouragement of the expansion of exports was channelled through the financial loan mechanism, which was controlled by the government. The government allowed loans to specifically designated industries or activities. It also adjusted the interest rates on loans according to the performance of exports.

In this context, companies and related industrial associations clearly internalised the government's intentions and concrete policies of export-oriented strategy. They were required to carry out the government's export drive in exchange for preferential treatments provided in the form of provision of infrastructure and special funds described as 'modestly pro-export bias' of the government.⁴¹² The criterion for evaluating the performance was the total amount of exports, not net profit. In this context, it can be easily understand most companies demonstrated attitudes of adaptation of the growth-at-all-cost strategy. The matter of size of production, marketing and investment in technology was important for gaining the governmental supports, because Park's government had a preference for economies of scale. Park's government

1960-1977," *Development and Change*, Vol.13, No.1, (1982) p.106.

⁴⁰⁹ David I. Steinberg, *The Republic of Korea - Economic Transformation and Social Change*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989) p.136.

⁴¹⁰ KOTRA was established in 1964 in order to promote export and to do market research. By 1984 its annual budget was \$10 million provided by the government. With financial support of government, KOTRA operated more than 200 branch offices in various trading positions abroad.

⁴¹¹ Korean Development Institute, *op.cit.*, p.3.

⁴¹² *Ibid.*; see Larry E. Westphal, *op.cit.*, (1978)

rewarded the large scale of business performance with better access to financial support. ⁴¹³

The various schemes of export encouragement under Park's regime were summarised by Heba A. Handoussa as follows⁴¹⁴:

- i) Exporters were given unrestricted access to imported capital and intermediate goods, together with tariff exemptions on certain commodities. Tariffs were rebated after goods are shipped. When exports were less than expected, the importer would be made to pay the difference in the tariff due. In 1965, tariff exemption was also extended to all domestic suppliers of exporting firms.
- ii) A 50% reduction on direct taxes was allowed on all income earned in exporting and this incentive measure lasted until 1973. Exporters were also exempted from the payment of any indirect taxes both on major intermediate inputs, whether imported or purchased locally, and on exported products.
- iii) Selective use of an 'export-import' link system entitled specific exporters to import certain popular goods that were not otherwise approved for import, thereby giving these exporters additional profit from the trading activity.
- iv) Government used the method of subsidised medium and short term credit as an incentive to exporters who could borrow foreign exchange to finance their fixed assets or working capital needs at substantially preferential rates. For example, in 1965, when the interest rate reforms had increased the rate to 26% for domestic borrowing, preferential loans were offered to exporters at 18%.
- v) Government also used the often criticised wastage allowance as an additional bribe to coax exporters. These generous duty free allowances for loss or spoilage of imported intermediates permitted the earning of premiums on the domestic sale of unused imports.
- vi) A number of other export incentives – of lesser significance – were utilised by Park's regime. Accelerated depreciation was allowed since 1966 for exporting enterprises, small price reductions on railroad and electricity rates (estimated at 0.4% of export value in 1968) were introduced in 1967, and a relaxation of tax surveillance on selected export achievers was also reported.

⁴¹³ Danny M. Leipziger, "Industrial Restructuring in Korea," *World Development*, Vol.16, No.1, (1988) pp.121-135.

⁴¹⁴ Heba A. Handoussa, "The South Korean Success Story: Comparison and Contrast with Egypt," *L'Egypte Contemporaine*, No.403, (Jan. 1986) pp.20-23.

The wide range of export incentives and the selectivity of their use demonstrate the extent to which the entire government machinery became oriented to the attainment of export targets.

3.2.2. Heavy and Chemical Industrialisation

Throughout the 1960s, Park's strong export-oriented policy proved to be more successful than expected. Particularly, the strategy of exporting light industrial products made a great contribution to enhancing the scale of the Korean economy and contributed remarkably to the expansion of exports. However, this strategy did produce some negative results. As the dependence on foreign capital for importing raw materials grew, the expansion of exports ended up causing a sizable deficit in the international balance of payments.⁴¹⁵ This worsening of the international balance of payments situation made Park seek an efficient method of reducing the imports of basic materials such as steel, metals, and refined petroleum etc. for industrialisation.

Under the circumstances, a strong drive for Heavy and Chemical Industrialisation. (H.C.I.) came to be the most representative industrialising policy of the latter half of Park's regime. On 12th of January 1973, the Korean government announced the launch of a new industrialisation scheme with its 'Heavy and Chemical Industrialisation proclamation'.⁴¹⁶ With this proclamation, Park's government started concentrating their support on certain conglomerates to encourage their participation in H.C.I., while on the other hand, Park's oppression of the working classes intensified.

The first support activity was the establishment of the promotional organisations. The proclamation in 1973 was a command to propel forward H.C.I. Immediately after the proclamation, the 'H.C.I. Promotion Council' was established as the command head quarters of H.C.I. This council drew up the master plan and the time schedule for the rapid accomplishment of H.C.I. Under this council, there was a subsidiary organisation, the H.C.I. Executive Board.

⁴¹⁵ The import inducing coefficient had grown from 0.22 in 1963 to 0.26 in 1970. This coefficient caused the deficit of international balance payments to get worse. The deficit in Korea's current balance which was \$5.5 million in 1962 increased up to \$6.23 billion. Dae Hwan Kim, "Chung Hee Park's Policy of Heavy and Chemical Industrialisation" in Dong-A Ilbo Sa, *How To Review the Modern History of Korea - Chung Hee Park and 5.16* (Seoul: Dong-A Ilbo Sa, 1990) p.319.

⁴¹⁶ Before the proclamation of the H.C.I. plan, there were several enactments of laws related to the heavy and chemical manufacturing industry: the Machinery manufacturing promotion law in 1967, the Electronic industry promotion law, the Textile & Chemical industry promotion law, and the plan for automobile industry promotion in 1969. In 1970, the basic plan for the shipbuilding industry, and the law for steel & iron industry promotion were established. With these series of laws related to heavy industrialisation, the government supported this sector with the tools of finance and taxation favours. Korea Industry Bank, *High level of Industrial Structure*, (Seoul: K.I.B., 1985) p.45.

This board was invested with complete authority to make, propel and evaluate the various policies concerning H.C.I. promotion.⁴¹⁷

At the same time as setting up command organisations, concrete processing plans were made. First of all, the six strategic industries were selected⁴¹⁸ and various programmes, such as the 'plant location allocating programme',⁴¹⁹ the 'five-year plan for the promotion of the machinery industry', and the 'supporting programme for the localisation of machinery', followed.

The other support activity consisted of fiscal preferences. Most tax obligations for the promotional H.C.I. were waived for at least five years, and often cut in half for an additional three years. The government depended on its control of the credit system to provide six strategic industries of H.C.I. with the privilege of access to considerably subsidised bank loans with beneficial conditions.⁴²⁰ The establishment of the National Investment Fund (N.I.F.) was a symbol of the encouragement of H.C.I. in the form of fiscal preference, as shown in the table 5.8. N.I.F. was introduced in 1974 in order to financially promote the H.C.I. drive.

Table 5.8. Financial Support of the National Investment Fund
(Billion Korean Won)

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	Total
The NIF(A)	626	1,066	1,607	2,013	3,626	4,397	4,384	5,430	23,149
Support HCI(B)	323	477	938	1,485	2,523	3,152	2,967	3,830	15,715
Ratio (B/A) (%)	54.8	44.7	58.4	73.8	69.6	71.7	67.7	70.5	67.9

Source: The Ministry of Finance, *The White Paper on Financial Investment*, 1982

As a result of the government's exceptional concentration on H.C.I., the proportion of H.C.I. in the Korean industrial economy grew to 52.6% in 1980. The enhancement of H.C.I. in Korea contributed to the transformation of the industrial structure into one fit for economics of

⁴¹⁷ Byung Yoon Park, "The Inside Story of Heavy and Chemical Industry," *Shin Dong-A*, May 1980.

⁴¹⁸ The six strategic industries were defined as: steel, petrochemicals, metals, shipbuilding, electronics, and machinery. Most of all, steel, petrochemicals, and metals were regarded as crucial industries of H.C.I. in Korea "with a view to enhancing self sufficiency in industrial raw materials". Won Chul Oh, *Heavy and Chemical Industry* (Seoul: Heavy and Chemical Industry Promotion Council, 1975) p.11.

⁴¹⁹ The H.C.I. Executive Board gave the job of finding the optimum locations for building the H.C.I. complex the Toyo Engineering, Japanese expertise and JGC group. Based on their investigative reports, the location of the HCI complexes was finally settled. Gwang Mo Kim, *Industrial Development of Korean and Heavy and Chemical Industrialisation Policy* (Seoul: Ji Goo Mun Hwa Sa, 1988) pp.212-214.

⁴²⁰ Loans by the Korea Industry Bank rose from 71.3% of all loans to the manufacturing sector in 1973 to 86.5% in 1976. Dae Hwan Kim, *op.cit.*, p.305.

scale, and laid the cornerstone for strengthening the industrial infrastructure.

However, there are some controversial assessments of H.C.I. in Korea. Excessive preferentialism to the conglomerates caused over-investment in certain areas.⁴²¹ This over-investment was a major cause in creating some improperly managed enterprises due to overheated competition for the occupation of profitable areas. Worse than that, the second oil crisis in 1979 and stagnation in international economy severely damaged H.C.I. in Korea. The working ratio of H.C.I. dropped dramatically.⁴²² This situation resulted in the burden of a large foreign debt.

The World Bank made an assessment of H.C.I. by mentioning as follows:

The H.C.I. drive was overambitious and resulted in serious misallocations of resources. Nevertheless... many of the goals of that policy were in fact achieved. Exports of H.C.I. did not quite reach the target of 50% of total exports by 1980, but exceeded the target only a few years later and reached 56% in 1983... In a comprehensive dynamic perspective, (they concluded), it is difficult to demonstrate that an alternative policy would have worked better.⁴²³

Table 5.9. The Progress of H.C.I. (%)

	H.C.I.	Light Industry
1960	19.0	81.0
1965	31.9	68.1
1970	37.8	62.2
1973	40.5	59.5
1975	46.4	53.6
1976	46.8	53.2
1977	48.5	51.5
1978	48.8	51.2
1979	51.2	48.8
1980	52.6	47.4

Source: Bank of Korea, *National Income of Korea*, 1982

⁴²¹ Yong Chul Park, *South Korea's Experience with Industrial Adjustment in the 1970s*, Asian Regional Team for Employment Promotion, (Bangkok: International Labour Organisation, 1983) p.17.

⁴²² The working ratio in H.C.I. in 1980 was as follows; oil refinement 86.0%, steel 70.6%, electronics and automobile 51.2%, metals 47.8%, and general machinery 34.8%. Korea Exchange Bank, *Monthly Review* (Seoul: K.E.B., December, 1980) p.6.

⁴²³ World Bank, *Korea: Managing the Industrial Transition, Vol. II* (Washington, D.C., 1987) p.45.

3.2.3. The Front-line Apparatus for State Capitalism in Korea

Korea's rapid economic development was due to the practice of state-led capitalism. Many commentators and scholars attribute the success of Korean economy to market-conforming policies or market-guided policies, but it is useful to see the situation not only with retrospection and with the theoretical perspectives, but also from the viewpoint of the responsible post.⁴²⁴ According to Duk Woo Nam, the former Minister of Finance Department of Korea,

“In the 1960's, Park's government had to take the initiative in almost all areas of development effort. It was busy introducing new institutions and reforming existing ones, building up social infrastructures, negotiating with foreign governments and international organisations for economic assistance, undertaking strategic investment projects, both public and private, and above all, campaigning to mobilise and motivate people towards fulfilling the development objectives.”⁴²⁵

According to Soon Cho, there is clear evidence that “the system of resource use in Korea throughout the period of rapid growth, and particularly during the 1970s, deviated markedly from the competitive market system”.⁴²⁶ Chung Hee Lee points out that Park's government and private sector established a quasi-internal organisation, which could allocate capital efficiently.⁴²⁷ In this context, the overall success of Korean economy revolved around as follows:

- i) Korea's bureaucracy and planning apparatus, led by the Economic Planning Board.
- ii) the unique relationship between business and government.
- iii) the intangibles of policy-making which revolve uniquely around culture and country-specific circumstances, but which account in large measure for the pragmatism, consistency, and decisiveness of policy formulation and implementation.⁴²⁸

⁴²⁴ Korean Development Institute, *op.cit.*, p.28.

⁴²⁵ Duk Woo Nam, “Korea's Economic Take-off in Retrospect,” paper presented at the 2nd Washington Conference of the Korean-American Economic Association (Washington D.C., 1992) p.7.

⁴²⁶ Soon Cho, *The Dynamics of Korean Economic Development*, (Seoul: Institute of International Economics, 1990) p.36. quoted in Korean Development Institute, *op.cit.*, p.28.

⁴²⁷ Chung Hee Lee, “Government, Financial Systems and Large Private Enterprises in the Economic Development of South Korea,” *Korean Perspective* Vol.20, 1988. pp.187-197.

⁴²⁸ Korean Development Institute, *op.cit.*, p.28.

3.2.3.1. The Institutions of the Government - Role of the Commanding Officer for State-led Capitalism

The argument linking the politics to the South Korean industrialisation strategy has a simple logic. The state acted largely as an agent for large industrial firms, providing capital both to promote aggregate growth and to secure financial support for political objectives.⁴²⁹ For this purpose, Park utilised various institutions to ensure that his state-led capitalism worked well. Amongst the various institutions, the most directive institutions were governmental institutions and organisations.

After coming to power, Park devoted his attention to the achievement of rapid economic development and national security. It seems that he did not want to abandon capitalism, but preferred to keep state dominance as well. In this context, he seemed to believe that in order to attain rapid economic development, a restructuring of the governmental organisations would be inevitable. He attempted to abolish the existing cabinet style of government, and tried to form a new shape of government in which power and authority were concentrated in the presidency. In this context, as the first step of building up the strong presidential initiative, Park established a special organisation that would not only formulate consistent economic policies but also coordinate their implementation. For the purpose of fulfilment of this intention, he finally established the Economic Planning Board (E.P.B. *Gyung Jei Gi Hweg Won*).

Established in 1961, the E.P.B. combined several policy functions previously entrusted to different ministries as follows:

- i) The planning function, originally located with the Ministry of Reconstruction, which had worked with U.S.A.I.D. in the aftermath of the war.
- ii) The power to prepare the government budget, which was removed from the Ministry of Finance.
- iii) The function of collecting and evaluating the national census and other statistics which was taken from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.⁴³⁰

⁴²⁹ Stephan Haggard and Chung-in Moon, "The State, Politics, and Economic Development in Postwar South Korea," in Hagen Koo (ed.), *State and Society in Contemporary Korea* (London: Cornell University Press, 1993) p.56.

Responsibility and jurisdiction over the inflow of foreign capital and technology were vested in the E.P.B. as well. The E.P.B. had three main functions:

- i) It planned and formulated economic policy programmes.
- ii) It coordinated economic policies implemented by individual Ministries on a continuing basis.
- iii) It supervised and evaluated the performance of economic policies devised by the government.⁴³¹

The E.P.B. became a 'big brother-ministry' which had both initiative and prestige in governmental performances in order to achieve effective coordination of various policies of economy matters. Its managing director was appointed to be the Deputy Prime Minister. When it comes to the ranking chart of the government, the managing director of the E.P.B. was just under the Prime Minister.

In addition to the leading role of the E.P.B., some other institutions were reorganised or launched in order to propel the economic development programmes of Park's regime. Amongst various institutes for economic development, three of them are noteworthy. These are the Office of National Tax Administration (O.N.T.A., *Gook Sei Chung*), the Office of Labour Affairs (*Ro Dong Chung*) and the Ministry of Science and Technology (M.O.S.T., *Gwa Hak Gi Sool Cheo*).

First, O.N.T.A. was in charge of all the taxation through vigorous enforcement of existing tax laws. In order to achieve effective tax collection, O.N.T.A. set up a tax collection situation room in the Presidential Office under the Park's direction.⁴³² President Park himself used to check progress on meeting tax collection targets on a daily basis. O.N.T.A. played role of a supervisor to control all the revenue of individual companies. As a matter of fact, the O.N.T.A. was a supervising agency to oversee all the activities of business sector by means of taxation which the President was strongly concerned about.

Secondly, it is noteworthy to look at the establishment of the Office of Labour Affairs. As mentioned before, Park's regime excluded workers and peasantry when it comes to plan the development programmes of economy. As time went, Park realised the peaceful relationship with labour class would be necessary in order to avoid labours' strong resistance to

⁴³⁰ Korean Development Institute, *op.cit.*, p.29.

⁴³¹ *Ibid.* p.29.

⁴³² Dong Kyu Choi, *The Government in the Age of Rapid Growth* (Seoul: The Korea Economic Daily Press, 1992) pp.33-34.

government's drive of 'labour-exclusionary' attitude. As the tool of pacifying the working class' wrath, the Office of Labour Affairs was launched. In addition to that, Park was worried about the possibility that trade unions could be controlled by North Korean regime. Under the circumstances, it was inevitable for Park to conduct surveillance of labour movements which could threaten the security and stability of Park's regime.⁴³³

The third new shape of governmental organisation of Park's regime was the M.O.S.T. As the overall situation of Korean economy remarkably grew up, Park came to be aware of the urgent need to increase the introduction of new foreign technologies and to develop its own technologies. In this context, in order to achieve these objectives, the Bureau of Technologies, established in the E.P.B., was transformed and expanded into an independent Ministry.⁴³⁴ This Ministry played a key role of building fundamentals of H.C.I. later.

3.2.3.2. The *Chaebols*: Role of the Advance Guard for State-led Capitalism

A peculiar terminology 'chaebol' means a 'great conglomerate' in Korean. When it comes to evaluation of the economic development process in Korea, Chaebol has a unique implication. Chaebol played a crucial role of the advance guard for Korea's state-led capitalism backed by governmental organisations which were mentioned above.

Principally as a result of Park's preference for economies of scale, the industrial structure became increasingly concentrated in the 1970s. From the initial stage of Park's economic development programme, Korean government made out that companies could compete in the international market only if they were a certain minimum size. This kind of interpretation was reinforced when the government introduced the H.C.I. strategy in the 1970s. The representative nature of the H.C.I. strategy may be described as 'capital intensive industrialisation' and typical example of 'economies of scale'.

The most efficient governmental method of controlling big companies was the finance. Industrialists had to rely exclusively on bank loans which were totally controlled by the Ministry of Finance in Korean government. K.D.I. report points out how government control the business sector with the method of finance:

When interest rates on bank loans were set below market clearing levels, demand for loans exceeded supply. It was therefore necessary for the government to ration loans by non-price mechanisms, which led to a

⁴³³ Korean Development Institute, *op.cit.*, p.30.

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.30.

concentration of economic power in the hands of a limited number of firms. Over time, loans were readily available only to those “strategic” industries favoured by the government.⁴³⁵

Table 5. 10. Increasing in Numbers of Subsidiary Companies of Chaebols

12 Great Chabols	Existing Companies	Increased Companies (1974-1978)
Hyundai	9	31
Samsung	24	33
Daewoo	10	35
LG	17	43
Hyosung	8	24
Kookjei	7	22
SK	8	23
Samhwa	10	30
Ssangyong	17	20
Keumho	9	17
Lotte	6	18
Kolon	15	22
Daehan Electronic Wire	6	22

The consequence of this concentration of business is that Chabol augmented the synergy effect in the context of ‘economies of scale’. This positive contribution of the Chaebol need to be seen alongside some negative ones as well:

When different firms or business units with different specialties are combined to form a Chaebol, initially the synergy effects are multiplied, and business risks are reduced. However, as the number of firms and units increase, profitable units have to be called on to subsidise the inefficient and unprofitable ones (particularly through cross-holdings of equity). This tends to lock in resources in inefficient areas. In addition, the overall vulnerability of the group to business fluctuations increases. In the opinion of many, this is precisely the position which some Korean conglomerates have now reached.⁴³⁶

Another consequence of the formation of the Chaebol is that they prevented steady development of small and medium-sized industries because Chaebol monopolised all the financial credits. The vulnerability of small and medium-sized industry has been considered to

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.35.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.36.

be the weakest link in industrial structure of Korean economy.

Because of the exclusive privilege of the Chaebol which had been guaranteed by Park's regime, Korean people came to have negative views on the Chaebol and its behaviours. In this context, the capitalist system itself as a whole was regarded as a negative system for the populace classes. In a view point of the public, the appearance of the Chaebol was an predictable result of capitalistic development drive. As a matter of fact, being placed under the protection of Park's regime, the Chaebol attempted to play a role of vanguard in Korea's state-led capitalism.

3.3. The Limits of Korean State-led Capitalism

3.3.1. The Exclusion of the Agrarian Sector and Labour Class

During the development period, the agrarian sector was particularly retarded in comparison with other sectors due to the excessive concentration of investment in the manufacturing sector and HCI programme. The lower-price system of grains designed to curb inflation caused a serious rural exodus to the urban areas, which brought about massive urbanisation and increasing unemployment.

Although Park introduced a movement in the agrarian sector aimed at promoting agrarian productivity and controlling the rural population - the 'New Village Movement' (*Sae Maeul Woondong*), - the disparity between the agrarian sector and the manufacturing / HCI sector widened enormously.

Table 1Table 5.11. The Status of the Agrarian Sector (%)

	1965	1975	1980
Percentage of Arable Surface	22.9	22.7	22.2
Planted Area / Arable Surface	158.0	-	125.0
Percentage of Farming Population	55.1	38.2	28.4
Gross Product of Agrarian Sector / GNP	37.6	24.9	15.1
Family Income of Agrarian Sector / Manufacturing Sector	99.7	67.1	64.0

Source: Byung Dong Lee, "Park Chung Hee and New Village Movement," in *Dong-A Ilbo Sa*, op.cit., p.368.

This kind of sectoral inequality undermined Park's strong drive for economic development by focusing on the manufacturing and HCI sectors. A gradual increase in dissatisfaction in the agrarian sector and amongst the labour force, which were alienated from the dominant coalition of the government and the Chaebol, became a great menace to Park's regime in the late 1970s.

Another factor which undermined the success of Park's state-led capitalism was the exclusion of labour. The state-led capitalist strategy for economic development leads inevitably to problems of increased inequality and a deepening dependency on the world capitalist system.⁴³⁷ In this context, the exclusion of the labour class from the distribution of the achievements of the rapid economic development came to be extremely problematic, and the ordinary people became more and more dissatisfied with such explicit inequality.

The tripartite relationship of 'state - capital - labour' under Park's regime could be characterised as 'inclusion of capital and exclusion of labour'. This explicit pro-con attitude is typical of Park's state-led capitalism. According to Kohli, Park's state-led capitalist model comprised three factors, as follows: i) a strong state which was able to control and manipulate the whole society, ii) a dominant coalition of state - capital - army, iii) the systematic mechanism of continuous suppression and exclusion of farmers and labourers.⁴³⁸

In order to achieve rapid economic development, the state intentionally excluded and suppressed the labour class. The demands of labourers for the enhancement of the welfare system and for the construction of a social security network for the poor was refused under the slogan of 'Growth First'. While the bottom 40% of the population occupied 18% of GNP, top 20% of the population in Korea possessed 45% of GNP in 1978.⁴³⁹ Even though this statistic illustrates the fact that the distribution of Korean wealth was relatively better than in other developing countries in the Third World, inequality prevailed throughout the class structure in Korea.⁴⁴⁰

The culmination of inequality when it comes to income distribution was the period of

⁴³⁷ Helio Jaguaribe, *Economic and Political Development: a Theoretical Approach and a Brazilian Case Study* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968) pp.190-191. quoted in Y.M.Kim, *op.cit.*, p.132.

⁴³⁸ Atul Kohli, "Where Do High-Growth Political Economies Come From? - The Japanese Lineage of Korea's Developmental State," *World Development*, Vol.22, No.9 (September, 1994) pp.1269-1270.

⁴³⁹ D.C. Rao, "Economic Growth and Equity in the Republic of Korea," *World Development*, Vol.6, No.3, (1978) p.108.

⁴⁴⁰ Irma Adelman and Roinson Sherman, *Income Distribution Policy in Developing Countries: A Case Study of Korea* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978), quoted in Y.M.Kim, *op.cit.*, p.134.

the HCI drive.⁴⁴¹ On every occasion when there was a conflict between labour and capital, the state intervened and stood on the side of capital. The state used the slogans 'economic development' and 'national security' as excuses for rejecting the demands of the workers. In addition, through the retrogressive revision of the Labour Law, all the activities of trade unions were illegalised in 1972 under the Yushin Constitution.⁴⁴²

Park's suppressive policy brought about a split in the country. This dichotomy between 'dominant coalition of state, army, and Chaebol' and 'protest coalition of labourer, farmer and some anti-government intellectuals' undermined the security network of Park's regime. A crisis developed in the political situation, and it proved to be irrevocable.

3.3.2. Corruption in the Business-Government Nexus (Chungkyung yuchak)

Park's strategy was to exclude the classes of ordinary people in order to afford crucial preference to a small number of enterprises. The special favours given to those enterprises were exemption from taxation, special loans, and the guarantee of a monopoly in a specific area. The freeze on private debt in 1972 was the biggest favour granted to Chaebols, and the measure of 29th of May 1973 established sub-financial institutions for the encouragement of financial support to big businesses. Between 1972 and 1979, 60% of policy-loans and more than half of general bank loans were injected into the one hundred business groups. By the end of the 1970s, the entire Korean economy was dominated by the few largest Chaebols.⁴⁴³ The big five Chaebols' growth rate was up to 30.1% at its highest point during the latter half of Park's regime, while the national economic growth rate was only 9.9%.⁴⁴⁴ And the total production of the top fifty Chaebols on a value-added basis accounted for 43% of GDP in 1978.⁴⁴⁵

After the launch of the ambitious HCI project in 1972, Park reinforced his pro-Chaebol strategy by granting a broader range of privileges, such as heavily subsidised credit, guaranteed shares in the domestic market, and relaxed foreign exchange regulations, which caused a strengthening of the 'business-government nexus'. As a result of the existence of this nexus between business (Chaebol) and government, most Chaebols became characterised as 'political capitalist'.⁴⁴⁶ Chaebols had to provide bureaucrats and politicians with regular black bribes in

⁴⁴¹ D.C. Rao, *op.cit.*, p.309.

⁴⁴² Yoon Hwan Kim, "Labour Problems during Industrialisation, and the Labour Movement," *Rediscovering Korean Society* (Seoul: Han Wool Chulpan Sa, 1985) pp.361-366.

⁴⁴³ S. Haggard and C.I. Moon, *op.cit.*, pp.79-80.

⁴⁴⁴ Ho Jin Kim, "Leadership and Ruling Strategy of Chung Hee Park," in Dong-A Ilbo Sa, *op.cit.*, p.33.

⁴⁴⁵ *Han Gook Ilbo*, 29th September, 1981, quoted in Haegun Koo, *op.cit.*, p.80.

⁴⁴⁶ Chan Il Park, "The Characteristics of Economic Aid from The U.S. and Its Consequences," Yoon Hwan Kim,

order to ensure that their benefits and privileges from the authorities continued to be forthcoming.

At the same time, this nexus became an obstacle to the democratisation of Korean politics, it created a lowering in the overall competitiveness of the business sector in the Korean economy in the long run, by inhibiting free competition, in the absence of any state intervention. It may be said that these negative effects of the business-government nexus were an unavoidable feature of Park's state-led capitalism, since he concentrated solely on the speed and visible outputs of economic development.

4. Conclusion

This chapter explored economic policies of both regimes in terms of attitude of economic strategy – Nasser's state capitalism and Park's state-led capitalism. In developing countries, the active role of state is essential to drive the economic strategy. State plays a key role of supervising and leading the development programmes. Although, in Nasser and Park's regimes, state functioned as the most important role of a main actor in various administering programmes, the ways of state's intervention were quite different from each other.

Nasser's state capitalism was similar to socialist economic strategy. He emphasised the egalitarian distribution and dissolution of oligarchic bourgeoisie at the initial stage of his regime. In a concrete way, his affiliations with populace classes were in conjunction with his regime characteristics - 'people-inclusionary'. As the result of inefficiency of excessive expanding public sectors and radical nationalisation, the fundamentals of Egyptian economy became weakening. In addition to that, the problems of tensions between accumulation and distribution, deepening economic dependence on outer powers brought about structural change in the opposite direction by Sadat's open-door economy.

Park's economic drive may be described as state-led capitalism. With the tool of strong hierarchical tradition, state dominated other sectors as big brother. Contrary to Nasser's state capitalism, Park's state-led capitalism did not attempt introduce socialist measure when it came to state's role in economic development. Instead of nationalisation or expanding public sectors, Park encouraged small clusters of private companies to act advance guard of Park's economic development programme. Park's economic drive excluded the populace classes such as peasant and workers who belonged to lower-middle classes. Although Park was able to achieve a remarkable economic development by means of the planning scheme of four stages of five-year-economic-development-plan, his abnormal favouritism to a small number of conglomerates made a big trouble due to lack of the competitiveness of big companies. Consequently, overdeveloped conglomerates became one of the critical reasons for financial crisis of Korean Economy in 1997 in the long run. Park's economic drive could be described as 'people-exclusionary' characteristics in terms of his attitude towards the populace classes in the course of economic development.

VI. CONCLUSION:

COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT

We have so far examined two authoritarian regimes in terms of their ideological orientations, the output of their economic policies, and on the basis of leadership characteristics which were determined by the issue of legitimacy. The examination has rendered several theoretical and empirical implications. By way of concluding this study, the researcher will present a comparative assessment of the performance of both regimes - that of Gamal Abdul Nasser in Egypt and that of Chung Hee Park in South Korea.

1. Comparative Assessment

1.1. Similarities

There are several similarities between Nasser's and Park's regimes. Amongst those similarities, four aspects are particularly worthy of note. First of all, both countries had experience of being ruled by a colonial power. Thus, Egypt and Korea had resentment towards their colonial countries - Britain and Japan respectively. In this context, the military regimes established by Nasser and Park had to clarify both their attitude toward the colonial power and their evaluation of the colonial period. For those who had experienced humiliation of foreign intervention, the attitude of new regimes towards colonialism would be critical issue.

Secondly, both regimes existed on the basis of military neo-professionalism, one of the prominent characteristics of military intervention in the Third World, as Alfred Stepan points out. The overdeveloped military sectors of both regimes, trained by former colonial military organisation, overruled other sectors. After the War in Korea, owing to an ambitious military training programme for Korean Army officers, the most talented men of ability throughout the country flocked to the army. This symptom of preponderance in vocational preference was the main cause of the development of neo-professionalism. In Egypt as well, the British military training system was well organised at that time, and military officers who were trained in the

modernised educational system were superior to any other vocational groups.

Thirdly, both leaders maintained their regimes' security in a non-democratic way through the personalisation of power, although their characters were very different from each other. They transformed their regime's outward appearance into that of a civilian government, even though their power bases still lay in the military sector. With this transformation, both leaders attempted to attain exclusive ultimate power in Egypt and South Korea.

Lastly, despite the nine year gap between the appearances of the two regimes, the international Cold War situation remained the same - one of unlimited competition between the East and West. In these circumstances, the political situations of Third World countries were heavily influenced by the strategy of the two opposing blocs. Thus, examining the reactions of regimes in developing countries to the Cold War system could be an effective way of figuration of determining the characteristics of these regimes.

1.2. The Legitimacy Issue and Its Consequences

The most outstanding difference between the regimes of Nasser and Park lies in the question of legitimacy. Generally speaking, when a leader came to power, his or her first concern was how to acquire legitimacy for his regime, in order to secure its stability. In order to deal with the matter of legitimacy, three dimensions are examined.

The first dimension to be considered is the leader's personal background. It is quite simple. A person with a good record could easily acquire legitimacy. By contrast, if a person's background were not good enough for him to be accepted as leader of a certain community by the people, or if he had some stains on his career, legitimacy would be a problem. Particularly, in newly emerging countries in the Third World which had experienced a colonial period, the leader's vocational background during the period of colonialism, and his or her attitude towards the colonial power, could be considered to be crucial factors in determining whether or not he or she could gain the support of a people who had anti-colonial sentiments.

From this point of view, Nasser had no particular problems in gaining the support of the people. He had joined student movements to protest against British domination in Egypt and had even organised a demonstration to resist the interventions of imperialism. The Egyptian people acknowledged Nasser as their legitimate leader without hesitation, despite his military coup.

Park's case was totally different. There were obvious reasons for his lack of legitimacy in his vocational background. The first reason was his role as a Japanese military officer in repressing the liberation movement for Korea's independence, and the second stain on his career was his participation in a secret communist movement while in the Korean army. It was ironic that Park subsequently banned all communist movements and purged any anti-regime movements on charges of involvement in communism.

Secondly, the process of power attainment has a crucial role to play in affecting legitimacy. Generally, if a military regime wants to make sure of legitimacy, the regime which they overthrew would have to be regarded as a malignant regime, and the new military leadership must persuade the people to believe that the *ancien regime* was a vicious one with tools of political propaganda. Although the main motivation behind the military coup may have been greed for power, the new leader should rationalise his military intervention by exposing the evil character of the former regime. For Nasser, this task was relatively easy. Since King Farouk's incompetence in dealing with foreign influences and domestic depravity had been obvious to his people, Nasser's military coup, which was justified by criticising King Farouk for his subservience to foreign power, his meanness, corruption of political core and poor performance in the Palestine War, was seen as no bad thing.

Park's situation was quite different. The Second Republic of Korea, which Park overthrew, was the first democratic government in the entire history of the Korean Peninsula. This republic was established with the sacrifice of students' lives in April 1960. During the transition period from the presidential system to the parliamentary system, there were some chaotic incidents due to the lack of any charismatic central power, such as President Rhee. In the context of constant threats from North Korea, military officers created the sense of an impending security crisis. Under these circumstances, Park's coup was carried out and he seized power in Korea. Although this justification seemed to be understood by the ordinary people in Korea, it was not accepted by students and intellectuals, who had dedicated themselves to the establishment of the Korea's first democratic government. Since Nasser did not suffer from a lack of legitimacy in the power attainment process, he was able to obtain sufficient autonomy to administer the country. Park, however, could not succeed in removing the stains of 'military leader who overthrew the genuine democracy', thus he was forced to focus on economic performance alone for the purpose of securing his regime's stability.

The last dimension of the issue of legitimacy concerns the 'regime's performance'. As mentioned above, Nasser was free of legitimacy problems. With the autonomy gained on the basis of sufficient legitimacy, he was able to concentrate on several political issues without serious hindrances. He attempted to inculcate the spirit of Arab unity in the Arab people, and

achieved the concrete realisation of his desire, the U.A.R., despite its short life. Above all things, the most outstanding feature of Nasser's political performance was his non-alignment stance in the arena of international politics. Nasser's independence of action may be seen to be closely linked with his solid legitimacy. In contrast, politically, Park did not possess any autonomy. Because of his lack of legitimacy, he had to adopt repressive methods of administration in domestic affairs. In addition to this, in the circumstances of the severe Cold War, as a buffer at the forefront of the bi-polar conflict, Park's regime had no option but to rely totally on the U.S.'s financial and military assistance. Thus, there was no room for political autonomy in relation to foreign powers. In this context, Park had to concentrate on economic performance and its visible outputs. His strict adherence to economic performance brought about dramatically rapid economic development unparalleled anywhere else in the world at that time. Through this economic development, Park tried to make up for the weakness of his legitimacy.

1.3. Leadership Characteristics

1.3.1. Personal Traits of Highly Personalised Leadership

Analysing characteristics of certain leadership may be carried out in two dimensions - the factor of leader's personal traits and surrounding situational factor. Although it is obvious that both dimensions of traits and situation should be dealt with simultaneously in order to execute an accurate analysis, sometimes the traits of approach of leadership analysis would be regarded as the more relevant factor to exemplify a leadership's characteristics than the situational approach when it comes to leadership analysis of the newly emerging countries. In newly emerging countries, the political factor of personal leader could be considered to be the most influential variable due to the low level of political institutionalisation and highly personalised political system.

In this context, classification of leader's traits can be useful for exemplification of Nasser and Park's leadership. For this classification of Nasser and Park's traits, essential factor to consider is the matter of legitimacy. As Raymond Grew points out in Chapter III, the matter of legitimacy may be positioned at the core when it comes to a regime's confrontation with various crises - identity, participation, penetration and distribution. In other words, a regime's

failure to secure legitimacy could quite possibly cause the instability and even collapsing of regime. Leaders in developing countries who recognise the importance of legitimacy tend to react to the legitimacy matter seriously. In this context, both leaders' way how to tackle the legitimacy issue may be determinant factor of forming the traits of their leadership.

Amongst many important traits that leaderships expose, five articulated traits, classified by Peter Northouse, may be useful; intelligence, self-confidence, determination, integrity and sociability. While Nasser had no serious weak points in those traits, Park had difficulties in his self-confidence, integrity and sociability out of five representative traits of leadership. This weakness in several major traits of Park was caused by his lack of legitimacy which was linked with his regimes' character – exclusive and introvert.

1.3.2. Idiosyncrasies of Nasser's and Park's Leadership

In addition to the personal traits of respective leaders as mentioned above, there are noticeable differences in leadership's idiosyncrasies. By using the personality model of political leaders proposed by Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, three types of idiosyncrasies of leadership could be applied to Nasser and Park's leadership. First type of idiosyncrasy classification is, with the regard of the adherence to leader's own ideology and belief, personality of 'doctrinaire / opportunist'. Nasser adhered to his own ideological belief – secularistic Arab nationalism and socialism. In contrast, Park basically had the attitude of opportunism which is demonstrated by inconsistency in between his ideological attitude and his performance after seizing power.

Secondly, in terms of classification of 'idealist / realist' which is determined by the feasibility of realisation, Nasser may be categorised as an idealist leader who persisted in attempting to realise his ideal of Arab cause for the purpose of attaining regional hegemony. On the contrary, Park thoroughly held fast to his principle of maximising the national interests. Thus, he demonstrated highly calculated attitude in his performance and tended to adhere to materialistic results.

The third classification of idiosyncrasies is 'fighter or gambler / planner or prudent'. This classification relates to outward style how a leader puts into practice concrete policies. Nasser was a good example of fighter style leadership. Whenever he faced crucial moment, he played high stakes despite the existence of risks. In contrast, Park's leadership style was that of a typical planner. His main consideration at every stage of policy enforcement was the matter of profit or loss. He performed excessively elaborate considerations and predictions in every single

process of policy making procedure.

1.3.3. Role Orientations

Another feature of leadership characteristics of Nasser's and Park's regime is their role orientation, which refers to the central emphasis leaders impose when they put into practice their own policies. This classification of role orientation influences the formation of regime's characteristics directly and distinguishes between Nasser's leadership and that of Park.

With regard to classification of leadership by role orientation, Nasser's leadership may be categorised as popularity-oriented (Follower-centred) leadership which was in collaboration with the people's desire. His regime's performance was determined by his aim to satisfy the desire of populace level and to govern in their interests. Popularity-oriented feature of Nasser's leadership made his government populist regime.

On the other hand, Park's leadership appeared task-oriented feature as leadership of entrepreneur. He disregarded people's demand and only sought his own desire of profitable government performance. He suspended any progressive measure for building the welfare system for the lower-middle classes. Instead, all the government's actions were projected into the materialistic productiveness. Park constantly examined detailed programmes of economic development and supervised the entire administering procedure of his government as if he was a C.E.O. of private company.

1.4. Ideology: Extrovert Features vs. Introvert Features

Ideology is the crucial factor for integration. In Third World countries, ideology is particularly important because most non-democratic regimes tend to mobilise the people by the leader's arbitrary intentions, which can be set out in the form of an ideology. With regard to Nasser and Park, their ideological attitudes were strikingly in contrast to each other.

Nasser adopted nationalism and socialism as the main ideologies for his regime. By means of a strict adherence to these ideologies, Nasser tried to obtain regional hegemony, and he actually came to the forefront of Middle Eastern politics as the most prominent leader of the

Arabs and as an important figure in international politics as well. In contrast, Park focused exclusively on internal integration and domestic development by means of his own particular brand of nationalism, which justified the oppressive nature of his regime under the pretext of 'rapid economic development to overcome prevailing destitution'. He also emphasised anti-communism with the rhetoric of 'threats from the communist North Korea'. This rhetoric of hard-line anti-communism was devised under the circumstances of mutual hatred between North and South in order to mobilise the people and suppress any protest against the regime.

1.4.1. Nationalism: Nasser's Pursuit of Regional Hegemony vs. Park's Pursuit of Economic Development

Even though Nasser and Park both adopted 'nationalism' as their main ideology, the outcomes of nationalism under the two regimes were remarkably different. Nasser's nationalism was based on the premise of regional integration - Arab unification, with a crucial role being played by the nucleus state, Egypt. Thus, Nasser's nationalism supported his implicit intention to become an Arab leader. Park's brand of nationalism was a type of economic nationalism, which drove the people to focus solely on economic development under the slogan of a 'the better life'. Various political movements for democracy were repressed.

Nasser's Arab nationalism emphasised the major role of Egypt in the movement towards Arab unification. His intention behind the scenes seemed to be to acquire hegemony in the region by means of the rhetoric of Arab unification. As a matter of fact, the direct practical beneficiaries of Arab unification would be Nasser's regime and the Egyptian people. Consequently, Nasser's ambitious attempt to establish the U.A.R. was regarded as an attempt to expand his own and Egyptian influence in the Arab world.

Nasser tried to expand his influence in the region by espousing the Arab cause, and to attain political autonomy as a prominent leader. On the other hand, Park's economic nationalism was devised as a survival strategy under the Cold War system and as a way of providing his regime with some stability. Thus, Park concentrated his energies on the issue of economic development and improvement of productivity. His rhetoric for the economic drive - 'the better life' - remained the main discourse over the twenty years of his regime. He utilised nationalism as the main force behind the achievement of rapid economic development.

1.4.2. Nasser's Arab Socialism vs. Park's Anti-communism

Nasser's socialism differed from scientific socialism in the strict sense of the term. He was not a genuine socialist. Immediately after coming to power, he eradicated the communist movements in order to get rid of the greatest potential threat to this regime. More than that, historical materialism, which is the socialist fundamental premise of atheism, was contradictory to the theistic principle of Islam. In this context, Nasser highlighted the peculiarity of his socialism with its connotations of 'theistic socialism or divine socialism'. In addition to this, he tried to combine the general concept of socialism with the specific term 'Arab'. By using a universal ideological structure, he intended to justify his specific situation and to promote the generality of his regime's public policy. Park's representative rhetoric 'Koreanised democracy' was along the same lines.

The explicit pledge of Arab socialism was 'justice and equality in distribution which was ordered by Allah'. Having experienced Western colonialism, the Egyptian people, who had also suffered from the mentality of social deprivation, seemed to agree with the principles of Lenin's theory of 'imperialism'. In addition to a strong anti-imperialist mentality, the passion for genuine egalitarianism amongst the poor in Egypt played a key role in producing for Nasser's socialism.

It is true that Arab socialism was an alternative ideological framework which came to the forefront due to the failure of Nasser's nationalist drive. After the collapse of the U.A.R., as the conflict between Egypt and the West escalated, Nasser proposed this type of ideology - Arab socialism - for the purpose of breaking the deadlock. However, after Nasser proclaimed positive neutralism as his main strategy of foreign policy, influenced by the Bandung conference, it appeared that he intended to adopt a socialist line in collaboration with the Soviet bloc. Despite Egypt's professing itself to be a non-aligned state, Nasser maintained an amicable affiliation with the Eastern bloc. With regard to domestic implications, socialism was used as the method of solidifying the domestic coalition. The A.S.U., the forefront organisation of Arab socialism, utilised the ideology of socialism as its apparatus of domestic integration.

Nasser defined Arab socialism as the final stage in the historical development process. In the same way that the ideal communist society was considered to be the perfect form of society from a Marxist point of view, Nasser asserted that Allah's divine will would be realised by the establishment of Arab socialism in the Middle East and North Africa. In addition to the aim of domestic stability, Nasser promoted this idea with the aim of solidifying his relationship with the Soviet bloc.

The salient features of Nasser's Arab socialism could therefore be summarised as follows: First, it appeared in the context of rapid changes in the political situation. The vulnerability of Arab nationalism was revealed when the U.A.R. collapsed, which meant that

the ideological mainstay for the integration of the nation disappeared. After a series of international incidents such as intervention in the Yemen War, the collapse of Ben Bellah regime, and conflict with the U.S., Nasser started to incline towards socialism. In other words, Nasser's socialism could be described as a 'situation forced' ideology. Secondly, the transition to socialism gave rise to Nasser's economic strategy: state capitalism. From this moment on, the dissolution of the monopolised rights of the bourgeoisie and private capital began. Thirdly, since the meaning of the term 'Arab socialism' was not elaborated, it was difficult to understand its real implications. Thus, practically, the concrete strategy of Arab socialism was not clear. It was perceived as merely a combination of dogmatic socialism and conservative nationalism, like a dialectical synthesis. Arab socialism is seen as striking 'a virtuous balance' thereby creating a "Third type of Society". In short, the main aim of Nasser's Arab socialism was to ensure an adequate level of autonomy in international politics and to maintain the mobilisation system in the domestic arena.

Park's extreme anti-communist line came to the fore with both internal and external aims. In domestic affairs, Park's anti-communism resembled the McCarthyism which swept America in the 1960s. Anti-communism played a role in maintaining the regime's security by manipulating the threat of potential political enemies. Even demands for worker's rights were turned into communist movements by the regime, and any criticism of his regime's performance was regarded as a communist conspiracy. Apart from these negative characteristics, anti-communism was an effective device for controlling and mobilising the people in the economic development drive.

Externally, Park's anti-communism was an important factor behind the military coalition with America. The first concern of the U.S. in East Asia was the Soviet intention to expand its influence at the front line of the Cold War, East Asia. The R.O.K.-U.S. Combined Forces Command (C.F.C.), headed by American generals, interfered in Korean politics. It appeared more like an invigilator. In this context, in order to ensure full support from the U.S., Park had to satisfy America that his regime adhered closely to hard-line anti-communism as a bulwark of the forefront of the Cold War. However, during the last stages of Park's regime, Park clashed with the Carter administration, because President Carter announced the withdrawal of the U.S. army from Korea. From that moment on, Park's anti-communism had to face a new era of self-reliance in terms of national defence.

1.5. Economy

1.5.1. The State Capitalism of Nasser: Inclusionary Features

Nasser's economic drive was expressed as state capitalism, which was similar to the socialist economic strategy. He expanded the public sector and tried to destroy the vested rights with the tools of state capitalism. Although in the initial stages of the regime, there were some indications of a capitalist development strategy, Nasser eventually decided to eradicate the oligarchic power groups and comprador capitalists who supported the old regime and derived benefits from foreign imperialism.

Through the progressive policies of nationalisation and expanding the public sector, Nasser tried to establish a people-centred welfare system. However, there were certain limitations that he was unable to overcome. Egypt's current economic problems stem largely from the legacy of state capitalism, instituted by President Nasser in the 1960s. The state-owned industries, especially in manufacturing, suffer from gross inefficiency, over-manning and very low productivity and profitability. The loss-making state-owned firms are a serious drain on the treasury. Consequently, the overall economic situation has become depressed. Nasser's foreign policy - non-alignment of positive neutralism – was effective in giving him autonomy in international politics, however, in terms of economic efficacy, his foreign policy did not help Egypt to push forward the economic development programme. It was a policy that was effective politically, but not economically.

The typical limitations of classic socialism - problems of accumulation and distribution - affected the foundation of the regime. Ultimately, although Nasser may be considered to have been a successful leader who was able to attain political autonomy and legitimacy, his failure in economic development did a great damage to his regime.

1.5.3. The State-led Capitalism of Park: Exclusionary Features

In terms of the state's intervention in the economy, both regimes were far from the classical meaning of capitalism. Although the economic strategy of both regimes depended on the exclusive role of the state, Park's economic strategy was strikingly different from Nasser's, which emphasised the socialist characteristics of expanding the public sector and nationalisation as the pre-stage of genuine socialism.

As a matter of fact, Park's economic development drive was determined by the environment of international politics. Park did not have any autonomy to adopt his own economic policy without consideration of the U.S.'s strategic initiative in East Asia. In this context, there was no room to accommodate any features of a socialist character in South Korea.

In this context, Park's regime, which had been troubled with the problem of legitimacy, had to concentrate on economic development under the slogan of 'national development and economic growth for the better life', in the hope that this would satisfy the people and thus provide Park's regime with some legitimacy. A large introduction of foreign capital was necessary for economic development. With this tool of foreign capital, Park's regime had absolute authority to control the private sector. Park utilised private companies as the vanguard of economic development, while himself holding full power over the private sector behind the scenes. This was state-led capitalism.

Park's drive for rapid economic growth may be divided into three periods: import substitute industrialisation at the early stage - export oriented industrialisation at the middle period - heavy & chemical industrialisation at the final stage. During the entire period, no direct nationalisation or expansion of public sector took place. Instead, from behind the scenes, the state dominated the private sector with the tool of foreign capital, and by the taxation system initiated by the E.P.B. During this process, conglomerates which had been exclusively supported by the government in order to lead economic development appeared. In the end, since these conglomerates had grown up with the help of exceptional favours from the government, the private sector had to be absolutely subservient to the regime, for example providing black money and campaign funds, in order to secure their vested rights.

Consequently, with the exception of a small number of conglomerates, medium and small-sized enterprises were not able to be competitive. Overdeveloped conglomerates were not troubled by the principles of free competition. Many of these conglomerates became insolvent in 1997, which caused a financial crisis in Korea.

2. Final Words

The present situation in Egypt is quite different from that in South Korea. With regard to economic development, South Korea has been running ahead of Egypt. The eighteen years' duration of Nasser's and Park's regimes could be considered to be critical in deciding the destiny of the two countries in modern history. Until Nasser appeared and came to power in Egypt, the Farouk monarchy had been a puppet regime operated by British colonialism. In South Korea, the trauma caused by the Korean War prevailed throughout the country in the 1950s. In addition, due to the after-effects of the student revolution in 1960, South Korea was in an absolutely chaotic situation when Park came to power. Therefore, the two regimes of Nasser and Park could be regarded as the key variables in shaping the modern states of Egypt and South Korea.

At the time when Nasser and Park seized power, the potential for economic development was much higher in Egypt than in South Korea, which had been burnt to the ground during the war. Park's economic achievements are therefore worthy of close attention. Over the eighteen years of his rule, GDP increased almost 27 times, and the annual average economic growth rate was 9.1%. The foundations for becoming one of the ten greatest trading countries in the world were established under Park's regime. His economic development strategy - state-led capitalism - has also been continued by his successors, President Doo Whan Chun, Tae Woo Roh, Young Sam Kim and Dae Jung Kim.

Egypt possessed far more favourable conditions for development, for example, large holdings of foreign currency and a secure and autonomous state. Despite these advantages, however, Nasser's economic development strategy was unsuccessful. In this context, Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat discontinued Nasser's development strategy and adopted an open-door policy, despite having adhered to strict socialism when he was a military officer. Since then, the present President of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, has continued to put into practice Sadat's economic policy.

In this dissertation, the distinctive differences of the performance of each regime have been looked upon as important, despite the fact that both leaders had similar positions and backgrounds, used neo-professional military intervention in praetorian political situations, and depended upon the process of the personalisation of power. As a result of the differences in their leadership characteristics, the outcomes of their performance were remarkably different.

With a strong level of state autonomy in domestic and international politics, Nasser put

into practice a populist economic strategy and foreign policy. He attempted to acquire hegemony in the Arab region and to become a prominent leader in that area. Although, he received massive support from the populace and main discourse of Arab initiative, concrete improvements in the people's quality of life and in economic conditions seemed to be relatively neglected.

The sole priority of Park's regime was economic growth. He had begun with a serious lack of legitimacy. It seems that he made up his mind to focus solely on improvements in material in order to legitimate his regime. By means of the Korea-Japan Talks for the normalisation of diplomatic relations and the Korea-U.S. security treaty, Park obtained capital and military support from Japan and the U.S. despite furious protests by the people. By depending on the U.S. and Japan's support, he gave up state autonomy for the sake of domestic economic development.

It is not productive to attempt to mark which regime was the better. In terms of building the self respect of the nation and securing diplomatic autonomy in international politics, it may be said that Nasser was superior to Park. Nasser brought emotional satisfaction to the Egyptian and Arab peoples by struggling against the impregnable colonial powers. He was regarded as the man who eradicated the prevailing defeatism in the Middle East, like a reincarnated Saladin in 20th century. In contrast, in terms of the improvement of people's quality of life, Park was more successful than Nasser. Despite his shameful dependence on foreign powers, Park was constantly driving his economic strategy - dependent developmentalism. It may be said that Park bartered national self-respect for economic development and improvements in the material life of the people.

In this dissertation, several issues have been explored. The legitimacy issue and its effect on leadership characteristics, ideology formation and its domestic applications, and remarkable differences in the economic policies of both regimes have been the subjects of this dissertation. The main focus has been on individual leadership and its responses to different situations. For a more comprehensive examination, features of the international political and economic environment should also be considered as main variables of the research, in addition to personal leadership and its consequences. These will be the subject of future research into military authoritarianism.

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